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The works of the Rev. P.
Doddridge

THE

Robert Ralston

WORKS

OF THE

REV. P. DODDRIDGE, D. D.

VOLUME IV.

CONTAINING,

I. LIFE OF COLONEL GARDINER.
II. A FRIENDLY LETTER TO THE PRIVATE SOLDIERS IN THE BATTLE OF CULLODEN.
III. A DISSERTATION ON SIR I. NEWTON'S CHRONOLOGY OF THE EVANGELISTS.
IV. A DISSERTATION ON THE INSPIRATION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.
V. FREE THOUGHTS ON THE MEANS OF REVIVING THE DISSENTING INTEREST.
VI. PRINCIPLES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION IN PLAIN AND EASY VERSE.
VII. LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THE REV. THOMAS STEFFE.
VIII. A COURSE OF LECTURES ON PNEUMATOLOGY, ETHICS AND DIVINITY.

LEEDS:

PRINTED BY EDWARD BAINES,

FOR THE EDITORS; CONDER, BUCKLERSBURY; BUTTON, PATERNOSTER-ROW; WILLIAMS, STATIONERS'-COURT; BAYNES, PATERNOSTER-ROW; OGLE, GREAT-TURN-STILE; NUNN, QUEEN-STREET; AND JONES, PATERNOSTER-ROW, LONDON; AND FOR BAINES, AND BINNS, LEEDS; COLBERT, DUBLIN; WILSON AND SPENCE, YORK; OGLE AND AIKMAN, EDINBURGH; M. OGLE, GLASGOW; CROOKES, ROTHERHAM; AND ABEL, NORTHAMPTON.

1803.

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SOME

REMARKABLE PASSAGES

IN

THE LIFE

OF THE HONOURABLE

COL. JAMES GARDINER,

WHO WAS SLAIN AT

THE BATTLE OF PRESTON PANS,

SEPTEMBER 21, 1745.

WITH

AN APPENDIX,

RELATING TO THE

ANCIENT FAMILY OF THE MUNROES OF FOWLIS.

——————————— Justior alter
Nec pietate fuit, nec bello major et armis. ——— Virg.

TO DAVID GARDINER, Esq.

CORNET IN SIR JOHN COPE'S REGIMENT OF DRAGOONS.

DEAR SIR,

WHILE my heart is following you, with a truly paternal solicitude, through all the dangers of military life, in which you are thus early engaged, anxious for your safety amidst the instruments of death, and the far more dangerous allurements of vice, I feel a peculiar pleasure in being able, at length, though after such long delays, to put into your hands the memoirs with which I now present you. They contain many particulars, which would have been worthy of your attentive notice, had they related to a person of the most distant nation or age: But they will, I doubt not, command your peculiar regard, as they are sacred to the memory of that excellent man, from whom you had the honour to derive your birth, and by whose generous and affectionate care you have been laid under all the obligations which the best of fathers could confer on a most beloved son.

Here, Sir, you see a gentleman, who, with all the advantages of a liberal and religious education, added to every natural accomplishment that could render him most agreeable, entered, before he had attained the stature of a man, on those arduous and generous services to which you are devoted, and behaved in them with a gallantry and courage, which will always give a splendour to his name among the British soldiery, and render him an example to all officers of his rank. But, alas! amidst all the intrepidity of the martial hero, you see him vanquished by the blandishments of pleasure, and, in chase of it, plunging himself into follies and vices, for which no want of education or genius could have been a sufficient excuse. You behold him urging the ignoble and fatal pursuit, unmoved by the terrors which death was continually darting around him, and the most signal deliverances by which Providence again and again rescued him from those terrors, till at length he was reclaimed by an ever-memorable interposition of divine grace. Then you have the pleasure of seeing him become, in good earnest, a convert to Christianity, and, by speedy advances, growing up into one of its brightest ornaments; his mind continually filled with the great ideas which the gospel of our Redeemer suggests, and bringing the blessed influence of its sublime principles into every relation of military and civil, of public and domestic life. You trace him persevering in a steady and uniform course of goodness, through a long series of honourable and prosperous years, the delight of all that were so happy as to know him, and, in his sphere, the most faithful guardian of his country; till at last, worn out with honourable labours, and broken with infirmities which they had hastened upon him before the time, you see him forgetting them at once, at the call of duty and providence; with all the generous ardour of his most vigorous days rushing on the enemies of religion and liberty, sustaining their shock with the most deliberate fortitude, when deserted by those that should have supported him, and cheerfully sacrificing the little remains of a mortal life in the triumphant views of a glorious immortality.

This, Sir, is the noble object I present to your view; and you will, I hope, fix your eye continually upon it, and will never allow yourself for one day to forget, that this illustrious man is Colonel Gardiner, your ever honoured father; who, having approved his *fidelity to the death*, and received a

crown of life, seems, as it were, by what you here read, to be calling out to you from amidst *the cloud of witnesses* with which you are surrounded, and urging you, by every generous, tender, filial sentiment, to mark the footsteps of his christian race, and strenuously to maintain that combat, where the victory is, through divine grace, certain; and the prize, an eternal kingdom in the heavens.

The last number of the Appendix introduces a most worthy triumvirate of your father's friends, following him through the same heroic path, to an end like his; and with pleasure pouring forth their lives in blood, for the rescue and preservation of their dearer country. And I trust, the eloquence of their examples will be prevalent with many, to emulate the many virtues for which they were conspicuous.

My hopes, Sir, that all these powerful motives will especially have their full efficacy on you, are greatly encouraged by the certainty which I have of your being well acquainted with the evidence of Christianity in its full extent; a criminal ignorance of which, in the midst of great advantages for learning them, leaves so many of our young people a prey to deism, and so to vice and ruin, which generally bring up its rear. My life would be a continual burden to me, if I had not a consciousness in the sight of God, that during the years in which the important trust of your education was committed to my care, I had laid before you the proofs both of natural and revealed religion, in what I assuredly esteem to be, with regard to the judgment, if they are carefully examined, an irresistible light; and that I had endeavoured to attend them with those addresses which might be most likely to impress your heart. You have not, dear Sir, forgotten, and I am confident you can never entirely forget, the assiduity with which I have laboured to form your mind, not only to what might be ornamental to you in human life, but, above all, to a true taste of what is really excellent, and an early contempt of those vanities by which the generality of our youth, especially in your station, are debased, enervated, and undone. My private, as well as public addresses for this purpose, will, I know, be remembered by you, and the tears of tenderness with which they have so often been accompanied: And may they be so remembered, that they who are most tenderly concerned, may be comforted under the loss of such an inestimable friend as Colonel Gardiner, by seeing that his character, in all its most amiable and resplendent parts, lives in you; and that, how difficult soever it may be to act up to that height of expectation, with which the eyes of the world will be fixed on the son of such a father, you are, in the strength of divine grace, attempting it; at least are following him with generous emulation and with daily solicitude, that the steps may be less unequal!

May the Lord God of your father, and I will add, of both your pious and honourable parents, animate your heart more and more with such views and sentiments as these! May he guard your life amidst every scene of danger, to be a protection and blessing to those that are yet unborn; and may he give you, in some far distant period of time, to resign it by a gentler dissolution than the hero from whom you sprung; or, if unerring Wisdom appoint it otherwise, to end it with equal glory!

I am, dear Sir,
Your ever faithful,
Affectionate Friend, and
Obliged humble Servant,

P. DODDRIDGE.

Northampton, July 1, 1747.

SOME

REMARKABLE PASSAGES IN THE LIFE

OF THE

HON. COLONEL JAMES GARDINER.

§ 1. WHEN I promised the public some larger account of the life and character of this illustrious person than I could conveniently insert in my sermon on the sad occasion of his death, I was secure, that if Providence continued my capacity of writing, I should not wholly disappoint the expectation: For I was furnished with a variety of particulars, which appeared to me worthy of general notice, in consequence of that intimate friendship with which he had honoured me during the six last years of his life; a friendship which led him to open his heart to me in repeated conversations, with an unbounded confidence (as he then assured me, beyond what he had with any other man living), so far as religious experiences were concerned; and I had also received several very valuable letters from him, during the time of our absence from each other, which contained most genuine and edifying traces of his christian character. But I hoped farther to learn many valuable particulars from the papers of his own closet, and from his letters to other friends, as well as from what they more circumstantially knew concerning him: I therefore determined to delay the execution of my promise till I could enjoy these advantages, for performing it in the most satisfactory manner; nor have I, on the whole, reason to regret that determination.

§ 2. I shall not trouble the reader with all the causes which concurred to retard these expected assistances for almost a whole year; the chief of them were, the tedious languishing illness of his afflicted lady, through whose hands it was proper the papers should pass; together with the confusion into which the rebels had thrown them, when they ransacked his seat at Bankton, where most of them were deposited. But having now received such of them as have escaped their voracious hands, and could

conveniently be collected and transmitted, I set myself with the greatest pleasure to perform what I esteem not merely a tribute of gratitude to the memory of my invaluable friend (though never was the memory of any mortal man more precious and sacred to me), but out of duty to God, and to my fellow-creatures; for I have a most cheerful hope, that the narrative I am now to write, will, under the divine blessing, be a means of spreading, what of all things in the world every benevolent heart will most desire to spread, a warm and lively sense of religion.

§ 3. My own heart has been so much edified and animated by what I have read in the memoirs of persons who have been eminent for wisdom and piety, that I cannot but wish the treasure may be more and more increased: and I would hope the world may gather the like valuable fruits from the life I am now attempting; not only as it will contain very singular circumstances, which may excite a general curiosity, but as it comes attended with some other particular advantages.

§ 4. The reader is here to survey a character of such eminent and various goodness, as might demand veneration, and inspire him with a desire to imitate it too, had it appeared in the obscurest rank; but it will surely command some peculiar regard, when viewed in so elevated and important a station, especially as it shone, not in ecclesiastical, but *military* life, where the temptations are so many, and the prevalency of the contrary character so great, that it may seem no inconsiderable praise and felicity to be free from dissolute vice, and to retain what, in most other professions, might be esteemed only a mediocrity of virtue. It may surely, with the highest justice, be expected, that the title and bravery of Colonel Gardiner will invite many of our officers and soldiers, to whom his name has been long honourable and dear, to peruse this account of him with some peculiar attention: In consequence of which it may be a means of increasing the number and brightening the character of those who are already adorning their office, their country, and their religion; and of reclaiming those who will see rather what they ought to be, than what they are. On the whole, to the gentlemen of the sword, I would particularly offer these memoirs, as theirs by so distinguished a title; yet I am firmly persuaded there are none whose office is so sacred, or whose proficiency in the religious life is so advanced, but they may find something to demand their thankfulness, and to awaken their emulation.

§ 5. Colonel James Gardiner, of whom we write, was the

son of Captain Patrick Gardiner, of the family of Torwoodhead, by Mrs. Mary Hodge, of the family of Gladsmuir. The captain, who was master of a handsome estate, served many years in the army of King William and Queen Anne, and died abroad with the British forces in Germany, soon after the battle of Hochstedt, through the fatigues he underwent in the duties of that celebrated campaign. He had a company in the regiment of foot once commanded by Colonel Hodge, his valiant brother-in-law, who was slain at the head of that regiment (my memorial from Scotland says), at the battle of Steenkirk, which was fought in the year 1692.

§ 6. Mrs. Gardiner, our Colonel's mother, was a lady of a very valuable character, but it pleased God to exercise her with very uncommon trials; for she not only lost her husband and her brother in the service of their country, as before related, but also her eldest son, Mr. Robert Gardiner, on the day which completed the 16th year of his age, at the siege of Namur in 1695. But there is great reason to believe God blessed these various and heavy afflictions as the means of forming her to that eminent degree of piety, which will render her memory honourable as long as it continues.

§ 7. Her second son, the worthy person of whom I am now to give a more particular account, was born at Carriden in Linlithgowshire, on the 10th of January, A. D. 1687-8, the memorable year of that glorious revolution, which he justly esteemed among the happiest of all events; so that, when he was slain in the defence of those liberties, which God then, by so gracious a providence, rescued from utter destruction, i. e. on the 21st of September 1745, he was aged fifty-seven years, eight months, and eleven days.

§ 8. The annual return of his birth-day was observed by him, in the later and better years of his life, in a manner very different from what is commonly practised; for instead of making it a day of festivity, I am told, he rather distinguished it as a season of more than ordinary humiliation before God; both in commemoration of those mercies which he received in the first opening of life, and under an affectionate sense, as well as of his long alienation from the great author and support of his being, and of the many imperfections which he lamented in the best of his days and services.

§ 9. I have not met with many things remarkable concerning the early years of his life, only that his mother took care to instruct him with great tenderness and affection in the principles of true christianity. He was also trained up in human literature at the school at Linlithgow, where he made a very considerable

progress in the languages. I remember to have heard him quote some passages of the latin classics very pertinently; though his employment in life, and the various turns which his mind took under different impulses in succeeding years, prevented him from cultivating such studies.

§ 10. The good effects of his mother's prudent and exemplary care were not so conspicuous as she wished and hoped in the younger part of her son's life; yet there is great reason to believe they were not entirely lost. As they were probably the occasion of many convictions, which in his younger years were overborne; so I doubt not, that when religious impressions took that strong hold of his heart, which they afterwards did, that stock of knowledge which had been so early laid up in his mind, was found of considerable service. And I have heard them make the observation, as an encouragement to parents and other pious friends, to do their duty, and to hope for those good consequences of it which may not immediately appear.

§ 11. Could his mother or a very religious aunt, (of whose good instructions and exhortations I have often heard him speak with pleasure), have prevailed, he would not have thought of a military life; from which it is no wonder these ladies endeavoured to dissuade him, considering the mournful experience they had of the dangers attending it, and the dear relatives they had lost already by it. But it suited his taste; and the ardour of his spirit, animated by the persuasions of a friend, who greatly urged it*, was not to be restrained. Nor will the reader wonder, that, thus excited and supported, it easily overbore their tender remonstrances, when he knows that this lively youth fought three duels before he attained to the stature of a man, in one of which, when he was about eight years old, he received, from a boy much older than himself, a wound in his right cheek, the scar of which was always very apparent. The false sense of honour which instigated him to it might seem indeed something excusable, in these unripened years, and considering the profession of his father, brother and uncle; but I have often heard him mention this rashness with that regret which the reflection would naturally give to so wise and good a man in the maturity of life. And I have been informed, that after his remarkable conversion, he declined accepting a challenge, with this calm and truly great reply, which, in a man of his experienced bravery, was exceeding graceful: "I fear sinning, though you know I do not fear fighting."

* I suppose this to have been Brigadier General Rue, who had from his childhood a peculiar affection for him.

§ 12. He served first as a cadet, which must have been very early; and then, at fourteen years old, he bore an ensign's commission in a Scotch regiment in the Dutch service; in which he continued till the year 1702, when, if my information be right, he received an ensign's commission from Queen Anne, which he bore in the battle of Ramillies, being then in the nineteenth year of his age. In this ever memorable action, he received a wound in his mouth by a musket-ball, which hath often been reported to be the occasion of his conversion. That report was a mistaken one; but as some very remarkable circumstances attended this affair, which I have had the pleasure of hearing more than once from his own mouth, I hope my reader will excuse me, if I give him so uncommon a story at large.

§ 13. Our young officer was of a party in the Forlorn Hope, and was commanded on what seemed almost a desperate service, to dispossess the French of the church-yard at Ramillies, where a considerable number of them were posted to remarkable advantage. They succeeded much better than was expected; and it may well be supposed, that Mr. Gardiner, who had before been in several encounters, and had the view of making his fortune, to animate the natural intrepidity of his spirit, was glad of such an opportunity of signalizing himself. Accordingly he had planted his colours on an advanced ground; and while he was calling to his men (probably in that horrid language which is so peculiar a disgrace to our soldiery, and so absurdly common in such articles of extreme danger), he received a shot into his mouth, which, without beating out any of his teeth, or touching the fore part of his tongue, went through his neck, and came out about an inch and an half on the left side of the vertebræ. Not feeling at first the pain of the stroke, he wondered what was become of the ball; and in the wildness of his surprise began to suspect he had swallowed it; but dropping soon after, he traced the passage of it by his finger, when he could discover it no other way, which I mention as one circumstance among many, which occur to make it probable, that the greater part of those, who fall in battle by these instruments of death, feel very little anguish from the most mortal wounds.

§ 14. This accident happened about five or six in the evening, on the 23d day of May, in the year 1706; and the army pursuing its advantages against the French, without ever regarding the wounded, (which was, it seems, the Duke of Marlborough's constant method), our young officer lay all night in the field, agitated, as may well be supposed, with a great variety of

thoughts. He assured me, that when he reflected upon the circumstances of his wound, that a ball should, as he then conceived it, go through his head without killing him, he thought, God had preserved him by miracle; and therefore assuredly concluded that he should live, abandoned and desperate as his state then seemed to be. Yet, which to me seemed very astonishing, he had little thoughts of humbling himself before God, and returning to him after the wanderings of a life so licentiously begun. But expecting to recover, his mind was taken up with contrivances to secure his gold, of which he had a good deal about him; and he had recourse to a very odd expedient, which proved successful. Expecting to be stripped, he first took out a handful of that clotted gore, of which he was frequently obliged to clear his mouth, or he would have been choked; and putting it in his left hand, he took out his money (which I think was about nineteen pistoles), and shutting his hand, and besmearing the back part of it with blood, he kept it in this position till the blood dried in such a manner, that his hand could not easily fall open, though any sudden surprise should happen, in which he might lose the presence of mind, which that concealment otherwise would have required.

§ 15. In the morning, the French, who were masters of the spot, though their forces were defeated at some distance, came to plunder the slain; and seeing him, to appearance, almost expiring, one of them was just applying a sword to his breast, to destroy the little remainder of life, when, in the critical moment upon which all the extraordinary events of such a life, as his afterwards proved, were suspended, a cordelier, who attended the plunderers, interposed, taking him by his dress for a Frenchman, and said, "Do not kill that poor child." Our young soldier heard all that passed, though he was not able to speak one word; and, opening his eyes, made a sign for something to drink. They gave him a sup of some spirituous liquor which happened to be at hand; by which, he said, he found a more sensible refreshment than he could remember from any thing he had tasted either before or since. Then signifying to the Friar to lean down his ear to his mouth, he employed the first efforts of his feeble breath in telling him, what, alas! was a contrived falsehood, that he was nephew to the governor of Huy, a neutral town in the neighbourhood; and that, if he could take any method of conveying him thither, he did not doubt but his uncle would liberally reward him. He had indeed a friend at Huy (who, I think, was governor, and, if I mistake not, had been acquainted with the captain his father), from whom he expected

a kind reception; but the relation was only pretended. On hearing this, they laid him on a sort of hand-barrow, and sent him by a file of musqueteers toward the place; but the men lost their way, and got into a wood towards the evening, in which they were obliged to continue all night. The poor patient's wound being still undressed, it is not to be wondered that, by this time, it raged violently. The anguish of it engaged him earnestly to beg, that they would either kill him outright, or leave him there to die, without the torture of any farther motion; and indeed, they were obliged to rest for a considerable time, on account of their own weariness. Thus he spent the second night in the open air, without any thing more than a common bandage to staunch the blood. He hath often mentioned it as a most astonishing Providence, that he did not bleed to death; which, under God, he ascribed to the remarkable coldness of these two nights.

§ 16. Judging it quite unsafe to attempt carrying him to Huy, from whence they were now several miles distant, his convoy took him early in the morning to a convent in the neighbourhood, where he was hospitably received, and treated with great kindness and tenderness. But the cure of his wound was committed to an ignorant barber-surgeon, who lived near the house; the best shift that could then be made, at a time, when, it may easily be supposed, persons of ability in their profession had their hands full of employment. The tent which this artist applied, was almost like a peg driven into the wound; and gentlemen of skill and experience, when they came to hear of the manner in which he was treated, wondered, how he could possibly survive such management. But, by the blessing of God on these applications, rough as they were, he recovered in a few months. The lady abbess, who called him her son, treated him with the affection and care of a mother; and he always declared, that every thing, which he saw within these walls, was conducted with the strictest decency and decorum. He received a great many devout admonitions from the ladies there; and they would fain have persuaded him to acknowledge what they thought so miraculous a deliverance, by embracing the catholic faith, as they were pleased to call it. But they could not succeed; for though no religion lay near his heart, yet he had too much the spirit of a gentleman, lightly to change that form of religion, which he wore, as it were, loose about him, as well as too much good sense to swallow those monstrous absurdities of popery, which immediately presented themselves to him, unacquainted as he was with the niceties of the controversy.

§ 17. When his liberty was regained by an exchange of prisoners, and his health thoroughly established, he was far from rendering unto the Lord, according to that wonderful display of divine mercy which he had experienced. I know very little of the particulars of those wild, thoughtless, and wretched years, which lay between the 19th and the 30th of his life; except it be, that he frequently experienced the divine goodness in renewed instances, particularly in preserving him in several hot military actions, in all which, he never received so much as a wound after this, forward as he was in tempting danger; and yet, that all these years were spent in an entire alienation from God, and an eager pursuit of animal pleasure, as his supreme good. The series of criminal amours in which he was almost incessantly engaged during this time, must probably have afforded some remarkable adventures and occurrences; but the memory of them is perished. Nor do I think it unworthy notice here, that amidst all the intimacy of this friendship, and the many years of cheerful, as well as serious converse which we spent together, I never remember to have heard him speak of any of these intrigues, otherwise than in the general, with deep and solemn abhorrence. This I the rather mention, as it seemed a most genuine proof of his unfeigned repentance; which, I think, there is great reason to suspect, when people seem to take a pleasure in relating and describing scenes of vicious indulgence, which yet they profess to have disapproved and forsaken.

§ 18. Amidst all these pernicious wanderings from the paths of religion, virtue, and happiness, he approved himself so well in his military character, that he was made a Lieutenant in that year, viz. 1706: and I am told, he was very quickly promoted to a Cornet's commission in Lord Stair's regiment of Scotch Greys; and on the 31st of January, 1714-15, was made Captain-Lieutenant in Colonel Ker's regiment of dragoons. He had the honour of being known to the Earl of Stair some time before, and was made his Aid-de camp; and when, upon his lordship's being appointed ambassador from his late majesty to the court of France, he made so splendid an entrance into Paris, Captain Gardiner was his master of the horse; and I have been told, that a great deal of the care of that admirably well adjusted ceremony fell upon him; so that he gained great credit by the manner, in which he conducted it. Under the benign influences of his lordship's favour (which to the last day of his life he retained) a Captain's commission was procured for him (dated July 22d, in the year 1715) in the regiment of dragoons,

commanded by Colonel Stanhope (now Earl of Harrington); and, in the year 1717, he was advanced to the Majority of that regiment; in which office he continued, till it was reduced on November 10, 1718, when he was put out of commission. But then his Majesty King George I. was so thoroughly apprised of his faithful and important services, that he gave him his sign manual, entitling him to the first Majority, that should become vacant in any regiment of horse or dragoons, which happened about five years after to be in Croft's regiment of dragoons, in which he received a commission, dated 1st of June 1724; and on the 20th of July, the same year, he was made Major of an older regiment, commanded by the Earl of Stair.

§ 19. As I am now speaking of so many of his military preferments, I will dispatch the account of them, by observing, that on the 24th of January, 1729-30, he was advanced to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the same regiment, long under the command of Lord Cadogan; with whose friendship this brave and vigilant officer was also honoured for many years. And he continued in this rank and regiment till the 19th of April 1743, when he received a Colonel's commission over a regiment of dragoons, lately commanded by Brigadier Bland; at the head of which he valiantly fell, in the defence of his sovereign and his country, about two years and a half after he received it.

§ 20. We will now return to that period of his life which passed at Paris, the scene of such remarkable and important events. He continued (if I remember right), several years under the roof of the brave and generous Earl of Stair: to whom he endeavoured to approve himself by every instance of diligent and faithful service. And his lordship gave no inconsiderable proof of the dependence which he had upon him, when, in the beginning of the year 1715, he intrusted him with the important dispatches relating to a discovery, which, by a series of admirable policy, he had made of a design which the French King was then forming for invading Great Britain, in favour of the Pretender; in which the French apprehended they were so sure of success, that it seemed a point of friendship in one of the chief counsellors of that court to dissuade a dependent of his from accepting some employment under his Britannic Majesty, when proposed by his envoy there; because, it was said, that, in less than six weeks, there would be a revolution in favour of, what they called, the family of the Stuarts. The captain dispatched his journey with the utmost speed; a variety of circumstances happily occurred to accelerate it; and they, who remember, how soon the regiments which that emergency requir-

ed were raised and armed, will, I doubt not, esteem it a memorable instance, both of the most cordial zeal in the friends of the government, and of the gracious care of Divine Providence over the house of Hanover, and the British liberties, so incomparably connected with its interest.

§ 21. While Captain Gardiner was at London, in one of the journeys he made upon this occasion, he, with that frankness which was natural to him, and which in those days was not always under the most prudent restraint, ventured to predict, from what he knew of the bad state of the French King's health, that he would not live six weeks. This was made known by some spies who were at St. James's, and came to be reported at the court of Versailles; for he received letters from some friends at Paris, advising him not to return thither, unless he could reconcile himself to a lodging in the Bastile. But he was soon free from that apprehension; for, if I mistake not, before half that time was accomplished, Lewis the XIV. died*; and, it is generally thought, his death was hastened by a very accidental circumstance, which had some reference to the Captain's prophecy: For the last time he ever dined in public, which was a very little while after the report of it had been made there, he happened to discover our British envoy among the spectators. The penetration of this illustrious person was too great, and his attachment to the interest of his royal master too well known, not to render him very disagreeable to that crafty and tyrannical prince, whom God had so long suffered to be the disgrace of monarchy and the scourge of Europe. He at first appeared very languid, as indeed he was; but on casting his eye upon the Earl of Stair, he affected to appear before him in a much better state of health than he really was; and therefore, as if he had been awakened on a sudden from some deep reverie, immediately put himself into an erect posture, called up a laboured vivacity into his countenance, and ate much more heartily than was by any means advisable, repeating it two or three times to a nobleman (I think the Duke of Bourbon), then in waiting, "Methinks I eat very well for a sick man who is to die so soon †." But this inroad upon that regularity of living which he had for some time observed, agreed so ill with him, that he never recovered this meal, but died in less than a fortnight. This gave occasion for some humourous people to say, that old Lewis, after all, was killed by a Briton. But if this

* September 1, 1715.

† Il me semble, que je ne mange pas mal pour un homme qui devoit mourir si tot.

story be true (which I think there can be no room to doubt, as the Colonel, from whom I have often heard it, though absent, could scarcely be misinformed), it might more properly be said that he fell by his own vanity; in which view I thought it so remarkable, as not to be unworthy a place in these memoirs.

§ 22. The Captain quickly returned, and continued, with small interruptions, at Paris, at least till the year 1720, and how much longer, I do not certainly know. The Earl's favour and generosity made him easy in his affairs, though he was (as has been observed above) part of the time out of commission, by breaking the regiment to which he belonged, of which before he was Major. This was, in all probability, the gayest part of his life, and the most criminal. Whatever wise and good examples he might find in the family where he had the honour to reside, it is certain that the French court, during the regency of the Duke of Orleans, was one of the most dissolute under heaven. What, by a wretched abuse of language, have been called intrigues of love and gallantry, were so entirely to the Major's then degenerate taste, that, if not the whole business, at least the whole happiness of his life consisted in them; and he had now too much leisure for one who was so prone to abuse it. His fine constitution, than which perhaps there was hardly ever a better, gave him great opportunities of indulging himself in these excesses; and his good spirits enabled him to pursue his pleasures of every kind, in so alert and sprightly a manner, that multitudes envied him, and called him, by a dreadful kind of compliment, the happy rake.

§ 23. Yet still the checks of conscience, and some remaining principles of so good an education, would break in upon his most licentious hours; and I particularly remember, he told me, that when some of his dissolute companions were once congratulating him on his distinguished felicity, a dog happening at that time to come into the room, he could not forbear groaning inwardly, and saying to himself, "Oh that I were that dog!" Such was then his happiness; and such perhaps is that of hundreds more, who bear themselves highest in the contempt of religion, and glory in that infamous servitude, which they affect to call liberty. But these remonstrances of reason and conscience were in vain; and, in short, he carried things so far in this wretched part of his life, that I am well assured, some sober English gentlemen, who made no great pretences to religion, how agreeable soever he might have been to them on other accounts, rather declined than sought his company, as fearing they might have been ensnared and corrupted by it.

§ 24. Yet I cannot find, that in these most abandoned days, he was fond of drinking. Indeed he never had any natural relish for that kind of intemperance, from which he used to think a manly pride might be sufficient to preserve persons of sense and spirit; as, by it they give up every thing that distinguishes them from the meanest of their species, or indeed from animals the most below it; so that if he ever fell into any excesses of this kind, it was merely out of complaisance to his company, and that he might not appear stiff and singular. His frank, obliging, and generous temper, procured him many friends; and these principles, which rendered him amiable to others, not being under the direction true of wisdom and piety, sometimes made him, in the ways of living he pursued, more uneasy to himself than he might perhaps have been, if he could entirely have outgrown them; especially, as he was never a sceptic in his principles, but still retained a secret apprehension, that natural and revealed religion, though he did not much care to think of either, were founded in truth. And with this conviction, his notorious violations of the most essential precepts of both, could not but occasion some secret misgivings of heart. His continual neglect of the Great Author of his being, of whose perfections he could not doubt, and to whom he knew himself to be under daily and perpetual obligations, gave him, in some moments of involuntary reflection, inexpressible remorse; and this, at times, wrought upon him to such a degree, that he resolved he would attempt to pay him some acknowledgments. Accordingly, for a few mornings, he did it; repeating, in retirement, some passages out of the psalms, and perhaps other scriptures, which he still retained in his memory; and owning, in a few strong words, the many mercies and deliverances he had received, and the ill returns he had made for them.

§ 25. I find among the other papers transmitted to me, the following verses, which I have heard him repeat, as what had impressed him a good deal in his unconverted state: and, as I suppose, they did something towards setting him on this effort towards devotion, and might probably furnish out a part of these orisons, I hope I need make no apology to my reader for inserting them, especially as I do not recollect, that I have seen them any where else:

Attend my soul! The early birds inspire
My groveling thoughts with pure celestial fire:
They from their temperate sleep awake, and pay
Their thankful anthems for the new-born day.

See, how the tuneful lark is mounted high,
And poet-like, salutes the eastern sky!
He warbles through the fragrant air his lays,
And seems the beauties of the morn to praise.
But man, more void of gratitude, awakes,
And gives no thanks for the sweet rest he takes;
Looks on the glorious sun's new kindled flame
Without one thought of him, from whom it came.
The wretch unhallow'd does the day begin;
Shakes off his sleep, but shakes not off his sin.

§ 26. But these strains were too devout to continue long in a heart, as yet, quite unsanctified; for how readily soever he could repeat such acknowledgments of the divine power, presence, and goodness, and own his own follies and faults, he was stopt short by the remonstrances of his conscience, as to the flagrant absurdity of confessing sins, he did not desire to forsake; and of pretending to praise God for his mercies, when he did not endeavour to live to his service, and to behave in such a manner, as gratitude, if sincere, would plainly dictate. A model of devotion, where such sentiments made no part, his good sense could not digest; and the use of such language before an heart-searching God, merely as an hypocritical form, while the sentiments of his soul were contrary to it, justly appeared to him such daring profaneness, that, irregular as the state of his mind was, the thought of it struck him with horror. He therefore determined to make no more attempts of this sort; and was perhaps one of the first that deliberately laid aside prayer, from some sense of God's omniscience, and some natural principle of honour and conscience.

§ 27. These secret debates with himself, and ineffectual efforts, would sometimes return: but they were overborne again and again by the force of temptation; and it is no wonder, that, in consequence of them, his heart grew yet harder. Nor was it softened or awakened by some very memorable deliverances, which at this time he received. He was in extreme danger by a fall from his horse, as he was riding post (I think, in the streets of Calais), when going down a hill, the horse threw him over his head, and pitched over him; so that, when he rose, the beast lay beyond him, and almost dead. Yet, though he received not the least harm, it made no serious impression on his mind. In his return from England in the packet boat (if I remember right, but a few weeks after the former accident), a violent storm, that drove them up to Harwich, tossed them from thence, for several hours in a dark night on the coast of Holland, and brought them into such extremity,

that the captain of the vessel urged him to go to prayers immediately, if he ever intended to do it at all; for he concluded, they would in a few minutes be at the bottom of the sea. In this circumstance he did pray, and that very fervently too; and it was very remarkable, that while he was crying to God for deliverance, the wind fell, and quickly after, they arrived at Calais. But the Major was so little affected with what had befallen him, that when some of his gay friends, on hearing the story, rallied him upon the efficacy of his prayers, he excused himself from the scandal of being thought much in earnest, by saying, "That it was midnight, and an hour, when his good mother and aunt were asleep, or else he should have left that part of the business to them." A speech, which I should not have mentioned, but as it shows, in so lively a view, the wretched situation of his mind at that time, though his great deliverance from the power of darkness was then nearly approaching. He recounted these things to me with the greatest humility, as showing how utterly unworthy he was of that miracle of divine grace, by which he was quickly after brought to so true and so prevalent a sense of religion.

§ 28. And now I am come to that astonishing part of his story, the account of his conversion; which I cannot enter upon, without assuring the reader, that I have sometimes been tempted to suppress many circumstances of it; not only, as they may seem incredible to some, and enthusiastical to others, but as I am very sensible, they are liable to great abuses; which was the reason that he gave me for concealing the most extraordinary from many persons, to whom he mentioned some of the rest. And I believe it was this, together with the desire of avoiding every thing, that might look like ostentation on this head, that prevented his leaving a written account of it; though I have often entreated him to do it; as I particularly remember I did in the very last letter, I ever wrote him; and pleaded the possibility of his falling amidst those dangers, to which I knew his valour might in such circumstances naturally expose him. I was not so happy as to receive any answer to this letter, which reached him but a few days before his death; nor can I certainly say, whether he had or had not complied with my request, as it is very possible, a paper of that kind, if it were written, might be lost amidst the ravages, which the rebels made, when they plundered Bankton.

§ 29. The story, however, was so remarkable, that I had little reason to apprehend, I should ever forget it; and yet, to guard against all contingencies of that kind, I wrote it down that very evening, as I heard it from his own mouth: And I

have now before me the memoirs of that conversation, dated August 14, 1739, which conclude with these words, (which I added; that, if we should both have died that night, the world might not have lost this edifying and affecting history, or have wanted any attestation of it, I was capable of giving): "N. B. I have written down this account with all the exactness I am capable of, and could safely take an oath of it, as to the truth of every circumstance, to the best of my remembrance, as the Colonel related it to me a few hours ago." I do not know that I had reviewed this paper since I wrote it, till I set myself thus publicly to record this extraordinary fact; but I find it punctually to agree with what I have often related from my memory, which I charged carefully with so wonderful and important a fact. It is with all solemnity, that I now deliver it down to posterity, as in the sight and presence of God; and I chose deliberately to expose myself to those severe censures, which the haughty, but empty scorn of infidelity, or principles nearly approaching it, and effectually doing its pernicious work, may very probably dictate upon the occasion, rather than to smother a relation, which may, in the judgment of my conscience, be like to conduce so much to the glory of God, the honour of the gospel, and the good of mankind. One thing more I will only premise, that I hope, none who have heard the Colonel himself speak something of this wonderful scene, will be surprised if they find some new circumstances here; because he assured me, at the time he first gave me the whole narration (which was in the very room in which I now write), that he had never imparted it so fully to any man living before. Yet, at the same time, he gave me full liberty to communicate it to whomsoever I should in my conscience judge, it might be useful to do it, whether before or after his death. Accordingly, I did, while he was alive, recount almost every circumstance I am now going to write, to several pious friends; referring them at the same time to the Colonel himself, whenever they might have an opportunity of seeing or writing to him, for a farther confirmation of what I told them, if they judged it requisite. They glorified God in him; and I humbly hope, many of my readers will also do it. They will soon perceive the reason of so much caution in my introduction to this story, for which therefore I shall make no further apology *.

* It is no small satisfaction to me, since I wrote this, to have received a letter from the Rev. Mr. Spears, minister of the gospel at Burntisland, dated January 14, 1746-7, in which he relates to me this whole story, as he had it from the Colonel's own mouth, about four years after he gave me the narration. There is not a single

§ 30. This memorable event happened towards the middle of July 1719; but I cannot be exact, as to the day. The Major had spent the evening (and, if I mistake not, it was the sabbath) in some gay company, and had an unhappy assignation with a married woman, of what rank or quality I did not particularly inquire, whom he was to attend exactly at twelve. The company broke up about eleven; and not judging it convenient to anticipate the time appointed, he went into his chamber to kill the tedious hour, perhaps, with some amusing book, or some other way. But it very accidentally happened, that he took up a religious book, which his good mother or aunt had, without his knowledge, slipped into his portmanteau. It was called, if I remember the title exactly, The Christian Soldier; or, Heaven taken by Storm; and was written by Mr. Thomas Watson. Guessing by the title of it, that, he should find some phrases of his own profession spiritualized, in a manner which, he thought, might afford him some diversion, he resolved to dip into it; but he took no serious notice of any thing he read in it: And yet, while this book was in his hand, an impression was made upon his mind (perhaps God only knows how), which drew after it a train of the most important and happy consequences.

§ 31. There is indeed a possibility, that while he was sitting in this attitude, and reading in this careless and profane manner, he might suddenly fall asleep, and only dream of what he apprehended he saw. But nothing can be more certain, than that, when he gave me this relation, he judged himself to have been as broad awake, during the whole time, as he ever was in any part of his life; and he mentioned it to me several times afterwards, as what undoubtedly passed, not only in his imagination, but before his eyes*.

circumstance in which either of our narrations disagree; and every one of the particulars in mine, which seem most astonishing, are attested by this, and sometimes in stronger words; one only excepted, on which I shall add a short remark when I come to it. As this letter was written near Lady Frances Gardiner, at her desire, and attended with a postscript from her own hand, this is, in effect, a sufficient attestation how agreeable it was to those accounts, which she must have often heard the Colonel give of this matter.

* Mr. Spears, in the letter mentioned above, where he introduces the Colonel telling his own story, has these words: "All of a sudden, there was presented, in a very lively manner, to my view, or to my mind, a representation of my glorious Redeemer," &c. And this gentleman adds, in a parenthesis, "It was so lively and striking, that he could not tell whether it was to his bodily eyes, or to those of his mind." This makes me think, that what I had said to him on the phenomena of visions, apparitions, &c. (as being, when most real, supernatural impressions on the imagination, rather than attended with any external object), had some influence upon him. Yet still it is evident, he looked upon this as a vision, whether it were before the eyes, or in the mind, and not as a dream.

§ 32. He thought he saw an unusual blaze of light fall upon the book, while he was reading, which, he at first imagined, might happen by some accident in the candle. But lifting up his eyes, he apprehended, to his extreme amazement, that there was before him, as it were, suspended in the air, a visible representation of the Lord Jesus Christ upon the cross, surrounded on all sides with a glory; and was impressed, as if a voice, or something equivalent to a voice, had come to him, to this effect (for he was not confident as to the very words): "Oh sinner! did I suffer this for thee, and are these thy returns?" But whether this were an audible voice, or only a strong impression on his mind equally striking, he did not seem very confident; though, to the best of my remembrance, he rather judged it to be the former. Struck with so amazing a phenomenon as this, there remained hardly any life in him; so that he sunk down in the arm-chair in which he sat, and continued, he knew not very exactly how long, insensible: (which was one circumstance that made me several times take the liberty to suggest, that he might possibly be all this while asleep). But however that were, he quickly after opened his eyes, and saw nothing more than usual.

§ 33. It may easily be supposed, he was in no condition to make any observation upon the time, in which he had remained in an insensible state; nor did he, throughout all the remainder of the night, once recollect that criminal and detestable assignation, which had before engrossed all his thoughts. He rose in a tumult of passions not to be conceived, and walked to and fro in his chamber, till he was ready to drop down, in unutterable astonishment and agony of heart, appearing to himself the vilest monster in the creation of God, who had all his lifetime been crucifying Christ afresh by his sins, and now saw, as he assuredly believed, by a miraculous vision, the horror of what he had done. With this was connected such a view, both of the majesty and goodness of God, as caused him to loathe and abhor himself, and to repent, as in dust and ashes. He immediately gave judgment against himself, that he was most justly worthy of eternal damnation. He was astonished that he had not been immediately struck dead in the midst of his wickedness; and (which, I think, deserves particular remark), though he assuredly believed, that he should ere long be in hell, and settled it as a point with himself for several months, that the wisdom and justice of God did almost necessarily require, that such an enormous sinner should be made an example of everlasting vengeance,

and a spectacle, as such, both to angels and men; so that he hardly durst presume to pray for pardon: yet, what he then suffered was not so much from the fear of hell, though he concluded it would soon be his portion, as from a fear of that horrible ingratitude he had shown to the God of his life, and to that blessed Redeemer, who had been in so affecting a manner set forth, as crucified, before him.

§ 34. To this he refers in a letter, dated from Douglas, April 1, 1725, communicated to me by his Lady *; but I know not, to whom it was addressed. His words are these: "One thing relating to my conversion, and a remarkable instance of the goodness of God to me, the chief of sinners, I do not remember that I ever told to any other person. It was this; that after the astonishing sight I had of my blessed Lord, the terrible condition in which I was, proceeded not so much from the terrors of the law, as from a sense of having been so ungrateful a monster to him, whom I thought, I saw pierced for my transgressions." I the rather insert these words, as they evidently attest the circumstance which may seem most amazing in this affair, and contain so express a declaration of his own apprehension concerning it.

§ 35. In this view, it may naturally be supposed, that he passed the remainder of the night, waking; and he could get but little rest in several, that followed. His mind was continually taken up in reflecting on the divine purity and goodness; the grace which had been proposed to him in the gospel, and which he had rejected; the singular advantages he had enjoyed and abused; and the many favours of Providence, which he had received, particularly, in rescuing him from so many imminent dangers of death, which, he now saw, must have been attended with such dreadful and hopeless destruction. The privileges of his education, which he had so much despised,

* N. B. Where I make any extracts, as from Colonel Gardiner's letters, they are either from originals, which I have in my own hands, or from copies which were transmitted to me from persons of undoubted credit, chiefly by the Right Hon. Lady Frances Gardiner, through the hands of the Rev. Mr. Webster, one of the ministers of Edinburgh. This I the rather mention, because some letters have been brought to me as Colonel Gardiner's, concerning which, I have not only been very dubious, but morally certain, that they could not have been written by him. I have also heard of many who have been fond of assuring the world, that they were well acquainted with him, and were near him when he fell, whose reports have been most inconsistent with each other, as well as contrary to that testimony relating to the circumstances of his death, which, on the whole, appeared to me, beyond controversy, the most natural and authentic; from whence, therefore, I shall take my account of that affecting scene.

now lay with an almost unsupportable weight on his mind; and the folly of that career of sinful pleasure, which he had, so many years, been running with desperate eagerness and unworthy delight, now filled him with indignation against himself, and against the great deceiver, by whom (to use his own phrase), he had been "so wretchedly and scandalously befooled." This he used often to express in the strongest terms, which I shall not repeat so particularly, as I can recollect some of them. But on the whole, it is certain, that by what passed before he left his chamber the next day, the whole frame and disposition of his soul was new-modelled and changed; so that he became, and continued to the last day of his exemplary and truly Christian life, the very reverse of what he had been before. A variety of particulars, which I am afterwards to mention, will illustrate this in the most convincing manner. But I cannot proceed to them, without pausing a while to adore so illustrious an instance of the power and freedom of divine grace, and entreating my reader seriously to reflect upon it, that his own heart may be suitably affected; for surely, if the truth of the fact be admitted in the lowest views, in which it can be placed, (that is, supposing the first impression to have passed in a dream), it must be allowed to have been little, if any thing, less than miraculous. It cannot, in the course of nature, be imagined, how such a dream should arise in a mind full of the most impure ideas and affections, and (as he himself often pleaded) more alienated from the thoughts of a crucified Saviour, than from any other object that can be conceived; nor can we surely suppose it should, without a mighty energy of the divine power, be effectual to produce, not only some transient flow of passion, but so entire and so permanent a change in character and conduct.

§ 36. On the whole, therefore, I must beg leave to express my own sentiments of the matter, by repeating, on this occasion, what I wrote several years ago, in my eighth sermon on Regeneration, in a passage dictated chiefly by the circumstantial knowledge, which I had of this amazing story, and, methinks, sufficiently vindicated by it, if it stood entirely alone; which yet, I must take the liberty to say, it does not: for I hope the world will be particularly informed, that there is at least a second, that does very nearly approach it, whenever the established church of England shall lose one of its brightest living ornaments, and one of the most useful members which that, or perhaps any other Christian communion, can boast: In the mean time, may his exemplary life be long continued,

and his zealous ministry abundantly prospered! I beg my reader's pardon for this digression. The passage I referred to above, is remarkably, though not equally applicable to both the cases, (as it stands in page 510, vol. ii. of the present edition of the Works); under that head, where I am showing that God sometimes accomplishes the great work, of which we speak, by secret and immediate impressions on the mind. After preceding illustrations, there are the following words, on which the Colonel's conversion will throw the justest light: "Yea, I have known those of distinguished genius, polite manners, and great experience in human affairs, who, after having outgrown all the impressions of a religious education, after having been hardened, rather than subdued, by the most singular mercies, even various, repeated, and astonishing deliverances, which have appeared to themselves no less than miraculous; after having lived for years without God in the world, notoriously corrupt themselves, and labouring to the utmost to corrupt others, have been stopt on a sudden in the full career of their sin, and have felt such rays of the divine presence, and of redeeming love, darting in upon their minds, almost like lightning from heaven, as have at once roused, over powered, and transformed them; so that they have come out of their secret chamber with an irreconcileable enmity to those vices, to which, when they entered them, they were the tamest and most abandoned slaves; and have appeared, from that very hour, the votaries, the patrons, the champions of religion; and after a course of the most resolute attachment to it, in spite of all the reasonings or the railleries, the importunities or the reproaches of its enemies, they have continued to this day, some of its brightest ornaments: A change which I behold with equal wonder and delight, and which, if a nation should join in deriding it, I would adore as the finger of God."

§ 37. The mind of Major Gardiner continued from this remarkable time till towards the end of October, (that is, rather more than three months, but especially, the two first of them), in as extraordinary a situation as one can well imagine. He knew nothing of the joys arising from a sense of pardon; but, on the contrary, for the greater part of that time, and with very short intervals of hope toward the end of it, took it for granted, that he must, in all probability, quickly perish. Nevertheless, he had such a sense of the evil of sin, of the goodness of the Divine Being, and of the admirable tendency of the Christian revelation, that he resolved to spend the remainder of his life, while God continued him out of hell, in as rational and as useful a manner as he could: and to continue casting himself at the

feet of divine mercy every day, and often in a day, if peradventure there might be hope of pardon, of which all that he could say, was, that he did not absolutely despair. He had, at that time, such a sense of the degeneracy of his own heart, that he hardly durst form any determinate resolution against sin, or pretend to engage himself by any vow in the presence of God; but was continually crying to him, that he would deliver him from the bondage of corruption. He perceived in himself a most surprising alteration with regard to the dispositions of his heart; so that, though he felt little of the delights of religious duties, he extremely desired opportunities of being engaged in them; and those licentious pleasures, which had before been his heaven, were now absolutely his aversion. And indeed, when I consider how habitual all those criminal indulgences were grown to him, and that he was now in the prime of life, and all this while, in high health too, I cannot but be astonished to reflect upon it, that he should be so wonderfully sanctified in body, as well as soul and spirit, as that, for all the future years of his life, he, from that hour, should find so constant a disinclination to, and abhorrence of those criminal sensualities, to which he fancied he was before so invincibly impelled by his very constitution, that he was used strangely to think, and to say, that Omnipotence itself could not reform him, without destroying that body, and giving him another*.

§ 38. Nor was he only delivered from that bondage of

* Mr. Spears expresses this wonderful circumstance in these remarkable words: "I was, (said the Colonel to me), effectually cured of all inclination to that sin I was so strongly addicted to, that I thought nothing but shooting me through the head could have cured me of it; and all desire and inclination to it was removed as entirely, as if I had been a sucking child: nor did the temptation return to this day." Mr. Webster's words on the same subject are these, "One thing I have heard the Colonel frequently say, that he was much addicted to impurity before his acquaintance with religion; but that, so soon as he was enlightened from above, he felt the power of the Holy Ghost changing his nature, so wonderfully, that his sanctification in this respect seemed more remarkable than in any other." On which, that worthy person, makes this very reasonable reflection: "So thorough a change of such a polluted nature, evidenced by the most unblemished walk and conversation for a long course of years, demonstrates, indeed, the power of the Highest, and leaves no room to doubt of its reality." Mr. Spears says, this happened in three days time: But from what I can recollect, all that the Colonel could mean by that expression, if he used it, (as I conclude he did), was, that he began to make the observation in the space of three days; whereas, during that time, his thoughts were so taken up with the wonderful views presented to his mind, that he did not immediately attend to it. If he had, within the first three days, any temptation to seek some ease from the anguish of his mind, in returning to former sensualities, it is a circumstance, he did not mention to me: and by what I can recollect of the strain of his discourse, he intimated, if he did not express the contrary.

corruption, which had been habitual to him for many years, but felt in his breast so contrary a disposition, that he was grieved to see human nature, in those, to whom he was almost entirely a stranger, prostituted to such low and contemptible pursuits. He therefore exerted his natural courage in a very new kind of combat; and became an open advocate for religion, in all its principles, so far as he was acquainted with them, and all its precepts, relating to sobriety, righteousness, and godliness. Yet he was very desirous and cautious, that he might not run into an extreme, and made it one of his first petitions to God, the very day after these amazing impressions had been wrought in his mind, that he might not be suffered to behave with such an affected strictness and preciseness, as would lead others about him into mistaken notions of religion, and expose it to reproach or suspicion, as if it were an unlovely or uncomfortable thing. For this reason, he endeavoured to appear as cheerful in conversation as he conscientiously could; though in spite of all his precautions, some traces of that deep inward sense, which he had of his guilt and misery, would at times appear. He made no secret of it, however, that his views were entirely changed, though he concealed the particular circumstances attending that change. He told his most intimate companions freely, that he had reflected on the course of life in which he had so long joined them, and found it to be folly and madness, unworthy a rational creature, and much more, unworthy persons calling themselves christians. And he set up his standard upon all occasions, against principles of infidelity and practices of vice, as determinately and as boldly as ever he displayed or planted his colours, when he bore them with so much honour in the field.

§ 39. I cannot forbear mentioning one struggle of this kind, which he described to me, with a large detail of circumstances, the first day of our acquaintance. There was, at that time, in Paris, a certain lady (whose name, then well known in the grand and the gay world, I must beg leave to conceal), who had imbibed the principles of deism, and valued herself much upon being an avowed advocate for them. The Major, with his usual frankness (though, I doubt not, with that politeness of manners, which was so habitual to him, and which he retained throughout his whole life), answered her like a man, who perfectly saw through the fallacy of her arguments, and was grieved to the heart for her delusion. On this, she briskly challenged him to debate the matter at large, and to fix upon a day for that purpose, when he should dine with her, attended with any clergyman he might

choose, whether of the Protestant or Catholic communion. A sense of duty would not allow him to decline this challenge; and yet he had no sooner accepted it, but he was thrown into great perplexity and distress, lest, being (as I remember he expressed it, when he told me the story), only a Christian of six weeks old, he should prejudice so good a cause, by his unskilful manner of defending it. However, he sought his refuge in earnest, and repeated prayers to God, that he, who can ordain strength, and perfect praise out of the mouth of babes and sucklings, would graciously enable him, on this occasion, to vindicate his truths in a manner which might carry conviction along with it. He then endeavoured to marshal the arguments in his own mind as well as he could; and apprehending that he could not speak with so much freedom, before a number of persons, especially before such, whose province he might, in that case, seem to invade, if he had not devolved the principal part of the discourse upon them, he easily admitted the apology of a clergyman or two, to whom he mentioned the affair, and waited on the lady alone, upon the day appointed. But his heart was so set upon the business, that he came earlier than he was expected, and time enough to have two hours' discourse before dinner; nor did he at all decline having two young persons nearly related to the lady, present during the conference.

§ 40. The Major opened it with a view of such arguments for the Christian religion, as he had digested in his own mind, to prove, that the apostles were not mistaken themselves, and that they could not have intended to impose upon us in the accounts they give of the grand facts they attest; with the truth of which facts, that of the Christian religion is most apparently connected. And it was a great encouragement to him to find, that, unaccustomed as he was to discourses of this nature, he had an unusual command both of thought and expression; so that he recollected and uttered every thing as he could have wished. The lady heard with attention; and though he paused between every branch of the argument, she did not interrupt the course of it, till he told her he had finished his design, and waited for her reply. She then produced some of her objections, which he took up and canvassed in such a manner, that, at length, she burst out into tears, allowed the force of his arguments and replies, and appeared, for some time after, so deeply impressed with the conversation, that it was observed by several of her friends: And there is reason to believe, that the impression continued, at least, so far as to prevent her from ever appearing under the character of an unbeliever or a sceptic.

§ 41. This is only one specimen, among many, of the battles he was almost daily called out to fight in the cause of religion and virtue; with relation to which I find him expressing himself thus, in a letter to Mrs. Gardiner, his good mother, dated from Paris, the 25th January following, that is, 1719-20, in answer to one, in which she had warned him to expect such trials: "I have (says he), already met with them, and am obliged to fight, and to dispute every inch of ground: But all thanks and praise to the great Captain of my salvation; he fights for me; and then it is no wonder, that I come off more than conqueror." By which last expression I suppose he meant to insinuate, that he was strengthened and established, rather than overborne by this opposition. Yet it was not immediately, that he gained such fortitude. He has often told me, how much he felt in those days of the emphasis of those well-chosen words, in which he ranks the trial of cruel mockings, with scourgings, and bonds, and imprisonments. The continual railleries with which he was received in almost all companies where he had been most familiar before, did often distress him beyond measure; so that he has several times declared, he would much rather have marched up to a battery of the enemy's cannon, than have been obliged, so continually as he was, to face such artillery as this. But, like a brave soldier in the first action wherein he is engaged, he continued resolute, though shuddering at the terror of the assault; and quickly overcame those impressions, which it is not perhaps in nature wholly to avoid. And therefore I find him, in the letter referred to above, which was written about half a year after his conversion, "quite ashamed to think of the uneasiness, which these things once gave him." In a word, he went on, as every resolute Christian, by divine grace, may do, till he turned ridicule and opposition, into respect and veneration.

§ 42. But this sensible triumph over these difficulties was not till his christian experience had been abundantly advanced, by the blessing of God, on the sermons he heard (particularly in the Swiss Chapel), and on the many hours, which he spent in devout retirement, pouring out his whole soul before God in prayer. He began, within about two months after his first memorable change, to perceive some secret dawnings of more cheerful hope, that vile as he saw himself to be (and I believe no words can express, how vile that was), he might nevertheless obtain mercy through a Redeemer. And at length (if I remember right, about the end of October 1719), he found all the burden

of his mind taken off at once, by the powerful impression of that memorable scripture upon his mind, Rom. iii. 25, 26. *Whom God hath set forth for a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness in the remission of sins,—that he might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus.* He had used to imagine, that the justice of God required the damnation of so enormous a sinner, as he saw himself to be: but now he was made deeply sensible, that the divine justice might be not only vindicated, but glorified, in saving him by the blood of Jesus, even that blood, which cleanseth us from all sin. Then did he see, and feel the riches of redeeming love and grace, in such a manner, as not only engaged him with the utmost pleasure and confidence to venture his soul upon it; but even swallowed up, as it were, his whole heart in the returns of love, which, from that blessed time, became the genuine and delightful principle of his obedience, and animated him with an enlarged heart, to turn to the way of God's commandments. Thus, God was pleased, as he himself used to speak, in an hour, to turn his captivity. All the terrors of his former state were changed into unutterable joy, which kept him almost continually waking for three nights together, and yet refreshed him as the noblest of cordials. His expressions, though naturally very strong, always seemed to be swallowed up, when he would describe the series of thought, through which he now passed, under the rapturous experience of that joy unspeakable, and full of glory, which then seemed to overflow his very soul; as indeed there was nothing, he seemed to speak of with greater relish. And though the first ecstasies of it afterwards subsided into a more calm and composed delight, yet were the impressions so deep and so permanent, that he assured me, on the word of a Christian and a friend, wonderful as it might seem, that for about seven years after this, he enjoyed almost an heaven upon earth. His soul was so continually filled with a sense of the love of God in Christ, that it knew little interruption, but when necessary converse and the duties of his station called off his thoughts for a little time; and when they did so, as soon as he was alone, the torrent returned into its natural channel again; so that, from the minute of his awakening in the morning, his heart was rising to God, and triumphing in him; and these thoughts attended him through all the scenes of life, till he lay down on his bed again, and a short parenthesis of sleep (for it was but a very short one, that he allowed himself) invigorated his animal powers for renewing them with greater intenseness and sensibility.

§ 43. I shall have an opportunity of illustrating this in the most convincing manner below, by extracts from several letters, which he wrote to intimate friends during this happy period of time; letters, which breathe a spirit of such sublime and fervent piety, as I have seldom met with any where else. In these circumstances, it is no wonder that he was greatly delighted with Dr. Watts's imitation of the 126th psalm; since it may be questioned whether there ever was a person, to whom the following stanzas of it were more suitable:

When God reveal'd his gracious name,
And chang'd my mournful state,
My rapture seem'd a pleasing dream;
Thy grace appear'd so great.

The world beheld the glorious change,
And did thine hand confess;
My tongue broke out in unknown strains,
And sung surprising grace.

"Great is the work," my neighbours cry'd,
And own'd the power divine:
"Great is the work," my heart reply'd;
"And be the glory thine."

The Lord can change the darkest skies,
Can give us day for night;
Make floods of sacred sorrow rise
To rivers of delight.

Let those that sow in sadness, wait
Till the fair harvest come:
They shall confess their sheaves are great,
And shout the blessings home.

§ 44. I have been so happy as to get the sight of five original letters, which he wrote to his mother about this time, which do, in a very lively manner, illustrate the surprising change made in the whole current of his thoughts and temper of his mind. Many of them were written in the most hasty manner, just as the courier, who brought them, was, perhaps, unexpectedly setting out; and they relate chiefly to affairs in which the public is not at all concerned: yet there is not one of them, in which he has not inserted some warm and genuine sentiments of religion. And indeed, it is very remarkable, that though he was pleased to honour me with a great many letters, and I have seen several more which he wrote to others, some of them on journeys, where he could have but a few minutes at command, yet I cannot recollect, that ever I saw any one, in which there was not some trace of piety. And the Rev. Mr. Webster, who was employed to review great numbers of them, that he might

select such extracts as he should think proper to communicate to me, has made the same observation *.

§ 45. The Major, with great justice, tells the good lady his mother, "that when she saw him again, she would find the person indeed the same, but every thing else entirely changed." And she might easily have perceived it of herself, by the whole tenor of those letters, which every where breathe the unaffected spirit of a true Christian. They are taken up, sometimes, with giving advice and directions concerning some pious and charitable contributions, one of which, I remember, amounted to ten guineas, though, as he was then out of commission, and had not formerly been very frugal, it cannot be supposed he had much to spare; sometimes, in speaking of the pleasure with which he attended sermons, and expected sacramental opportunities; and at other times, in exhorting her, established as she was in religion, to labour after a yet more exemplary character and conduct, or in recommending her to the divine presence and blessing, as well as himself to her prayers. What satisfaction such letters as these must give to a lady of her distinguished piety, who had so long wept over this dear and amiable son as quite lost to God, and on the verge of final destruction, it is not for me to describe, or indeed to conceive. But hastily as these letters were written, only for private view, I will give a few specimens from them in his own words; which will serve to illustrate, as well as confirm, what I have hinted above.

§ 46. "I must take the liberty," says he, in a letter dated on the first day of the new year, or, according to the old style, Dec. 21, 1719, "to entreat you, that you would receive no company on the Lord's day. I know you have a great many good acquaintance, with whose discourses one might be very well edified; but as you cannot keep out, and let in, whom you please, the best way, in my humble opinion, will be to see none." In another, Jan. 25, "I am happier than any one can imagine, except I could put him exactly in the same situation with myself; which is, what the world cannot give, and no man ever attained it, unless it were from above." In another, dated March 30, which was just before a sacrament, "To-morrow, if

* His words are these: "I have read over a vast number of the Colonel's letters, and have not found any of them, however short, and writ in the most passing manner, even when posting, but what is expressive of the most passionate breathings towards his God and Saviour. If the letter consists but of two sentences, religion is not forgotten, which doubtless deserves to be carefully remarked as the most uncontested evidence of a pious mind, ever under the warmest impressions of divine things."

it please God, I shall be happy, my soul being to be fed with the bread of life, which came down from heaven. I shall be mindful of you all there." In another of Jan. 29, he thus expresses that indifference for worldly possessions, which he so remarkably carried through all the remainder of his life: "I know the rich are only stewards for the poor, and must give an account of every penny: therefore the less I have, the more easy will it be to render a faithful account of it." And, to add no more from these letters at present, in conclusion of one of them, he has these comprehensive and solemn words: "Now, that he who is the ease of the afflicted, the support of the weak, the wealth of the poor, the teacher of the ignorant, the anchor of the fearful, and the infinite reward of all faithful souls, may pour out upon you all his richest blessings, shall always be the prayer of him, who is entirely yours," &c.

§ 47. To this account of his correspondence with his excellent mother, I should be glad to add a large view of another, to which she introduced him, with that reverend and valuable person, under whose pastoral care she was placed, I mean the justly celebrated Dr. Edmund Calamy, to whom she could not but early communicate the joyful news of her son's conversion. I am not so happy as to be possessed of the letters, which passed between them, which, I have reason to believe, would make a curious and valuable collection: But I have had the pleasure of receiving, from my worthy and amiable friend, the Rev. Mr. Edmund Calamy, one of the letters which the Doctor, his father, wrote to the Major, on this wonderful occasion. I perceive by the contents of it, that it was the first; and indeed, it is dated as early as the 3d of August, 1719, which must be but a few days after his own account, dated August 4th, N. S. could reach England. There is so much true religion and good sense in this paper, and the counsel it suggests, may be so seasonable to other persons in circumstances, which bear any resemblance to his, that I make no apology to my reader for inserting a large extract from it.

§ 48. "Dear Sir,——I conceive, it will not much surprise you to understand that your good mother communicated to me your letter to her, dated August 4th, N. S. which brought her the news, you conceive would be so acceptable to her. I, who have often been a witness to her concern for you on a spiritual account, can attest, with what joy this news was received by her, and imparted to me as a special friend, who, she knew, would bear a part with her on such an occasion. And indeed, if, as our Saviour intimates, Luke xv. 7, 10. *There is*, in such cases, *joy in*

heaven, and *among the angels of God*, it may well be supposed, that of a pious mother, who has spent so many prayers and tears upon you, and has, as it were, *travailed in birth with you again, till Christ was formed in you*, could not be small. You may believe me, if I add, that I also, as a common friend of hers and yours, and, which is much more, of the Prince of Light, whom you now declare you heartily fall in with, in opposition to that of the dark kingdom, could not but be tenderly affected with an account of it under your own hand. My joy on this account, was the greater, considering the importance of your capacity, interests, and prospects; which, in such an age as this, may promise most happy consequences, on your heartily appearing on God's side, and embarking in the interest of our dear Redeemer. If I have hitherto, at all remembered you at the throne of grace, at your good mother's desire, (which you are pleased to take notice of with so much respect), I can assure you, I shall henceforth be led to do it with more concern and particularity, both by duty and inclination. And if I were capable of giving you any little assistance in the noble design you are engaging in, by corresponding with you by letter, while you are at such a distance, I should do it most cheerfully. And, perhaps, such a motion may not be altogether unacceptable: For I am inclinable to believe, that when some, whom you are obliged to converse with, observe your behaviour so different from what it formerly was, and banter you upon it, as mad and fanciful, it may be some little relief to correspond with one, who will take a pleasure in heartening and encouraging you. And when a great many things frequently offer, in which conscience may be concerned, where duty may not always be plain, nor suitable persons to advise with, at hand, it may be some satisfaction to you to correspond with one, with whom you may use a friendly freedom in all such matters, and on whose fidelity you may depend. You may therefore, command me in any of these respects, and I shall take a pleasure in serving you. One piece of advice I shall venture to give you, though your own good sense will make my enlarging upon it less needful; I mean, that you would from your first setting out, carefully distinguish between the essentials of real religion, and those things, which are commonly reckoned by its professors to belong to it. The want of this distinction has had very unhappy consequences from one age to another, and perhaps, in none more than the present. But your daily converse with your bible, which you mention, may herein give you great assistance.

I move also, that since infidelity so much abounds, you would, not only by close and serious consideration, endeavour to settle yourself well in the fundamental principles of religion, but also that, as opportunity offers, you would converse with those books, which treat most judiciously on the divine original of Christianity, such as Grotius, Abadie, Baxter, Bates, Du Plessis, &c. which may establish you against the cavils, that occur in almost all conversations, and furnish you with arguments, which, when properly offered, may be of use to make some impressions on others. But being too much straitened to enlarge at present, I can only add, that if your hearty falling in with serious religion should prove any hinderance to your advancement in the world, which I pray God it may not, unless such advancement would be a real snare to you, I hope you will trust our Saviour's word, that it shall be no disadvantage to you in the final issue: He has given you his word for it, Matt. xix. 29. upon which you may safely depend; and I am satisfied, none that ever did so, at last repented of it. May you go on and prosper, and the God of all grace and peace be with you!"

§ 49. I think it very evident from the contents of this letter, that the Major had not imparted to his mother the most singular circumstances attending his conversion: And, indeed, there was something so peculiar in them, that I do not wonder, he was always cautious in speaking of them, and, especially, that he was at first, much on the reserve. We may also naturally reflect, that there seems to have been something very providential in this letter, considering the debate, in which our illustrious convert was so soon engaged; for it was written but about three weeks before his conference with the Lady abovementioned, in the defence of Christianity; or, at least, before the appointment of it. And as some of the books recommended by Dr. Calamy, particularly Abadie and Du Plessis, were undoubtedly within his reach, if our English advocates were not, this might, by the divine blessing, contribute considerably towards arming him for that combat, in which he came off with such happy success. And as in this instance, so in many others, they who will observe the coincidence and concurrence of things, may be engaged to adore the wise conduct of Providence in events, which, when taken singly and by themselves, have nothing very remarkable in them.

§ 50. I think it was about this time, that this resolute and exemplary Christian entered upon that methodical manner of living, which he pursued through so many succeeding years of

life; and, I believe generally, so far as the broken state of his health would allow it in his latter days, to the very end of it. He used constantly to rise at four in the morning, and to spend his time till six, in secret exercises of devotion, reading, meditation, and prayer; in which last he contracted such a fervency of spirit, as I believe, few men living ever obtained. This certainly tended very much to strengthen that firm faith in God, and reverend animating sense of his presence, for which he was so eminently remarkable, and which carried him through the trials and services of life, with such steadiness, and with such activity; for he indeed endured, and acted, as always seeing him, who is invisible. If at any time he was obliged to go out before six in the morning, he rose proportionably sooner; so that when a journey or a march has required him to be on horseback by four, he would be at his devotions, at farthest, by two. He likewise secured time for retirement in an evening; and that he might have it the more at command, and be the more fit to use it properly, as well as the better able to rise early the next morning, he generally went to bed about ten: And, during the time I was acquainted with him, he seldom ate any supper, but a mouthful of bread with one glass of wine. In consequence of this, as well as of his admirably good constitution, and the long habit he had formed, he required less sleep than most persons I have known: And I doubt not but his uncommon progress in piety was, in a great measure, owing to these resolute habits of self-denial.

§ 51. A life, any thing like this, could not, to be sure, be entered upon, in the midst of such company as he had been accustomed to keep, without great opposition; especially, as he did not entirely withdraw himself from cheerful conversation; but, on the contrary, gave several hours every day to it; lest religion should be reproached, as having made him morose. He, however, early began a practice, which to the last day of his life he retained, of reproving vice and profaneness; and was never afraid to debate the matter with any, under the consciousness of such superiority in the goodness of his cause.

§ 52. A remarkable instance of this happened, if I mistake not, about the middle of the year 1720, though I cannot be very exact as to the date of the story. It was, however, on his first return to make any considerable abode in England after this remarkable change. He had heard, on the other side of the water, that it was currently reported among his companions at home, that he was stark mad; a report, at which no reader, who knows the wisdom of the world in these matters, will be

much surprised, any more than himself. He concluded, therefore, that he should have many battles to fight, and was willing to dispatch the business as fast as he could. And therefore, being to spend a few days at the country house of a person of distinguished rank, with whom he had been very intimate, (whose name I do not remember that he told me, nor did I think proper to inquire after it), he begged the favour of him, that he would contrive matters so, that a day or two after he came down, several of their former gay companions might meet at his Lordship's table, that he might have an opportunity of making his apology to them, and acquainting them with the nature and reasons of his change. It was accordingly agreed to; and a pretty large company met on the day appointed, with previous notice, that Major Gardiner would be there. A good deal of raillery passed at dinner, to which the Major made very little answer. But when the cloth was taken away and the servants retired, he begged their patience for a few minutes, and then plainly and seriously told them, what notions he entertained of virtue and religion, and on what considerations he had absolutely determined, that, by the grace of God, he would make it the care and business of life, whatever he might lose by it, and whatever censure and contempt he might incur. He well knew, how improper it was, in such company, to relate the extraordinary manner in which he was awakened; which they would probably have interpreted to a demonstration of lunacy, against all the gravity and solidity of his discourse: But he contented himself with such a rational defence of a righteous, sober, and godly life, as he knew none of them could, with any shadow of reason, contest. He then challenged them to propose any thing they could urge, to prove that a life of irreligion and debauchery was preferable to the fear, love, and worship of the eternal God, and a conduct agreeable to the precepts of his gospel. And he failed not to bear his testimony from his own experience (to one part of which many of them had been witnesses), that after having run the widest round of sensual pleasure, with all the advantages, the best constitution and spirits could give him, he had never tasted any thing that deserved to be called happiness, till he had made religion his refuge and his delight. He testified calmly and boldly the habitual serenity and peace, that he now felt in his breast (for, the most elevated delights he did not think fit to plead, lest they should be esteemed enthusiasm), and the composure and pleasure, with which he looked forward to objects,

which the gayest sinner must acknowledge to be equally unavoidable and dreadful.

§ 53. I know not what might be attempted by some of the company in answer to this; but I well remember, he told me, the master of the table, a person of a very frank and candid disposition, cut short the debate, and said, "Come, let us call another cause: We thought this man mad, and he is, in good earnest, proving that we are so." On the whole, this well judged circumstance saved him a great deal of trouble. When his former acquaintance observed, that he was still conversable and innocently cheerful, and that he was immoveable in his resolutions, they desisted from farther importunity. And he has assured me, that instead of losing any one valuable friend by this change in his character, he found himself much more esteemed and regarded by many, who could not persuade themselves to imitate his example.

§ 54. I have not any memoirs of Colonel Gardiner's life, or of any other remarkable event befalling him in it, from the time of his return to England, till his marriage in the year 1726, except the extracts which have been sent me from some letters, which he wrote to his religious friends during this interval, and which I cannot pass by without a more particular notice. It may be recollected, that in consequence of the reduction of that regiment, of which he was Major, he was out of commission from Nov. 10, 1718, till June 1, 1724: And after he returned from Paris, I find all his letters during this period, dated from London, where he continued in communion with the Christian society, under the pastoral care of Doctor Calamy. As his good mother also belonged to the same, it is easy to imagine, it must be an unspeakable pleasure to her, to have such frequent opportunities of conversing with such a son, of observing in his daily conduct and discourses, the blessed effects of that change, which divine grace had made in his heart, and of sitting down with him monthly at that sacred feast, where Christians so frequently enjoy the divinest entertainments, which they expect on this side heaven. I the rather mention this ordinance, because, as this excellent lady had a very high esteem for it, so she had an opportunity of attending, but the very Lord's day immediately preceding her death, which happened on Thursday Oct. 7, 1725, after her son had been removed from her, almost a year. He had maintained her handsomely out of that very moderate income, on which he subsisted, since his regiment had been disbanded; and when she expressed her gratitude to him for it, he assured her (I think, in one of the last letters she

ever received from him), " that he esteemed it a great honour, that God put it into his power to make, what he called, a very small acknowledgment of all her care for him, and especially of the many prayers she had offered on his account, which had already been remarkably answered, and the benefit of which he hoped ever to enjoy."

§ 55. I apprehend that the Earl of Stair's regiment, to the Majority of which he was promoted on the 20th of July, 1724, was then quartered in Scotland; for all the letters in my hand, from that time to the 6th of February, 1726, are dated from thence, and particularly from Douglas, Stranraer, Hamilton and Ayr; but I have the pleasure to find, from comparing these with others of an earlier date from London, and the neighbouring parts, that neither the detriment, which he must suffer by being so long out of commission, nor the hurry of affairs while charged with it, could prevent or interrupt that intercourse with heaven, which was his daily feast, and his daily strength.

§ 56. These were most eminently the happy years of his life; for he had learned to estimate his happiness, not by the increase of honour, or the possession of wealth, or by what was much dearer to his generous heart than either, the converse of the nearest and worthiest human friends, but by nearness to God, and by opportunities of humble converse with him, in the lively exercise of contemplation, praise, and prayer. Now, there was no period of his life, in which he was more eminently favoured with these; nor do I find any of his letters so overflowing with transports of holy joy, as those which were dated during this time. There are, indeed, in some of them, such very sublime passages, that I have been dubious, whether I should communicate them to the public or not, lest I should administer matter of profane ridicule to some, who look upon all the elevations of devotion as contemptible enthusiasm. And it has also given me some apprehensions, lest it should discourage some pious christians, who after having spent several years in the service of God, and in humble obedience to the precepts of his gospel, may not have attained to any such heights as these. But, on the whole, I cannot satisfy myself to suppress them, not only as I number some of them, considered in a devotional view, among the most extraordinary pieces of the kind, I have ever met with; but as some of the most excellent and judicious persons, I any where know, to whom I have read them, have assured me, that they felt their hearts in an unusual manner impressed, quickened, and edified by them.

§ 57. I will therefore draw back the veil, and show my much

honoured friend in his most secret recesses, that the world may see, what those springs were, from whence issued that clear, permanent, and living stream of wisdom, piety, and virtue, which so apparently ran through all that part of his life, which was open to public observation. It is not to be imagined, that letters written in the intimacy of Christian friendship, some of them with the most apparent marks of haste, and amidst a variety of important public cares, should be adorned with any studied elegance of expression, about which the greatness of his soul would not allow him to be, at any time, very solicitous; for he generally, so far as I could observe, wrote as fast as his pen could move, which, happily both for him and his many friends, was very freely. Yet here the grandeur of his subject has sometimes clothed his ideas with a language more elevated, than is ordinarily to be expected in an epistolary correspondence. The proud scorners, who may deride sentiments and enjoyments like those, which this truly great man so experimentally and pathetically describes, I pity from my heart; and grieve to think, how unfit they must be for the hallelujahs of heaven, who pour contempt upon the nearest approaches to them: Nor shall I think it any misfortune to share with so excellent a person in their profane derision. It will be infinitely more than an equivalent for all, that such ignorance and petulancy can think and say, if I may convince some, who are, as yet, strangers to religion, how real, and how noble its delights are; if I may engage my pious readers to glorify God for so illustrious an instance of his grace; and finally, if I may quicken them, and, above all, may rouse my own too indulgent spirit to follow, with less unequal steps, an example, to the sublimity of which I fear, few of us shall, after all, be able fully to attain. And that we may not be too much discouraged under the deficiency, let it be recollected, that few have the advantage of a temper naturally so warm; few have an equal command of retirement; and perhaps, hardly any one, who thinks himself most indebted to the riches and freedom of divine grace, can trace interpositions of it, in all respects, equally astonishing.

§ 58. The first of these extraordinary letters, which have fallen into my hand, is dated near three years after his conversion, and addressed to a lady of quality. I believe it is the first, the Major ever wrote so immediately on the subject of his religious consolations and converse with God in devout retirement. For I well remember, that he once told me, he was so much afraid, that something of spiritual pride should mingle itself with the relation of such kind of experiences, that he concealed

them a long time: But observing with how much freedom the sacred writers open all the most secret recesses of their hearts, especially in the psalms, his conscience began to be burdened, under an apprehension, that, for the honour of God, and in order to engage the concurrent praises of some of his people, he ought to disclose them. On this he set himself to reflect, who, among all his numerous acquaintance, seemed at once the most experienced Christian he knew, (to whom therefore, such things as he had to communicate, might appear solid and credible), and who the humblest. He quickly thought of the Lady Marchioness of Douglas in this view; and the reader may well imagine, that it struck my mind very strongly, to think, that now, more than twenty-four years after it was written, Providence should bring to my hands, (as it has done within these few days), what I assuredly believe to be a genuine copy of that very letter, which I had not the least reason to expect, I should ever have seen, when I learned from his own mouth, amidst the freedom of an accidental conversation, the occasion and circumstances of it.

§ 59. It is dated from London, July 21, 1722; and the very first lines of it relate to a very remarkable circumstance, which, from others of his letters, I find has happened several times. I mean, that, when he had received from any of his Christian friends a few lines, which particularly affected his heart, he could not stay till the stated return of his devotional hour, but immediately retired to pray for them, and to give vent to those religious emotions of mind, which such a correspondence raised. How invaluable was such a friend! and how great reason have those of us, who once possessed a large share in his heart, and in those retired and sacred moments, to bless God for so singular a felicity; and to comfort ourselves in a pleasing hope, that we may yet reap future blessings, as the harvest of those petitions, which he can no more repeat.

§ 60. His words are these: "I was so happy as to receive yours, just as I arrived; and I had no sooner read it, but I shut my door, and sought him, whom my soul loveth. I sought him, and found him; and would not let him go, till he had blessed us all. It is impossible to find words to express, what I obtained; but I suppose, it was something like that, which the disciples got, as they were going to Emmaus, when they said, Did not our hearts burn within us? &c. or rather like what Paul felt, when he could not tell, whether he was in the body, or out of it." He then mentions his dread of spiritual pride, from which he earnestly prays, that God may deliver and

preserve him. "This," says he, "would have hindered me from communicating these things, if I had not such an example before me, as the man after God's own heart, saying, I will declare what God hath done for my soul; and elsewhere, The humble shall hear thereof, and be glad: Now I am well satisfied, that your ladyship is of that number." He then adds, "I had no sooner finished this exercise," that is, of prayer above mentioned, "but I sat down to admire the goodness of my God, that he would vouchsafe to influence, by his free Spirit, so undeserving a wretch as I, and to make me thus to mount up with eagle's wings. And, here I was lost again, and got into an ocean, where I could find neither bound nor bottom; but was obliged to cry out with the apostle, 'O the breadth, the length, the depth, the height of the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge!' But if I give way to this strain, I shall never have done. That the God of hope, may fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that you may abound in hope through the power of the Holy Ghost; shall always be the prayer of him, who is, with the greatest sincerity and respect, your Ladyship's," &c.

§ 61. Another passage, to the same purpose, I find in a memorandum, which he seems to have written for his own use, dated, Monday, March 11, which I perceive, from many concurrent circumstances, must have been in the year 1722-3. "This day," says he, "having been to visit Mrs. G. at Hamstead, I came home about two, and read a sermon on these words, Psal. cxxx. 4. *But there is forgiveness with thee, that thou mayest be feared;* about the latter end of which, there is a description of the miserable condition of those, that are slighters of pardoning grace. From a sense of the great obligations I lay under to the Almighty God, who hath made me to differ from such, from what I was, and from the rest of my companions, I kneeled down to praise his holy name; and I know not that in my lifetime, I ever lay lower in the dust, never having had a fuller view of my own unworthiness. I never pleaded more strongly the merits and intercession of him, who, I know, is worthy; never vowed more sincerely to be the Lord's, and to accept of Christ, as he is offered in the gospel, as my king, priest, and prophet; never had so strong a desire to depart, that I might sin no more; but—'my grace is sufficient'—curbed that desire. I never pleaded with greater fervency for the Comforter, which, our blessed Lord hath promised, shall abide with us for ever. For all which, I desire to ascribe glory, &c. to him that sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb."

§ 62. There are several others of his papers, which speak much the same language; which, had he kept a diary, would, I doubt not, have filled many sheets. I believe, my devout readers would not soon be weary of reading extracts of this kind. But that I may not exceed in this part of my narrative, I shall mention only two more, each of them dated some years after; that is, one from Douglas, April 1, 1725; and the other from Stranraer, 25th May following.

§ 63. The former of these relates to the frame of his spirit on a journey; on the mention of which, I cannot but recollect, how often I have heard him say, that some of the most delightful days of his life were days, in which he travelled alone, that is, with only a servant at a distance; when he could, especially in roads not much frequented, indulge himself in the pleasures of prayer and praise; in the exercise of which last, he was greatly assisted by several psalms and hymns, which he had treasured up in his memory, and which he used, not only to repeat aloud, but sometimes to sing. In reference to this, I remember the following passage in a letter, which he wrote to me many years after, when, on mentioning my ever dear and honoured friend the Rev. Dr. Watts, he says, "How often, in singing some of his psalms, hymns, or lyrics, on horseback, and elsewhere, has the evil spirit been made to flee,

> "Whene'er my heart in tune is found,
> "Like David's harp of solemn sound!"

§ 64. Such was the first of April above mentioned, in the evening of which he writes thus to an intimate friend: "What would I have given this day upon the road, for paper, pen, and ink, when the Spirit of the Most High rested upon me! O for the pen of a ready writer, and the tongue of an angel, to declare what God hath done this day for my soul! But in short, it is in vain to attempt it: All that I am able to say, is only this, that my soul has been for some hours joining with the blessed spirits above, in giving glory, and honour, and praise, unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and to the Lamb, for ever and ever. My praises began from a renewed view of him, whom I saw pierced for my transgressions. I summoned the whole hierarchy of heaven to join with me; and I am persuaded, they all echoed back praise to the Most High. Yea, one would have thought, the very larks joined me with emulation. Sure then I need not make use of many words, to persuade you that are his saints, to join me in blessing and praising his holy name." He concludes,

"May the blessing of the God of Jacob rest upon you all! Adieu. Written in great haste, late, and weary."

§ 65. Scarce can I here refrain from breaking out into more copious reflections on the exquisite pleasures of true religion, when risen to such eminent degrees, which can thus feast the soul in its solitude, and refresh it on journeys; and bring down so much of heaven to earth, as this delightful letter expresses. But the remark is so obvious, that I will not enlarge upon it; but to proceed to the other letter above mentioned, which was written the next month, on the Thursday after a sacrament day.

§ 66. He mentions the pleasure, with which he had attended a preparation sermon the Saturday before; and then he adds, "I took a walk upon the mountains that are over against Ireland; and I persuade myself, that were I capable of giving you a description of what passed there, you would agree, that I had much better reason to remember my God from the hills of Port Patrick, than David from the land of Jordan, and of the Hermonites from the hill Mizar." I suppose he means, in reference to the clearer discoveries of the gospel, with which we are favoured. "In short," says he immediately afterwards, in that scripture phrase which was become so familiar to him, "I wrestled some hours with the angel of the covenant, and made supplications to him with floods of tears and cries,—until I had almost expired: But he strengthened me so, that like Jacob, I had power with God, and prevailed. This," adds he, "is but a very faint description: You will be more able to judge of it by what you have felt yourself upon the like occasions. After such preparatory work, I need not tell you, how blessed the solemn ordinance of the Lord's supper proved to me; I hope it was so to many. You may believe, I should have been exceeding glad, if my gracious Lord had ordered it so, that I might have made you a visit, as I proposed: but I am now glad, it was ordered otherwise, since he hath caused so much of his goodness to pass before me. Were I to give you an account of the many favours, my God hath loaded me with, since I parted from you, I must have taken up many days in nothing but writing. I hope you will join with me in praises for all the goodness, he has shown to your unworthy brother in the Lord."

§ 67. Such were the ardours and elevations of his soul: But while I record these memorials of them, I am very sensible there are many, who will be inclined to censure them, as the flights of enthusiasm; for which reason, I must beg leave to add, a remark or two on the occasion, which will be illustrated

by several other extracts, which I shall introduce into the sequel of these memoirs. The one is, that he never pretends, in any of the passages cited above, or elsewhere, to have received any immediate revelations from God, which should raise him above the ordinary methods of instruction, or discover any thing to him, whether of doctrines or facts. No man was farther from pretending to predict future events, except it were from the moral prognostications of causes naturally tending to produce them; in tracing of which he had, indeed, an admirable sagacity, as I have seen in some very remarkable instances. Neither was he at all inclinable to govern himself by secret impulses upon his mind, leading him to things, for which he could assign no reason but the impulse itself. Had he ventured, in a presumption on such secret agitations of mind, to teach or to do any thing not warranted by the dictates of sound sense, and the word of God, I should readily have acknowledged him an enthusiast, unless he could have produced some other evidence, than his own persuasion, to have supported the authority of them. But these ardent expressions, which some may call enthusiasm, seem only to evidence a heart deeply affected with a sense of the divine presence and perfections, and of that love which passeth knowledge; especially, as manifested in our redemption by the Son of God, which did indeed inflame his whole soul. And he thought he might reasonably ascribe the strong impressions, to which men are generally such strangers, and of which he had long been entirely destitute, to the agency or influence of the Spirit of God upon his heart; and that, in proportion to the degree in which he felt them, he might properly say, God was present with him, and he conversed with God*. Now, when we consider the scriptural phrases of walking with God, of having communion with the Father and

* The ingenious and pious Mr. Grove, who, I think, was as little suspected of running into enthusiastical extremes as most divines I could name, has a noble passage to this purpose in the sixth volume of his posthumous works, p. 40, 41. which, respect to the memory of both these excellent persons, inclines me to insert here: "How often are good thoughts suggested, viz. to the pure in heart, heavenly affections kindled and inflamed! How often is the Christian prompted to holy actions, drawn to his duty, restored, quickened, persuaded, in such a manner, that he would be unjust to the Spirit of God, to question his agency in the whole? Yes, Oh my soul, there is a Supreme Being, who governs the world, and is present with it, who takes up his more special habitation in good men, and is nigh to all who call upon him, to sanctify and assist them! Hast thou not felt him, oh my soul! like another soul actuating thy faculties, exalting thy faculties, exalting thy views, purifying thy passions, exciting thy graces, and begetting in thee an abhorrence of sin, and a love of holiness? And is not all this an argument of his presence, as truly as if thou didst see him?"

his Son Jesus Christ, of Christ's coming to them, that open the door of their hearts to him, and supping with them, of God's shedding abroad his love in the heart by his Spirit, of his coming with Jesus Christ and making his abode with any man that loves him, of his melting him that worketh righteousness, of his making us glad by the light of his countenance, and a variety of other equivalent expressions; I believe, we shall see reason to judge much more favourably of such expressions as those now in question, than persons who are themselves strangers to elevated devotion, and perhaps converse but little with their bible, are inclined to do; especially if they have, as many such persons have, a temper that inclines them to cavil and find fault. And I must farther observe, that amidst all those freedoms, with which this eminent Christian opens his devout heart to the most intimate of his friends, he still speaks with profound awe and reverence of his heavenly Father, and his Saviour, and maintains (after the example of the sacred writers themselves), a kind of dignity in his expressions, suitable to such a subject; without any of that fond familiarity of language, and degrading meanness of phrase, by which it is, especially of late, grown fashionable among some (who nevertheless, I believe, mean well), to express their love and their humility.

§ 68. On the whole, if habitual love to God, firm faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, a steady dependence on the divine promises, a full persuasion of the wisdom and goodness of all the dispensations of providence, a high esteem for the blessings of the heavenly world, and a sincere contempt for the vanities of this, can properly be called enthusiasm; then was Colonel Gardiner, indeed, one of the greatest enthusiasts, our age has produced; and in proportion to the degree, in which he was so, I must esteem him one of the wisest and happiest of mankind; nor do I fear to tell the world, that it is the design of my writing these memoirs, and of every thing else, that I undertake in life, to spread this glorious and blessed enthusiasm; which I know to be the anticipation of heaven, as well as the most certain way to it.

§ 69. But lest any should possibly imagine, that allowing the experiences which have been described above, to have been ever so solid and important, yet there may be some appearance of boasting, in so free a communication of them; I must add to what I have hinted in reference to this above, that I find in many of the papers before me very genuine expressions of the deepest humility and self-abasement; which, indeed, such holy converse with God in prayer and praise does, above all things in the

world, tend to inspire and promote. Thus, in one of his letters, he says, "I am but as a beast before him." In another, he calls himself "a miserable hell-deserving sinner:" And in another, he cries out, "Oh, how good a master do I serve! but alas, how ungrateful am I! What can be so astonishing as the love of Christ to us, unless it be the coldness of our sinful hearts towards such a Saviour?" With many other clauses, of the like nature, which I shall not set myself more particularly to trace through the variety of letters, in which they occur.

§ 70. It is a farther instance of this unfeigned humility, that when (as his lady, with her usual propriety of language, expresses it, in one of her letters to me concerning him), "these divine joys and consolations were not his daily allowance," he, with equal freedom, in the confidence of Christian friendship, acknowledges and laments it. Thus, in the first letter I had the honour of receiving from him, dated from Leicester, July 9, 1739, when he had been mentioning the blessing, with which it had pleased God to attend my last address to him, and the influence it had upon his mind, he adds: "Much do I stand in need of every help, to awaken me out of that spiritual deadness, which seizes me so often. Once indeed it was quite otherwise with me, and that for many years:

"Firm was my health, my day was bright,
"And I presum'd 'twould ne'er be night:
"Fondly I said within my heart,
"Pleasure and peace shall ne'er depart.
"But I forgot: Thine arm was strong,
"Which made my mountain stand so long:
"Soon as thy face began to hide,
"My health was gone, my comforts died.

"And here," adds he, "lies my sin and my folly."

§ 71. I mention this, that the whole matter may be seen just as it was, and that other Christians may not be discouraged, if they feel some abatement of that fervour, and of those holy joys, which they may have experienced during some of the first months or years of their spiritual life. But with relation to the Colonel, I have great reason to believe, that these which he laments as his days of spiritual deadness, were not unanimated; and, that, quickly after the date of this letter, and especially nearer the close of his life, he had farther revivings, as the joyful anticipation of those better things in reserve, which were then nearly approaching. And thus Mr. Spears, in the letter I mentioned above, tells us he related the matter to him (for he studies as much as possible to retain the Colonel's

own words): "However," says he, "after that happy period of sensible communion, though my joys and enlargements were not so overflowing and sensible, yet I have had habitual real communion with God from that day to this;" the latter end of the year 1733; "and I know myself, and all that know me, see, that through the grace of God, to which I ascribe all, my conversation has been becoming the gospel; and let me die, whenever it shall please God, or wherever it shall be, I am sure I shall go to the mansions of eternal glory," &c. And this is perfectly agreeable to the manner in which he used to speak to me on this head, which we have talked over frequently and largely.

§ 72. In this connection, I hope my reader will forgive my inserting a little story, which I received from a very worthy minister in Scotland, and which I shall give in his own words: "In this period," meaning that which followed the first seven years after his conversion, "when his complaint of comparative deadness and languor in religion began, he had a dream, which, though he had no turn at all for taking notice of dreams, yet made a very strong impression upon his mind. He imagined that he saw his blessed Redeemer on earth, and that he was following him through a large field, following him whom his soul loved, but much troubled, because he thought his blessed Lord did not speak to him; till he came to the gate of a burying-place, when, turning about, he smiled upon him in such a manner as filled his soul with the most ravishing joy; and, on after reflection, animated his faith in believing, that, whatever storms and darkness he might meet with in the way at the hour of death, his glorious Redeemer would lift up upon him the light of his life-giving countenance." My correspondent adds a circumstance, for which he makes some apology, as what may seem whimsical, and yet made some impression on himself; "that there was a remarkable resemblance in the field, in which this brave man met death, and that he had represented to him in the dream." I did not fully understand this at first; but a passage in that letter from Mr. Spears, which I have mentioned more than once, has cleared it. "Now observe, Sir, this seems to be a literal description of the place where this Christian hero ended his sorrows and conflicts, and from which he entered triumphantly into the joy of his Lord. For after he fell in battle, fighting gloriously for his king and the cause of his God, his wounded body, while life was yet remaining, was carried from the field of battle by the east side of his own enclosure, till he came to the churchyard of Tranent, and was brought to

the minister's house; where he soon after breathed out his soul into the hands of his Lord, and was conducted to his presence, where there is fullness of joy, without any cloud or interruption, for ever."

§ 73. I well know, that in dreams there are diverse vanities, and readily acknowledge, that nothing certain could be inferred from this: Yet it seems at least to show, which way the imagination was working, even in sleep; and I cannot think it unworthy of a wise and good man sometimes to reflect with complacency on any images, which, passing through his mind even in that state, may tend either to express or to quicken his love to the great Saviour. Those eminently pious divines of the church of England, Bishop Bull, and Bishop Kenn, do both intimate it as their opinion, that it may be a part of the service of ministering angels to suggest devout dreams *: And I know the worthy person of whom I speak, was well acquainted with that midnight hymn of the latter of those excellent writers, which has these lines:

"Lord, lest the tempter me surprise,
"Watch over thine own sacrifice!
"All loose, all idle thoughts cast out;
"And make my very dreams devout!"

Nor would it be difficult to produce other passages much to the same purpose†, if it would not be deemed too great a digression from our subject, and too laboured a vindication of a

* Bishop Bull has these remarkable words: "Although I am no doter on dreams, yet I verily believe, that some dreams are monitory above the power of fancy, and impressed upon us by some superior influence. For of such dreams we have plain and undeniable instances in history, both sacred and profane, and in our own age and observation. Nor shall I so value the laughter of sceptics, and the scoffs of the epicureans, as to be ashamed to profess, that I myself have had some convincing experiments of such impressions." Bishop Bull's Ser. and Disc. vol. ii. p. 489, 490.

† If I mistake not, the same Bishop Kenn is the author of a midnight hymn, concluding with these words:

"May my ethereal guardian kindly spread
"His wings, and from the tempter screen my head;
"Grant of celestial light some piercing beams,
"To bless my sleep, and sanctify my dreams!"

As he certainly was of those exactly parallel lines:

"Oh may my guardian, while I sleep,
"Close to my bed his vigils keep;
"His love angelical instill,
"Stop all the avenues of ill!
"May he celestial joys rehearse,
"And, thought to thought, with me converse!"

little incident, of very small importance, when compared with most of those, which make up this narrative.

§ 74. I meet not with any other remarkable event relating to Major Gardiner, which can properly be introduced here, till the year 1726, when, on, the 11th day of July, he was married to the Right Hon. the Lady Frances Erskine, daughter to the late Earl of Buchan, by whom he had thirteen children, five only of which survived their father, two sons and three daughters; whom I cannot mention without the most fervent prayers to God for them, that they may always behave worthy the honour of being descended from such parents; and that the God of their father, and of their mother, may make them perpetually the care of his Providence, and yet more eminently happy in the constant and abundant influences of his grace!

§ 75. As her ladyship is still living (and for the sake of her dear offspring and numerous friends, may she long be spared)! I shall not here indulge myself in saying any thing of her; except it be, that the Colonel assured me, when he had been happy in this intimate relation to her, more than fourteen years, that the greatest imperfection, he knew in her character, was, "that she valued and loved him, much more than he deserved." And little did he think, in the simplicity of heart, with which he spoke this, how high an encomium he was making upon her, and how lasting an honour such a testimony must leave upon her name, long as the memory of it shall continue.

§ 76. As I do not intend these memoirs a laboured essay on the character of Colonel Gardiner, digested under the various virtues and graces, which Christianity requires (which would, I think, be a little too formal for a work of this kind, and would give it such an air of panegyric, as would neither suit my design, nor be at all likely to render it more useful); I shall now mention what I have either observed in him, or heard concerning him, with regard to those domestic relations, which commenced about this time, or quickly after. And here my reader will easily conclude, that the resolution of Joshua was, from the first, adopted and declared, "As for me and my house, we will serve the Lord." It will naturally be supposed, that as soon as he had a house, he erected an altar in it; that the word of God was read there, and prayers and praises were constantly offered. These were not to be omitted, on account of any guest; for he esteemed it a part of due respect to those that remained under his roof, to take it for granted, they would

look upon it as a very bad compliment, to imagine they would have been obliged, by neglecting the duties of religion on their account. As his family increased, he had a minister statedly resident in his house, who both discharged the office of a tutor to his children, and of a chaplain, and who was always treated with a becoming kindness and respect. But in his absence, the Colonel himself led the devotions of the family; and they were happy, who had an opportunity of knowing, with how much solemnity, fervour, and propriety he did it.

§ 77. He was constant in attendance upon public worship, in which an exemplary care was taken, that the children and servants might accompany the heads of the family. And how he would have resented the non-attendance of any member of it, may easily be conjectured, from a free, but lively passage in a letter to one of his intimate friends on an occasion, which it is not material to mention: "Oh, Sir, had a child of yours under my roof but once neglected the public worship of God, when he was able to attend it, I should have been ready to conclude, he had been distracted, and should have thought of shaving his head, and confining him in a dark room."

§ 78. He always treated his lady with a manly tenderness, giving her the most natural evidences of a cordial habitual esteem, and expressing a most affectionate sympathy with her, under the infirmities of a very delicate constitution, much broken, at least towards the latter years of their marriage, in consequence of so frequent pregnancy. He had, at all times, a most faithful care of all her interests, and especially those relating to the state of religion in her mind. His conversation and his letters concurred to cherish those sublime ideas, which Christianity suggests; to promote our submission to the will of God, to teach us to centre our happiness in the great Author of our being, and to live by faith in the invisible world. These, no doubt, were frequently the subjects of mutual discourse; and many letters, which her Ladyship has had the goodness to communicate to me, are most convincing evidences of the degree, in which this noble and most friendly care filled his mind in the days of their separation; days, which so entire a mutual affection must have rendered exceeding painful, had they not been supported by such exalted sentiments of piety, and sweetened by daily communion with an ever present, and ever gracious God.

§ 79. The necessity of being so many months together distant from his family, hindered him from many of those condescending labours in cultivating the minds of his children in

early life, which, to a soul so benevolent, so wise, and so zealous, would undoubtedly have afforded a very exquisite pleasure. The care of his worthy consort, who well knew, that it is one of the brightest parts of a mother's character, and one of the most important views, in which the sex can be considered, made him the easier under such a circumstance: But when he was with them, he failed not to instruct and admonish them; and the constant deep sense, with which he spoke of divine things, and the real unaffected indifference, which he always showed for what this vain world is most ready to admire, were excellent lessons of daily wisdom, which, I hope, they will recollect with advantage in every future scene of life. And I have seen such hints in his letters relating to them, as plainly shew, with how great a weight they lay on his mind, and how highly he desired, above all things, that they might be the faithful disciples of Christ, and acquainted betimes with the unequalled pleasures and blessings of religion. He thought an excess of delicacy and of indulgence one of the most dangerous faults in education, by which he every where saw great numbers of young people undone: Yet he was solicitous to guard against a severity, which might terrify or discourage; and though he endeavoured to take all prudent precautions to prevent the commission of faults, yet, when they had been committed, and there seemed to be a sense of them, he was always ready to make the most candid allowances for the thoughtlessness of unripened years, and tenderly to cherish every purpose of a more proper conduct for the time to come.

§ 80. It was easy to perceive, that the openings of genius in the young branches of his family gave him great delight, and, that he had a secret ambition to see them excel in what they undertook. Yet he was greatly cautious over his heart, lest it should be too fondly attached to them; and as he was one of the most eminent proficients I ever knew, in the blessed science of resignation to the divine will, so there was no effect of that resignation which appeared to me more admirable, than what related to the life of his children. An experience, which no length of time will ever efface out of my memory, has so sensibly taught me, how difficult it is, fully to support the Christian character here, that I hope my reader will pardon me (I am sure at least, the heart of wounded parents will), if I dwell a little longer upon so interesting a subject.

§ 81. When he was in Herefordshire, in the month of July, in the year 1734, it pleased God to visit his little family

with the small-pox. Five days before the date of the letter, I am just going to mention, he had received the agreeable news, that there was a prospect of the recovery of his son, then under that awful visitation; and he had been expressing his thankfulness for it in a letter, which he had sent away, but a few hours before he was informed of his death; the surprise of which, in this connection, must naturally be very great. But behold (says the reverend and worthy person, from whom I received the copy) his truly filial submission to the will of his heavenly Father, in the following lines, addressed to the dear partner of his affliction: "Your resignation to the will of God under this dispensation gives me more joy, than the death of the child has given me sorrow. He, to be sure, is happy; and we shall go to him, though he shall not return to us. Oh! that we had our latter end always in view!—We shall soon follow; and Oh! what reason have we to long for that glorious day, when we shall get quit of this body of sin and death, under which we now groan, and which renders this life so wretched! I desire to bless God, that——[another of his children] is in so good a way: But I have resigned her. We must not choose for ourselves, and it is well we must not, for we should often make a very bad choice. And therefore it is our wisdom, as well as our duty, to leave all with a gracious God, who hath promised, that all things shall work together for good to those that love him: And he is faithful, that hath promised, who will infallibly perform it, if our unbelief does not stand in the way."

§ 82. The greatest trial of this kind, that he ever bore, was in the removal of his second son, who was one of the most amiable and promising children that has been known. The dear little creature was the darling of all, that knew him; and promised very fair, so far as a child could be known by its doings, to have been a great ornament to the family, and blessing to the public. The suddenness of the stroke must, no doubt, render it the more painful; for this beloved child was snatched away by an illness, which seized him but about fifteen hours before it carried him off. He died in the month of October 1733, at near six years old. Their friends were ready to fear, that his affectionate parents would be almost overwhelmed with such a loss: But the happy father had so firm a persuasion, that God had received the dear little one to the felicities of the celestial world, and, at the same time, had so strong a sense of the divine goodness, in taking one of his children, and that too, one who lay so near his heart, so early to himself, that the sorrows of nature were quite swallowed up in

the sublime joys, which these considerations administered. When he reflected, what human life is; how many its snares and temptations are; and how frequently, children, who once promised very well, are insensibly corrupted, and at length undone; with Solomon, he blessed the dead already dead, more than the living who were yet alive, and felt an unspeakable pleasure in looking after the lovely infant, as safely and delightfully lodged in the house of its heavenly Father. Yea, he assured me, that his heart was at this time so entirely taken up with these views, that he was afraid, they, who did not thoroughly know him, might suspect, that he was deficient in the natural affections of a parent; while thus borne above the anguish of them, by the views, which faith administered to him, and which divine grace supported in his soul.

§ 83. So much did he, on one of the most trying occasions of life, manifest of the temper of a glorified saint; and to such happy purposes did he retain those lessons of submission to God, and acquiescence in him, which, I remember, he once inculcated in a letter, he wrote to a lady of quality, under the apprehension of a breach in her family, with which Providence seemed to threaten her; which I am willing to insert here, though a little out of what might seem its proper place, rather than entirely to omit it. It is dated from London, June 16, 1722, when, speaking of the dangerous illness of a dear relative, he has these words: "When my mind runs hither," that is, to God, as its refuge and strong defence, as the connection plainly determines it, "I think I can bear any thing, the loss of all, the loss of health, of relations, on whom I depend, and whom I love, all that is dear to me, without repining or murmuring. When I think that God orders, disposes, and manages all things according to the counsel of his own will; when I think of the extent of his Providence, that it reaches to the minutest things; then, though a useful friend or dear relative be snatched away by death, I recall myself, and check my thoughts with these considerations: Is he not God, from everlasting to everlasting? And has he not promised to be a God to me? A God in all his attributes; a God in all his persons; a God in all his creatures and providences? And shall I dare to say, What shall I do? Was not He the infinite cause of all I met with in the creatures? and were not they the finite effects of his infinite love and kindness? I have daily experienced, that the instrument was, and is, what God makes it to be; and I know, that this God hath the hearts of all men in his hands, and the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof. If this earth be good for me, I shall have it; for my Father hath

it all in possession. If favour in the eyes of men be good for me, I shall have it, for the spring of every motion in the heart of man is in God's hand. My dear ——— seems now to be dying; but God is all-wise; and every thing is done by him for the best. Shall I hold back any thing that is his own, when he requires it? No; God forbid! When I consider the excellency of his glorious attributes, I am satisfied with all his dealings." I perceive, by the introduction, and by what follows, that most, if not all of this, is a quotation from something written by a lady; but whether from some manuscript or a printed book, whether exactly transcribed, or quoted from memory, I cannot determine: And therefore I thought proper to insert, as the Major, (for that was the office he bore then), by thus interweaving it with his letter, makes it his own; and as it seems to express, in a very lively manner, the principles, which bore him on to a conduct so truly great and heroic, in circumstances that have overwhelmed many an heart, that could have faced danger and death with the greatest intrepidity.

§ 84. I return now to consider his character in the domestic relation of a master, on which I shall not enlarge. It is, however, proper to remark, that as his habitual meekness and command of his passions prevented indecent sallies of ungoverned anger towards those in the lowest state of subjection to him, by which some in high life do strangely debase themselves, and lose much of their authority, so the natural greatness of his mind made him solicitous to render their inferior stations as easy as he could; and so much the rather, because he considered all the children of Adam, as standing upon a level before their great Creator, and had also a deeper sense of the dignity and worth of every immortal soul, how meanly soever it might chance to be lodged, than most persons I have known. This engaged him to give his servants frequent religious exhortations and instructions, as I have been assured by several, who were so happy as to live with him under that character. One of the first letters, after he entered on this Christian course, expresses the same disposition; in which, with great tenderness, he recommends a servant, who was in a bad state of health, to his mother's care, as he was well acquainted with her condescending temper; mentioning, at the same time, the endeavours, he had used to promote his preparations for a better world, under an apprehension that he would not continue long in this. And we shall have an affecting instance of the prevalency of the same disposition in the closing scene of his life, and indeed in the last words he ever spoke,

which expressed his generous solicitude for the safety of a faithful servant, who was then near him.

§ 85. As it was a few years after his marriage, that he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, in which he continued till he had a regiment of his own, I shall, for the future, speak of him by that title; and may not perhaps find any more proper place, in which to mention, what it is proper for me to say of his behaviour and conduct as an officer. I shall not here enlarge on his bravery in the field, though that was very remarkable, as I have heard from others: I say from others, for I never heard any thing of that kind from himself; nor knew, till after his death, that he was present at almost every battle, that was fought in Flanders, while the illustrious Duke of Marlborough commanded the allied army there. I have also been assured from several very credible persons, some of whom were eye-witnesses, that at the skirmish with the rebels at Preston in Lancashire, thirty years before that engagement at the other Preston, which deprived us of this gallant guardian of his country, he signalized himself very particularly; for he headed a little body of men, I think about twelve, and set fire to the barricado of the rebels, in the face of their whole army, while they were pouring in their shot, by which, eight of the twelve that attended him, fell. This was the last action of the kind in which he was engaged, before the long peace, which ensued: And who can express, how happy it was for him, and indeed for his country, of which he was ever so generous, and in his latter years, so important a friend, that he did not fall then; when the profaneness, which mingled itself with his martial rage, seemed to rend the heavens, and shocked some other military gentlemen, who were not themselves remarkable for their caution in this respect.

§ 86. But I insist not on things of this nature, which the true greatness of his soul would hardly ever permit him to mention, unless, when it tended to illustrate the divine care over him in these extremities of danger, and the grace of God, in calling him from so abandoned a state. It is well known, that the character of an officer is not only to be approved in the day of combat. Colonel Gardiner was truly sensible, that every day brought its duties along with it; and he was constantly careful, that no pretence of amusement, friendship, or even devotion itself, might prevent their being discharged in their season.

§ 87. I doubt not, but the noble persons, in whose regiment he was lieutenant-colonel, will always be ready to bear an honourable and grateful testimony to his exemplary diligence

and fidelity, in all that related to the care of the troops, over which he was set; whether with regard to the men or the horses. He knew, that it is incumbent on those, who have the honour of presiding over others, whether in civil, ecclesiastical, or military offices, not to content themselves with doing only so much as may preserve them from the reproach of gross and visible neglect; but seriously to consider, how much they can possibly do, without going out of their proper sphere, to serve the public, by the due inspection of those committed to their care. The duties of the closet and of the sanctuary were so adjusted, as not to interfere with those of the parade, or any other place, where the welfare of the regiment called him. On the other hand, he was solicitous, nor to suffer these things to interfere with religion; a due attendance to which, he apprehended to be the surest method of attaining all desirable success in every other interest and concern in life. He therefore abhorred every thing, that should look like a contrivance to keep his soldiers employed about their horses and their arms at the seasons of public worship, an indecency, which I wish there were no room to mention: Far from that, he used to have them drawn up just before it began; and, from the parade, they went off to the house of God. He understood the rights of conscience too well to impose his own particular profession in religion on others, or to use those, who differed from him in the choice of its modes the less kindly or respectfully on that account. But as most of his own company, and many of the rest, chose, when in England, to attend him to the dissenting chapel, he used to march them up thither in due time, so as to be there, before the worship began. And I must do them the justice to say, that, so far as I could ever discern, when I have seen them in large numbers before me, they have behaved with as much reverence, gravity, and decorum, during the time of divine service, as any of their fellow-worshippers.

§ 88. That his remarkable care to maintain good discipline among them, of which we shall afterwards speak, might be the more effectual, he made himself, on all proper occasions, accessible to them, and expressed a great concern for their interests, which being so genuine and sincere, naturally discovered itself in a variety of instances. I remember, I had once occasion to visit one of his dragoons in his last illness at Harborough, and I found the man upon the borders of eternity; a circumstance, which, as he apprehended it himself, must add some peculiar weight and credibility to his discourse. And he then told me, in his Colonel's absence, that he questioned not, but he should have

everlasting reason to bless God, on Colonel Gardiner's account; for he had been a father to him in all his interests, both temporal and spiritual. He added, that he had visited him almost every day during his illness, with religious advice and instruction, as well as taken care, that he should want nothing, that might conduce to the recovery of his health. And he did not speak of this, as the result of any particular attachment to him, but as the manner, in which he was accustomed to treat those under his command. It is no wonder, that this engaged their affection to a very great degree. And I doubt not, that if he had fought the fatal battle of Preston-Pans at the head of that gallant regiment, of which he had the care for so many years, and which is allowed by most unexceptionable judges to be one of the finest in the British service, and consequently in the world, he had been supported in a very different manner, and had found a much greater number, who would have rejoiced in an opportunity of making their own breasts a barrier in the defence of his.

§ 89. It could not but greatly endear him to his soldiers, that so far as preferments lay in his power, or were under his influence, they were distributed according to merit, which he knew to be, as much the dictate of prudence, as of equity. I find by one of his letters before me, dated but a few months after his happy change, that he was solicited to improve his interest with the Earl of Stair, in favour of one, whom he judged a very worthy person; and that it had been suggested by another, who recommended him, that, if he succeeded, he might expect some handsome acknowledgment. But he answers with some degree of indignation, "Do you imagine, I am to be bribed to do justice?" for such, it seems, he esteemed it, to confer the favour, which was asked from him, on one so deserving. Our enemies had been humbled long ere this, had the same maxims every where prevailed: And, if they do not prevail, the worthiest men in an army or fleet may be sunk under repeated discouragements, and the basest exalted, to the infamy of the public, and perhaps to its ruin.

§ 90. In the midst of all the gentleness, which Colonel Gardiner exercised towards his soldiers, he made it very apparent, that he knew how to reconcile the tenderness of a real, faithful, and condescending friend, with the authority of a commander. Perhaps, hardly any thing conduced more generally to the maintaining of this authority, than the strict decorum and good manners, with which he treated even the private gentlemen of

his regiment; which has always a great efficacy towards keeping inferiors at a proper distance, and forbids, in the least offensive manner, familiarities, which degrade the superior, and enervate his influence. The calmness and steadiness of his behaviour on all occasions, did also greatly tend to the same purpose. He knew, how mean a man looks in the transports of passion, and would not use so much freedom with any of his men, as to fall into such transports before them; well knowing, that persons in the lowest rank of life are aware, how unfit they are to govern others, who cannot govern themselves. He was also sensible, how necessary it is in all, who preside over others, and especially in military officers, to check irregularities, when they first begin to appear: And that he might be able to do it, he kept a strict inspection over his soldiers; in which view it was observed, that as he generally chose to reside among them as much as he could, though in circumstances, which sometimes occasioned him to deny himself in some interests, which were very dear to him, so when they were around him, he seldom staid long in a place; but was frequently walking the streets, and looking into their quarters and stables, as well as reviewing and exercising them, himself. It has often been observed, that the regiment, of which he was so many years lieutenant colonel, was one of the most regular and orderly regiments in the public service; so that, perhaps, none of our dragoons were more welcome than they, to the towns, where their character was known. Yet no such bodies of men are so blameless in their conduct, but something will be found, especially among such considerable numbers, worthy of censure, and sometimes of punishment. This, Colonel Gardiner knew how to inflict with a becoming resolution, and with all the severity, which he judged necessary: A severity, the more awful and impressing, as it was always attended with meekness; for he well knew, that when things are done in a passion, it seems only an accidental circumstance, that they are acts of justice, and that such indecencies greatly obstruct the ends of punishment, both, as it relates to reforming offenders, and to deterring others from an imitation of their faults.

§ 91. One instance of his conduct, which happened at Leicester, and was related by the person chiefly concerned, to a worthy friend from whom I had it, I cannot forbear inserting. While part of the regiment was encamped in the neighbourhood of that place, the colonel went incognito to the camp in the middle of the night; for he sometimes lodged at his quarters in the town. One of the centinels, then on duty, had abandoned

his post, and on being seized, broke out into some oaths, and profane execrations against those that discovered him; a crime, of which the Colonel had the greatest abhorrence, and on which he never failed to animadvert. The man afterwards appeared much ashamed, and concerned for what he had done. But the Colonel ordered him to be brought early the next morning to his own quarters, where he had prepared a piquet, on which he appointed him a private sort of penance: And while he was put upon it, he discoursed with him seriously and tenderly upon the evils and aggravations of his fault; admonished him of the divine displeasure which he had incurred; and urged him to argue from the pain, which he then felt, how infinitely more dreadful it must be, to fall into the hands of the living God, and indeed, to meet the terrors of that damnation, which he had been accustomed impiously to call for on himself and his companions. The result of this proceeding was, that the offender accepted his punishment, not only with submission, but with thankfulness. He went away with a more cordial affection for his Colonel than he ever had before, and spoke of it some years after to my friend, in such a manner, that there seemed reason to hope, it had been instrumental in producing, not only a change in his life, but in his heart.

§ 92. There cannot, I think, be a more proper place for mentioning the great reverence, this excellent officer always expressed for the name of the blessed God, and the zeal, with which he endeavoured to suppress, and, if possible, to extirpate that detestable sin of swearing and cursing, which is every where so common, and especially among our military men. He often declared his sentiments with respect to this enormity, at the head of his regiment; and urged his captains and their subalterns, to take the greatest care, that they did not give the sanction of their example to that, which by their office they were obliged to punish in others. And indeed, his zeal on these occasions wrought in a very active, and sometimes in a remarkably successful manner, not only among his equals, but sometimes among his superiors too. An instance of this in Flanders, I shall have an opportunity hereafter to produce; at present, I shall only mention his conduct in Scotland a little before his death, as I have it from a very valuable young minister of that country, on whose testimony I can thoroughly depend; and I wish, it may excite many to imitation.

§ 93. The commanding officer of the king's forces then about Edinburgh, with the other colonels, and several other

gentlemen of rank in their respective regiments, favoured him with their company at Bankton, and took a dinner with him. He too well foresaw what might happen, amidst such a variety of tempers and characters: And fearing, lest his conscience might have been insnared by a sinful silence, or that, on the other hand, he might seem to pass the bounds of decency, and infringe upon the laws of hospitality, by animadverting on guests so justly intitled to his regard; he happily determined on the following method of avoiding each of these difficulties. As soon as they were come together, he addressed them with a great deal of respect, and yet at the same time, with a very frank and determined air; and told them, that he had the honour in that district to be a justice of the peace, and consequently that he was sworn to put the laws in execution, and, among the rest, those against swearing: That he could not execute them upon others with any confidence, or by any means approve himself as a man of impartiality and integrity to his own heart, if he suffered them to be broken in his presence by persons of any rank whatsoever: And that therefore he intreated all the gentlemen, who then honoured him with their company, that they would please to be upon their guard; and that if any oath or curse should escape them, he hoped, they would consider his legal animadversion upon it, as a regard to the duties of his office and the dictates of his conscience, and not as owing to any want of deference to them. The commanding officer immediately supported him in this declaration, as entirely becoming the station in which he was, assuring him, that he would be ready to pay the penalty, if he inadvertently transgressed; and when Colonel Gardiner on any occasion stepped out of the room, he himself undertook to be the guardian of the law in his absence; and as one of the inferior officers offended during this time, he informed the Colonel, so that the fine was exacted, and given to the poor,* with the universal approbation of the company. The story spread in the neighbourhood, and was perhaps applauded highly by many, who wanted the courage to go and do likewise. But it may be said of the worthy person, of whom I write, with the utmost propriety, that he feared the face of no man living, where the honour of God was concerned. In all

* It is observable, that the money, which was forfeited on this account by his own officers, whom he never spared, or by any others of his soldiers, who rather chose to pay, than submit to corporal punishment, was, by the Colonel's order, laid by in bank, till some of the private men fell sick; and then was laid out, in providing them with proper help and accommodations in their distress.

such cases he might be justly said, in scripture phrase, to *set his face like a flint;* and I assuredly believe, that, had he been in the presence of a sovereign prince, who had been guilty of this fault, his looks at least would have testified his grief and surprise; if he had apprehended it unfit to have borne his testimony any other way.

§ 94. Lord Cadogan's regiment of dragoons, during the years I have mentioned, while he was Lieutenant Colonel of it, was quartered in a great variety of places, both in England and Scotland, from many of which I have letters before me; particularly from Hamilton, Air, Carlisle, Hereford, Maidenhead, Leicester, Warwick, Coventry, Stamford, Harborough, Northampton, and several other places, especially in our inland parts. The natural consequence was, that the Colonel, whose character was on many accounts so very remarkable, had a very extensive acquaintance: And, I believe, I may certainly say, that where ever he was known by persons of wisdom and worth, he was proportionably respected, and left behind him traces of unaffected devotion, humility, benevolence, and zeal for the support and advancement of religion and virtue.

§ 95. The equable tenor of his mind in these respects, is illustrated by his letters from several of these places; and though it is but comparatively a small number of them, which I have now in my hands, yet they will afford some valuable extracts; which I shall therefore here lay before my reader, that he may the better judge as to his real character, in particulars, of which I have already discoursed, or which may hereafter occur.

§ 96. In a letter to his Lady, dated from Carlisle, Nov. 19, 1733, when he was on his journey to Herefordshire, he breathes out his cheerful soul in these words: "I bless God, I was never better in my life time; and I wish I could be so happy, as to hear the same of you; or rather, (in other words), to hear that you had obtained an entire trust in God. That would infallibly keep you in perfect peace; for the God of truth hath promised it. Oh, how ought we to be longing to be with Christ, which is infinitely better than any thing we can propose here! To be there, where all complaints shall be for ever banished; where no mountains shall separate between God and our souls: And I hope, it will be some addition to our happiness, that you and I shall be separated no more; but that as we have joined in singing the praises of our glorious Redeemer here, we shall sing them in a much higher key through

an endless eternity. Oh eternity, eternity! what a wonderful thought is eternity!"

§ 97. From Leicester, Aug. 6, 1739, he writes thus to his Lady, "Yesterday I was at the Lord's Table, where you and the children were not forgotten: But how wonderfully was I assisted when I came home, to plead for you all with many tears!" And then, speaking of some intimate friends, who were impatient, as I suppose by the connection, for his return to them, he takes occasion to observe the necessity "of endeavouring to compose our minds, and to say with the Psalmist, My soul, wait thou only upon God." Afterwards, speaking of one of his children, of whom he heard that he made a commendable progress in learning, he expresses his satisfaction in it, and adds, "But how much greater joy would it give me, to hear that he was greatly advanced in the school of Christ? Oh that our children may but be wise to salvation; and may grow in grace, as they do in stature!"

§ 98. These letters, which to so familiar a friend evidently lay open the heart, and shew the ideas and affections which were lodged deepest there, are sometimes taken up with an account of sermons, he had attended, and the impression they had made upon his mind. I shall mention one only, as a specimen of many more, which was dated from a place called Cohorn, April 15. "We had here a minister from Wales, who gave us two excellent discourses on the love of Christ to us, as an argument to engage our love to him. And indeed, next to the greatness of his love to us, methinks there is nothing so astonishing, as the coldness of our love to him. Oh that he would shed abroad his love upon our hearts by his Holy Spirit, that ours might be kindled into a flame! May God enable you to trust in him, and then you will be kept in perfect peace!"

§ 99. We have met with many traces of that habitual gratitude to the blessed God, as his heavenly Father and constant friend, which made his life probably one of the happiest, that ever was spent on earth. I cannot omit one more, which appears to me the more worthy of notice, as being a short turn in as hasty a letter, as any I remember to have seen, of his, which he wrote from Leicester in June 1739, "I am now under the deepest sense of the many favours, the Almighty has bestowed upon me: surely you will help me to celebrate the praise of our gracious God and kind benefactor." This exuberance of grateful affection, which, while it was almost every hour pouring itself forth before God in the most genuine and emphatical language, felt itself still, as it were, straitened for

want of a sufficient vent, and therefore called on others to help him with their concurrent praises, appears to me the most glorious and happy state, in which a human soul can find itself on this side heaven.

§ 100. Such was the temper which this excellent man appears to have carried along with him through such a variety of places and circumstances; and the whole of his deportment was suitable to these impressions. Strangers were agreeably struck with his first appearance; there was so much of the Christian, the well-bred man, and the universal friend in it; and as they came more intimately to know him, they discovered, more and more, the uniformity and consistency of his whole temper and behaviour; so that, whether he made only a visit for a few days to any place, or continued there for many weeks or months, he was always beloved and esteemed, and spoken of with that honourable testimony from persons of the most different denominations and parties, which nothing but true sterling worth, if I may be allowed the expression, and that in an eminent degree, can secure.

§. 101. Of the justice of this testimony, which I had so often heard from a variety of persons, I myself began to be a witness, about the time, when the last mentioned letter was dated. In this view, I believe, I shall never forget that happy day, June 13, 1739, when I first met him at Leicester. I remember, I happened that day to preach a lecture from Psalm cxix. 158. *I beheld the transgressors, and was grieved, because they kept not thy law.* I was large in describing that mixture of indignation and grief, strongly expressed by the original word there, with which a good man looks on the daring transgressors of the divine law; and in tracing the causes of that grief, as arising from a regard to the divine honour, and the interest of a Redeemer, and a compassionate concern for the misery, such offenders bring on themselves, and for the mischief, they do to the world about them. I little thought, how exactly I was drawing Colonel Gardiner's character under each of those heads; and I have often reflected upon it as a happy providence, which opened a much speedier way, than I could have expected, to the breast of one of the most amiable and useful friends, which I ever expect to find upon earth. We afterwards sung a hymn, which brought over again some of the leading thoughts in the sermon, and struck him so strongly, that on obtaining a copy of it, he committed it to his memory, and used to repeat it with so forcible an accent, as shewed, how much every line expressed of his very soul. In this view, the reader will pardon

my inserting it; especially, as I know not, when I may get time to publish a volume of these serious, though artless composures, which I sent him in manuscript some years ago, and to which I have since made very large additions:

Arise, my tenderest thoughts, arise,
To torrents melt my streaming eyes!
And thou, my heart, with anguish feel
Those evils which thou can'st not heal!

See human nature sunk in shame!
See scandals pour'd on Jesus' name!
The Father wounded through the Son!
The world abus'd, the soul undone!

See the short course of vain delight
Closing in everlasting night!
In flames that no abatement know,
The briny tears for ever flow.

My God, I feel the mournful scene;
My bowels yearn o'er dying men:
And fain my pity would reclaim,
And snatch the fire-brands from the flame.

But feeble my compassion proves,
And can but weep where most it loves:
Thine own all-saving arm employ,
And turn these drops of grief to joy!

§ 102. The Colonel, immediately after the conclusion of the service, met me in the vestry, and embraced me in the most obliging and affectionate manner, as if there had been a long friendship between us; assured me, that he had, for some years, been intimately acquainted with my writings; and desired, that we might concert measures for spending some hours together, before I left the town. I was so happy, as to be able to secure an opportunity of doing it: And I must leave it upon record, that I cannot recollect, I was ever equally edified by any conversation, I remember to have enjoyed. We passed that evening and the next morning together; and it is impossible for me to describe the impression, which the interview left upon my heart. I rode alone all the remainder of the day; and it was my unspeakable happiness, that I was alone, since I could be no longer with him; for I can hardly conceive, what other company would not then have been an incumbrance. The views, which he gave me, even then, (for he began to repose a most obliging confidence in me, though he concealed some of the most extraordinary circumstances of the methods, by which he had been recovered to God and happiness), with those cordial sen-

timents of evangelical piety and extensive goodness, which he poured out into my bosom with so endearing a freedom, fired my very soul, and I hope, I may truly say, (what I wish and pray, many of my readers may also adopt for themselves) that I glorified God in him. Our epistolary correspondence immediately commenced upon my return; and though, through the multiplicity of business on both sides, it suffered many interruptions, it was in some degree the blessing of all the following years of my life, till he fell by those unreasonable and wicked men, who had it in their hearts, with him, to have destroyed all our glory, defence, and happiness.

§ 103. The first letter, I received from him, was so remarkable, that some persons of eminent piety, to whom I communicated it, would not be content without copying it out, or making some extracts from it. I persuade myself, that my devout reader will not be displeased, that I insert the greatest part of it here, especially, as it serves to illustrate the affectionate sense, which he had of the divine goodness in his conversion, though more than twenty years had passed, since that memorable event happened. Having mentioned my ever dear and honoured friend, Dr. Isaac Watts, on an occasion, which I hinted at above (§ 70.) he adds, "I have been in pain these several years, lest that excellent person, that sweet singer in our Israel, should have been called to heaven, before I had an opportunity of letting him know, how much his works have been blessed to me, and of course, of returning him my hearty thanks: For though it is owing to the operation of the Blessed Spirit, that any thing works effectually upon our hearts, yet if we are not thankful to the instrument, which God is pleased to make use of, whom we do see, how shall we be thankful to the Almighty, whom we have not seen? I desire to bless God for the good news of his recovery, and entreat you to tell him, that, although I cannot keep pace with him here, in celebrating the high praises of our glorious Redeemer, which is the greatest grief of my heart, yet I am persuaded, that when I join the glorious company above, where there will be no drawbacks, none will outsing me there, because I shall not find any, that will be more indebted to the wonderful riches of divine grace, than I.

"Give me a place at thy saints' feet,
"Or some fall'n angel's vacant seat;
"I'll strive to sing as loud as they,
"Who sit above in brighter day.

" I know, it is natural for every one, who has felt the Almighty power, which raised our glorious Redeemer from the grave, to believe his case singular: But I have made every one in this respect submit, as soon as he has heard my story. And if you seemed so surprised at the account, which I gave you, what will you be when you hear it all?

" Oh! if I had an angel's voice,
" And could be heard from pole to pole;
" I would to all the listening world
" Proclaim thy goodness to my soul."

He then concludes, after some expressions of endearment, (which, with whatever pleasure I review them, I must not here insert); " If you knew, what a natural aversion I have to writing, you would be astonished at the length of this letter, which is, I believe, the longest I ever wrote: But my heart warms, when I write to you, which makes my pen move the easier. I hope, it will please our gracious God long to preserve you a blessed instrument in his hand, of doing great good in the church of Christ; and that you may always enjoy a thriving soul in a healthful body, shall be the continual prayer of," &c.

§ 104. As our intimacy grew, our mutual affection increased; and " my dearest friend," was the form of address, with which most of his epistles of the last years were begun and ended. Many of them are filled up with his sentiments of those writings, which I published during these years, which he read with great attention, and of which he speaks in terms, which it becomes me to suppress, and to impute in a considerable degree to the kind prejudices of so endeared a friendship. He gives me repeated assurances, " that he was daily mindful of me in his prayers;" a circumstance, which I cannot recollect without the greatest thankfulness; the loss of which I should more deeply lament, did I not hope that the happy effect of these prayers might still continue, and might run into all my remaining days.

§ 105. It might be a pleasure to me, to make several extracts from many others of his letters: But it is a pleasure, which I ought to suppress, and rather to reflect with unfeigned humility, how unworthy I was of such regards from such a person, and of that divine goodness, which gave me such a friend in him. I shall therefore only add two general remarks, which offer themselves from several of his letters. The one is, that there is in some of them, as our freedom increased, an agreeable vein of humour and pleasantry; which shews, how easy religion sat upon him, and, how far he was from placing any part

of it in a gloomy melancholy, or stiff formality. The other is, that he frequently refers to domestic circumstances, such as the illness or recovery of my children, &c. which I am surprised, how a man of his extensive and important business could so distinctly bear upon his mind. But his memory was good, and his heart was yet better; and his friendship was such, that nothing which sensibly affected the heart of one, whom he honoured with it, left his own but slightly touched. I have all imaginable reason to believe, that, in many instances, his prayers were not only offered for us in general terms, but varied, as our particular situation required. Many quotations might verify this; but I decline troubling the reader with an enumeration of passages, in which it was only the abundance of friendly sympathy, that gave this truly great, as well as good man, so cordial a concern.

§ 106. After this correspondence, carried on for the space of about three years, and some interviews, which we had enjoyed at different places, he came to spend some time with us at Northampton, and brought with him his lady and his two eldest children. I had here an opportunity of taking a much nearer view of his character, and surveying it in a much greater variety of lights than before; and my esteem for him increased, in proportion to these opportunities. What I have wrote above, with respect to his conduct in relative life, was in a great measure drawn from what I now saw: And I shall mention here some other points in his behaviour, which particularly struck my mind; and likewise shall touch on his sentiments on some topics of importance, which he freely communicated to me, and which I remarked on account of that wisdom and propriety, which I apprehended in them.

§ 107. There was nothing more openly observable in Colonel Gardiner, than the exemplary gravity, composure, and reverence, with which he attended public worship. Copious as he was in his secret devotions, before he engaged in it, he always began them so early, as not to be retarded by them, when he should resort to the house of God. He, and all his soldiers, who chose to worship with him, were generally there, as I have already hinted, before the service began, that the entrance of so many of them at once might not disturb the congregation already engaged in devotion, and that there might be the better opportunity for bringing the mind to a becoming attention, and preparing it for converse with the divine Being. While acts of worship were going on, whether of prayer or singing, he always

stood up; and whatever regard he might have for persons, who passed by him at that time, though it were to come into the same pew, he never paid any compliment to them: And often has he expressed his wonder at the indecorum of breaking off our address to God, to bow to a fellow creature, which he thought a much greater indecency, than it would be, on a like occasion and circumstance, to interrupt an address to our prince. During the time of preaching, his eye was commonly fixed upon the minister, though sometimes turned round upon the auditory, where, if he observed any to trifle, it filled him with just indignation. And I have known instances, in which, upon making the remark, he has communicated it to some friend of the persons, who were guilty of it, that proper application might be made to prevent it for the time to come.

§ 108. A more devout communicant at the table of the Lord has, perhaps, seldom been any where known. Often have I had the pleasure to see that manly countenance softened to all the marks of humiliation and contrition, on this occasion; and to discern, in spite of all his efforts to conceal them, streams of tears flowing down from his eyes, while he has been directing them to those memorials of his Redeemer's love. And some, who have conversed intimately with him, after he came from that ordinance, have observed a visible abstraction from surrounding objects, by which there seemed reason to imagine, that his soul was wrapped up in holy contemplation. And I particularly remember, that when we had once spent great part of the following Monday in riding together, he made an apology to me for being so absent, as he seemed, by telling me, "that his heart was flown upward, before he was aware, to him, whom not having seen, he loved*; and that he was rejoicing in him with such unspeakable joy, that he could not hold it down to creature-converse."

§ 109. In all the offices of friendship he was remarkably ready, and had a most sweet and engaging manner of performing them, which greatly heightened the obligations he conferred. He seemed not to set any high value upon any benefit he bestowed; but did it without the least parade, as a thing, which in those circumstances, came of course, where he had professed love and respect; which he was not over forward to do, though he treated strangers and those, who were most his inferiors very courteously, and always seemed, because he in truth always was, glad of any opportunity of doing them good.

* N. B. This alluded to the subject of the sermon, the day before, which was 1 Pet. i. 8.

§ 110. He was particularly zealous in vindicating the reputation of his friends in their absence; and though I cannot recollect, that I had ever an opportunity of observing this immediately, as I do not know that I ever was present with him, when any ill was spoken of others at all; yet by what I have heard him say, with relation to attempts to injure the character of worthy and useful men, I have reason to believe, that no man living was more sensible of the baseness and infamy, as well as the cruelty of such a conduct. He knew and despised the low principles of resentment for unreasonable expectations disappointed, of personal attachment to men of some crossing interests, of envy, and of party-zeal, from whence such a conduct often proceeds; and was particularly offended, when he found it, as he frequently did, in persons that set up for the greatest patrons of liberty, virtue, and candour. He looked upon the murderers of reputation and usefulness, as some of the vilest pests of society; and plainly shewed, on every proper occasion, that he thought it the part of a generous, benevolent, and courageous man, to exert himself in tracing and hunting down the slander, that the authors or abettors of it might be less capable of mischief for the future.

§ 111. The most plausible objection, that I ever heard to Colonel Gardiner's character, is, that he was too much attached to some religious principles, established indeed in the churches both of England and Scotland, but which have, of late years, been much disputed, and from which, it is at least, generally supposed, not a few in both have thought proper to depart; whatever expedients they may have found to quiet their consciences, in subscribing those formularies, in which they are plainly taught. His zeal was especially apparent in opposition to those doctrines, which seemed to derogate from the divine honours of the Son, and Spirit of God, and from the freedom of divine grace, or the reality and necessity of its operations in the conversion and salvation of sinners.

§ 112. With relation to these, I must observe, that it was his most stedfast persuasion, that all those notions, which represent our blessed Redeemer and the Holy Spirit, as mere creatures, or which set aside the atonement of the former, or the influence of the latter, do sap the very foundation of Christianity, by rejecting the most glorious doctrines peculiar to it. He had attentively observed, what indeed is too obvious, the unhappy influence, which the denial of these principles often has on the character of ministers, and on their success; and was persuaded, that an attempt to substitute that mutilated form of Christianity,

which remains, when these essentials of it are taken away, has proved one of the most successful methods, which the great enemy of souls has ever taken, in these latter days, to lead men, by insensible degrees, into deism, vice, and perdition. He also sagaciously observed the artful manner, in which obnoxious tenets are often maintained or insinuated, with all that mixture of zeal and address, with which they are propagated in the world, even by those, who had most solemnly professed to believe, and engaged to teach the contrary: And, as he really apprehended, that the glory of God and the salvation of souls was concerned, his piety and charity made him eager and strenuous in opposing, what he judged to be errors of so pernicious a nature. Yet I must declare, that according to what I have known of him (and I believe, he opened his heart on these topics to me with as much freedom, as to any man living), he was not ready, upon light suspicions, to charge tenets, which he thought so pernicious, on any, especially, where he saw the appearances of a good temper and life, which he always reverenced and loved in persons of all sentiments and professions. He severely condemned causeless jealousies, and evil surmisings of every kind; and extended that charity in this respect, both to clergy, and laity, which good Bishop Burnet was so ready, according to his own account, to limit to the latter, "of believing every man good, till he knew him to be bad, and his notions right, till he knew them wrong." He could not but be very sensible of the unhappy consequences, which may follow on attacking the characters of men, especially of those, who are ministers of the gospel: And if, through a mixture of human frailty, from which the best of men, in the best of their meanings and intentions, are not entirely free, he has ever, in the warmth of his heart, dropped a word, which might be injurious to any on that account, which I believe very seldom happened, he would gladly retract it on better information; which was perfectly agreeable to that honest and generous frankness of temper, in which I never knew any man, who exceeded him.

§ 113. On the whole, it was indeed his deliberate judgment, that the Arian, Socinian, and Pelagian doctrines were highly dishonourable to God, and dangerous to the souls of men; and that it was the duty of private Christians, to be greatly on their guard against those ministers, by whom they are entertained, lest their minds should be corrupted from the simplicity, that is in Christ. Yet he sincerely abhorred the thought of persecution for conscience sake, of the absurdity and

iniquity of which in all its kinds and degrees, he had as deep and rational a conviction, as any man I could name. And indeed the generosity of his heroic heart could hardly bear to think, that those glorious truths, which he so cordially loved, and which he assuredly believed to be capable of such fair support, both from reason and the word of God, should be disgraced by methods of defence and propagation, common to the most impious and ridiculous falsehoods. Nor did he by any means approve of passionate and furious ways of vindicating the most vital and important doctrines of the gospel: For he knew, that, to maintain the most benevolent religion in the world by such malevolent and infernal methods, was destroying the end, to accomplish the means; and that it was as impossible, that true Christianity should be supported thus, as it is, that a man should long be nourished by eating his own flesh. To display the genuine fruits of christianity in a good life, to be ready to plead with meekness and sweetness for the doctrines, it teaches, and to labour, by every office of humanity and goodness, to gain upon them that oppose it, were the weapons, with which this good soldier of Jesus Christ faithfully fought the battles of the Lord. These weapons will always be victorious in his cause; and they who have recourse to others of a different temperature, how strong soever they may seem, and how sharp soever they may really be, will find, they break in their hands, when they exert them most furiously, and are much more likely to wound themselves, than to conquer the enemies they oppose.

§ 114. But while I am speaking of Colonel Gardiner's charity in this respect, I must not omit that of another kind, which has indeed engrossed the name of charity much more than it ought, excellent as it is; I mean almsgiving, for which he was very remarkable. I have often wondered how he was able to do so many generous things this way: But his frugality fed the spring. He made no pleasurable expence on himself; and was contented with a very decent appearance in his family, without affecting such an air of grandeur, as could not have been supported without sacrificing to it satisfactions far nobler, and to a temper like his, far more delightful. The lively and tender feelings of his heart in favour of the distressed and afflicted, made it a self-indulgence to him to relieve them; and the deep conviction, he had of the vain and transitory nature of the enjoyments of this world, together with the sublime view, he had of another, engaged him to dispense his bounties with a very liberal hand, and even to seek out proper objects of them:

And above all, his sincere and ardent love to the Lord Jesus Christ engaged him to feel, with a true sympathy, the concerns of his poor members. In consequence of this, he honoured several of his friends with commissions for the relief of the poor; and particularly, with relation to some under my pastoral care, he referred it to my discretion, to supply them with what I should judge expedient; and frequently pressed me in his letters to be sure not to let them want. And where persons standing in need of his charity happened, as they often did, to be persons of remarkably religious dispositions, it was easy to perceive, that he not only loved, but honoured them, and really esteemed it an honour, which Providence conferred upon him, that he should be made, as it were, the almoner of God for the relief of such.

§ 115. I cannot forbear relating a little story here, which, when the Colonel himself heard it, gave him such exquisite pleasure, that I hope it will be acceptable to several of my readers. There was in a village about three miles from Northampton, and in a family which of all others near me was afterwards most indebted to him (though he had never then seen any member of it), an aged, and poor, but eminently good woman, who had, with great difficulty, in the exercise of much faith and patience, diligence and humility, made shift to educate a large family of children, after the death of her husband, without being chargeable to the parish; which, as it was quite beyond her hope, she often spoke of with great delight. At length, when worn out with age and infirmities, she lay upon her dying bed, she did in a most lively and affecting manner express her hope and joy in the views of approaching glory. Yet, amidst all the triumph of such a prospect, there was one remaining care and distress which lay heavy on her mind; which was, that as her journey and her stock of provisions were both ended together, she feared that she must either be buried at the parish expence, or leave her most dutiful and affectionate daughters the house stripped of some of the few moveables which remained in it, to perform the last office of duty to her, which, she had reason to believe they would do. While she was combating with this only remaining anxiety, I happened, though I knew not the extremity of her illness, to come in, and to bring with me a guinea, which the generous Colonel had sent by a special message, on hearing the character of the family, for its relief. A present like this (probably the most considerable they had ever received in their lives), coming in this manner from an entire stranger, at such a crisis of time,

threw my dying friend (for such, amidst all her poverty, I rejoiced to call her), into a perfect transport of joy. She esteemed it as a singular favour of Providence, sent to her in her last moments, as a token for good, and greeted it as a special mark of that loving kindness of God, which should attend her for ever. She would therefore be raised up in her bed, that she might bless God for it upon her knees, and with her last breath pray for her kind and generous benefactor, and for him who had been the instrument of directing his bounty into this channel. After which she soon expired, with such tranquility and sweetness, as could not but most sensibly delight all, who beheld her, and occasioned many, who knew the circumstances, to glorify God on her behalf.

§ 116. The Colonel's last residence at Northampton was in June and July 1742, when Lord Cadogan's regiment of dragoons was quartered here: And I cannot but observe, that wherever that regiment came, it was remarkable not only for the fine appearance it made, and for the exactness, with which it performed its various exercises (of which it had about this time the honour to receive the most illustrious testimonials), but also for the great sobriety and regularity of the soldiers. Many of the officers copied after the excellent pattern, which they had daily before their eyes; and a considerable number of the private men seemed to be persons not only of strict virtue, but of serious piety. And I doubt not but they found their abundant account in it, not only in the serenity and happiness of their own minds, which is beyond comparison the most important consideration; but also, in some degree, in the obliging and respectful treatment which they generally met with in their quarters. And I mention this, because I am persuaded, that if gentlemen of their profession knew, and would reflect, how much more comfortable they make their own quarters, by a sober, orderly and obliging conduct, they would be regular out of mere self-love, if they were not influenced, as I heartily wish they may always be, by a nobler principle.

§ 117. Towards the latter end of this year he embarked for Flanders, and spent some considerable time with the regiment at Ghent, where he much regretted the want of those religious ordinances and opportunities which had made his other abodes delightful. But as he had made so eminent a progress in that divine life, which they are all intended to promote, he could not be unactive in the cause of God. I have now before me a letter dated from thence, October 16, 1742, in which he writes,

"As for me, I am indeed in a dry and barren land, where no water is. Rivers of waters run down mine eyes, because nothing is to be heard in our Sodom, but blaspheming the name of my God; and I am not honoured as the instrument of doing any great service. It is true, I have reformed six or seven field-officers of swearing. I dine every day with them, and have entered them into a voluntary contract, to pay a shilling to the poor for every oath; and it is wonderful to observe the effect it has had already. One of them told me this day at dinner, that it had really such an influence upon him, that being at cards last night, when another officer fell a swearing, he was not able to bear it, but rose up and left the company. So you see, restraints at first arising from a low principle may improve into something better."

§ 118. During his abode here, he had a great deal of business upon his hands; and had also, in some marches, the care of more regiments than his own: And it has been very delightful to me to observe, what a degree of converse with heaven, and the God of it, he maintained, amidst these scenes of hurry and fatigue; of which the reader may find a remarkable specimen in the following letter, dated from Lichtwick, in the beginning of April, 1743, which was one of the last, I received from him while abroad, and begins with these words: "Yesterday being the Lord's day, at six in the morning, I had the pleasure of receiving yours at Nortonick; and it proved a sabbath-day's blessing to me. Some time before it reached me," (from whence, by the way, it may be observed, that his former custom of rising so early to his devotions was still retained,) "I had been wrestling with God with many tears; and when I had read it, I returned to my knees again, to give hearty thanks to him, for all his goodness to you and yours, and also to my self, in that he hath been pleased to stir up so many who are dear to him, to be mindful of me at the throne of grace." And then, after the mention of some other particulars, he adds; "Blessed, and adored for ever, be the holy name of my heavenly Father, who holds my soul in life, and my body in perfect health! Were I to recount his mercy and goodness to me even in the midst of all these hurries, I should never have done.—I hope, your Master will still encourage you in his work, and make you a blessing to many. My dearest friend, I am much more yours, than I can express, and shall remain so, while I am J. G."

§ 119. In this correspondence I had a farther opportunity of discovering that humble resignation to the will of God,

which made so amiable a part of his character, and of which I had before seen so many instances. He speaks, in the letter from which I have just been giving an extract, of the hope, he had expressed in a former, of seeing us again that winter; and he adds, "To be sure, it would have been a great pleasure to me: But we poor mortals form projects, and the Almighty Ruler of the universe disposes of all, as he pleases. A great many of us were getting ready for our return to England, when we received an order to march towards Frankfort, to the great surprise of the whole army, neither can any of us comprehend what we are to do there; for there is no enemy in that country, the French army being marched into Bavaria, where I am sure we cannot follow them. But it is the will of the Lord; and his will be done! I desire to bless and praise my heavenly Father, that I am entirely resigned to it. It is no matter where I go, or what becomes of me, so that God may be glorified, in my life, or my death. I should rejoice much to hear, that all my friends were equally resigned."

§ 120. The mention of this article reminds me of another, relating to the views which he had of obtaining a regiment for himself. He endeavoured to deserve it by the most faithful services; some of them, indeed, beyond what the strength of his constitution would well bear: For the weather in some of these marches proved exceeding bad, and yet he would be always at the head of his people, that he might look to every thing that concerned them, with the exactest care. This obliged him to neglect the beginnings of a feverish illness; the natural consequence of which was, that it grew very formidable, forced a long confinement upon him, and gave animal nature a shock, which it never recovered.

§ 121. In the mean time, as he had the promise of a regiment, before he quitted England, his friends were continually expecting an occasion of congratulating him, on having received the command of one. But still they were disappointed; and, on some of them, the disappointment seemed to sit heavy. As for the Colonel himself, he seemed quite easy about it; and, appeared much greater in that easy situation of mind, than the highest military honours and preferments could have made him. With great pleasure do I, at this moment, recollect the unaffected serenity, and even indifference, with which he expresses himself, upon this occasion, in a letter to me, dated about the beginning of April, 1743. "The disappointment of a regiment is nothing to me; for I am satisfied, that had it been for

God's glory, I should have had it; and I should have been sorry to have had it on any other terms. My heavenly Father has bestowed upon me infinitely more, than if He had made me emperor of the whole world."

§ 122. I find several parallel expressions in other letters; and those to his Lady, about the same time, were just in the same strain. In an extract from one, which was written from Aix la Chapelle, April 21, the same year, I meet with these words: "People here imagine, I must be sadly troubled, that I have not got a regiment, (for six, out of seven vacant, are now disposed of;) but they are strangely mistaken, for it has given me no sort of trouble. My heavenly Father knows what is best for me; and blessed, and for ever adored be his name, He has given me an entire resignation to his will: Besides, I don't know, that ever I met with any disappointment, since I was a Christian, but it pleased God to discover to me, that, it was plainly for my advantage, by bestowing something better upon me afterwards: Many instances of which I am able to produce; and therefore I should be the greatest of monsters, if I did not trust in him."

§ 123. I should be guilty of a great omission, if I were not to add, how remarkably the event corresponded with his faith, on this occasion. For, whereas, he had no intimation, or expectation of any thing, more than a regiment of foot, his Majesty was pleased, out of his great goodness, to give him a regiment of dragoons, which was then quartered just in his own neighbourhood. And it is properly remarked, by the reverend and worthy person, through whose hand, this letter was transmitted to me, that when the Colonel thus expressed himself, he could have no prospect of what he afterwards so soon obtained; as general Bland's regiment, to which he was advanced, was only vacant on the 19th of April, that is, two days before the date of this letter, when it was impossible, he should have any notice of that vacancy. And, it also deserves observation, that some few days after the Colonel was thus unexpectedly promoted to the command of these dragoons, Lord Cornwallis's regiment of foot, then in Flanders, became vacant: Now, had this happened, before his promotion to General Bland's, Colonel Gardiner, in all probability, would only have had that regiment of foot, and so have continued in Flanders. When the affair was issued, he informs Lady Frances of it, in a letter, dated from a village near Frankfort, May 3, in which he refers to his former of the 21st of April, observing, how remarkably it was verified, "in God's having given him," (for so he ex-

presses it, agreeably to the views he continually maintained of the universal agency of divine Providence,) " what he had no expectation of, and what was so much better, than that which he had missed, a regiment of dragoons quartered at his own door."

§ 124. It appeared to him, that by this remarkable event, Providence called him home. Accordingly, though he had other preferments offered him in the army, he chose to return ; and I believe, the more willingly, as he did not expect, there would have been any action. Just at this time, it pleased God to give him an awful instance of the uncertainty of human prospects, and enjoyments, by that violent fever, which seized him at Ghent, in his way to England ; and perhaps, the more severely, for the efforts he made to push on his journey, though he had, for some days, been much indisposed. It was, I think, one of the first fits of severe illness he had ever met with ; and he was ready to look upon it, as a sudden call into eternity : But it gave him no painful alarm in that view. He committed himself to the God of his life, and, in a few weeks, he was so well recovered, as to be capable of pursuing his journey, though not without difficulty : And, I cannot but think, it might have conduced much to a more perfect recovery than he ever attained, to have allowed himself a longer repose, in order to recruit his exhausted strength and spirits. But, there was an activity in his temper, not easy to be restrained ; and it was now stimulated, not only by a desire of seeing his friends, but of being with his regiment ; that he might omit nothing in his power, to regulate their morals, and their discipline, and to form them for public service. Accordingly, he passed through London, about the middle of June, 1743, where he had the honour of waiting on their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales, and of receiving, from both, the most obliging tokens of favour and esteem. He arrived at Northampton, on Monday the 21st of June, and spent part of three days here. But the great pleasure which his return and preferment gave us, was much abated, by observing his countenance so sadly altered, and the many marks of languor, and remaining disorder, which evidently appeared ; so that he really looked ten years older, than he had done ten months before. I had, however, a satisfaction, sufficient to counter-balance much of the concern, which this alteration gave me, in a renewed opportunity of observing, indeed more sensibly than ever, in how remarkable a degree he was dead to the enjoyments and views of this mortal life. When I congratulated him on the favour-

able appearances of Providence for him in the late event, he briefly told me the remarkable circumstances that attended it, with the most genuine impressions of gratitude to God for them; but added, "that as his account was increased with his income, power, and influence, and his cares were proportionably increased too, it was, as to his own personal concern, much the same to him, whether he had remained in his former station, or been elevated to this; but, that if God, should by this means honour him, as an instrument of doing more good than he could otherwise have done, he should rejoice in it."

§ 125. I perceived, that, the near views he had taken of eternity, in the illness, from which he was then so imperfectly recovered, had not in the least alarmed him; but, that he would have been entirely willing, had such been the determination of God, to have been cut short in a foreign land, without any earthly friend near him, and in the midst of a journey, undertaken with hopes and prospects so pleasing to nature; which appeared to me no inconsiderable evidence of the strength of his faith. But we shall wonder the less at this extraordinary resignation, if we consider the joyful and assured prospect, which he had of an happiness infinitely superior beyond the grave; of which, that worthy minister of the church of Scotland, who had an opportunity of conversing with him quickly after his return, and having the memorable story of his conversion from his own mouth, as I have hinted above, writes thus in his letter to me, dated Jan. 14, 1746-7. "When he came to review his regiment, at Linlithgow, in summer 1743, after having given me the wonderful story as above, he concluded in words to this purpose:—Let me die, whenever it shall please God, or wherever it shall be, I am sure, I shall go to the mansions of eternal glory, and enjoy my God, and my Redeemer, in heaven for ever."

§ 126. While he was with us at this time, he appeared deeply affected with the sad state of things as to religion and morals, and seemed to apprehend, that the rod of God was hanging over so sinful a nation. He observed a great deal of disaffection, which the enemies of the government had, by a variety of artifices, been raising in Scotland for some years: And the number of jacobites there, together with the defenceless state in which our island then was, with respect to the number of its forces at home, of which he spoke at once with great concern and astonishment, led him to expect an invasion from France, and an attempt in favour of the Pretender, much sooner than it happened. I have heard him often say, many years before it

came so near being accomplished, "that a few thousands might have a fair chance for marching from Edinburgh to London uncontrolled, and throw the whole kingdom into an astonishment." And I have great reason to believe, that this was one main consideration, which engaged him to make such haste to his regiment, then quartered in those parts; as he imagined there was not a spot of ground, where he might be more like to have a call to expose his life in the service of his country; and perhaps, by appearing on a proper call early in its defence, be instrumental in suppressing the beginnings of most formidable mischief. How rightly he judged in these things, the event did too evidently shew.

§ 127. The evening before our last separation, as I knew, I could not entertain the invaluable friend, who was then my guest more agreeably, I preached a sermon in my own house, with some peculiar reference to his case and circumstances, from those ever memorable words, than which I have never felt any more powerful and more comfortable: Psal xci. 14, 15, 16. *Because he hath set his love upon me, therefore will I deliver him; I will set him on high, because he hath known my name: He shall call upon me, and I will answer him: I will be with him in trouble, I will deliver him, and honour him: With long life*, or length of days, *will I satisfy him, and shew him my salvation.* This scripture could not but lead our meditations to survey the character of the good man, as one, who so knows the name of the blessed God, (has such a deep apprehension of the glories and perfections of his nature,) as determinately to set his love upon him, to make him the supreme object of his most ardent and constant affection. And it suggested the most sublime and animating hopes to persons of such a character; that their prayers shall be always acceptable to God; that though they may, and must, be called out to their share in the troubles and calamities of life, yet they may assure themselves of the divine presence in all; which shall issue in their deliverance, in their exaltation, sometimes to distinguished honour and esteem among men, and, it may be, in a long course of useful and happy years on earth; at least, which shall undoubtedly end in seeing, to their perpetual delight, the complete salvation of God, in a world, where they shall enjoy *length of days for ever and ever*, and employ them all in adoring the great author of their salvation and felicity. It is evident, that these natural thoughts on such a scripture were matters of universal concern. Yet, had I known, that this was the last time, I should ever address Colonel Gardiner, as a minister of the gospel, and had I fore-

seen the scenes through which God was about to lead him, I hardly know what considerations I could have suggested with more peculiar propriety. The attention, elevation, and delight, with which he heard them, was very apparent; and the pleasure, which the observation of it gave me, continues to this moment. And let me be permitted to digress so far, as to add, that this is, indeed, the great support of a Christian minister, under the many discouragements and disappointments which he meets with, in his attempts to fix upon the profligate or the thoughtless part of mankind, a deep sense of religious truth; that there is another important part of his work, in which he may hope to be more generally successful; as by plain, artless, but serious discourses, the great principles of Christian duty and hope may be nourished and invigorated in good men, their graces watered as at the root, and their souls animated, both to persevere, and improve in holiness. And when we are effectually performing such benevolent offices, so well suiting our immortal natures, to persons, whose hearts are cemented with ours in the bonds of the most endearing and sacred friendship, it is too little to say, it over-pays the fatigue of our labours; it even swallows up all sense of it, in the most rational and sublime pleasure.

§ 128. An incident occurs to my mind, which happened that evening, which, at least, for the oddness of it, may deserve a place in these memoirs. I had then with me one Thomas Porter, a poor, but very honest and religious man, now living at Hatfield-Broadoak, in Essex, who is quite unacquainted with letters, so as not to be able to distinguish one from another; yet is master of the contents of the bible in so extraordinary a degree, that he has not only fixed an immense number of texts in his memory, but merely by hearing them quoted in sermons, has registered there the chapter and verse, in which these passages are to be found: This is attended with a marvellous facility in directing those that can read, to turn to them, and a most unaccountable talent of fixing on such, as suit almost every imaginable variety of circumstances in common life. There are two considerations in his case, which make it the more wonderful: The one, that he is a person of a very low genius, having, besides a stammering, which makes his speech almost unintelligible to strangers, so wild and awkward a manner of behaviour, that he is frequently taken for an idiot, and seems, in many things, to be indeed so: The other, that he grew up to manhood in a very licentious course of living, and an entire ignorance of divine things, so that all these exact

impressions on his memory have been made in his riper years. I thought it would not be disagreeable to the Colonel, to introduce to him this odd phænomenon, which many hundreds of people have had a curiosity to examine: And among all the strange things, I have seen in him, I never remember any, which equalled what passed on this occasion. On hearing the Colonel's profession, and receiving some hints of his religious character, he ran through a vast variety of scriptures, beginning at the Pentateuch and going on to the Revelation, relating either to the dependance to be fixed on God for the success of military preparations, or to the instances and promises occurring there of his care of good men in the most imminent dangers, or to the encouragement to despise perils and death, while engaged in a good cause, and supported by the views of a happy immortality. I believe, he quoted more than twenty of these passages; and I must freely own, that I know not, who could have chose them with greater propriety. If my memory do not deceive me, the last of this catalogue was that, from which I afterwards preached on the lamented occasion of this great man's fall: *Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life.* We were all astonished at so remarkable a fact; and I question not, but that many of my readers will think the memory of it worthy of being thus preserved.

§ 129. But to return to my main subject: The next day after the sermon and conversation, of which I have been speaking, I took my last leave of my inestimable friend, after attending him some part of his way northward. The first stage of our journey was to the cottage of that poor, but very religious family, which I had occasion to mention above, as relieved, and indeed, in a great measure, subsisted, by his charity. And nothing could be more delightful, than to observe the condescension, with which he conversed with these his humble pensioners. We there put up our last united prayers together; and he afterwards expressed, in the strongest terms, I ever heard him use on such an occasion, the singular pleasure with which he had joined in them. Indeed, it was no small satisfaction to me, to have an opportunity of recommending such a valuable friend to the divine protection and blessing, with that particular freedom, and enlargement on what was peculiar in his circumstances, which hardly any other situation, unless we had been quite alone, could so conveniently have admitted. We went from thence to the table of a person of distinction in the neighbourhood; where he had an opportunity of shewing, in how decent and graceful a

manner he could unite the Christian and the gentleman, and give conversation an improving and religious turn, without violating any of the rules of polite behaviour, or saying or doing any thing, which looked at all constrained or affected. Here we took our last embrace, committing each other to the care of the God of heaven; and the Colonel pursued his journey to the north, where he spent all the remainder of his days.

§ 130. The more I reflect upon this appointment of Providence, the more I discern of the beauty and wisdom of it; not only, as it led directly to that glorious period of life, with which God had determined to honour him, and in which, I think, it becomes all his friends to rejoice; but also, as the retirement, on which he entered, could not but have a happy tendency to favour his more immediate and complete preparation for so speedy a remove. To which we may add, that it must probably have a very powerful influence to promote the interests of religion, incomparably the greatest of all interests, among the members of his own family; who must surely edify much by such daily lessons as they received from his lips, when they saw them illustrated and enforced by so admirable an example, and this for two complete years. It is the more remarkable, as I cannot find from the memoirs of his life in my hands, that he had ever been so long at home since he had a family, or indeed, from his childhood, ever so long at a time in any one place.

§ 131. With how clear a lustre his lamp shone, and with what holy vigour his loins were girded up in the service of his God, in these his latter days, I learn, in part, from the letters of several excellent persons, in the ministry, or in secular life, with whom I have since conversed or corresponded. And in his many letters, dated from Bankton, during this period, I have still farther evidence, how happy he was, amidst those infirmities of body, which his tenderness for me would seldom allow him to mention; for it appears from them, what a daily intercourse he kept up with heaven, and what delightful communion with God crowned his attendance on public ordinances, and his sweet hours of devout retirement. He mentions his sacramental opportunities with peculiar relish, crying out as in a holy rapture, in reference to one and another of them, "Oh how gracious a Master do we serve! How pleasant is his service! How rich the entertainments of his love! Yet, oh how poor, and cold are our services!"—But I will not multiply quotations of this sort, after those I have given above, which may be a sufficient specimen of many more in the same strain. This hint may suffice to shew, that the same ardor of soul held out in a great measure to

the last; and indeed, it seems, that towards the close of life, like the flame of a lamp almost expiring, it sometimes exerted an unusual blaze.

§ 132. He spent much of his time at Bankton in religious solitude; and one most intimately conversant with him assures me, that the traces of that delightful converse with God, which he enjoyed in it, might easily be discerned in that solemn yet cheerful countenance, with which he often came out of his closet. Yet his exercises there must sometimes have been very mournful, considering the melancholy views which he had of the state of our public affairs. "I should be glad," says he, in a letter which he sent me, about the close of the year, 1743, "to hear what wise and good people among you think of the present circumstances of things. For my own part, though, I thank God, I fear nothing for myself, my apprehensions for the public are very gloomy, considering the deplorable prevalency of almost all kinds of wickedness amongst us; the natural consequence of the contempt of the gospel. I am daily offering my prayers to God for this sinful land of ours, over which his judgment seems to be gathering; and my strength is sometimes so exhausted with those strong cries and tears, which I pour out before God on this occasion, that I am hardly able to stand when I arise from my knees." If we have many remaining to stand in the breach with equal fervency, I hope, crying as our provocations are, God will still be intreated for us, and save us.

§ 133. Most of the other letters, I had the pleasure of receiving from him after our last separation, are either filled, like those of former years, with tender expressions of affectionate solicitude for my domestic comfort and public usefulness, or relate to the writings I published during this time, or to the affairs of his eldest Son then under my care. But these are things, which are by no means of a nature to be communicated here. It is enough to remark in the general, that the christian was still mingled, with all the care of the friend, and the parent.

§ 134. But I think it incumbent upon me to observe, that during this time, and some preceding years, his attention, ever wakeful to such concerns, was much engaged by some religious appearances, which happened about this time, both in England and Scotland; with regard to which, some may be curious to know his sentiments. He communicated them to me with the most unreserved freedom; and I cannot apprehend myself

under any engagements to conceal them, as I am persuaded, that it will be no prejudice to his memory, that they should be publicly known.

§ 135. It was from Colonel Gardiner's pen that I received the first notice of that ever memorable scene which was opened at Kilsyth, under the ministry of the Reverend Mr. MacCulloch, in the month of February, 1741-2. He communicated to me the copy of two letters from that eminently favoured servant of God, giving an account of that extraordinary success, which had within a few days accompanied his preaching; when, as I remember, in a little more than a fortnight, a hundred and thirty souls, who had before continued in long insensibility under the faithful preaching of the gospel, were awakened on a sudden to attend to it, as if it had been a new revelation brought down from heaven, and attested by as astonishing miracles as ever were wrought by Peter or Paul; though they heard it only from a person, under whose ministry they had sate for several years. Struck with a power and majesty in the word of God, which they had never felt before, they crouded his house, night and day, making their applications to him for spiritual direction and assistance, with an earnestness and solicitude, which floods of tears and cries, that swallowed up their own words and his, could not sufficiently express. The Colonel mentioned this at first to me, "as matter of eternal praise, which he knew would rejoice my very soul;" And when he saw it spread in the neighbouring parts, and observed the glorious reformation which it produced in the lives of great multitudes, and the abiding fruits of it for succeeding months and years, it increased and confirmed his joy. But the facts relating to this matter have been laid before the world in so authentic a manner, and the agency of divine grace in them has been so rationally vindicated, and so pathetically represented, in what the reverend and judicious Mr. Webster has written upon the subject; that it is altogether superfluous for me to add any thing farther than my hearty prayers, that the work may be as extensive, as it was apparently glorious and divine.

§ 136. It was with great pleasure, that he received any intelligence of a like kind from England; whether the clergy of the established church, or dissenting ministers, whether our own countrymen, or foreigners, were the instruments of it. And whatever weaknesses or errors might mingle themselves with valuable qualities in such as were active in such a work, he appeared to love and honour them, in proportion to the

degree, he saw reason to believe, their hearts were devoted to the service of Christ, and their attempts owned and succeeded by him. I remember, that mentioning one of these gentlemen, who had been remarkably successful in his ministry, and seemed to have met with some very unkind usage, he says, I had rather be that despised persecuted man, to be an instrument in the hand of the Spirit, in converting so many souls, and building up so many in their holy faith, than I would be emperor of the whole world." Yet this steady and judicious Christian, for such he most assuredly was, at the same time that he esteemed a man for his good intention and his worthy qualities, did not suffer himself to be hurried away into all the singularity of his sentiments, or to admire his imprudences or excesses. On the contrary, he saw and lamented that artifice, which the great father of fraud has so long, and so successfully been practising; who, like the enemies of Israel, when he cannot entirely prevent the building of God's temple, does, as it were, offer his assistance to carry on the work, that he may thereby get the most effectual opportunities of obstructing it. The Colonel often expressed his astonishment at the wide extremes, into which some, whom on the whole he thought very worthy men, were permitted to run in many doctrinal and speculative points; and discerned how evidently it appeared from hence, that we cannot argue the truth of any doctrine from the success of the preacher; since this would be a demonstration, which might equally prove both parts of a contradiction. Yet when he observed, that an high regard to the atonement and righteousness of Christ, and to the free grace of God in him, exerted by the operation of the Divine Spirit, was generally common to all, who had been peculiarly successful in the conversion and reformation of men, (how widely soever their judgments might differ in other points, and how warmly soever they might oppose each other in consequence of that diversity;) it tended greatly to confirm his faith in these principles, as well as to open his heart in love to all of every denomination, who maintained an affectionate regard to them. And though what he remarked as to the conduct and success of ministers of the most opposite strains of preaching, confirmed him in these sentiments; yet he always esteemed and loved virtuous and benevolent men, even where he thought them most mistaken in the notions they formed of religion, or in the methods, by which they attempted to serve it.

§ 137. While I thus represent what all who knew him must soon have observed of Colonel Gardiner's affectionate regard to

these peculiar doctrines of our holy religion, it is necessary that I should also inform my reader, that it was not his judgment, that the attention of ministers or their hearers should be wholly engrossed by these, excellent as they are; but that all the parts of the scheme of truth and duty should be regarded in their due connection and proportion. Far from that distempered taste, which can bear nothing but cordials, it was his deliberate judgment, that the law should be preached, as well as the gospel; and hardly any thing gave him greater offence, than the irreverent manner in which some, who have been ignorantly extolled as the most zealous evangelical preachers, have sometimes been tempted to speak of the former; much indeed to the scandal of all consistent and judicious Christians. He delighted to be instructed in his duty, and to hear much of the inward exercises of the spiritual and divine life. And he always wished, so far as I could observe, to have these topics treated in a rational as well as a spiritual manner, with solidity, and order of thought, with perspicuity and weight of expression; as well knowing, that religion is a most reasonable service; that God has not chosen idiots or lunatics as the instruments, or nonsense as the means, of building up his church; and that, though the charge of enthusiasm is often fixed on christianity and its ministers, in a wild, undeserved, and indeed (on the whole) enthusiastical manner, by some of the loudest or most solemn pretenders to reason, yet there is really such a thing as enthusiasm, against which it becomes the true friends of the Revelation, to be diligently on their guard; lest Christianity, instead of being exalted, should be greatly corrupted and debased, and all manner of aburdity, both in doctrine and practice, introduced by methods, which, like persecution, throw truth, and falsehood on a level, render the grossest errors, at once more plausible, and more incurable. He had too much candour and equity, to fix general charges of this nature; but he was really (and I think not vainly) apprehensive, that the emissaries and agents of the most corrupt church, that ever dishonoured the christian name, (by which, it will easily be understood, I mean that of Rome,) might very possibly insinuate themselves into societies, to which they could no otherwise have access, and make their advantage of that total resignation of the understanding, and contempt of reason and learning, which nothing but ignorance, delirium, or knavery can dictate, to lead men blindfold whither it pleased, till it set them down at the foot of an altar, where transubstantiation itself was consecrated.

§ 138. I know not where I can more properly introduce another part of the Colonel's character, which, obvious as it was, I have not yet touched upon; I mean, his tenderness to those who were under any spiritual distress; wherein he was, indeed, an example to ministers, in a duty more peculiarly theirs. I have seen many amiable instances of this, myself; and I have been informed of many others: One of which happened about the time of that awakening in the western parts of Scotland, which I touched upon above; when the Rev. Mr. M'Laurin, of Glasgow, found occasion to witness to the great propriety, judgment, and felicity of manner, with which he addressed spiritual consolation to an afflicted soul, who applied to the professor, at a time, when he had not an opportunity immediately to give audience to the case. And, indeed, as long ago as the year 1726, I find him writing to a friend, in a strain of tenderness in this regard, which might well have become the most affectionate and experienced pastor. He there congratulates him on some religious enjoyments lately received, in part, it seems, by his means, when among others he has this modest expression: "If I have been made any way the means of doing you good, give the whole glory to God; for he has been willing to shew, that the power was entirely of himself, since he has been pleased to make use of so very weak an instrument." In the same letter, he admonishes his friend, that he should not be too much surprised, if after having been, as he expresses it, upon the mount, he should be brought into the valley again; and reminds him, that "we live by faith, and not by sensible assurance," representing, that there are some such full communications from God, as seem almost to swallow up the actings of faith, from whence they take their rise: "Whereas, when a Christian who walks in darkness, and sees no light, will yet hang, as it were, on the report of an absent Jesus, and," as one expresses it, in allusion to the story of Jacob and Joseph, "can put himself as on the chariot of the promises, to be borne on to him, whom now he sees not; there may be sublimer and more acceptable actings of a pure and strong faith, than in moments which afford the soul a much more rapturous delight." This is the substance of what he says in this excellent letter. Some of the phrases made use of, might not, perhaps, be intelligible to several of my readers, for which reason I do not exactly transscribe them all: But this is plainly and fully his meaning, and most of the words are his own. The sentiment is surely very just and important; and happy would it be for many excellent persons, who through wrong notions of the nature of faith,

(which was never more misrepresented, than now among some,) are perplexing themselves with most groundless doubts and scruples, if it were more generally understood, admitted, and considered.

§ 139. An endeared friend, who was most intimately conversant with the Colonel during the two last years of his life, has favoured me with an account of some little circumstances relating to him; which I esteem as precious fragments, by which the consistent tenor of his character may be farther illustrated. I shall therefore insert them here, without being very solicitous as to the order in which they are introduced.

§ 140. He perceived himself evidently in a very declining state from his first arrival in Britain, and seemed to entertain a fixed apprehension, that he should continue but a little while longer in life. "He expected death," says my good correspondent, and was delighted with the prospect," which did not grow less amiable by a nearer approach. The word of God, with which he had as intimate an acquaintance as most men, I ever knew, and on which, especially on the New Testament, I have heard him make many very judicious and accurate remarks, was still his daily study; and it furnished him with matter of frequent conversation, much to the edification and comfort of those that were about him. It was recollected, that, among other passages, he had lately spoken of the following, as having made a deep impression on his mind: *My soul, wait thou upon God!* He would repeat it again and again, Only, only, only! So plainly did he see, and so deeply did he feel, the vanity of creature confidences and expectations. With the strongest attestation would he often mention those words in Isaiah, as verified by long experience: *Thou wilt keep him in perfect peace, whose mind has stayed on thee; because he trusteth in thee.* And with peculiar satisfaction would he utter those heroic words in Habakkuk, which he found armour of proof against every fear and every contingency: *Though the fig-tree shall not blossom, neither shall fruit be in the vines; the labour of the olive shall fail, and the fields shall yield no meat: the flocks shall be cut off from the fold, and there shall be no herd in the stalls: Yet I will rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation.* The cxlvth Psalm was also spoken of by him with great delight, and Dr. Watts's version of it; as well as several other of that excellent person's poetical composures. My friend, who transmits to me this account, adds the following words; which I desire to insert with the deepest sentiments of unfeigned humility and self-abasement before God, as most

unworthy the honour of contributing in the least degree to the joys and graces of one so much my superior in every part of the Christian character. "As the joy, with which good men see the happy fruits of their labours, makes a part of the present reward of the servants of God and the friends of Jesus, it must not be omitted, even in a letter to you, that your spiritual hymns were among his most delightful and soul-improving repasts; particularly those, on beholding transgressors with grief, and Christ's message." What is added concerning my book of the Rise and Progress of Religion, and the terms, in which he expressed his esteem of it, I cannot suffer to pass my pen; only desire most sincerely to bless God, that especially by the last chapters of that treatise, I had an opportunity at so great a distance of exhibiting some offices of Christian friendship to this excellent person, in the closing scenes of life; which it would have been my greatest joy to have performed in person, had Providence permitted me then to have been near him.

§ 141. The former of those hymns my correspondent mentions, as having been so agreeable to Colonel Gardiner, I have given the reader above, at the end of § 101. The latter, which is called Christ's message, took its rise from Luke iv. 18, and seq. and is as follows:

Hark! the glad sound! the Saviour comes,
The Saviour promis'd long!
Let every heart prepare a throne,
And every voice a song.

On him the Spirit largely pour'd
Exerts its sacred fire:
Wisdom, and might, and zeal, and love,
His holy breast inspire.

He comes, the prisoners to release
In Satan's bondage held:
The gates of brass before him burst,
The iron fetters yield.

He comes, from thickest films of vice
To clear the mental ray,
And on the eye-balls of the blind
To pour celestial day *.

He comes, the broken heart to bind,
The bleeding soul to cure;
And with the treasures of his grace
To enrich the humble poor.

* This stanza is mostly borrowed from Mr. Pope.

His silver trumpets publish loud
The jubilee of the Lord;
Our debts are all remitted now,
Our heritage restor'd.

Our glad hosannahs, Prince of Peace,
Thy welcome shall proclaim;
And heaven's eternal arches ring
With thy beloved name.

§ 142. There is one hymn more, I shall beg leave to add, plain as it is, which Colonel Gardiner has been heard to mention with particular regard, as expressing the inmost sentiments of his soul; and they were undoubtedly so, in the last rational moments of his expiring life. It is called, Christ precious to the believer; and was composed to be sung after a sermon on 1 Pet. ii. 7.

Jesus! I love thy charming name,
'Tis music to my ear:
Fain would I sound it out so loud,
That earth and heaven should hear!

Yes, thou art precious to my soul,
My transport, and my trust:
Jewels to thee are gaudy toys,
And gold is sordid dust.

All my capacious powers can wish,
In thee most richly meet:
Nor to my eyes is life so dear,
Nor friendship half so sweet.

Thy grace still dwells upon my heart,
And sheds its fragrance there;
The noblest balm of all its wounds,
The cordial of its care.

I'll speak the honours of thy name
With my last labouring breath;
Then speechless clasp thee in my arms,
The antidote of death.

§ 143. Those who were intimate with Colonel Gardiner must have observed, how ready he was to give a devotional turn to any subject that occurred. And in particular, the spiritual and heavenly disposition of his soul discovered itself in the reflections and improvements, which he made, when reading history; in which he took a great deal of pleasure, as persons remarkable for their knowledge of mankind, and observation of Providence, generally do. I have an instance of this before me, which, though too natural to be at all surprising, will, I dare

say, be pleasing to the devout mind. He had just been reading, in Rollin's extract from Xenophon, the answer which the lady of Tigranes made, when all the company were extolling Cyrus, and, expressing the admiration, with which his appearance and behaviour struck them; the question being asked her, What she thought of him? She answered, I don't know, I did not observe him. On what then, said one of the company, did you fix your attention? On him, replied she, (referring to the generous speech which her husband had just made,) who said he would give a thousand lives to ransom my liberty. "Oh," cried the Colonel when reading it, "how ought we to fix our eyes and hearts on him, who not in offer, but in reality, gave his own precious life to ransom us from the most dreadful slavery, and from eternal destruction!" But this is only one instance among a thousand. His heart was so habitually set upon divine things, and he had such a permanent and overflowing sense of the love of Christ, that he could not forbear connecting such reflections, with a multitude of more distant occasions occurring in daily life, where less advanced Christians would not have thought of them: And thus, like our great Master, he made every little incident a source of devotion, and an instrument of holy zeal.

§ 144. Enfeebled as his constitution was, he was still intent on improving his time to some valuable purposes: And when his friends expostulated with him, that he gave his body so little rest, he used to answer, "It will rest long enough in the grave."

§ 145. The July before his death, he was persuaded to take a journey to Scarborough for the recovery of his health; from which he was at least encouraged to expect some little revival. After this he had thoughts of going to London, and designed to have spent part of September at Northampton. The expectation of this was mutually agreeable; but providence saw fit to disconcert the scheme. His love for his friends in these parts occasioned him to express some regret on his being commanded back: And I am pretty confident, from the manner, in which he expressed himself in one of his last letters to me, that he had some more important reasons for wishing an opportunity of making a London journey just at that crisis; which, the reader will remember, was before the rebellion broke out. But as Providence determined it otherwise, he acquiesced; and I am well satisfied, that could he have distinctly foreseen the approaching event, so far as it concerned his own person, he would have

esteemed it the happiest summons he received. While he was at Scarborough, I find by a letter dated from thence, July 26, 1745, that he had been informed of the gaiety, which so unseasonably prevailed at Edinburgh, where great multitudes were then spending their time in balls, assemblies, and plays, little mindful of the rod of God which was then hanging over them; on which occasion, he hath this expression: "I am greatly surprised, that the people of Edinburgh should be employed in such foolish diversions, when our situation is at present more melancholy than ever I saw it in my life. But there is one thing which I am very sure of, that comforts me, viz. that it shall go well with the righteous, come what will."

§ 146. Quickly after his return home, the flame burst out, and his regiment was ordered to Stirling. It was in the castle there, that his Lady and eldest daughter enjoyed the last happy hours of his company; and I think, it was about ten or twelve days before his death, that he parted from them there. A remarkable circumstance attended that parting, which hath been touched upon by surviving friends in more than one of their letters to me. His Lady was so affected when she took her last leave of him, that she could not forbear bursting out into a flood of tears, with other marks of unusual emotion. And when he asked her the reason, she urged the apprehension, she had of losing such an invaluable friend, amidst the dangers to which he was then called out, as a very sufficient apology. Upon which she took particular notice, that whereas he had generally comforted her on such occasions, by pleading with her that remarkable hand of Providence, which had so frequently in former instances been exerted for his preservation, and that in the greatest extremity, he said nothing of it now; but only replied, in his sententious manner, "We have an eternity to spend together."

§ 147. That heroic contempt of death, which had often discovered itself in the midst of former dangers, was manifested now in his discourse with several of his most intimate friends. I have reserved for this place one genuine expression of it many years before, which I thought might be mentioned with some advantage here. In July, 1725, he had been sent to some place, not far from Hamilton, to quell a mutiny among some of our troops. I know not the particular occasion; but I remember to have heard him mention it as so fierce a one, that he scarce ever apprehended himself in a more hazardous circumstance. Yet he quelled it, by his presence alone, and the expostulations he used; evidently putting his life into his hand to do it. The

particulars of the story struck me much; but I do not so exactly remember them, as to venture to relate them here. I only observe, that in a letter dated July 16, that year, which I have now before me, and which evidently refers to this event, he writes thus: "I have been very busy, hurried about from place to place; but blessed be God, all is over without bloodshed. And pray let me ask, What made you shew so much concern for me in your last? Were you afraid, I should get to heaven before you? Or can any evil befall those, who are followers of that which is good *?

§ 148. And as these were his sentiments in the vigour of his days, so neither did declining years and the infirmities of a broken constitution on the one hand, nor any desires of enjoying the honours and profits of so high a station, or, what was much more to him, the converse of the most affectionate of wives and so many amiable children and friends on the other, enervate his spirits in the least: But as he had in former years often expressed it, to me and several others, as his desire, "that if it were the will of God, he might have some honourable call to sacrifice his life in defence of religion and the liberties of his country;" so, when it appeared to him most probable that he might be called to it immediately, he met the summons with the greatest readiness. This appears in part from a letter which he wrote to the Reverend Mr. Adams of Falkirk, just as he was on marching from Stirling, which was only eight days before his death: "The rebels" says he, "are advancing to cross the Firth; but I trust in the Almighty God, who doth whatsoever he pleases, in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth." And the same gentleman tells me, that a few days after the date of this, he marched through Falkirk with his regiment; and though he was then in so languishing a state, that he needed his assistance as a secretary to write for some reinforcement, which might put it in his power to make a stand, as he was very desirous to have done, he expressed a most genuine

* I doubt not, but this will remind some of my readers of that noble speech of Zuinglius, when (according to the usage of that country, attending his flock to a battle, in which their religion and liberties were all at stake, on his receiving a mortal wound by a bullet, of which he soon expired, while his friends were in all the first astonishment of grief, he bravely said as he was dying, "Ecquid hoc Infortunii? Is this "to be reckoned a misfortune?" How many of our Deists would have celebrated such a sentence, if it had come from the lips of an ancient Roman? Strange, that the name of Christ should be so odious, that, the brightest virtues of his followers should be despised for his sake! but so it is; and so our Master told us, it would be: And our faith is in this connection confirmed by those, that strive most to overthrow it.

and noble contempt of life, when to be exposed in the defence of a worthy cause.

§ 149. These sentiments wrought in him to the last, in the most effectual manner; and he seemed for a while to have infused them into the regiment which he commanded: For they expressed such a spirit in their march from Stirling, that I am assured, the Colonel was obliged to exert all his authority to prevent their making incursions on the rebel army, which then lay very near them; and had it been thought proper to send him the reinforcement he requested, none can say what the consequence might have been. But he was ordered to march as fast as possible, to meet Sir John Cope's forces at Dunbar, which he did: And that hasty retreat, in concurrence with the news which they soon after received, of the surrender of Edinburgh to the rebels, (as there is great reason to believe, by the treachery of a few, in opposition to the judgment of by far the greater and better part of the inhabitants,) struck a panic into both the regiments of dragoons, which became visible in some very apparent and remarkable circumstances in their behaviour, which I forbear to relate. This affected Colonel Gardiner so much, that on the Thursday before the fatal action at Preston-Pans, he intimated to an officer of considerable rank and note, from whom I had it by a very sure channel of conveyance, that he expected the event would be, as in fact it was. In this view, there is all imaginable reason to believe, he had formed his resolution as to his own personal conduct, which was, "that he would not, in case of the flight of those under his command, retreat with them;" by which, as it seemed, he was reasonably apprehensive, he might have stained the honour of his former services, and have given some occasion for the enemy to have spoken reproachfully. He much rather chose, if Providence gave him the call, to leave in his death an example of fidelity and bravery, which might very probably be, as in fact it seems indeed to have been, of much greater importance to his country, than any other service, which, in the few days of remaining life, he could expect to render it. I conclude these to have been his views, not only from what I knew of his general character and temper, but likewise from some intimations which he gave to a very worthy person from Edinburgh, who visited him the day before the action; to whom he said, "I cannot influence the conduct of others, as I could wish; but I have one life to sacrifice to my country's safety, and I shall not spare it;" or words to this effect.

§ 150. I have heard such a multitude of inconsistent re-

ports of the circumstances of Colonel Gardiner's death, that I had almost despaired of being able to give my reader any particular satisfaction concerning so interesting a scene. But by a happy accident I have very lately had an opportunity of being exactly informed of the whole, by that brave man Mr. John Forster, his faithful servant, and worthy of the honour of serving such a master, whom I had seen with him at my house some years before. He attended him in his last hours, and gave me the narration at large; which he would be ready, if it were requisite, to attest upon oath. From his mouth I wrote it down with the utmost exactness, and could easily believe from the genuine and affectionate manner, in which he related the particulars, that according to his own striking expression, "his eye and his heart were always upon his honoured master, during the whole time."*.

§ 151. On Friday, September 20, (the day before the battle, which transmitted him to his immortal crown,) the Colonel drew up his regiment in the afternoon, and rode through all their ranks; addressing them at once, in the most respectful and animating manner, both as soldiers, and as Christians, to engage them to exert themselves courageously in the service of their country, and to neglect nothing, that might have a tendency to prepare them for whatever event might happen. They seemed much affected with the address, and expressed a very ardent desire of attacking the enemy immediately: A desire, in which he and another very gallant officer of distinguished rank, dignity, and character both for bravery and conduct, would gladly have gratified them, if it had been in the power of either. He earnestly pressed it on the commanding officer, both as the soldiers were then in better spirits, than it could be supposed they would be, after having passed the night under arms; and also, as the circumstance of making an attack, would be some encouragement to them, and probably some terror to the enemy, who would have had the disadvantage of standing on the defence: A disadvantage, with which those wild barbarians, for such most of them were, perhaps, would have been more struck than better disciplined troops; especially, when they fought against the laws of their country too. He also apprehended,

* Just as I am putting the last hand to these memoirs, March 2, 1746-7, I have met with a corporal in Colonel Lascelle's regiment, who was also an eye-witness to what happened at Preston-Pans on the day of the battle, and the day before: And the account he has given me of some memorable particulars is so exactly agreeable to that which I received from Mr. Forster, that it would much corroborate his testimony, if there were not so many other considerations to render it convincing.

that by marching to meet them, some advantage might have been secured with regard to the ground; with which, it is natural to imagine, he must have been perfectly acquainted, as it lay just at his own door, and he had rode over it so many hundred times. When I mention these things, I do not pretend to be capable of judging, how far this advice was, on the whole, right. A variety of circumstances, to me unknown, might make it otherwise. It is certain, however, that it was brave. But it was over-ruled in this respect, as it also was in the disposition of the cannon, which he would have had planted in the centre of our small army, rather than just before his regiment, which was in the right wing; where he was apprehensive, that the horses, which had not been in any engagement before, might be thrown into some disorder by the discharge so very near them. He urged this the more, as he thought, the attack of the rebels might probably be made on the centre of the foot; where he knew there were some brave men, on whose standing he thought, under God, the success of the day depended. When he found, that he could not carry either of these points, nor some others, which out of regard to the common safety, he insisted upon with some unusual earnestness, he dropped some intimations of the consequences, which he apprehended, and which did, in fact, follow; and submitting to Providence, spent the remainder of the day in making as good a disposition, as circumstances would allow *.

§ 152. He continued all night under arms, wrapped up in his cloak, and generally sheltered under a rick of barley, which happened to be in the field. About three in the morning, he called his domestic servants to him, of which there were four in waiting. He dismissed three of them, with most affectionate Christian advice, and such solemn charges relating to the performance of their duty and the care of their souls, as seemed plainly to intimate, that he apprehended it at least very probable, he was taking his last farewell of them. There is great reason to believe, that he spent the little remainder of the time,

* Several of these circumstances have since been confirmed by the concurrent testimony of another very credible person, Mr. Robert Douglas, now a surgeon in the navy, who was a volunteer at Edinburgh, just before the rebels entered the place; who saw Colonel Gardiner come from Haddington to the field of battle, the day before the action, in a chaise, being, as from that circumstance he supposed, in so weak a state, that he could not well endure the fatigue of riding on horseback. He observed Colonel Gardiner in discourse with several officers, the evening before the engagement; at which time, it was afterwards reported, he gave his advice to attack the rebels: And when it was overruled, he afterwards saw the Colonel walk by himself in a very pensive manner.

which could not be much above an hour, in those devout exercises of soul, which had so long been habitual to him, and to which so many circumstances did then concur to call him. The army was alarmed by break of day, by the noise of the rebels' approach, and the attack was made before sunrise; yet, when it was light enough to discern what passed. As soon as the enemy came within gun-shot, they made a furious fire; and it is said, that the dragoons, which constituted the left wing, immediately fled. The Colonel, at the beginning of the onset, which, in the whole, lasted but a few minutes, received a wound by a bullet in his left breast, which made him give a sudden spring in his saddle; upon which his servant, who had the led horse, would have persuaded him to retreat: But he said, it was only a wound in the flesh; and fought on, though he presently after received a shot in his right thigh. In the mean time, it was discerned, that some of the enemies fell by him; and particularly one man, who had made him a treacherous visit but a few days before, with great professions of zeal for the present establishment.

§ 153. Events of this kind pass in less time, than the description of them can be written, or than it can be read. The Colonel was for a few moments supported by his men, and particularly by that worthy person Lieutenant-Colonel Whitney, who was shot through the arm here, and, a few months after, fell nobly in the battle of Falkirk; and by Lieutenant West, a man of distinguished bravery; as also by about fifteen dragoons, who stood by him to the last. But after a faint fire, the regiment, in general, was seized with a panic; and though their Colonel and some other gallant officers, did what they could, to rally them once or twice, they at last took a precipitate flight. And just in the moment when Colonel Gardiner seemed to be making a pause, to deliberate what duty required him to do in such a circumstance, an accident happened, which must, I think, in the judgment of every worthy and generous man, be allowed a sufficient apology for exposing his life to so great hazard, when his regiment had left him *. He saw a party of the foot, who were

* The colonel, who was well acquainted with military history, might possibly remember, that in the battle at Blenheim, the illustrious Prince Eugene, when the horse of the wing he commanded had run away thrice, charged at the head of the foot, and thereby greatly contributed to the glorious success of the day. At least such an example may conduce to vindicate that noble ardour, which, amidst all the applauses of his country, some have been so cool and so critical as to blame. For my own part, I thank God, that I am not called to apologize for his following his troops in their flight; which I fear would have been a much harder task, and which,

then bravely fighting near him, and whom he was ordered to support, had no officer to head them; upon which he said eagerly, in the hearing of the person, from whom I had this account, "Those brave fellows will be cut to pieces for want of a commander;" or words to that effect: Which while he was speaking, he rode up to them, and cried out aloud, "Fire on, my lads, and fear nothing." But just as the words were out of his mouth, an highlander advanced towards him with a scythe, fastened to a long pole, with which he gave him such a deep wound on his right arm, that his sword dropped out of his hand; and at the same time several others coming about him, while he was thus dreadfully entangled with that cruel weapon, he was dragged off from his horse. The moment he fell, another highlander, who, if the king's evidence at Carlisle may be credited, as I know not why they should not, though the unhappy creature died denying it, was one Macnaught, who was executed about a year after, gave him a stroke, either with a broad sword, or a Lochaber axe, for my informant could not exactly distinguish, on the hinder part of his head, which was the mortal blow. All, that his faithful attendant saw farther at this time, was, that his hat was fallen off, he took it in his left hand, and waved it, as a signal to him to retreat; and added, what were the last words, he ever heard him speak, "Take care of yourself:" Upon which, the servant retired.

§ 154. It was reported at Edinburgh, on the day of the battle, by what seemed a considerable authority, that as the Colonel lay in his wounds, he said to a chief of the opposite side, "You are fighting for an earthly crown, I am going to receive an heavenly one;" or something to that purpose. When I preached the sermon, long since printed, on occasion of his death, I had great reason to believe, this report was true; though before the publication of it, I began to be in doubt: And on the whole, after the most accurate enquiry I could possibly make, at this distance, I cannot get any convincing evidence of it. Yet I must here observe, that it does not appear impossible, that something of this kind might indeed be uttered by him; as his servant testifies, that he spoke to him after receiving that fatal blow, which would seem most likely to have taken away the power of speech; and as it is certain, he lived several hours after he fell. If therefore any

dear as he was to me, would have grieved me much more than his death, with these heroic circumstances attending it.

thing of this kind did happen, it must have been just about this instant. But as to the story of his being taken prisoner, and carried to the pretended prince, (who, by the way, afterwards rode his horse, and entered upon it into Derby,) with several other circumstances which were grafted upon that interview, there is the most undoubted evidence of its falsehood. For his attendant mentioned above assures me, that he himself immediately fled to a mill, at the distance of about two miles, from the spot of ground, on which the Colonel fell; where he changed his dress, and, disguised like a miller's servant, returned with a cart as soon as possible; which yet was not till near two hours after the engagement. The hurry of the action was then pretty well over, and he found his much honoured Master, not only plundered of his watch and other things of value, but also stripped of his upper garments and boots; yet still breathing: And adds, that though he were not capable of speech, yet, on taking him up, he opened his eyes; which makes it something questionable, whether he were altogether insensible. In this condition, and in this manner, he conveyed him to the church of Tranent, from whence he was immediately taken into the minister's house, and laid in bed; where he continued breathing, and frequently groaning, till about eleven in the forenoon; when he took his final leave of pain and sorrow, and undoubtedly rose to those distinguished glories, which are reserved for those who have been so eminently and remarkably faithful unto death.

§ 155. From the moment in which he fell, it was no longer a battle, but a rout and carnage. The cruelties, which the rebels, as it is generally said, under the command of Lord Elcho, inflicted on some of the king's troops after they had asked quarter, are dreadfully legible on the countenances of many who survived it. They entered Colonel Gardiner's house, before he was carried off from the field; and, notwithstanding the strict orders which the unhappy Duke of Perth whose conduct is said to have been very humane in many instances, gave to the contrary, every thing of value was plundered, to the very curtains of the beds, and hangings of the rooms. His papers were all thrown into the wildest disorder, and his house made an hospital, for the reception of those who were wounded in the action.

§ 156. Such was the close of a life, which had been so zealously devoted to God, and filled up with so many honourable services. This was the death of him, who had been so

highly favoured by God, in the method, by which he was brought back to him after so long and so great an estrangement, and in the progress of so many years, during which, in the expressive phrase of the most ancient of writers, he had walked with him;—to fall, as God threatened the people of his wrath that they should do, *with tumult, with shouting, and with the sound of the trumpet;* Amos ii. 2. Several other very worthy, and some of them very eminent persons, shared the same fate; either now, in the battle of Preston-Pans, or quickly after, in that of Falkirk:* Providence, no doubt, permitting it, to establish our faith in the rewards of an invisible world; as well as to teach us, to cease from man, and fix our dependance on an Almighty arm.

§ 157. The remains of this Christian hero as I believe every reader is now convinced, he may justly be called, were interred the Tuesday following, Sept. 24. at the parish church at Tranent; where he had usually attended divine service with great solemnity. His obsequies were honoured with the presence of some persons of distinction, who were not afraid of paying that last piece of respect to his memory, though the country was then in the hands of the enemy. But indeed there was no great hazard in this; for his character was so well known, that even they themselves spoke honourably of him, and seemed to join with his friends in lamenting the fall of so brave and so worthy a man.

§ 158. The remotest posterity will remember, for whom the honour of subduing this unnatural and pernicious rebellion was reserved; and it will endear the person of the illustrious Duke of Cumberland, to all but the open, or secret abettors of it in the present age, and consecrate his name to immortal honours among all the friends of religion and liberty, who shall arise after us. And I dare say, it will not be imagined, that I at all derogate from his glory, in suggesting, that the memory of that valiant and excellent person, whose memoirs I am now concluding, may in some measure have contributed to that

* Of these none were more memorable than those illustrious brothers, Sir Robert Munro, and Doctor Munro; whose tragical but glorious fate was also shared quickly after by a third hero of the family, Captain Munro, of Culcairn, brother to Sir Robert and the Doctor. I thought of adding some account of these Martyrs in the cause of liberty and religion, in this place; but having had the pleasure of receiving from some very credible and worthy persons, to whom they were well known, a larger account of them and their family, than can conveniently be comprehended in a note, I chuse to make it a distinct article in the appendix, numb. III; by which I question not but I shall oblige every intelligent and generous reader, and I think myself very happy to have it in my power to do it.

signal and complete victory, with which God was pleased to crown the arms of his royal highness: For the force of such an example is very animating, and a painful consciousness of having deserted such a commander in such extremity must at least awaken, where there was any spark of generosity, an earnest desire to avenge his death on those, who had sacrificed his blood, and that of so many other excellent persons, to the views of their ambition, rapine, or bigotry.

§ 159. The reflections, I have made in my funeral sermon on my honoured friend, and in the dedication of it to his worthy and most afflicted Lady, supersede many things, which might otherwise have properly been added here. I conclude therefore, with humbly acknowledging the wisdom and goodness of that awful providence, which drew so thick a gloom around him in the last hours of his life, that the lustre of his virtues might dart through it with a more vivid and observable ray. It is abundant matter of thankfulness, that so signal a monument of grace, and ornament of the christian profession, was raised in our age and country, and spared for so many honourable and useful years. Nor can all the tenderness of the most affectionate friendship, while its sorrows bleed afresh in the view of so tragical a scene, prevent my adoring the gracious appointment of the great Lord of all events, that when the day, in which he must have expired without an enemy, appeared so very near, the last ebb of his generous blood should be poured out, as a kind of sacred libation to the liberties of his country, and the honour of his God; that all the other virtues of his character, embalmed as it were by that precious stream, might diffuse around a more extensive fragrancy, and be transmitted to the most remote posterity with that peculiar charm, which they cannot but derive from their connection with so gallant a fall: An event, as that blessed apostle, of whose spirit he so deeply drank, has expressed it, according to his earnest expectation, and his hope, that in him Christ might be glorified in all things, whether by his life, or by his death.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

RELATING TO THE COLONEL'S PERSON.

IN the midst of so many more important articles, I had really forgot to say any thing of the person of Colonel Gardiner, of which nevertheless it may be proper here to add a word or two. It was, as I am informed, in younger life, remarkably graceful and amiable: And I can easily believe it, from what I knew him to be, when our acquaintance began; though he was then turned of fifty, and had gone through so many fatigues as well as dangers, which could not but leave some traces on his countenance. He was tall, I suppose something more than six foot, well proportioned, and strongly built: His eyes of a dark grey, and not very large; his forehead pretty high; his nose of a length and height no way remarkable, but very well suited to his other features; his cheeks not very prominent, his mouth moderately large, and his chin rather a little inclining when I knew him to be peaked. He had a strong voice, and lively accent; with an Air very intrepid, yet attempered with much gentleness: And there was something in his manner of address most perfectly easy and obliging, which was in a great measure the result of the great candor and benevolence of his natural temper; and which, no doubt, was much improved by the deep humility, which divine grace had wrought into his heart; as well as his having been accustomed, from his early youth, to the company of persons of distinguished rank and polite behaviour.

No. II.

POETICAL PIECES

ON

THE DEATH OF COLONEL GARDINER.

So animating a subject as the death of such a man, in such circumstances, has occasioned a great deal of poetry. Some of this has already been published; especially, one large composition, said to be done by a worthy clergyman in Lincolnshire, in which there are many excellent lines and noble sentiments: But I rather chuse to refer to the piece itself, than to insert any extracts from it here. It may be more expedient to oblige my reader with the following copy of verses, and an elegiac poem, composed by two of my valuable friends, whose names are annexed. I could not presume to attempt any thing of this kind myself; because I knew, that nothing, I was capable of writing, could properly express my sense of his worth, or describe the tenderness of my friendship; the sentiments of which, will, as I assuredly believe, mingle themselves with the last ideas, which pass through my mind in this world, and, perhaps, with some of the first, which may open upon it in that, which is to come.

VERSES

ON THE DEATH OF COLONEL GARDINER.

BY THE REV. MR. BENJ. SOWDEN.

Quis desiderio sit pudor, aut modus,
Tam chari capitis? HOR.

COULD piety perpetuate human breath,
Or shield one mortal from the shafts of death,
Thou ne'er, illustrious man! thou ne'er hadst been
A pallid corpse on Preston's fatal plain.
Or could her hand, though impotent to save
Consummate worth, redeem it from the grave,
Soon would thy urn resign its sacred trust,
And recent life re-animate thy dust.

But vain the wish.—The savage hand of war—
Oh how shall words the mournful tale declare!
Too soon the news afflicted friendship hears,
Too soon, alas, confirm'd her boding fears.
Struck with the sound, unconscious of redress,
She felt thy wounds, and wept severe distress.
A while dissolv'd in truceless grief she lay,
And mourn'd the event of that unhappy day,
Which left thee to relentless rage a prey.
At length kind fame suspends our heaving sighs,
And wipes the sorrows from our flowing eyes;
Gives us to know, thine exit well supply'd
Those blooming laurels, victory deny'd.
When thy great soul suppress'd each timid moan,
And soar'd triumphant in a dying groan,
Thy fall, which rais'd, now calms each wild complaint,
Thy fall, which join'd the hero to the saint.
As o'er the expiring lamp the quivering flame
Collects its lustre in a brighter gleam,
Thy virtues, glimmering on the verge of night,
Through the dim shade diffus'd celestial light;
A radiance, death or time can ne'er destroy,
The auspicious omen of eternal joy.
Hence every unavailing grief! No more
As hapless, thy removal we deplore.
Thy gushing veins, in every drop they bleed,
Of patriot warriors shed the fruitful seed.
Soon shall the ripen'd harvest rise in arms
To crush rebellion's insolent alarms.
While prosperous moments sooth'd through life his way,
Conceal'd from public view the hero lay:
But when affliction clouded his decline,
It not eclips'd, but made his honours shine;
Gave them to beam conspicuous from the gloom,
And plant unfading trophies round his tomb.
So stars are lost, amidst the blaze of day;
But when the sun withdraws his golden ray,
Refulgent through the ætherial arch they roll,
And gild the wide expanse from pole to pole.

AN ELEGY

ON THE DEATH OF THE TRULY PIOUS, AND BRAVE

COL. JAMES GARDINER,

Who was Slain by the Rebel-Forces, Sept. 21, 1745, in the fatal Action at Preston-Pans.

BY THE REV. MR. THOMAS GIBBONS.

Nam, dum duelli lætior, hostica
Opprobriorum murmura vindice
Excusat ense, barbararum
Immortuus aggeribus cohortum;
Præsecta tandem colla volubili
Lapsu reclinat. Sed famulâ prope
Decusque, præsignisque virtus,
Semianimem subiere dextrâ:
Mox, expeditis corpore manibus,
Deprœliatrix gloria siderum
Occurrit, et fulvo reclinans
Ire jubet super astra curru. CASIMIR.

COME, Melancholy, from the stony cave,
The scoop of time for thee has made,
Under the broad cliff's shade,
Upon the naked shore,
Where warring tempests roar
In concert with the hoarse resounding wave:
Come, but with solemn gait,
With trickling eyes,
And heavy sighs,
And all the escutcheon'd pomp of fate;
And bring with thee the cypress, and the yew,
All bath'd and dropping with the mortal dew,
To this sequester'd bower;
And let the midnight hour
Be hung in deeper glooms by thee,
And bid each gay idea flee:
While all the baleful images of woe,
That haunt the marble bust,
Or hover round sepulchred dust,
With conscious horrors all my soul o'erflow.
For 'tis no vulgar death
Urania means to mourn;
But in a doleful strain
She bids the harp complain,
And hangs the funeral wreath
On Gardiner's awful urn.

Gardiner, what various fame
For ever crowns thy name!
Nor is it possible to say,
Or if the saint's, or hero's ray
Shone brightest in that blended blaze,
That form'd thine ample round of praise.
Like Moses on the sacred hill,
How hast thou stood with pleading eyes,
Outstretching hands, and fervent cries,
Unwearied wrestler with the skies!
Till heaven, responsive to thy will,
Would all thy largest wishes fill;
Till the high-brandish'd bolt aside was thrown,
And the full blessing stream'd in silver murmurs down.
Nor less a Joshua, than a Moses, thou;
For oft in liberty's high strife
Hast thou expos'd thy generous life,
And with impatient ardors on thy brow,
Rush'd foremost in the horrid van of fight,
Driving the troops of tyranny to flight,
Unshaken in the noble cause,
To pluck her bloody fangs, and break her iron jaws.

When Anna sent her chosen chief,
Victorious Marlborough,
To Europe's groans to give relief
In Bourbon's overthrow;
Renown'd Ramilia's tented field,
Where Gallia dropt her idle shield,
And to the British standard kneel'd,
Beheld young Gardiner there.
Young Gardiner, where the combat mow'd
The falling ranks, and widely strow'd
Destruction and despair,
Wielded serene his youthful arms,
And, kindling at the dire alarms,
Enjoy'd the raging war:
But here, (for steel and flying shot
Fall chiefly to the hero's lot,)
Swift through his lips the glancing bullet rung,
His lips, on which the unfinish'd oath was hung;
Nor stopt its wing'd impetuous force
Till through the neck it plough'd its angry course.

Amazing thought! that they who life expose,
Where all the thunder of the battle glows,
Who see pale death triumphant ride
Upon the crimson's surging tide,
Scattering his shafts on every side,
In blasphemy and proud contempt should rise,
And hurl their mad defiance to the skies;
Whither a moment may convey
Their souls, dislodging from their quivering clay,
To take their last inexorable doom,
Loaded with deathless pains, and long despair to come.

Such Gardiner was in early youth;
And though the warrior's rays
Beam'd round his head, celestial truth
He spurn'd, and scorn'd her ways:
And, though the Almighty arm was near,
Made his endanger'd life its care,
And heal'd the burning sores;
Yet vice, collecting with his strength,
Soon, soon bursts out in wilder length,
And like a torrent roars.
Now in the wide enchanting bowl
The hero melts his manly soul;
And now he blots the shades of night
With blacker scenes of lewd delight:
Anon in sport he lifts his brow to heaven,
And swears by the eternal name;
Asks, that the bolt may on his head be driven,
And courts the lagging flame.
So Pharaoh, when the feverish blains
No more emboss'd his flesh,
Nor shot infection through his veins,
Assum'd his rage a-fresh;
And hard, grew harder still,
And propp'd on his wild will,
Set up the standard of his pride,
Curs'd Israel's God and King, and all his plagues defy'd.

But, muse, in softer notes relate,
For softer notes upon thee wait,
How Gardiner, when his youth had rang'd
These guilty scenes, to heaven estrang'd,
Paus'd in his mid career, and was divinely chang'd.

That God, whose piercing radiance darts
O'er all our ways, and all our hearts,
The bold transgressor from his throne survey'd,
And thus in accents breathing mildness said:
"Go, mercy, charg'd with my supreme command,
"Thou fairest daughter thron'd at my right hand,
"Go wing thy downward race,
"And stop that rebel in his furious way;
"His heart shall thy victorious call obey,
"And take the willing stamp of grace:
"For never can thy call successless prove,
"When urg'd with the Redeemer's boundless love."
He spoke; and gave the Almighty nod,
The sanction of the eternal God:
At once the joyful news is propagated round,
Loud anthems from the golden roofs rebound,
And heaven's high crystal domes remurmur with the sound.

Mercy obeys; and from the empyreal height
Precipitates her glittering flight;
A starry circle sparkled round her head,
And a wide rainbow o'er her progress spread.
Muse, sing the wondrous plan,
And sing the wondrous hour,
In which the Sovereign power
The Almighty work began,
And signaliz'd her arm, and triumph'd o'er the man.
Bent on adultrous shame
The sinner she beheld;
His bosom burnt with guilty flame,
And at the future joy in secret raptures swell'd:
Enrag'd he curs'd the lazy moon
In her nocturnal tour,
That thought his bliss would come too soon,
And clogg'd the midnight hour.
'Twas then, when lust's malignant sway
Had stifled conscience' pang, and smother'd reasons ray,
That mercy stept between
The adulterer, and his sinful scene;
And painted on his mental sight,
Dress'd round in beams divinely bright,
The Saviour stretch'd upon the tree,
In purple sweats, and dying agony:

(Such was the vision, and the blaze the same,
That Saul, intent on murders, saw,
When Jesus, speaking from the radiant flame,
O'erwhelm'd his conscious soul with awe ;)
Then thus a voice arrests his ear :
"See Gardiner, see thy Saviour here!
"What, was this wood
"Wash'd in my blood,
"And was I gash'd with wounds for thee,
"And can'st thou plunge new wounds in me?"
O'erpowr'd with vast surprise,
A prisoner of the skies
The swooning champion falls,
And fear, that never yet his soul had shook,
Bedews his limbs, glares wild upon his look,
And all his soul appals :
But half the agony was unfulfill'd,
Till mercy from her crystal urn instill'd
Fierce on his heart three burning drops,*
Drops that from Sinai came,
From Sinai, where the Almighty thunderer forms
His shafted lightnings, and his bolted storms,
And from whose boiling tops
The wild sulphureous surge runs down in liquid flame.
Stung with the unsufferable smart,
That fester'd at his heart,
Gardiner awakes, and round he throws
His ghastly eyes, and scarce he knows,
Or if he lives in nature's midnight gloom,
Or, clos'd in hell's unfathomable womb,
Black, o'er his head eternal horrors roll,
And the keen gnawing worm devours his inmost soul.

But when his wandering thought had found
Himself a tenant of the ground,
Still, still his conscience felt the flaming wound.
Sudden before his prospect glows
The everlasting gulf of woes;
From the o'erhanging brink he seems to bend,
The brink, that crumbled as he stood,
And nodded o'er the dreadful flood,
And down in headlong ruin to descend
To the broad burning waves, and pains that never end.

* See Milton's Paradise Lost, B. xi. L. 416.

He turns; but ah! no friendly hand,
Nor spark of glimmering hope, appears
Amidst the raging torment of his fears;
But, outlaw'd from the realms of shining bliss,
He thinks he feels the unextinguish'd fires,
A waving waste of blue ascending spires,
And plunges in the bottomless abyss:
For, oh! his sins in crouding numbers stand,
And each tempts vengeance from the Almighty hand;
But fiercer o'er the rest ingratitude appears,
That scorn'd the Saviour's love, and flaming horrors wears.
But while in sad confusion toss'd,
And tortur'd with despair
He doom'd his soul for ever lost,
The bright ætherial Fair,
For 'twas her kind design
Not to destroy, but to refine,
Amidst the darkness and the storms
Her sacred embassy performs;
For guilt display'd in all its frightful dyes,
And crimson'd over with redeeming blood,
Draws out the rolling anguish from his eyes,
And all his stubborn soul with low submission bow'd.
'Tis done: O miracle of love!
Not minds below, nor minds above,
Great God, can trace thy mystic ways,
And pay the equal note of praise.
'Tis done: And now with outstretch'd wings
Back to the skies the radiant power withdrew;
And, as her mounting path she springs,
The silver trump of victory she blows,
In stronger dyes her arch refulgent glows,
And a far streaming glory tracks the ætherial blue.

At once abjuring all his sins,
Gardiner the heavenly life begins,
And pleads the honours of his God
With irresistible defence
Against the colour'd arts of eloquence,
Though clouded with his Maker's frown, and crush'd beneath
his rod.
But quickly a celestial ray
Shot o'er his soul unclouded day,

And balmy dews, and cheering fruits were given,
The early antepast of heaven.
And now what equal words shall paint
How Gardiner, freed from tyrant lusts,
Nor longer toss'd in passion's gusts,
Felt, spoke, and acted all the saint?
That holy name, which he profan'd before,
Behold him now with suppliant knee adore;
At morn and evening his devotions rise,
Like clouds of incense climbing to the skies:
No more the grape's nectareous juice
Could tempt beyond a prudent use;
No wanton speech defil'd his tongue;
No deed design'd his neighbour wrong;
But the fair streams of innocence,
And unconfin'd benevolence,
O'er all his life uninterrupted ran,
And through their crystal mirrors shew'd the man.
The numerous characters he bore
With a distinguish'd praise he wore,
And subject, soldier, husband, parent, friend,
He well sustain'd, and fill'd them to the end.
Now with seraphic transports fir'd,
The pinions of his zeal aspir'd,
Scarce patient till he broke the mortal shell,
And bid this empty scene, and dusky globe, farewell.
Heaven was his home, and to his home he bent,
And ere the rounds of fated life were spent,
Thither his passions would divinely roll,
The swift wing'd heralds of his coming soul.
Peace at his tent would often light, and sing,
And shed the dewy blessings from her wing;
And rills, devolving from the fount above,
Pour'd o'er his heart ecstatic life and love.

Thus Gardiner liv'd; till from the gloomy North,
Rebellion, grasping large and steely arms,
Rush'd, like a mountain boar, impetuous forth,
And shook our realms with horrible alarms;
Rebellion aiming at one wasteful sway
To strike the diadem from Brunswick's head,
Tear liberty, and all her mounds away,
And popery's o'erwhelming horrors spread.

The news to Gardiner came,
And fann'd the noble flame,
Which pure religion, heaven-born liberty,
And dauntless fortitude had rais'd;
And, as the gathering terrors thunder'd nigh,
With a redoubled strength the mounting fervors blaz'd.
What, though distemper had subdu'd his limbs,
And age defrauded half the purple streams,
That bloom'd his features o'er,
When in rebellion's storm before,
He, rising in the glorious cause
Of George's rights, and Britain's laws,
Swept down the traitorous files, and Preston swam with gore?
Yet his unbroken soul disdains
Age's dull load of cramps and pains;
His youthful rage returns,
And for the battle burns:
Then, springing from Francissa's tender arms,
Dissolv'd in flowing tears,
O'erwhelm'd with boding fears,
And only solac'd with the view,
That heaven their friendship would renew;
He, in the unshaken confidence of prayer,
Sways the keen flame of his revenging sword
For his eternal, and his earthly Lord,
Serenely meets the danger's wild alarms,
Plants his embattled force, and waits the rushing war.
So Michael *, bent on glorious fight,
Against Satanic rage and might,
Came towering to the field;
Unconscious of a quivering fear,
He saw the foe his dusky horrors rear,
Wave his broad flaming sword, and heave his moony shield.

Not far from where Edina lifts
Her towers into the skies,
Or where the ocean-bounding clifts
In clouded summits rise,
Preston extends her humble cots,
Long, long unknown to fame,
But flying routs, and purple spots
Have stamp'd the eternal shame.
Here, here, (Oh! could time's brazen pen
Dash the reproach away,

* Milton's Paradise Lost, B. vi. L. 255.

Or, as the day returns again,
Might midnight choak its ray!
Britannia's troops in vain
Oppos'd the rebel-host,
And fled inglorious o'er the plain,
Their courage wither'd, and their standards lost.
Muse, paint the doleful scene
With sighs and tears between;
For sighs and tears shall rise
From every British heart, and gush from all our eyes:
Swift on the British van
The yelling furies ran,
Like the wild ocean that has rent
Its shores, and roars along the Continent;
Or the wing'd lightning's livid glare
Darting along the immeasur'd fields of air.
Confounded at the shock,
The yielding squadrons broke:
And now, for hell inspir'd the throng,
The gloomy murderers rush'd along;
And fierce the steely blade
Its horrid circles play'd,
Till hideous cries,
Quivering sighs,
Hopeless steams,
Batter'd limbs,
Bloody streams,
And universal rout deform'd the ground,
Laid waste the British strength, and the wide Champaign drowned.
"Come on, come on," mad Elcho cries,
And for his murders thanks the skies,
(While the Italian from afar,
Too soft a soul to mix in war,
Enjoying all the guilt, beheld
His bloody harpies tear the field,)
"Ply, ply the thirsty steel,
"Round the full vengeance wheel;
"Each heretic must yield his breath,
"That for the Hanoverian brood
"Or lifts a sword,
"Or speaks a word;

" Come, gorge your souls with death,
" And drown your steps in blood :
" Think, think what blissful periods roll behind,
" Let London's mighty plunder fill your mind,
" When boundless wealth shall be with boundless empire join'd."

Gardiner, with mind elate
Above the rage of fate,
His country's bulwark stood
'Midst broken lines of death, and rising waves of blood.
His soul disdains retreat,
Though urg'd by foul defeat ;
Now to his scattering friends he calls,
To wheel again and charge the foe ;
Now hurls the wide destroying balls,
Now deals the vengeful blow.
Forsaken and alone,
And torn with gashing wounds,
He hears the treasonous shout, he hears the loyal groan ;
But nought the purpose of his soul confounds :
And still with new delight
He tempts the midnight fight,
Propp'd on his sacred cause, and courage of his own.
The embattled ranks of foot he spies
Without a leading chief,
And, like a shooting ray, he flies
To lend his brave relief.
Here the broad weapon's forceful sway,
Swung with tempestuous hand,
Plough'd through his flesh its furious way,
And stretch'd him on the strand.
Weltering in gore with fiery fiends beset,
The dying Gardiner lies ;
No gentle hand to wipe the mortal sweat,
And close his swimming eyes.
The unrelenting crew
The hero disarray'd ;
But struck at his majestic view,
Their souls were half dismay'd :
And, had not hell instamp'd his hate,
Their stony eye-balls o'er his fate
Had stream'd with human woe ; for, heavenly mild,
He o'er their fiend-like forms the Christian pardon smil'd.

But not a tear must bathe, or garment shield
His mangled limbs from sight,
Down-trodden in the fight:
While his fair mansion, that o'er tops the field,
The naked murder sees, and trembles from its height.
Still the departing flame of life
Play'd quivering in a doubtful strife;
Till, such his faithful servant's care,
(May heaven's distinguish'd goodness crown
The goodness to his master shewn!)
The wheels slow moving, from the scenes of war,
To Tranent bore the expiring chief,
In sullen sounds remurmuring to his grief.
Urania, mark the melancholy road,
And with thy tears efface the scattering blood;
Nor stop, till on the late reposing bed
(Oh! rather 'tis the funeral bier!)
You see the hero's pallid body spread,
And his last anguish hear.
Half-choak'd with clotted gore,
He draws the hollow moan;
Flitting his pulse, and fix'd his eyes,
All pale and motionless he lies,
And seems to breathe no more.——
Oh! that's the life-dissolving groan:
Farewel, dear man! for in that pang, thy mind
Soars to its God, and leaves the clog behind.

Gardiner is dead!—The bloody trump of fame
Proclaim'd the mighty death;
In every look the posting rumour came,
And flew on every breath.
The widow'd partner of his life
The doleful tidings hears,
And, silent in stupendous grief,
Her eyes refuse their tears:
Oppress'd beneath the immeasurable weight,
Her spirit faints away,
As, sympathetic with the hero's fate,
It meant to quit its clay.
The pledges of his love
Their filial duty prove,

And each with tender hands uprears,
With hands all cover'd o'er in tears,
Their mother's sinking head;
And groan resounds to groan,
For oh! the best of husbands gone,
The best of Fathers dead!
But Gardiner's death is more than private woe;
Wide and more wide the increasing sorrows run,
O'er British lands unlimited they go,
And fly across the seas, and travel with the sun.
Religion, that from heaven had bow'd
To watch the scale of fight,
When holy Gardiner fell,
Who lov'd, and who adorn'd her cause so well,
Retir'd behind behind a crimson cloud,
Nor could sustain the sight.
Britannia, where she sate
Upon the sea-beat shore
To eye the battle's fate,
Her silver mantle tore:
Then thus, her blushing honours wann'd,
Her sceptre quivering in her hand,
Her laurels wither'd, and her head declin'd,
Ten thousand terrors boding in her mind,
She to the deep in bitter wailings griev'd,
While her fall'n helm the trickling drops receiv'd:
"What havoc of my martial force
"Has this sad morn beheld,
"Torn, gash'd, and heap'd without remorse
"Upon the naked field?
"But Gardiner's death afflicts me most,
"Than whom a chief I could not boast
"More faithful, vigilant and brave;
"And should across his grave
"An hetacomb of Highland-Brutes be slain,
"They could not recompense his injur'd ghost,
"Nor fully quench my rage, and wipe away my stain."

But see, in splendid state
Cherubic convoys come,
And waft the hero from his fate
To his celestial home.
Now, now he sails along,
Encircled with their throng,

The throng, that clap their mantling wings,
And to loud triumphs strike their strings,
Through liquid seas of day
Ploughing the azure way,
Till to the starry towers the squadrons rise.
The starry towers, thick sown with pearl and gold,
Their adamantine leaves unfold,
And shew the entrance to the empyreal skies:
Through them our hero mark'd his road,
And through the wheeling ranks of heaven
An unobstructed path was given,
Till he attain'd the eternal throne of God;
A throne array'd in uncreated beams,
And from its footstool rolling blissful streams.
Well hast thou done, the Almighty Father spoke;
Well hast thou done, the exalted Jesus cry'd;
Well hast thou done, all heaven the Euge took,
The saints and angels in their songs reply'd.
And now a robe of spotless white,
But where the Saviour's flowing vein
Had blush'd it with a sanguine stain,
Invests him round: In various light
(For such was the divine command,).
Refulgent on his brows a crown was plac'd;
And a triumphal palm his better hand
With golden blossoms grac'd.
Nigh to the seat of bliss
His mansion was assign'd;
Sorrow and sin forsook his breast,
His weary soul was now at rest,
And life, and love, and ecstasies
Unbound his secret powers, and overflow'd his mind.

Nor has thy life, heroic man, been spilt
Without a wrath proportion'd to the guilt:
Enkindled by the cries that rose
From thy dear sacred blood, with those
That shriek'd for vengeance from the brave Munroes,
Who fell a martyr'd sacrifice
To cool inhuman butcheries,
Heaven sends its angel righteously severe,
And from the foe exacts the last arrear.
For when the barbarous bands,
Thick as the swarms that blackened Egypt's strands,

And furious as the winter's rushing rains,
Impell'd by whirlwinds through the plains
Had o'er our country roll'd,
Young William rose, auspicious name,
Sacred to liberty and fame!
And their mad rage controll'd.
Back to their hills and bogs they fled,
(For terror wing'd their nimble speed,)
And howl'd for help in vain:
William pursu'd, and launch'd his vengeful ire,
(As o'er the stubble runs the crackling fire,)
Upon the groveling train:
Shuddering with horror and despair
With bellowing pain they rend the air,
Till Culloden's illustrious moor
Groan'd with the heaps of slain, and smoak'd with rebel-gore.
Then, muse, forego thy swelling sighs,
And wipe the anguish from thine eyes;
Sing, how rebellion has receiv'd its doom,
How Gardiner dwells in his eternal home,
And in each British heart has rais'd a lasting tomb.

No. III.

AN ACCOUNT

OF

SOME REMARKABLE PARTICULARS CONCERNING THE ANCIENT FAMILY

OF THE

MUNROES, OF FOWLIS.

WHILE I was endeavouring to do justice to the memory of that excellent man, and most beloved friend, whose memoirs I have now concluded; and was mentioning, in the course of my narration, the tragical consequences, which the unnatural rebellion, by which he fell, had drawn along with it, and the many other valuable persons, of which it had also deprived us; I could not but particularly reflect on the awful catastrophe of Sir Robert Munro, and his two brothers, the Captain, and the Doctor; who all, within the compass of eight months, and in less than twelve after the death of Colonel Gardiner, (with whom they were all acquainted, and to whom they were allied in the bonds of a virtuous and honourable friendship,) fell a sacrifice to the rage and cruelty of the same savage destroyers.—I was desirous of interweaving so remarkable a piece of history, with a subject, to which it was, alas! so nearly connected: And therefore I applied myself to a person of high rank most nearly related to them, on whose information I was sure I might entirely depend; intreating the favour of such an account of these three excellent brothers, and of the circumstances of their death, as I might safely and properly offer to the view of the public.

This honourable person referred me to a gentleman, well acquainted with the history of the family of the Munroes of Fowlis, and possessed of a distinct historical account of it, taken from the annals, which have been kept of that family for many ages past, and from the old writs, charters, and other authentic deeds belonging to it, which are the vouchers of these annals.

This gentleman was pleased to favour me with a pretty large historical account of his family, beginning at much higher,

and carrying it through a much wider extent, than I could have expected from the particular view, with which I first requested information.——I next obtained instructions on the same subject from a gentleman at London ——I was then furnished with a particular relation from another gentleman, a pious minister of the church of Scotland, with whom I have the happiness of being well acquainted. And as all these are persons of such a character, that none, who know them, can question the veracity and testimony of each, so they were each of them happy in a most intimate acquaintance with all the three brothers, after whom I enquired.——And last of all, I received from a fourth gentleman, an historical account of this family from the most early times; which, by the date it bears, was compiled a great many years ago, and which, it seems, was intended to have been published in an historical account of some of the ancient families of Scotland; which work became abortive through the death of the author.

When I compared these several accounts, as I received them from time to time, it gave me great satisfaction to find them all agree, and tally so exactly, in their accounts of this family, and of the three excellent brothers last deceased.—— On an attentive perusal of these informations, I found they contained, what was too curious and important to be lost, and yet too long to be inserted in the memoirs of Colonel Gardiner, without breaking the unity of design in a manner, that would have proved inconvenient.——I concluded therefore, that (especially as those memoirs were finished, before some of these papers came to my hands,) it would be best to present it to the world in a distinct piece, connected by way of appendix to the former. And I feel a most sensible pleasure in the addition, I am hereby making to the work; as it is paying some little debt of gratitude to the illustrious dead; and, at the same time, doing a just honour to the surviving branches of a family, from whence so many heroes have sprung, and of which there are still, though after much sad desolation made in it, most worthy remains. And I hope, that it may not only entertain my readers with some remarkable facts worthy of commemoration, but excite in their breasts something of the same generous spirit, to which nothing can more powerfully instigate the mind, than the view of such glorious examples.

The family of the Munroes of Fowlis is among the most ancient and honourable families in the north of Scotland, and has generally been remarkable for a brave, martial, and heroic spirit. It is mentioned by Buchanan with a memorable testi-

mony*, when after speaking of the difficulties, in which Mary Queen of Scots was involved at Inverness, he adds, "That as soon as they heard of their sovereign's danger, a great number of the ancient Scots poured in around her, especially the Frasers and Munroes; which, says he, were esteemed among the most valiant of the clans inhabiting those countries." And, how well the latter have ever since continued to deserve that character, the following memoirs, brief as they are, may in some degree shew.

The Munroes of Fowlis have, in every one of their generations, been intermarried with many of the best families of nobility and gentry in the north of Scotland. And it is yet more for their honour, that they were among the first in those parts, that embraced the reformation, and have ever since been zealous asserters of it. And many of them have not only given great countenance and encouragement to the ministers of the gospel in the parishes under their influence, in consequence of which, a great harvest of most eminent Christians hath been produced there; but also have themselves been signal examples of true piety, and a behaviour in all its branches most ornamental to a Christian profession.——I fear, there have been few families, to which such a character can be universally applied: But it is certain, that so far as it is the case, it is the most illustrious of all hereditary honours; and therefore seems to have been mentioned with the utmost propriety by my several correspondents in this connection.

According to Buchanan, it was in the beginning of the eleventh century, and about the time of the conquest in England, when Malcolm II. of that name, King of Scots, first distributed, or as it is expressed, *feu-ed out* or *fee-ed*, the lands of Scotland to the great families thereof, on account of their eminent services in his many battles with the Danes, until he forced them quite out of his kingdom. And according to tradition, it was on that occasion, that the country betwixt the borough of Dingwall and the water of Alness, in the shire of Ross, was given to Donald Munro; and which is therefore to this day called Ferrindonald, that is, Donald's Land. And part of these lands were afterwards by the king erected into a barony, called the Barony of Fowlis.

I shall not follow the annals of this family so far, as to entertain the public with a detail of the barons of Fowlis in their

* Audito principis periculo, magna priscorum Scotorum multitudo affluit, imprimis Fraserii et Munroii, hominum fortissimorum in illis gentibus familiæ. Buchan. Hist. Lib. xvii. p. 618.

several generations through these early ages; but shall begin my particular narration of them, only from the time they became protestants, when their brave behaviour and example will afford us more instruction, and the facts concerning them may be depended on with more certainty. And therefore I shall only before that time observe,

That George IX. Baron* of Fowlis, (in a direct lineal descent from the above Donald, the first Baron,) was slain at the memorable battle of Bannock-burn, fought by King Robert Bruce of Scotland, against Edward II. of England, in the year 1314.——George X. Baron of Fowlis, and son of the former, was also slain with a great many of his name at the battle of Halydon-Hill, near Berwick; in which battle the Scots were defeated by the English, and a great number of them killed, on the 22d of July, A. D. 1333——Robert Munro, XVII. Baron of Fowlis, was slain at the battle of Pinkie near Edinburgh, with many of his name; where the Scots were again defeated by the English, and a great number of them killed, A. D. 1547.——I mention the fall of these three gentlemen with their friends and followers, fighting valiantly in the cause of their country, as illustrating the valour and bravery of this family in their different generations, and shewing, how justly they merited the character which Buchanan gives them in the place before cited. How long this brave spirit has continued, as it were, hereditary to them, will appear from what follows.

The first protestant of this family was Robert Munro, the XVIII. Baron of Fowlis, son to Robert last mentioned, and the same, who came to the assistance of Mary Queen of Scots upon the occasion before cited, A. D. 1562. He embraced the protestant religion quickly after; and being a wise and a good man, he left an opulent estate to the family, and died A. D. 1588.——He was suceeded by his son Robert Munro, XIX.

* It is to be observed, 1st, That baron in Scotland does not import nobility, as it does now in England: For at the time the lands of Scotland were divided as above, there were then no nobility in that nation; but the great families had their estates erected into baronies, with a jurisdiction over all the vassals, tenants, and possessors thereof; which was the origin and support of the clans in Scotland, these being the only military force in that kingdom, until, upon the union of the two crowns in the person of King James VI. of Scotland, regular troops were introduced into that kingdom.—To this I would add, 2dly, That the annals of this family contain a genealogical account of all the Barons of Fowlis, from the above Donald Munro to this present time. Several of these can only be transmitted to us by tradition: But as to those whom I have mentioned, there is full evidence of the facts concerning them from the old writs, charters, and deeds in the family of Fowlis; and even several others of them, whom I have not mentioned, are taken notice of in these old writs.

Baron of Fowlis, who died the same year with his father.—— The next to him was his brother, Hector Munro, XX. Baron of Fowlis, who died A. D. 1603.——Robert Munro, his son, succeeded him, the XXI. Baron of Fowlis, who flourished when Gustavus Adolphus, that justly celebrated King of Sweden, whose religion and valour were so distinguished among his many religious and valiant cotemporaries, was engaged in a protestant war against the Emperor Ferdinand II. in defence of the civil as well as sacred liberties of Germany. The generous heart of this worthy gentleman was so struck with a regard to the common cause, in which he himself had no concern, but what piety and virtue gave him, that he joined Gustavus with a very great number of his friends, who bore his own name. Many of them gained great reputation in this war; and that of Robert their leader was so eminent, that he was made Colonel of two regiments at the same time, the one of horse, and the other of foot, in that service; in which he acquitted himself with so much fidelity and zeal, that he died of the wounds which he received in crossing the Danube, and was buried at Ulm, in the month of March, 1633.

He was succeeded by Sir Hector Munro, XXII. Baron of Fowlis, the next male heir of the family,* who was also Colonel of a regiment in the same service; and upon his coming over to Britain, was created a baronet in June, 1633. Returning afterwards to Germany, he died at Hamburgh, in April, 1635.—— His son, Sir Hector Munro, was XXIII. Baron of Fowlis, who died without issue in the year 1651, at seventeen years of age. Sir Robert Munro, XXIV. Baron of Fowlis, succeeded as the nearest male heir, being grandson to George Munro of Obsdale, who was third son to Robert Munro, the XVIII. Baron of Fowlis.

My information imports, that in the before-mentioned annals of this family, there is a well attested list of officers, of which I have a copy in the memorial last sent me, wherein there are three Generals, eight Colonels, five Lieutenant Colonels, eleven Majors, and above thirty Captains, all of the name of Munro; besides a great number of subalterns. Most of these were in that religious war under the great Gustavus Adolphus; and some of the descendants of this family are at this day in the possession of considerable military commands in Sweden, and various parts of Germany.

* It was formerly the custom in Scotland, and is so still among ancient families, to entail the succession of their family estate to the nearest male relation of the deceased, passing by the females, thereby to preserve their estate in their own name and family.

General Robert Munro (who was uncle to Sir Robert, the XXIV. Baron of Fowlis, published in the year 1644, an account of this religious war under Gustavus Adolphus, in a folio volume, intitled, "Military Discipline learned from the valiant Swede:" A book, of which, though I never happened to see it, I have heard a high character. I am informed, that it contains an exact journal of that expedition into Germany for the relief of the distressed protestants; and, it is said, to be filled with most excellent observations on military affairs, delivered in a strain of piety, which seems to breathe the spirit of its brave and worthy author. And, indeed, by what I have heard of that instructive history, it is hard to say, when there has been, even in the Christian world, so religious and so well disciplined an army, as this; at the head of which, a mysterious Providence permitted that royal hero and martyr, the great Gustavus, to fall. Would to God, the time might at length come, when our commanders shall take their lessons from it; at least, so far, as to learn from the example of some of the bravest and greatest of men, to maintain in the military bodies under their command, the authority of the Lord of Hosts; and particularly, that reverence for his name, and for his day, which was there so beautifully and gloriously conspicuous!

This worthy General, in the year 1641, was appointed by King Charles I. Major General of the Scotch forces, that were sent to Ireland to suppress the infamous and destructive rebellion there. It is not my business here to insist on those unhappy circumstances, which so long retarded their march, and so greatly obstructed their success. I find, however, that he had at length the honour to be in the number of those, by whom God gave blood to drink to those miscreants, who had rendered themselves so eminently worthy of it by a series of outrages, which the most sanguinary and detestable faction on earth, I mean that of popery, has seldom been able to exceed. For in the year 1644, this illustrious commander, at the head of 14,000 of the Scotch and English protestants, fought and defeated 22,000 of the Irish in Ulster, killed and took many thousands of them, and seized on a great quantity of cattle and other provisions, of which the protestants were then in great want.

The General was a great favourer of the presbyterian interest, and among the first who established it in Ireland. He sate in their presbyteries and synods; and adhered to the interest of the parliament, till he apprehended they were carrying matters to an excessive height against the King: On which he accepted of

a commission from him, and acted under the Duke of Ormond; to which he was persuaded by his nephew Sir George Munro, of whom afterwards, who had always adhered to the interest of Charles I. as he afterwards did to that of Charles II.

In the year 1645, the General was surprised by Colonel Monk, before he could draw out his men from their quarters; and he and they were by that means taken prisoners: But he continued not long in their hands; for death came and set him at liberty soon after.

It is worthy of our notice by the way, that in the year 1644, we find Monk imprisoned by the parliament, for having accepted a commission from the king, and acted in consequence of it, though before that, he had acted by commission from the parliament: And again, in the year 1648, we find him fighting for the parliament, against the king: And his surprising and taking General Munro, was the first thing that brought him into favour with the parliament. For in that reeling time we find men of a much better character than Monk, changing sides again and again, as they apprehended the one party or the other to be in the right, from the many different demands, refusals, and concessions, which then happened between them.

The General was succeeded in his command by Sir George Munro, brother to the last mentioned Sir Robert, and both of them nephews to General Robert by his brother Colonel John Munro, of Obsdale, in the Swedish service: Sir George was also bred in that service with his uncle, and afterwards served with him in Ireland; where he arrived to the rank of a Colonel. He was made Major-General by King Charles II. and had a body of forces under his command at Kendal, when James Duke of Hamilton was defeated by Cromwell at Lancaster, A. D. 1648. Upon this defeat, Sir George returned to Scotland, and defeated the Earl of Argyle: And afterwards, his forces being disbanded by order of the states of Scotland, he went to Holland, and joined King Charles II. After whose restoration he was made Lieutenant-General, and commander in chief in Scotland.

Sir John Munro, XXV. Baron of Fowlis, succeeded his father Sir Robert, A. D. 1668. He was a member of the convention of the estates of Scotland at the revolution, and a very zealous promoter of that happy event. He was no less strenuous in asserting presbytery; and on that account, being also remarkable for a large and corpulent stature, he was nick-named the presbyterian mortar-piece. His eminent piety and zeal had exposed him to great sufferings in the cause of religion, in those

unhappy and infamous days, when the best friends to their country were treated as the worst enemies to the government; and when to be conscientiously solicitous to depart from evil, made so many thousands a prey. Sir John suffered greatly, among many others, of whom the world was not worthy: His person was doomed to long imprisonment, for no pretended cause, but what was found against him in the matters of his God: And his estate, which before was considerable, was harrassed by severe fines and confiscations; which reduced it to a diminution, much more honourable indeed than any augmentation could have been, but from which it has not recovered even to this day. He died A. D. 1696, and was succeeded by his son.

Sir Robert Munro, XXVI. Baron of Fowlis, who succeeded his father, was also a pious and benevolent man, and for some time a captain: But it pleased God early to deprive him of his sight, and to continue him in that condition during the remainder of his life. Under this calamity, he calmly submitted himself to that God, who can shed abroad a far more cheering light on the soul, than these bodily eyes can admit. Providence was pleased to bless him with children, in whom he could not but find the highest satisfaction; and whose amiable characters, in general, leave no room to doubt of the tenderness and respect, with which they would treat so worthy a parent, under a distressing calamity, which would naturally move compassion even in strangers. There were four of them, who all reached maturity of age, and were the heirs of many blessings, though Providence suffered three of them to fall almost at once, by most unjust and barbarous hands; Sir Robert, Captain George Munro, and the Doctor, whose christian name was Duncan: Their only sister, married to Mr. Gordon of Ardoch, still survives; an example of profound submission and fortitude, mingled with the most tender sensibility of temper.

Sir Robert Munro, XXVII. Baron of Fowlis, succeeded his father, A. D. 1729. He went early from the university to the camp, where he served seven years in Flanders; being some time Captain in the royal Scots, before that fatal cessation of arms, A. D. 1712; as his late Majesty, with so much propriety, publicly called it, to which therefore I shall not presume to give, either a milder, or a severer name. It was here, that Sir Robert contracted that acquaintance and strict friendship with good Colonel Gardiner, which ran through the remainder of their lives, and of which each was so worthy. On Sir Robert's return from Flanders, he was reduced, on account of

his inflexible opposition in parliament, of which he was then a member, to the measures, which the ministry were then taking to subvert the succession in the present royal family, and with it, no doubt, the protestant religion, of which that family was, and is, under God, the firmest barrier.

My correspondent observes concerning Sir Robert, "That he was noted for the countenance, he gave to divine worship, both in public and his family, and for the regard, which he always expressed to the word of God, and its ministers;" and then adds, "That he was sincere in his friendship, and full of compassion even to the meanest of those around him: And that he was remarkable above most, for his activity in the discharge of any office of friendship, where he had professed it, and for his great exactness in the performance of his promises."

His military services are particularly worthy of being mentioned here. In the year 1715, He with his clan, in conjunction with the Earl of Sutherland, kept the Earl of Seaforth with 3000 men under his command, from joining the rebel camp at Perth, for near two months; and thereby prevented the Earl of Marr from crossing the Forth, till the Duke of Argyle had gathered strength sufficient to oppose him. In consequence of this, Sir Robert exposed his own country to the fiercest resentments of the rebels, by whom it was plundered and destroyed; while others, who yet pretended to be friends to the government, saved themselves and their lands by capitulations with the enemy. Being then made Governor of Inverness, Sir Robert kept 400 of his name there, during the rest of that rebellion, regularly paid and regimented: And these, together with some other clans, well-affected to the interest of the present royal family, kept possession of that important pass; whereby the rebels were hindered from making a stand there, when they were dislodged from Perth by the Duke of Argyle.

He was, in the year 1716, made a commissioner of enquiry into the forfeited estates of the rebels; in which he strenuously exerted himself, in procuring a number of parishes to be erected through the rebel countries, and provided with suitable stipends out of the confiscated lands; whereby the gospel was preached in places, where it had not been preached since the reformation: So that some new presbyteries were formed, in countries, where the discipline and worship of protestant churches had before, no footing. And such was the compassion and humanity, which attempered his high courage, that, by his interest with the government, he did eminent service to the unfortunate widows and children of such, as had to the ruin of their families been engaged in the rebellion.

Sir Robert was thirty years member of parliament by his family interest; during which time, he always maintained the firmest attachment to the service of his majesty and his royal father, and to the religion and liberties of his country. His fidelity and zeal for these did not need to be purchased, solicited, or quickened, by personal favours: It continued through all this period unshaken and active, though from the ending of his commission of enquiry in 1724, till the year 1740, he had no post under the government. He then found, the nation was to be involved in a foreign war, the necessity of which was generally apprehended and acknowledged: And therefore, though his friends thought his merit and experience might have pretended to something more, as he had been in the rank of a Lieutenant-Colonel 25 years, his heart was too generous, and too warm, not to accept of the same commission, which was then given him in the highland regiment. This regiment, when first formed out of independent highland companies, was under the command of the Earl of Crawford as its Colonel, who, all the while he stood in that relation to it, was abroad, confined by the wounds, he had received as a volunteer against the Turks. During this time Sir Robert Munro was his lordship's Lieutenant-Colonel. Before it went to Flanders, Lord Semple was its Colonel; but he also being generally absent, and Sir Robert an old experienced Officer, the regiment during the war was left under his care; and the manner, in which he modelled and conducted it, will remain in many respects an immortal honour to his name.

It is indeed surprising, that a regiment, composed of Highlanders, who are generally used to so rapacious a life at home, should yet by discipline, have been brought to so good a behaviour, as that they should be judged the most trusty guards of property; and that, when the people in Flanders were allowed a protection for their goods, they should chuse to have some of this regiment, among others of the British soldiers, appointed to protect them. This may indeed seem hardly credible:* Yet my informer assures me, that he had it from an officer of their own, of unquestionable credit;

* A very worthy person, to whose inspection this appendix has been committed since it was finished, observes here, that though the Highlanders are much addicted to depredations on their neighbours, yet the very actors even in them are generally as faithful to their trust, as any set of people whatever: And that, if his officer shews but any degree of civility and kindness to one of these people, the fear of disobliging him has a greater influence, than that of stripes generally has on others of the common people. This remark I thought proper to insert here, that the representation of this affair might be as impartial as possible.

who added further, that it was but seldom he had observed a man among them drunk, and as seldom heard any of them swear. This is very agreeable to the high character, which I heard of this regiment, from an English gentleman then in Flanders, whose veracity is undoubted, and who cannot, I am sure, be suspected of any prejudice here. And among Sir Robert's papers, there is still existing a copy of a letter from the elector palatine to his envoy at London, desiring him to thank the King of Great Britain, in his name, for the excellent behaviour of the Highland regiment, while they were in his territories, "which" as he says expressly, "was owing to the care of Sir Robert Munro, their Lieutenant-Colonel; for whose sake, he adds, he should always pay a regard to a Scotchman for the future."

I the rather mention these particulars, not only as they do an honour to Sir Robert, and his worthy brother, through whose interest, and that of the other officers, with the private men, this great reformation was effected; but likewise as they seem to shew in a very convincing manner, of how great importance it is, that some methods be seriously thought of, for breaking the other uncultivated inhabitants of these countries into useful men, by bringing them, at once, under the protection and discipline of the laws, and inforcing their obedience to them, by teaching them the principles of religion, and the arts of peace and commerce. This is a happy effect, which methinks we may naturally hope for from the late rebellion, pernicious as it has in many respects been; considering, how much it has reduced them to the power of the government, and how justly obnoxious it has made the chiefs of many fierce and barbarous clans.

According to my best information, from persons who are most thoroughly acquainted with affairs in the north, the two great springs of rebellion amongst the inhabitants of these Highland countries, are, their idleness, and their ignorance.—The former subjects them to a slavish dependance on their masters, and is also the cause of their being so addicted to stealing: And the latter makes them a prey to popish priests and missionaries from Rome, who are constantly and in great numbers trafficing among them. It has been very justly remarked, that the success, they have in seducing these poor ignorant people, is occasioned, in a great measure, by the vast extent of parishes in those Highland countries; some of them being betwixt 30 and 40 miles in length, and 20 and 30 in

breadth, full of great mountains, rapid rivers, and arms of the sea; and those parishes, which are more moderate in their extent, are about 20 miles in length, and 10 or 12 in breadth: And it is every where to be observed through these parishes, that around the place of the minister's residence, the inhabitants are almost all protestants; but in the corners, which are remote from his residence, they are generally all papists.

Now it is evident, that these poor people can only be cured of idleness, by teaching them manufactures, to which they are wholly strangers:—And it is hard to imagine, how they can be rescued from popish ignorance, until there are several new parishes erected in those extensive countries. It would ill become me to pretend to direct the government of Britain on such an occasion; but I know it to be the opinion of many persons in those parts, of distinguished wisdom and experience, that if it should be thought fit to employ the produce of the estates confiscated by the late rebellion, for these valuable purposes, this, with the thousand pounds of his Majesty's royal bounty annually bestowed, would go a good way towards remedying these two great evils, with their train of miserable consequences, which we have of late so deeply felt. And who would not rejoice, to see all these poor people sharing with us fully in all the privileges and advantages of Christians and of Britons? I pray God to guide and prosper every scheme for this purpose! And in this connection, I cannot but mention, and recommend the society for propagating the knowledge of religion, and, with it, the principles of loyalty, in these Highland countries; a design, in which so many worthy persons, both in the northern and southern parts of our island, are incorporated: But their stock is by no means equal to the purposes here mentioned; and by their constitution, they are confined to the support of schools, which are indeed going on with great success, as far as the revenue will allow them.

But to return from this natural, and therefore, I hope, very pardonable, digression: The behaviour of Sir Robert Munro, and this regiment, at the battle of Fontenoy, was heard through all Britain. He had obtained leave of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, to allow them their own way of fighting. They were early in the field, and were ordered to attack the main battery of the French, at the village, from which the battle derives its name; which they did, and drove the enemy from it: But finding the body of the French forces deeply intrenched behind the battery, they did not give over the charge, but bravely drew up to attack them. Sir Robert,

according to the usage of his countrymen, ordered the whole regiment to clap to the ground on receiving the French fire; and instantly, as soon as it was discharged, they sprung up, and coming close to the enemy, poured in their shot upon them, to the certain destruction of multitudes, and drove them precipitately through their own lines: Then retreating, they drew up again, and attacked them a second time after the same manner. These attacks they repeated several times that day, to the surprise of the whole army.

Sir Robert was every where with his regiment, notwithstanding his great corpulency; and when in the trenches, he was hauled out again by the legs and arms by his own men. And it is observable, that when he commanded the whole regiment to clap to the ground, he himself alone, with the colours behind him, stood upright, receiving the whole fire of the enemy; and this, because, as he said, though he could easily lie down, his great bulk would not suffer him to rise so quickly.

His preservation that day was the surprise and astonishment, not only of the whole army, but of all that heard the particulars of the action: And my information relates, that a most eminent person in the army was heard to say upon the occasion, "That it was enough to convince one of the truth of the doctrine of predestination, and to justify what King William of glorious memory had been used to say, that every bullet has its billet, or its particular direction and commission, where it should lodge." It is added, that on the retreat of our army, the Highland regiment was in the rear; and a great body of the French horse being ordered to pursue, Sir Robert made his regiment face about, and give them a general fire, so full and effectual, that a great number of them being brought to the ground, the rest wheeled about and rode off.

But to close what relates to Sir Robert Munro: As an acknowledgment for his brave services at Fontenoy, as well as on former occasions, his Majesty was pleased to appoint him to succeed General Ponsonby, who was slain there, in the command of his regiment; which was among the troops that arrived at Newcastle, during the rebellion, and made a part of General Wade's army. They were afterwards ordered to Scotland; and being upon the left wing at the battle of Falkirk, on that fatal day, the 17th of January 1745-6, they shamefully left their brave Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, with five or six more of their officers, to be cut in pieces.

By the account which the rebels themselves give of Sir Robert, he defended himself against six of them with his half-pike, and killed two of their number: Upon which, a seventh came up, and, as they expressed it, poured a shot into his belly, which brought him immediately to the ground. In this dreadful moment, in the midst of all this extremity, his brother Doctor Munro, whom the warmest instances of his friends could not divert from exposing his person in the defence of his country, and who was near at hand, ran to him to support him, attended by his servant and the surgeon of the regiment: But they were all murdered on the spot, in the most barbarous manner, by those cruel men.

Sir Robert's body was the next day sought out; and his face was so cut and mangled by these savages, after he fell, that it could scarce be known. He was found, and buried honourably in the church-yard of Falkirk by the Macdonalds, who, though engaged in rebellion against their lawful sovereign, could not but pay some public regard to the memory of so valiant a man; the principal persons among the rebels, attending him all the way to the grave.

And thus fell those two brave brothers; for the Doctor undoubtedly deserves that title with Sir Robert, who, though professing the peaceful art of medicine, adventured himself amidst the most visible danger, fired with love to his illustrious brother; and attempting in vain to bring him some aid in his last extremities amidst armed enemies, expired with him, no less lamented than he, by all, that intimately knew him. How just that lamentation was, will appear from the accounts, which I have had of the Doctor's character from his most intimate friends, which I here subjoin.

He was a gentleman of an excellent understanding, and had a brightness and solidity in his genius, which are not often united; but which, when they concur, do greatly illustrate each other. He had been bred up in the study of medicine and surgery, which, in Scotland, are frequently joined, as they have so great an affinity. "He had a large stock of knowledge, not only in his own profession, but in most parts of polite literature. But these, adds my correspondent, I hold cheap, when compared to the goodness of his heart. His greatest study was to know himself; and I verily believe, that, since the early ages of Christianity, there has not appeared a more upright person."

He spent a great many years in the East-Indies, and had most accurately and diligently enquired into the manners, cus-

toms, arts and manufactures of the natives, and into the produce and commodities of the country: So that he was much more capable of giving entertainment to persons of curiosity in such things, than travellers commonly are; and his veracity was such, that all, who knew him, could entirely depend upon whatever he reported, as on his own knowledge. To all these advantages was added, a memory remarkably tenacious of every circumstance, with which he charged it: But perhaps, it was a loss to the world that it was so, as it hindered him from committing many extraordinary things to writing, which might have afforded improvement, as well as delight, to the public.

The want of such memoirs from so able an hand is the more to be regretted, as his remarkable modesty did not permit him to talk much in company. One might spend a good deal of time with him, without perceiving, by any hints from him, that he had ever been out of Britain: But when his friends seemed desirous of information on any of those topics, as they fell in his way, he communicated his observations upon them with the utmost freedom, and gave them the greatest satisfaction imaginable; of which, some remarkable instances happened at the houses of persons of very considerable rank, who paid him that respect, which he so well deserved.

It was the more to be desired, that he should have left behind him some written memoirs of his own remarks and adventures, as he was a most attentive observer of Divine Providence, and had experienced many singular instances of it. One is so remarkable, that it claims a place here, brief as these hints must necessarily be:—After he had continued eight or ten years in the East-Indies, he was shipwrecked on the Malabarian coast, as he was on his passage home; he saved his life on a plank, but lost all his effects, except a small parcel of diamonds. This ruinous calamity, as it seemed to be, obliged him to return to Fort St. George, where he experienced, far beyond what he could have expected, the extraordinary friendship of several English gentlemen of that settlement; and felt the solid effects of it, as, by their assistance, he acquired much more in six or seven years following, for his whole stay in that country was about sixteen years, than he had lost by shipwreck. And when he left the settlement, he had all sort of encouragement offered him to induce him to stay; but his health and other circumstances obliged him to return home.

This return, which happened, if I mistake not, about the year 1726, was a happy Providence to many. For as he was remarkably successful in both the branches of his peculiar pro-

fession, he took great pains in both: And as he did this without fee or reward, when he was satisfied, the circumstances of the afflicted needed such assistance, he was an instrument of saving many limbs, and many lives, which must otherwise, in all probability, have been lost.

To this account, I must beg leave to add, what another of my correspondents writes to me concerning the Doctor in the following words: "As we were often by ourselves, I still found him inclined to turn our discourse to spiritual subjects, concerning God and religion, the offices of the great Redeemer, and the power of God's Spirit in converting and sanctifying the souls of men, and the hope of eternal life through Christ." I transcribe the passage thus particularly concerning this pious physician, as I esteem it, in one view, a peculiar honour to him, and, permit me to say, in another, to the profession itself: Blessed be God, that though it is so rare a case, yet there are those of that learned body, who are *not ashamed of the gospel of Christ*; but, who knowing it to be true on incontestible evidence, and having felt (what one would imagine every rational creature who believes it to be true, must immediately see), its infinite importance, have steadily determined to submit to its influence, and to maintain its honours in the midst of all the scorn and derision of their infidel brethren: A determination, which, perhaps, requires no less courage, especially in some tempers, than that generous instance of fraternal love, which will entail lasting glory on the memory of Dr. Munro.

There yet remained one valiant brother of this family, whom Providence reserved for a few months, before he shared the fate of the other two. The person I mean, was Captain George Munro, of Culcairn, esq. of whom I have conceived such an idea from the account of him, which has been put into my hands, that I cannot forbear wishing, the world were blessed with a much larger narrative of his life and character, than my instructions will furnish out, or than I should have room to insert in such an appendix as this. Much do I regret, that Providence never favoured me with an opportunity of being personally acquainted with him; especially as I have reason to believe, from what my friends in the north write, that he had the like disposition towards forming a friendship with me, as produced so quick a growth of it in the breast of Colonel Gardiner; whom, on the whole, Capt. Munro seems to have resembled almost in every part of his character, taking it as it was, since that happy change, which I have so largely described in the foregoing memoirs: But what was wanting in my personal knowledge, is supplied

by a large and animated account from my correspondents, who had the best opportunity of knowing him, and upon whose information I can safely depend.

Captain George Munro was the second brother of the family, the Doctor being the youngest son. He, like the other gentlemen, had the advantages of a very liberal education, and soon discovered marks of a good genius, which might have qualified him for making a figure under any character in the learned world. Besides the other branches of literature, common to all the professions, he acquired a stock of theological knowledge; and before he was seventeen years old, he was well acquainted with ecclesiastical history, so as to be able to give a good account of the advance and decline of the Christian interest in various ages and countries; and the degrees and manner, by which the corruption and reformation of the church had been introduced, established, or obstructed. I the rather mention this, as it seems to be an accomplishment of great importance; on which account, I much wonder, that the generality of young gentlemen should think it so little worth attending to: And I wish I could say, that all, who are intended for the ministry, were so careful in pursuing it, as its usefulness and its absolute necessity to them might demand.

But his taste and talents particularly lay for a military life; and in the year 1715, he behaved himself with great courage and activity during the whole course of that rebellion; and after the dispersion of the rebels, he was employed in reducing the inhabitants of those Highland countries, and the adjacent Isles, to a submission to the government.

In the year 1719, when on occasion of the invasion from Spain, General Wightman with the troops under his command, had waited long at Inverness for a body of Highland men to conduct the troops through the mountains to Glenshiel, where the Spaniards and rebels were encamped; and when many promises of such assistance made to the General had failed, Sir Robert Munro being then out of the country, his brother the Captain, of whom we now speak, assembled, in a most expeditious manner, a body of the Munro clan, and marched with the regular troops to Glenshiel; where they distinguished themselves by the gallantry of their behaviour, driving the enemy before them in a sharp action, in which many of them were killed, and more wounded; and among the rest, the Captain himself in a very dangerous manner. He had, however, the satisfaction to see these foreign invaders, and their rebel abettors, totally routed and dispersed on the Pretender's birth-day, June 10: And

though his constitution suffered much by the loss of his blood on this occasion, yet it pleased God to recover him for further service to his country.

As he still continued vigorous and active in the service of the government, he obtained the command of one of the independent companies then in the national pay: And when they were afterwards regimented and sent to Flanders, he attended them thither, and continued in the public service till the year 1744; when he became so exceedingly asthmatic, that he could not breathe in the Flanders air. On which, General Wade, not only allowed him to sell his commission, but out of compassion to his distress, joined his brother Sir Robert in obliging him to do it, and to return home: To which, at length, he submitted, though not without regret; and thereupon returned to his domestic seat at Newtown in Ross-shire, in the views of spending his days with his family and friends in a peaceful retreat. But Providence determined otherwise, and had reserved for him some farther labours of a military life, in which it had appointed him gloriously to toil and fall, after services, which might have done an honour to his most vigorous and active days.

The late wicked and unnatural rebellion broke out soon after his arrival; and the danger of his country and its religious and civil constitution gave him at once a new stock of life and spirits.

When General Cope came to Inverness, and had been assured of being joined by a number of Highlanders, to conduct him and his small army through the rebel countries, between that town and Aberdeen, Captain Munro, with 200 of his brother's clan, were indeed the only persons, that were found willing to perform the promises, that were made by several others. He marched with the General directly to Aberdeen, from whence he was ordered to return home: In which return, he was under a necessity of marching through a great number of the rebels under the command of Gordon of Glenbucket, who lay on the road to attack the Captain and his party; but Glenbucket finding that the Captain was determined to dispute every inch of ground with him, retired, and allowed him to proceed without disturbance to Inverness.

Not long after that, the Earl of Loudoun sent Captain Munro, in conjunction with the Laird of Macleod, with a body of men, to relieve the city of Aberdeen, and the neighbouring country, then greatly oppressed by the outrages committed upon them by Lord Lewis Gordon, and the rebels under his command. Accordingly the Captain and Macleod proceeded

as far as Inverury, a small town, a few miles west of Aberdeen, where they halted to receive intelligence; and from the narrowness of the place, they were obliged to quarter a great number of their men in distant places through the adjacent country. In the mean time, a considerable reinforcement from the main body of the rebel army, which then lay at Perth, was sent under the command of a French officer, supported by their picquets and Irish brigades: By the assistance of which, Lord Lewis attempted to surprise, and cut off the Captain and his whole party. In this view they were moving towards Inverury in the dusk of the evening, after Captains Munro and Macleod had sent their men through the country to their quarters; but though there was not such good intelligence provided, as might have been wished, they were providentially discovered at such a distance, that Captain Munro and the Laird of Macleod had time to draw up the men, they had in the town of Inverury, in so regular a manner, that in consequence of it, they gave the enemy such a warm reception, attacking them at once in front and flank, that many of them were left dead in the field. The brave Captain and his associate continued very sedate, intrepid, and active, during the heat of the skirmish, till at last being overpowered by far superior numbers, they thought it advisable to retire; and brought off their party safe and in good order, excepting some few who had been killed or taken prisoners. Among the latter was Mr. Adam Gordon of Ardoch, nephew to Captain Munro, who was seized by the rebels, and treated with a deal of rigour and severity for a considerable time, while detained in their power. But they did not presume to pursue the rest; and the young gentleman at length made his escape, to the great joy of the family, being, I hope, reserved by Providence to tread in the steps of his heroic uncles, and to bless his country with some considerable future services.

Upon the retreat of the rebels northward before his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, the Earl of Loudon had not sufficient strength to maintain his possession of Inverness against them; whereupon he, with the Lord President and Captain Munro, retreated to the shire of Sutherland, proposing to defend themselves there, until the season allowed his Royal Highness to march the troops to Inverness. But in this interval, the rebels having spread themselves through the shires of Inverness, Murray, and Ross, they got possession of a great many boats; by the help of which, they transported a great part of their body to the Sutherland coast, under the covert of a very thick fog: Upon

which the Earl of Loudon, with the Lord President and the Captain, were obliged to retreat through the western parts of Ross into the Isle of Sky, where they continued until the rebel army was broke and dispersed at the battle of Culloden.

I have been the more particular in this narrative of the Captain's conduct during the rebellion, as it gives some light into the situation and transactions of the friends of our constitution, in those parts at that time: And my information assures me, that the facts are taken from persons of undoubted veracity who were present with the Captain in his march to Aberdeen with General Cope, and in his return from it; and who were with him in the skirmish at Inverury, and were afterwards witnesses of his death.

Upon his return from the Isle of Sky, he was constantly employed in expeditions through the rebel countries of great extent, to reduce them to a submission to the government, which he performed with diligence, and zeal, but still with the greatest humanity. This the rebels themselves must acknowledge, as he never did the least injury to any man; and in all that vast circuit which he made through these distant countries, he neither himself seized, nor allowed those under his command to seize any thing but arms; and yet, notwithstanding all this humanity, his diligence and zeal had been such in the whole of this rebellion, as rendered him obnoxious to the rage and revenge of the rebels, who had vowed his destruction upon the first opportunity; and because they had not courage to face him, they had recourse to the base method of assassination, which was effected on the Lord's-day, the 31st of August 1746. He was then on a long and necessary march at the head of 500 men, on the side of Locharkey, amongst the wild rocks of Lochaber, where, as he was passing by the side of a wood, between the advanced guard and the main body of his men, he was shot dead by a villain who concealed himself behind the trees and rocks in the wood, and who, by the advantages of that situation, got off without being discovered, and has never since been found out: An event to the Captain, no doubt, most happy, and a blessed kind of instantaneous translation to the regions of endless peace and triumphant joy; but to all who loved the public, not to be mentioned without the tenderest sensibility and deepest regret.

One of my correspondents on this occasion concludes his account of the deaths of Sir Robert, the Doctor, and the Captain, in these words: "Thus died those three worthy men, to the irreparable loss of the country in which they lived, all of

them remarkable for a brave spirit, full of love to their native land, and of disinterested zeal for religion and liberty; faithful in their promises, stedfast in their friendship, abundant in their charity to the poor and distressed; moderate in their resentments, and easy to be reconciled; and especially, remarkable for their great and entire love to each other; so that one soul seemed, as it were, to actuate all the three*." To which it might have been added, blessed with a sister, not unworthy to make a fourth person in such a friendship.

My other correspondent, in his character of the Captain, speaks in this manner: "The great foundation of all his other virtues was laid in a most sincere and stedfast regard to the Supreme Being. He carefully studied the great doctrines of our holy religion, which he courageously professed, and, as it was requisite, defended, in whatever company he might be cast: He did this with the greater freedom, as his practice was always agreeable to it; and in particular, his regard, both to the book and to the day of God. He had from his infancy been trained up in an acquaintance with the scripture, and he daily perused it with pleasure, and doubtless, with advantage. And though the natural cheerfulness of his temper inclined him on other days to facetious turns in conversation, yet on the Sabbath he was not only grave and devout, but carefully attentive that all his speech might tend to edification, and as far as possible minister grace to the hearers. He was exemplary in the social virtues, temperate in the use of food and sleep, and rose early for devotion, wherein, as in many other respects, he remarkably resembled his beloved friend Colonel Gardiner. He was also thoroughly sensible how much a faithful discharge of relative duties is essential to the character of a Christian. He approved himself therefore as a brave and vigilant officer, a most active and faithful servant of the crown, and a true patriot to his country in the worst of times; and in domestic life was exemplary as a husband, a father, and a master. He was a most affectionate brother, a faithful friend, a constant benefactor, and a sure patron of the oppressed; and, to crown all, was at last, in effect, a martyr in the cause of that religion he

* The intimacy of their friendship, though chiefly founded on a similarity of character, might perhaps be further promoted, by their being so nearly of the same age; for Sir Robert was born August 24, 1684; the Captain, September 18, 1685; and the Doctor, September 19, 1687. Sir Robert therefore was slain in his sixty-second year; the Captain in his sixty-first, and the Doctor in his fifty-ninth.

had so eminently adorned, and of those liberties he had so long and so bravely defended."

It must give a sensible pleasure to every reader, who enters into these things with a becoming spirit, to reflect, that notwithstanding these unparalleled and irreparable losses, this family, which has been long celebrated for so many worthy branches, is not yet extinct; but that both Sir Robert Munro and the Captain have left those behind them, who may not only bear up the name, but if they answer the hopes, which in the opening of life they give to their country, may add new honours to it.

I hope the reader will not lay down this narrative, which is now brought to a close, without deriving some useful lessons from the remarkable train of Providence, which this Appendix, as well as the preceding memoirs, offer to his observation. And the more he enters into these lessons, the more will he be disposed to lift up his wishes and prayers to God for those valuable remains, both of Sir Robert Munro's and of Colonel Gardiner's family, which may yet be within the reach of such addresses; that God may graciously support them in their sorrows, and that all the virtues and graces of the illustrious dead may live in them, and in their remotest posterity. Amen!

A

FRIENDLY LETTER

TO

THE PRIVATE SOLDIERS

IN A

REGIMENT OF FOOT,

WHICH WAS ONE OF THOSE ENGAGED IN THE IMPORTANT AND GLORIOUS

BATTLE OF CULLODEN.

A

FRIENDLY LETTER

TO

THE PRIVATE SOLDIERS, &c.

GENTLEMEN, *April* 16, 1747.

I HOPE you will excuse whatever freedom may attend this address, as it proceeds from sincere respect and affection. I look upon a brave soldier with great esteem. He is the guardian of his country; and every one who is a friend to it, ought under that character to honour him, and love him: and they in particular, who were, as you have been, the happy instruments in the hand of God, of delivering us from the worst of enemies, and of cutting off great numbers of those traitors and rebels who would have left us nothing worth fighting or living for, have a peculiar claim to our regard.

You, Gentlemen, to whom I now write, had your part in the labours and dangers of that glorious day; and blessed be God, you were preserved in it; preserved, I hope, to be a further blessing to your country. Divine Providence has now, as the date reminds me, lengthened out your lives to another year: and I should be very ungrateful, if I did not wish, that your years may be happily multiplied, and that God may reward and bless you with present prosperity and future happiness. But to pretend to wish this, and not to endeavour to promote it, were unworthy the profession of a Christian. I cannot therefore, allow myself to be silent on an occasion, in which I am sure both are nearly concerned.

Give me leave to speak plainly to you. It is the character of a brave man, to love to hear the truth without reserve or disguise: it is the character of an honest man and real friend, to speak it. I had ten times rather commend, than blame: but as circumstances at present stand, I will do so much violence to my own inclination, as plainly and boldly to tell you, I am extreme-

ly grieved to see, that so many of you have so little sense of the goodness of the blessed God your protector, and that you take no greater care to secure his favour, upon which your safety and happiness both for time and eternity does so evidently depend.

You will however observe, that I charge nothing that is amiss upon the wholy body of you. I have the pleasure to be informed, that there are some among you of a very worthy character, who seem to have a sense, not only of decency and morality, but of true religion; and I hope, that such will always meet with the distinguished respect and encouragement which they deserve. No single man among you, therefore, would have been charged, nor consequently injured, if I had mentioned the name of your regiment, or the town in which you are now quartered: but out of tenderness to you, I forbear this; and suppress my own name, as of no importance in the present address. And with this precaution, which, if you think at all, you must see, proceeds from great respect, I will now go on to tell you as plainly as possible, what it is that offends and grieves me; and what, if God may bless this weak attempt, I sincerely desire to be the instrument of reforming.

The evil, which I have most immediately in view, is, that you do in such an open, contemptuous, and indeed, outrageous manner, profane the great and glorious name of God, and mock at his most awful judgments. I write to you in the warmth and anguish of my heart, under a very late and lamentable instance of this; which is one, among many others. In walking out, not an hour ago, a few yards from my own house, I have heard one company of you swearing on the right hand, and another on the left. I have heard the same abominable language from the windows of the houses where you are quartered: and it often reaches me, and wounds my ears, as I sit in my study.—You are calling upon God to damn you;—to damn your soul;—to damn your blood;—and this is your language to each other; the wish, you are forming for friends, as well as enemies. My heart burns with indignation, and melts with compassion at the same time, while I hear this foolish, this detestable language. I know, that to reprove you as I pass by you in the streets, would be more likely to provoke and exasperate, than to reform you: and, therefore, I do humbly and meekly, yet earnestly beseech you, to hear me a little, while I address you in this manner, that I may deliver my own soul at least; and that, if it be possible, I may contribute towards delivering yours.

Permit me therefore to ask you, Sirs, Do you believe there is a God? and that there is such a thing as damnation?—If you do not, how absurd is it to talk of it, and to wish it to yourselves and each other?—If you do, as I dare say you do, let me beseech you to consider, who this God is; and what is damnation.

Do you not indeed know, that God is the greatest and best of all beings? That he made you? That he preserves you every moment? That he gives you breath, while you use it thus to his dishonour? And have you never been told, or have you forgot, that he said once from the midst of the flames, while the mountain was trembling, and a whole mighty army were ready to die with fear; *Thoushalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless, that taketh his name in vain?* Have you not often heard this? And have you not often said, on hearing it, "Lord have mercy upon us, and incline our hearts to keep this law!" How monstrous then is it, thus insolently to break it continually, almost with every breath? Who are you, that dare thus boldly to provoke God Almighty to his face? Can you possibly imagine, that you are able to resist him? If you were ten thousand times as many as you are, could he not bring you in a moment all down together to the dust of death, and to the flames of hell?

Let me ask you again, Do you know, what damnation is? Did you ever consider, what it signifies? Why, to be damned, is to be pronounced accursed by God, in the great day of judgment. It is, for God to say to a poor creature, *Depart from me accursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.* It is, to be plunged into that lake, *which burns with fire and brimstone,* and burns for ever, *which is the second death.* It is, to go to that place, where Christ tells us, *the worm never dies, and the fire is never quenched.*—And do you indeed wish this to yourselves? Do you think, you could bear it? Poor creatures! How have I seen some of the strongest and boldest men in our army ready to faint, when they have been hung up, perhaps not for an hour, by one hand, while their foot has stood upon a picquet? Can you not then bear that trifling punishment? And can you bear damnation? If you cannot, why do you call for it?—Could you wish it to the worst enemy you had in the world? Surely you could not do it deliberately. And yet, you wish it to your friends; you wish it to yourselves.

Take heed, Sirs, take heed; you wish it in the presence and hearing of God; of that God, who can send it upon you. And let me tell you, your oaths and curses are all set down in the book of his remembrance: he cannot possibly forget one of them; and he will bring you into judgment for them. And what will you do in the day of that judgment? The laws of man you despise? the laws of your king and country; though you pretend a great deal of regard for your king, and for the nation. You trample upon their authority every day? and your fellow-subjects have not courage and virtue, to attempt to bring you to justice for it. But do you think, that therefore you shall trample on the law of God, and go unpunished? Take heed, Sirs, as you value your souls, take heed. He may execute his justice upon you, much sooner than you think of it.

You drown your senses in liquor. Often I see that likewise, with the greatest concern; though to be sure, this and your swearing escape the view of your officers, or they would not bear it. But reflect again, can it escape the observation of the great and blessed God? And will it be any excuse before God, that you added sin to sin? That when you dishonoured him, and profaned his great and terrible name, you also dishonoured your own nature, and made brutes of yourselves? Will it not rather provoke God so much the more?

Oh Sirs, by the grace of God set yourselves immediately to repent and reform.—Do it, while there is room to do it. You may perhaps be called abroad in a few months, and whole ranks of you may be mowed down at once by the artillery of the enemy; or distempers at home may be as fatal. And what will you do, when your separate spirits come to stand before God, and you must answer to him for all this wickedness? For all this unprofitable wickedness, which you have committed upon no temptation? Which with respect to swearing is so evidently the case.

Sirs, the hour is certainly coming, when it will be too late to think of repentance and asking pardon. But I hope, it is not too late now? God is gracious and merciful; that God, whom you have so often affronted, and challenged to damn you. He is a God, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin. If you now humble yourselves before him, if you seek his pardon through Christ, and seek his spirit and grace to teach you to forsake sin, and to love and practice your duty, there is still hope concerning you.

It is the business of this letter, seriously to exhort you to

do it. I know, your hearts are hardened by the practice of sin: but if you are a little alarmed, by what I have now been setting before you, perhaps God may soften them. Yea, he will surely do it, if you earnestly, and seriously, and resolutely ask it.

I have no interest at all, in representing these things to you. I am at some expence to do it. It proceeds entirely from a real regard to the honour of God, and the salvation of your own souls; and indeed I may say, from a regard to your own reputation too. For this is a most mean and infamous practice; quite below your character, as gentlemen. And accordingly I must here remind you, that I have never heard your officers fall into such language; nor heard it commonly reported of them, that they use it. No, they are sensible, that it belongs, not to gentlemen, but to the lowest and vilest of the people, to the very dregs and refuse of mankind. The wretches who die by the hand of the hang-man, have generally been accustomed to such language, as that of which I now desire to cure you; and perhaps, it is by the judgment of God upon them for swearing and cursing, that they have been left to commit other crimes, for which they die, and are made a curse. This consideration might, methinks, teach you to scorn it: but the others, that I have urged, are of infinitely greater importance. Your souls, your immortal souls, are, as it were, murdered by these hellish weapons, with which you pierce yourselves through every hour, or almost every minute. Adore the divine goodness, that you have not been taken at your word; and that experience, dreadful experience, has not taught you, to know what damnation is. I pray God, that it never may. I pray God, to bless this plain, affectionate, and well-intended letter, as the means of doing some good on some of you. And if this evil can be cured, there will be more room to hope, other happy consequences may follow reformation in this respect.

But while I am thus speaking to you, let me add a few words more, to intreat you to a religious observation of the Lord's-day, to a careful attendance upon the public ordinances of God, and to a readiness to receive good instructions from any one, who will be charitable enough to give them you. But above all, let me urge you, to pray to God, that he would pardon you, and teach you better things. Yes, Sirs, having called upon him so often to damn your souls, now begin to cry to him to save them: and rest not, till that cry be answered; as,

if you persevere in the request, you will find, it most certainly will. God grant, that it may be so! And that as you have been in one respect, you may each of you be in another, like a brand pluckt out of the burning! It is, I am sure, the earnest desire, and by the grace of God it shall be the frequent prayer, of,

Gentlemen,

Your affectionate Friend,

and faithful Servant, &c.

TWO DISSERTATIONS.

No. I.

A DISSERTATION

ON

SIR ISAAC NEWTON'S SCHEME

FOR

REDUCING THE SEVERAL HISTORIES CONTAINED IN THE EVANGELISTS

TO THEIR PROPER ORDER.

THE name of Sir Isaac Newton is so justly celebrated through the learned world, that they who know he has endeavoured to establish a method of settling a chronology of our Lord's life, (for I think one can hardly call it, an harmony of the evangelists,) quite different from what has hitherto been advanced, may be curious to know what it is, and why we presume to depart from it; since it is so natural to imagine, that such a genius must demonstrate whatever it attempts to prove. I therefore, think it incumbent upon me to lay the scheme before my reader, as I promised long since to do: (Note (m) on Mat. iv. 25.) After which I shall briefly present, in one view, those reasons (many of which have been already hinted,) which compelled me to tread a different road, after having most attentively considered all that this illustrious writer has urged for the support of his plan.

I cannot set myself to this task, without feeling the fatigue of it sensibly allayed, by the pleasure with which I reflect on the firm persuasion which a person of his unequalled sagacity must have entertained of the truth of Christianity, in order to his being engaged to take such pains in illustrating the Sacred Oracles. A pleasure, which I doubt not every good reader will share with me; especially as (according to the best information, whether public or private, I could ever get,) his firm faith in the divine revelation discovered itself in the most genuine fruits of substantial virtue and piety; and consequently gives us the justest reason to conclude, that he is now rejoicing in the happy effects of it, infinitely more than in all the applause which his philosophical works have procured him; though they have

commanded a fame lasting as the world, the true theory of which he had discovered, and (in spite of all the vain efforts of ignorance, pride, and their offspring bigotry,) have arrayed him as it were in the beams of the sun, and inscribed his name among the constellations of heaven.

Sir Isaac Newton has given us his sentiments on the chronology of our Lord's history, in his Observations on Prophecy, book I. chap. XI. page 144——168. and, according to his usual method, he has done it concisely, only marking out some of the outlines; and after having endeavoured to establish some of the chief principles, by arguments which he judged to be conclusive, he leaves it to his readers to apply those principles to several other particulars; which being deducible from them, he did not think it necessary to enter into. Such is the method he has also taken in his chronology of ancient kingdoms; and it was most suitable to that great genius, which bore him with such amazing velocity through so vast a circle of various literature. Yet it must render him less sensible of the difficulty attending some of his schemes, than he would otherwise have been; and may leave room to those, who are justly sensible how much they are his inferiors, to shew by their remarks upon him, how possible it is for the greatest of mankind to be misled by some plausible appearances of things in a general view of them, against which invincible objections may arise, when they come to be applied to unthought of particulars.

There are many facts recorded in the evangelists, the order of which is so plain, that all harmonies agree in them: And such especially are most of those with which the history begins, and most of those with which it ends, though there be some disputes about a few circumstances relating to the resurrection. But Sir Isaac enters not at all into that part of the history, nor into any thing that precedes the appearance of John the Baptist.

He lays it down as the foundation of all his other reasonings and calculations here, (on the authority of Luke iii. 1.) that John began to baptize in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, reckoning his reign to have commenced from the death of Augustus, which happened, he says, Aug. 28*. in the year of our Lord (according to the common reckoning) 29. This is said (Newt. page 147.) to have been in the year of the Julian period 4727, which must surely be an error of the press for 4742, the year of

* This is a small mistake; for Suetonius (Aug. 100.) fixes it to xiv. Kal. Septemb. that is, Aug. 19.

that period which is universally known to have answered to the 29th of the received Christian æra. He supposes, the Baptist's ministry opened in the spring, when the weather was warm; and allowing the remainder of the year to the spreading of his reputation, he concludes, that our Lord was baptized before the end of it, when Tiberius's 16th year was begun. (Mat. iii. 1—17. Mark i. 1—11. Luke iii. 1—18, 21—23. John i. 6—18, sect. 15—18.) After this the temptation ensued, (Mat. iv. 1—11. Mark i. 12, 13. Luke iv. 1—13, sect. 19.) and all those testimonies of John to Jesus, and the interviews between Jesus and his first disciples, (which are mentioned John i. 19, to the end, sect. 20—22.) as likewise our Lord's journey to Galilee, and his first miracle there. (John ii. 1—11, sect. 23.) Then followed our Lord's FIRST PASSOVER, which, according to Sir Isaac, (and I would be understood through all this part of the dissertation to be only reporting his opinion,) happened A. D. 30. at which he drove the traders out of the temple, (John ii. 12, to the end, sect. 24.) had that celebrated conference with Nicodemus, (John iii. 1—21. sect. 25, 26.) and continued for some time to abide in Judea, baptizing by his disciples, while John baptized in Enon, and bore his last recorded testimony to him. (John iii. 22, to the end, sect. 27.)

Thus the summer was spent, till John was thrown into prison about November; (Mat. xiv. 3—5. Luke iii. 19, 20. Mark vi. 17—20, sect. 28.) and our Lord passed through Samaria, in his way to Galilee, about the winter solstice, that is, four months before harvest: (John iv. 1—42, sect. 29, 30. See note (c) on John iv. 35. After which he went, first to Cana in Galilee; (John iv. 43—54. sect. 31.—) and then, after a circuit, or rather journey, in Galilee, (Mat. iv. 12. Mark i. 14, 15. Luke iv. 14, 15. sect.—31, 32.—) he came and preached at Nazareth, (Luke iv. 16—30. sect.—32.) and being rejected there, went and settled for a while at Capernaum, where he called Peter, Andrew, James, and John. (Mat. iv. 13—22. Mark i. 16—20. Luke iv. 31, 32. v. 1—11. sect. 33, 34.) This our author thinks must have taken up all the spring, and must bring us to our Lord's SECOND PASSOVER, A. D. 31.

It is after this passover, that Sir Isaac places another circuit through Galilee; which also carried his fame throughout all Syria, and added multitudes from thence, and from Decapolis, to those that followed him from Judea and Jerusalem. (Mat. iv. 23, to the end. Mark i. 28. Luke iv. 44. sect.—36. To these he preached the celebrated sermon on the mount: (Mat. v. vi. vii.

sect. 37—43.) Immediately after which, he cured the leper, (Mat. viii. 1—4. Mark i. 40, to the end. Luke v. 12—16. sect. 44). the centurion's servant, (Mat. viii. 5—13. Luke vii. 1—10. sect. 55.) and Peter's mother in law, with many others. (Mat. viii. 14—17. Mark i. 29—38. Luke iv. 38—44. sect. 35, 36.—)

By this time Sir Isaac supposes, the feast of tabernacles approached, when our Lord passing through Samaria was refused a lodging; (Luke ix. 51—56. sect. 127.—) to which he strangely supposes a reference, Mat. viii. 19, 20. (Sect. 69.—) After which, when the feast was over and Christ returned from Jerusalem toward winter, he stilled a tempest as he crossed the sea, (Mat. viii. 23—27. Mark iv. 35, to the end. Luke viii. 22—25. sect.—69.) and when he had landed, dispossessed the legion: (Mat. viii. 28, to the end. Mark v. 1—21. Luke viii. 26—40. sect. 70.) And then returning again to the western side of the sea, cured the paralytic, (Mat. ix. 1—8. Mark ii. 1—12. Luke v. 18—26. sect. 45.—) called Matthew, (Mat. ix. 9. Mark ii. 14. Luke v. 27, 28. sect.—45.) and having been entertained at his house, (Mat. ix. 10—17. Mark ii. 15—22. Luke v. 29, to the end, sect. 71.) went out to raise Jairus's daughter, curing the woman, who had a bloody flux, by the way. (Mat. ix. 18—26. Mark v. 22, to the end Luke viii. 41, to the end, sect. 72.—) And after performing other cures, (Mat. ix. 27—34. sect.—72.) he took another circuit in Galilee, (Mat. ix. 35, to the end, sect. —73.) gave a charge to his apostles, and sent them out: (Mat. x. 1, to the end. xi. 1. Mark vi. 7—13. Luke ix. 1—6. sect. 74—76.) After which, having answered the messengers which John had sent, he discourses with the people concerning him, (Mat. xi. 2—19. Luke vii. 18—35. sect. 57, 58.) and upbraids the impenitent cities of Galilee. (Mat. xi. 20, to the end, sect. 59.) And as these events would employ the winter and the spring, our author places the THIRD PASSOVER here, A. D. 32.

He does not indeed expressly assert, that this was the feast, at which our Lord cured the lame man at the pool of Bethesda in Jerusalem, and made that defence before the Sanhedrim, related in the vth chapter of John: (Sect. 46—48.) But according to this general plan, this must be its proper place. And that there was a passover about this time, he argues from the story of the disciples rubbing out the ears of corn, which is related as in this place: (Mat. xii. 1—8. Mark ii. 23, to the end. Luke vi. 1—5. sect. 49.) Soon after which, happened the cure of the withered hand, (Mat. xii. 9—15. Mark iii. 1—7. Luke vi. 6—11. sect. 50.) and a variety of other miracles, (Mat. xii. 15—21.

Mark iii. 7—12, sect 51.) with that of the dispossession imputed to a confederacy with Beelzebub. (Mat. xii. 22, to the end. Mark iii. 22, to the end. Luke xi. 14—36. sect 61—64.) Here Sir Isaac places the parables delivered at the sea side, as he supposes about seed-time, or the feast of tabernacles, (Mat. xiii. 1—52. Mark iv. 1—34. Luke viii. 4—18. sect. 65—68.) his renewed visit to Nazareth, (Mat. xiii. 53, to the end. Mark vi. 1—6. sect. 73.—) and the return of the twelve, after having spent, as he supposes, a year in their embassy. (Mark vi. 30, 31. Luke ix. 10. sect. 78.—)

About this time our author places the beheading of John the Baptist, after he had been in prison two years and a quarter: (Mat. xiv. 1—12. Mark vi. 14—29. Luke ix. 7—9. sect. 77.) After which those multitudes resorted to Christ, whom he fed with the five loaves, (Mat. xiv. 13—23. Mark vi. 30—46. Luke ix. 10—17. John vi. 1—15. sect. 78.) and to whom, after having crossed the Lake, (Mat. xiv. 24, to the end. Mark vi. 47, to the end. John vi. 16—21. sect. 79.) he discourses concerning the bread of life. (John vi. 21, to the end, sect. 80—82.) As we are expressly told, John vi. 4. that when this miracle was wrought the passover was near, Sir Isaac concludes this to be the FOURTH PASSOVER after our Lord's baptism, A. D. 33. and argues from John vii. 1. that Christ did not celebrate it at Jerusalem.

Quickly after this, followed the dispute with the scribes who came from Jerusalem: (Mat. xv. 1—20. Mark vii. 1—23. sect. 83, 84.) After which our Lord departed into the coasts of Tyre and Sidon; and after having dispossessed the daughter of a Syrophænician woman, (Mat. xv. 21—28. Mark vii. 24, to the end, sect. 85.) he returned to the sea of Galilee, where he fed the four thousand; (Mat. xv. 29, to the end. Mark viii. 1—10. sect. 86.) and after having replied to the unreasonable demand the pharisees made of a sign from heaven, and cautioned his disciples against the leaven of their false doctrine, (Mat. xvi. 1—12. Mark viii. 11—26. sect. 87.) he came to Cæsarea Philippi; and having by the way acknowledged himself to be the Messiah, he was afterwards transfigured, and ejected an obstinate dæmon. (Mat. xvi. 13, to the end, xvii. 1—21. Mark viii. 27, to the end, ix. 1—29. Luke ix. 18—43. sect. 88—91.) He then came to Capernaum, and made provision by a miracle to pay the tribute; (Mat. xvii. 24, to the end, sect. 92.) and there, or in the neighbourhood of it, discoursed of humility, forgiveness, &c. (Mat xviii. 1, to the end. Mark ix. 33, to the end. (Luke ix. 46—48. sect. 93—95.)

Our author takes no notice of the mission of the seventy, and their return ; (Luke x. 1—24, sect. 97, 106.) but he would probably have placed it here, previous to that which he supposes to be Christ's last departure from Galilee, (Mat. xix. 1, 2. Mark x. 1. sect. 135.—) when he went up to the feast of tabernacles. (John vii, viii. sect. 98—105.) Neither does he take notice of the visit to Bethany ; (Luke x. 38, to the end, sect. 108.) nor of the date of any of those discourses which are recorded by Luke, (from chap. xi. 1. to chap. xviii. 14. sect. 109—129. except where any passages happen to be parallel to those in Matthew, to which he hints they are to be reduced.

He then introduces our Lord's visit to Jerusalem, and the cure of the blind man at the feast of dedication ; (John ix, x. sect. 130—134.) after which Christ retired beyond Jordan, (John x. 40.) where he treats of divorce, (Mat. xix. 3—12. Mark x. 2—12. sect. —135.) blesses the little children, (Mat. xix. 13—15. Mark x. 13—16. Luke xviii. 15—17. sect. 136.) answers, and remarks upon the young ruler. (Mat. xix. 16, to the end. xx. 1—16. Mark x. 17—31. Luke xviii. 18—30. sect. 137, 138.) After which, on the death of Lazarus, he returns to Bethany, and raises him from the dead ; (John xi. 1—46. sect. 139, 140.) and then withdraws to Ephraim, till the approach of the FIFTH PASSOVER after his baptism, which was the last of his life : The particulars of which are related at large by the evangelists, and with the subsequent circumstances of his death, resurrection, appearances, and ascension, make up the rest of this important history : But the contents need not be inserted here, as, for any thing that appears, there is no material difference between a harmony formed on Sir Isaac's principles, or on ours.

I have taken the trouble of quoting the particular passages in each evangelist, as well as of every correspondent section in the Family Expositor, that it may be easy for any who desires it, to read over the whole Paraphrase according to this new scheme ; and also to see, how it transposes the passages in question, and how it differs from what I judge to be the most exact method of disposition. And the attentive reader will easily see, that there is a difference in the order of several of the stories, and a much greater in the dates we have respectively assigned to several which are placed in the same order by both.

A repetition of all the particulars would perhaps be disagreeable. I shall therefore content myself here with observing in general, that Sir Isaac constantly follows the order of Matthew, whatever transpositions of Mark and Luke it may require ; which we do not : And he also concludes, there were FIVE

PASSOVERS from the baptism to the death of Christ, whereas we, with the generality of harmonizers, suppose there were but FOUR. I have in my notes hinted at some considerations which determined me to the method I have taken: But it will be expected, I should here at least touch upon them again, and give a view of them together; which I the rather do, as they strongly illustrate each other.

The grand reason, why I do not every where follow the order of Matthew, is in one word this: That both Mark and Luke do not only in several instances agree to place the stories otherwise, though we have not the least reason to think, that one wrote from the other; but also, that they do, one or another of them, expressly assert, "that the events in question actually happened in a different order from that in which Matthew relates them:" Whereas it is observable, that in all such cases Matthew does not so expressly assert his order, as to contradict theirs. A few instances of this may be expedient; and a few shall suffice.

Thus, though Matthew relates the cure of Peter's mother-in-law, (sect. 35.) in his viiith chap. ver. 14, 15. after the sermon on the mount, and according to Sir Isaac some months after the call of Peter, Andrew, James, and John, which he had related, chap. iv. 18—22. Mark says, this cure was immediately after they came out of the synagogue, into which they entered straightway after the call of those disciples. Mark i. 20, 21, 29.

Again, though Matthew gives us the story of Christ's calming the sea, dispossessing legion, and curing the paralytic, in the latter part of his viiith and beginning of his ixth chap. and does not relate the parables of the sower, tares, &c. delivered from the ship, till the xiiith; and places so many facts between, that Sir Isaac concludes the miracles to have been wrought in winter, some time before the passover A. D. 32. and the parables not to have been delivered till about the feast of tabernacles, almost a year after; Mark is very punctual in assuring us, (chap. iv. 35, and seq.) that, in the evening of the same day in which the parables were delivered from the ship, Jesus calmed the sea, and dispossessed legion: For which reason I have followed him, and placed these miracles immediately after the parables: (sect. 69, 70.) But have set that of the paralytic much higher, (sect. 45.) as both Luke and Mark connect it strongly with the cure of the leper, which Sir Isaac allows to have happened immediately after the sermon on the mount.

Matthew relates the message of John, and those subsequent

discourses of our Lord, which are contained in his xith chap. after having given us an account of the mission of the apostles in his xth. But Luke (who more accurately distinguishes between their call, Luke vi. 13—16. and mission, Luke ix. 2—6. as Mark also does, Mark iii. 13—19. and vi. 7—13.) places this message, together with the account of several miracles on which it is founded, as well as the circuit which our Lord made with the twelve before he sent them out, and the fore-mentioned miracles of calming the sea, dispossessing legion, &c. between those two events, that is, the call, and actual mission of the twelve, the one of which must in all reason be supposed considerably to precede the other: In which he also agrees with Mark, as was observed above.

Matthew also relates the story of the disciples rubbing out the ears of corn, and the cure of the withered hand, (chap. xii. 1—13.) after the mission of the twelve: Whereas both Luke and Mark place which ever of those events they mention, before the choice of them: (See Mark iii. 1—6. Luke vi. 1—11. And Luke expressly says, that choice was in those days, (Luke vi. 12, 13) that is, at the time which followed the fore-mentioned events.

These, and the discourse on the unpardonable sin, (sect. 61.) which we readily allow might have happened twice, are all the most material transpositions we have made: And I must submit it to the judgment of the reader, whether it be not more for the honour of the New Testament in general, to suppose that Matthew might not intend exactly to preserve the order of the history, where he asserts nothing directly concerning it, than to suppose both Mark and Luke to have mistaken it, when they so expressly declare their regard to it; as in some of these instances they do.

Sir Isaac indeed urges, that Matthew (as well as John, in whom I have made scarce any transposition,) was an eye-witness: But this can have no weight; unless it be certain, that he every where intended to observe an exact order, which for variety of reasons or causes, many of which may be to us unknown, he might not be solicitous about *.

And I cannot forbear observing, that on this great man's own principles there cannot be a great deal in the argument: For as Matthew was not called till chap. ix. 9. he could not, according to his hypothesis, have been an eye and ear-witness to

* Mr. Jere. Jones has hinted at some conjectured reasons, in his vindication of the former part of St. Matthew's gospel: see chap. iii page 29—34.

all the events from chap. iv. to that place: And if, as Sir Isaac also urges, he was sent out as one of the twelve, chap. x. init. and continued a year on his embassy, he could not be such a witness to what passed from the beginning of chap. xi. to the end of chap. xiii. where he places their return after a year's absence. And these are the chapters, where we have made the greatest, and most material transpositions, the others hardly deserving a mention.

If this branch of Sir Isaac's argument falls to the ground, and it be not allowed that Matthew observed a strict chronological order; that part of his reasoning, by which he would fix the date of each event, must fall with it. For if it were to be granted, that Matthew hinted at the different seasons of the year when they passed, we could not fix the chronology by that, unless we were sure, that each was such a season of a different year, and not of the same; which on this supposition we cannot assert. But I think it very easy (*ex abundanti*) to shew, that passages which Sir Isaac produces as indications of the seasons, are not so; or at least do not point them out so punctually, as they ought to do, in order to justify the uses he would make of them.

One cannot but wonder, that some of the arguments which I have now in my eye, should ever have been urged by a writer of such extraordinary discernment. As for instance, That he should conclude the sermon on the mount must be preached later than the passover, because multitudes followed Christ in the open fields, which he says, (page 151.) was an argument of the summer season; though it is so apparent, that when there were those five thousand men besides women and children assembled around him, whom he fed with the five loaves, the passover was only at hand: (John vi. 4.)——Or that he should say, (page 153) the storm mentioned Mat. viii. 23. "shews the winter was "now come on," as if there were no storms in the summer:——Or, once more, that it must be seed-time, when the parables in Mat. xiii. were delivered, "because sowing seed is mentioned in them;" (page 154.) when it is so evident, (as I have observed elsewhere, note (d) on Mark iv. 3.) the very same principle would prove it to be harvest, as another parable delivered the same day refers to that season.

I am not willing to swell this dissertation, and therefore omitting many remarks which might easily be made on other passages, I will conclude with the mention of two or three particulars, which might contribute to lead this illustrious writer into some error.

One thing that has occasioned this, was, his taking it for granted, as I observed before, that the fifteenth year of Tiberius, in which John the Baptist opened his ministry, must needs be reckoned from the death of Augustus; whereas it ought to be computed from the time, when Augustus made him his colleague in the empire. (See note (b) on Luke iii. 1.)

Another is, his admitting the rabinnical rules for the translation of the Jewish feasts, of which we have not one word, either in the scriptures, or in Josephus, or Philo. Yet it is on this principle, that he rejects some years from the possibility of being the year of Christ's suffering, because, as he imagines, the passover, two years before each, would not fall late enough to have the corn ripe on the sabbath that succeeded the paschal *. (See notes (b) and (c), on Luke vi. 1.

And to mention no more, a third principle (which is also very precarious, and yet has much stress laid upon it in Sir Isaac's scheme,) is, his taking it for granted, that whenever Matthew speaks of Christ's going about Galilee and preaching in the synagogues there, he intended to tell us, that our Lord made a circuit over all the country: Which, if it were admitted, might indeed make it necessary (if Matthew's order were to be the standard,) to suppose a longer space of time, than we or most others allow, to have passed between his entrance on his public work, and the passover just preceding the rubbing out the ears of corn; which we own on both sides to have been two years before his death. For four circuits of this kind are mentioned, before we come to the xiith chapter of Matthew, where the story last referred to is recorded: The first, John iv. 43. and Luke iv. 14, 15. the second, Mat. iv. 23. the third, Mat. ix. 35. and the fourth, Mat. xi. 1. But if we should grant, that his going about all Galilee in the second of these instances, and his going about all the cities and villages in the third, (though that might only be those on the shore of the sea of Tiberias, were to be taken ever so literally; yet his passing through Galilee in his way from Sichar to Nazareth in the first instance, and his departing, that is, setting out to teach and to preach in their cities in the fourth, can infer no such conclusion.

This might be suggested, even if Matthew's order were to be admitted, and would invalidate the argument for protracting the years of our Lord's ministry on that supposition: But it is

* I shall content myself with observing here, that on these principles Sir Isaac places the passover, A. D. 31. on Wednesday, March 28.——A. D. 32. on Monday, April 14.——A. D. 33. on Friday, April 3.——and A. D. 34. on Friday, April 23.

to be remembered, we have produced arguments to prove, that order must sometimes be inverted; and particularly, that Christ going about all the cities and villages, (Mat. ix. 35. sect. 73.) and his departing to teach and to preach in their cities, (Mat. xi. 1. sect. 76.) was some considerable time after the passover, after which the ears of corn were rubbed out. (Mat. xii. 1. sect. 49.)

On the whole, I think, that if our order be admitted, there is no part of Christ's ministry which seems so crouded with business, as that between his last passover but one, and the following feast of dedication. But here, our harmony allows more time for the work in Galilee, than Sir Isaac, who supposes "Christ never returned thither after the feast of tabernacles:" (page 157.) And I leave the reader to judge, whether if such a variety of journies and events must be allowed to have happened in these nine months, or according to him in six, we may not, by a parity of reason, or rather with greater, comprehend all the preceding within the compass of about sixteen; especially when it is considered, that according to Sir Isaac that progress of our Lord, for which the apostles were intended to make way, and that after the embassy of the seventy, must be thrown into the first six months of this year, and is an extreme, and, I think, insurmountable difficulty, into which we shall not be driven *.

*To make the reader more sensible of this, I shall add a brief survey of the compass of time, within which I suppose the principal events between the several passovers of our Lord's ministry to have happened; referring him to the following chronological table for a more exact view of them.

Events which we suppose between the first and second of our Lord's passovers.

Our Lord spends the summer, and beginning of the winter, in Judea; about the winter solstice, passes through Samaria into Galilee: (Sect. 25——30.) spends the remainder of the winter and the spring in a circuit through Galilee, in which are included his visit to Nazareth, and short stay at Capernaum; and towards the close of the circuit, having preached his celebrated sermon on the mount, returns to Capernaum. (Sect. 31——45.

Events between the second and third passover.

After vindicating what passed upon rubbing out the ears of corn, and curing the withered hand, he travels to the sea of Galilee, chuses his apostles, and makes another abode at Capernaum; visits Naim, and dismisses John's messengers; all which might pass before the end of May: (Sect. 46——60.) Then travels with the twelve in his train (Luke viii. 1. Mat. ix. 35.) through the places near the sea of Tiberias, perhaps, during the months of June, July, and August; (Sect. 61——73.) and intending a much more extensive circuit, dispatches the twelve to make way for him, and probably setting out quickly after them, might employ six months in this part of it, (Sect. 74——77.) and leave sufficient time for his interview with the five thou-

I shall conclude this dissertation with one reflection, which may perhaps be of some use to those, who have but little relish for the niceties of this enquiry. I mean, that when we find this great master, and I had almost said, so far as the title can be applied to a mortal man, this great father of reason, falling into such obvious mistakes, as I have been obliged here to point out, it tends to give us an humbling idea of the imperfections of the human mind in its present state. And consequently we may learn from it two of the most important lessons, that can be imagined in social life:——A caution, lest we assert our own opinions with too dogmatical an air;——and a care to avoid such petulancy in censuring the mistakes of others, as if we thought none but the weakest and most contemptible of mankind were capable of being misled by the specious appearances of some inconclusive arguments. And I will venture to say, that if Sir Isaac Newton's error in the order of the harmony teach us this candour, it will be a much greater benefit to us, than if he had placed every circumstance relating to it beyond all possibility of farther dispute.

sand whom he miraculously fed, and his conference with the scribes and pharisees from Jerusalem, before the next passover. (Sect. 78——84.

Events between Christ's third passover and the feast of dedication, which preceded his fourth.

Allowing the time between the passover and the end of May for his journey to the coasts of Tyre and Sidon, and other places in Galilee, he might return to Dalmanutha, and feed the four thousand by that time; (Sect. 85, 86.) and if subsequent events and discourses (recorded Sect. 87——96.) employed him till the end of June, he might then send out the seventy, and they might easily meet him at Jerusalem at the feast of tabernacles in September; between which, and the feast of dedication near the end of December, we must place his last circuit in Galilee; (Sect. 97—127.) unless, which is possible, we suppose it to have been begun quickly after the mission of the seventy, and so some part of July and September to have been employed in it. And indeed one cannot imagine any necessity, that all the seventy, or all the apostles, should have finished their progress, before our Lord began to follow those who were sent to the nearest places. Or if we should suppose it, and follow Sir Isaac's scheme, we must of necessity place the two circuits, which followed these two embassies, within this space of time, as was hinted above; whereas, if we consider the journey to the coast of Tyre and Sidon as an appendix to the former, we may (according to our scheme,) assign near eight months to that grand tour of our Lord, in which he followed the twelve, which might make it convenient to dispatch that, in which he followed the seventy, in proportionably less time. And I believe, that if we consider Galilee not to have been larger than three or four of our western counties, we shall more easily acquiesce in the competency of the time assigned to these visits to it.

POSTSCRIPT.

I never had, nor never took, an opportunity of looking into Dupin's Life of Christ, till about a year ago, long after the publication of the second edition of my Paraphrase on the Evangelists: But then I found, to my agreeable surprise, a more perfect agreement between his scheme of the harmony and mine, than I expected any where to have met with; and particularly, in the story of the resurrection.

Of the 203 sections, into which I have divided the evangelists, we differ only in the order of 29: And as several of these are inseparably connected, there are only, on the whole, nine stories or discourses, in which there is a variety in our order.

The first, sect. 12. The wise-men's visit to Christ; which he places before the presentation, sect. 11.

The second, sect. 37—43. Matthew's account of the sermon on the mount; which he supposes to have been coincident with that in Luke, sect. 53, 54. which I consider as a repetition of it.

The third, sect. 69, 70. The stilling the tempest, and dispossessing legion, which he places before the calling of Matthew, and immediately after sect. 36.

The fourth, sect. 96. Christ's reproving John for an instance of the narrowness of his spirit; which, as a similar and undetermined fact, he subjoins to sect. 93. Christ's checking the ambition of his disciples.

The fifth, sect. 106. The return of the seventy; which he connects with the story of their mission, sect. 97.

The sixth, sect. 118. Christ's urging the necessity of striving for heaven, &c. which he strangely introduces between sect. 154, and 158.

The seventh, the discourses and facts, sect. 126—135. which he scatters promiscuously, after sect. 105. and elsewhere.

The eighth, sect. 170. The intimation of Judas's treachery; which he introduces after the eucharist, sect. 172.

And the last, sect. 181. The warning Christ gave of Peter's denying him; which he joins with sect. 171, though I take them to be two different predictions of the same event.

The reader may see my reasons for the order, in which I have placed most of these sections, in the notes upon them: But I cannot forbear thinking, that such a coincidence in all the rest, where the one could not write from the other, is a strong presumption in favour of both.

No. II.

A DISSERTATION

ON

THE INSPIRATION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT,

AS

PROVED FROM THE FACTS RECORDED IN THE

HISTORICAL BOOKS OF IT.

NOTHING can be more evident, than that a firm and cordial belief of the inspiration of the sacred scripture is of the highest moment; not only to the edification and peace of the church, but in a great measure to its very existence. For if this be given up, the authority of the revelation is enervated, and its use destroyed: The star which is to direct our course, is clouded; our compass is broke to pieces; and we are left to make the voyage of life in sad uncertainty, amidst a thousand rocks, and shelves, and quicksands. I hope, therefore, I may perform a service acceptable to God and my christian brethren, while I endeavour, as plainly and as briefly as I can, to place some leading proofs of it in a convincing view. And I undertake the task the more willingly, as in the preface to the first volume of my Family Expositor I laid myself under an obligation, several years ago, to attempt something of this kind, and have often been reminded of it by persons, for whom I have the highest regard.

I then proposed to handle the subject in a few sermons, to be added to those, long since published, on the evidences of the gospel. But on a review of that particular connection, which the argument I am here to pursue, has, with the history of the New Testament, I apprehend, it could no where appear better, than at the end of my exposition on the books which contain it. The reader will, I hope, recollect, that in the sermons just now mentioned, I have endavoured to demonstrate the truth of that history; and every year convinces me more and more, of the unanswerable force of the evidence there displayed. It is with great pleasure that I reflect on the divine blessing, which hath seemed to attend those discourses; and it is a great

encouragement to me to hope, that, what I am now to offer may be a means of establishing some of my readers in that regard to the sacred oracles, which will be their best preservative against the errors and the vices of that licentious age in which Providence hath cast our lot; whereby our fidelity and our zeal are brought to a trial, which few ages but those of martyrdom could have afforded.

It will be my business,——First, to state the nature of inspiration in general, and of that kind of it, which, as I apprehend, we are to ascribe to the New Testament:——I shall then prove, that it was undoubtedly written by such Inspiration:——And after this, I shall briefly hint at the influence, which this important truth ought always to have upon our temper and conduct; by inforcing which, I apprehend, I shall take the best method to promote a growing persuasion of the truth I am labouring to establish.

I will only premise, That I do not intend this, as a full discussion of the subject; but only, as such a compendious view of the chief proofs, as may suit the place in which it stands; and as may, from the easiest and plainest principles, give rational satisfaction to the minds of common christians; who have not leisure, nor perhaps ability, to enter into all the niceties of theological and scholastical controversy.

I. I shall state the nature of Inspiration, and of that kind of it, which we are to ascribe to the New Testament.

In this I shall be more particular, as I apprehend, the want of a sufficient accuracy here has occasioned some confusion in the reasoning of several worthy persons, who have treated this important subject more largely, than I must here allow myself to do. I shall not, however, criticise on their account of the matter, but plainly lay down what seems to me intelligible, right, and safe.

By Inspiration in general, I would be understood to mean, "Any supernatural influence of God upon the mind of a rational creature, where it is formed to any degree of intellectual improvement, beyond what it would, at that time, and in those circumstances, have attained in a natural way, that is, by the usual exercise of its faculties, unassisted by any special divine interposition." Thus, if a man were instantaneously enabled to speak a language which he had never learned, how possible soever it might have been for him to have obtained an equal readiness in it by degrees, I believe few would scruple to say, that he owed his acquaintance with it to a divine inspiration.

Or if he gave a true and exact account of what was doing at a distance, and published a particular relation of what he neither saw nor heard, as some of the prophets did; all the world would own, if the affair were too complex, and the account too circumstantial, to be the result of a lucky guess, that he must be inspired with the knowledge of it; though another account equally exact, given by a person on the spot, would be ascribed to no inspiration at all.

But of this supernatural influence on the minds of men, forming them to such extraordinary intellectual improvements and abilities, there are various sorts and degrees, which it will be of importance for us accurately to distinguish from each other.

If a person be discoursing either in word or writing, and God do miraculously watch over his mind, and, however secretly, direct it in such a manner, as to keep him more secure from error in what he speaks or writes, than he could have been merely by the natural exercise of his faculties, I should say, he was inspired; even though there should be no extraordinary marks of high genius in the work; or even though another person, with a stronger memory, or relating a fact more immediately after it happened, might naturally have recounted it with equal exactness. Yet still, if there was in this case any thing miraculous, we must, on the principles above, allow an inspiration; and I would call this, to distinguish it from other and higher degrees, an inspiration of superintendency.

If this influence should act in such a degree, as absolutely to exclude all mixture of error in a declaration of doctrines or facts so superintended, we might then call it a plenary superintending inspiration; or, as I would chuse for popular use to express myself in this discourse, a full inspiration.

Now it will from hence follow, and I desire that it may be seriously attended to, that a book, the contents of which are entirely true, may be said to be written by a full inspiration, even though it contain many things which the author might have known and recorded merely by the use of his natural faculties, if there be others which he did not so well know, or could not without miraculous assistance have so exactly recollected; or if, on the whole, a freedom from all error would not, in fact, have been found, unless God had thus superintended or watched over his mind and pen. And in regard to such a production, it would be altogether impertinent and insignificant to enquire, how far did natural memory or natural reason operate, and in what particular facts or doctrines did supernatural agency prevail. It

is enough, if I know, that what the author says or writes is true, though I know not particularly how he came by this or that truth: For my obligation to receive it arises from its being known truth, and not merely from its being made known this or that way. And should God miraculously assure me, that any particular writing contained nothing but the truth; and should he at the same time tell me, it had been drawn up without any miraculous assistance at all, though I could not then call it inspired, I should be as much obliged to receive and submit to it on its being thus attested by God, as if every single word had been immediately dictated by him.

It will farther follow from what is said above, that a book may be written by such full inspiration as I have described, though, the author being left to the choice of his own words, phrases, and manner*, there may be some imperfection in the style and method, provided the whole contents of it are true; if the subject be so important, as to make it consistent with the divine wisdom miraculously to interpose, to preserve an entire credibility as to the exact truth of facts recorded, and doctrines delivered as divine. If indeed God were represented, as declaring such a book to be intended by him as an exact standard for logic, oratory, or poetry, every apparent defect in either would be an internal objection against it. But if it be represented only as intended to teach us truth, in order to its having a proper influence on our temper and actions, such defects would no more warrant or excuse our rejecting its authority, than the want of a ready utterance or a musical voice would excuse our disregard to a person, who should bring us competent evidence of his being a messenger from God to us.

I have been more particular in stating this kind of inspiration, because it is that, which I shall endeavour to assert to the sacred books of the New Testament, and this, without any exception or limitation, as they came out of the hands of the apostles; though I allow it is possible, they may, in this or that particular copy, and in some minuter instances which now perhaps affect all our remaining copies, have suffered something by the injuries of time, or the negligence of transcribers, as well as printers: Which, that they have in some particulars, suffered, is as notorious a fact, as that there is a written or a printed copy of them in the world; yet is at the same time a fact, which no man of common sense or honesty can seriously urge against their authority.

* It is very evident, that the learned Maimonides thought this to be the case with regard to the prophets; though I think it least of all to be apprehended in such oracles. See Maimon. Mor. Nev. Lib. ii. cap. 29.

Though it be the main point in my view, to prove that the New Testament is written under that kind of inspiration which I have been explaining, I must nevertheless beg leave to mention two other kinds, of which divines often speak, and which do also in a considerable degree belong to many parts of scripture, though I think it neither expedient, material, nor safe to assert that they run through the whole of it: I mean, an inspiration of elevation, and of suggestion.

The former, as its name plainly intimates, prevails, where the faculties, though they act in a regular, and, as it seems, a common manner, are nevertheless elevated, or raised to some extraordinary degree, so that the performance is more truly sublime, noble, and pathetic, than what would have been produced merely by the force of a man's natural genius. As for the particular degree of the divine agency, where there is indeed something of this inspiration, perhaps neither the person that is under it, nor any other creature, may be able confidently to pronounce concerning it. Perhaps, nothing less penetrating than the eye of God himself, may be able universally to distinguish that narrow line, which divides what is natural from what is supernatural, in all the productions and powers of imagination, reasoning, and language, or in the effects and powers of memory under the former head. It is a curiosity, in the minute particulars of which we are not at all concerned; as it is the same God, which, whether naturally or miraculously, worketh all and in all. 1 Cor. xii. 9. But if any excellency in the performance itself can speak it to be more than human, productions of this sort are to be found in scripture; and the rank and education of some of the sacred penmen render the hand of God peculiarly conspicuous in the sublimity and lustre of their writings. What the gifts of the spirit may in every age of the church have done, by operations of this kind, we know not. And I think, it would be presumptuous absolutely to deny, that God might act in some extraordinary degree on some of the heathen writers, to produce those glorious works of antiquity, which have been, under the direction of his providence, so efficacious, on the one hand to transmit the evidences of divine revelation, and on the other to illustrate the necessity of it: In consequence of which I cannot forbear saying by the way, that I think they who are intimately acquainted with them, are of all men upon earth the most inexcusable in rejecting christianity. But our inability to mark out the exact boundaries between nature and an extraordinary divine agency, is not much to be regretted; since it does not appear to be the design

of providence, by such elevations of sentiment, style, and manner, by any means to bear testimony to the person adorned with them, as a messenger sent to speak in his name; which may as effectually be done in the plainest and simplest forms of expression, without any thing, which looks like the heightenings of art, or the sparklings of an extraordinary genius.

The other, which divines have called immediate suggestion, is the highest and most extraordinary kind of inspiration; and takes place, when the use of our faculties is superseded, and God does, as it were, speak directly to the mind; making such discoveries to it, as it could not otherwise have obtained, and dictating the very words in which these discoveries are to be communicated to others: So that a person, in what he writes from hence, is no other than first the auditor, and then, if I may be allowed the expression, the secretary of God; as John was of our Lord Jesus Christ, when he wrote from his sacred lips the seven epistles to the Asiatic churches. And it is, no doubt, to an inspiration of this kind, that the book of the revelation owes its original.

It is evident from the definitions above, that there may be a full superintendency, where neither of the latter kinds of inspiration, of elevation, or suggestion, take place: But I think, we must necessarily allow, that an inspiration of suggestion, so far as it goes, must also imply a full superintendency in recording the history of what has been seen or heard, in any prophetic vision, when it is necessary to make a report of it. For as it would, on the one hand, be impious to imagine, that the blessed God would dictate a falsehood to any of his creatures; so neither can we suppose it consistent with the divine wisdom, to suffer the prophet, through infirmity, to err in delivering a message, with which he had expressly charged him; and which would be given in vain, so far as there was a failure in the exact delivery of it.

Besides the last book of the New Testament, I mean, the revelation, which I have already mentioned in this view, it seems evident to me, that some other parts of it were given by such a suggestion; seeing there are so many predictions interspersed, and so many mysteries revealed, which lay entirely beyond the ken of any human, or perhaps angelic mind. But that this is applicable to all the history of it, or to all things contained in its epistolary parts, I chuse not to assert. For as it cannot be necessary to its entire credibility, which nothing can more effectually secure, than a full superintendency, it would subject

us to many difficulties, which have been so forcibly urged by others, that it is not necessary for me here to repeat them. But I am well assured, that the apparent insufficiency of the answers, which have been returned to these objections by some very sincere, but I think in this instance, less judicious defenders of scripture, has led some people to conclude, that the scripture was not inspired at all; as if it had been on both sides agreed, that an universal suggestion was the only kind of inspiration worth contending about. The consequence of this hath been, that such as are dissatisfied with the arguments, which these defenders of the divine authority of the scripture insist upon, read the scriptures, if they read them at all, not to learn their authentic dictates, but to try the sentiments contained in them by the touch-stone of their own reason, and to separate what that shall allow to be right, from what it presumptuously concludes to be wrong. And this boasted standard has been so very defective, that on this mistaken notion they have not only rejected many of the most vital truths of christianity, but even some essential principles of natural religion. And thus they have in effect annihilated the christian revelation, at the very same time, that they have acknowledged the historical truth of the facts, on which it is built. This is the body of men, that have affected to call themselves cautious believers: But their character is so admirably well described under that of Agrippa, by my honoured friend Dr. Watts, in his little treatise called the Redeemer and Sanctifier, that it may be sufficient here to have hinted it thus briefly, as the reason, why out of regard to them as well as others, I have resumed the subject of inspiration, and endeavoured to place it in, what I do in my conscience apprehend to be both a safe and rational light.

That I may remedy, so far as God shall enable me to do it, the great and destructive evil, I have just been mentioning, and may establish in the minds of christians a due regard to the sacred oracles of eternal truth, I shall now proceed to the second part of this discourse: In which

II. I am to shew, how evidently the full inspiration of the New Testament, in the sense stated above, follows from the acknowledged truth of the history which it contains, in all its leading and most important facts.

But before I proceed to the discussion of the matter, I must beg leave to observe, that, though this is what I apprehend to be the grand argument, and that which may most properly be connected with an exposition of the historical books, I am very

far from slighting those other arguments which fall not so directly in my way here.

I greatly revere the testimony of the primitive christian writers, not only to the real existence of the sacred books in those early ages, but also to their divine original: Their persuasion of which most evidently appears from the veneration, with which they speak of them, even while miraculous gifts remained in the church; and consequently, an exact attendance to a written rule might seem less absolutely necessary, and the authority of inferior teachers might approach nearer to that of the apostles. I believe every candid reader will acknowledge, that nothing can be objected to many strong passages in Clemens Romanus, Polycarp, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Theophilus Antiochenus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Origen, Eusebius, and some other ancient writers he has mentioned, that are now lost. It is needless to produce them here, after those valuable specimens of them, which Dr. Whitby and Mons. Du Pin have given; and especially, considering what my learned friend Dr. Lardner has with so much industry and accuracy of judgment collected on this head in the second part of his credibility of the gospel history. I shall therefore content myself with observing here, that several of the most learned and considerable of these ancients speak of this veneration for the sacred writings of the New Testament, not as the result of their own private judgment, but as that, in which all the churches were unanimously agreed *.

The internal characters of divine inspiration, with which every page of the New Testament abounds, do also deserve our attentive notice; and render the book itself, if considered as detached from all external evidence whatsoever, a compendious demonstration of its own sacred original, and consequently of

* Thus Origen says, (Philocal. cap. xii. page 41.) Δει σε, ——— ως πιθη παραδεξασθαι, ὁτι θεοπνευστοι εισιν· "That if a man would not confess himself to be an infidel, he must admit the inspiration of the scriptures." And he elsewhere places the gospels in the number of writings, "which were received as divine by all the churches of God, and were the elements, or first principles, of the church's faith:" Εν πασαις εκκλησιαις θεου πεπιστευμενων ειναι θειων, ——— Στοιχεια της πιστεως της εκκλησιας.——Tertullian also lays it down as a fundamental principle in disputing with heretics, "That the truth of doctrines is to be determined by scripture:" For the question has evidently the force of a strong negation. Aliunde scilicet loqui possunt de Rebus Fidei, nisi ex Litteris Fidei? (De Præscript. Hæret. cap. xv.)——And Eusebius quotes a much more ancient writer than himself, (Euseb. Eccles. Hist. Lib. v. cap. 28.) who calls the scripture, πιστεως αρχαιως κανονα, "the rule of ancient faith;" and who afterwards speaking of heretics, declares, "that if they denied the scriptures to be divinely inspired, they were infidels."

the certainty of that religion which it teaches. The excellency of its doctrines, the spirituality and elevation of its design, the majesty and simplicity of its style, the agreement of its parts in the most unsuspicious manner, with its more than human efficacy on the hearts and consciences of men, do all concur to give us a very high idea of the New Testament: And I am persuaded, that the wiser and better any man is, and the more familiarly he converses with these unequalled books, the more will he be struck with this evidence. But these things, in the general, are better felt than expressed; and several of the arguments arise, not from particular passages, but from the general tenor of the books: and consequently, they cannot be judged of, but by a serious and attentive perusal.

Dismissing therefore these topics, not with neglect, but with the sincerest expressions of just and high veneration, I now proceed to that grand proof of the inspiration of the New Testament, which is derived from the credibility of its leading facts; which having so fully illustrated in the sermons referred to above, I think I have a just title to assume as the foundation of what farther reasonings may occur.

Admitting this great principle, it is undeniably certain,—That Jesus of Nazareth was a most extraordinary person:——That after having been foretold by many prophets, in distant periods of time, he was at length, agreeably to the repeated declaration of an angel, first to a priest ministering at the golden altar in the temple, and then to his mother, conceived by a virgin of David's family:——That his birth was proclaimed by a choir of angels, who celebrated it in celestial anthems, as the foundation of peace on earth, and the most glorious display of divine benevolence to men:——That before his public appearance, a person greater than any of the prophets, and whose birth had also been foretold by an angel, was sent to prepare his way:——That on his being baptized, he was anointed with a wonderful effusion of the Spirit, poured down upon him by a visible symbol: And that the efficacy of this sacred agent, continually residing in him, was apparent throughout the whole course of his ministry; not only in the unspotted sanctity of his life, amidst a thousand most violent temptations, and in the bright assemblage of virtues and graces, which shone in it with a lustre before unknown, and since absolutely unparalleled; but also in a multitude of various works of wonder and mercy, which he miraculously wrought on those, whose diseases were of the most desperate and incurable nature, and even on the dead, whom that Almighty voice of his, which had driven out

the fiercest infernal spirits, and calmed the rage of tempests, did with serene majesty awaken into life, as from a slumber.—— It is also on the same foundation certain, That this illustrious person, having by the malice of his enemies been most unjustly and cruelly put to death, did on the third day arise from the dead:——And that, after having given to his disciples the most abundant proofs of that important fact, he at length ascended to heaven gradually in their sight; angels appearing, to assure them he should as visibly descend from thence to the universal judgment, the administration of which he had declared to be committed to him.

I must freely declare, that had I been an entire stranger to the sacred story, and proceeded no farther in it than this, supposing me firmly to have believed all these wonderful things, though delivered in the shortest abstract that could have been made of them, I should readily have concluded, that this extraordinary person, being sent, as it plainly appears from the history, that he was, with a divine revelation for the benefit of all nations and of all ages, had taken care to leave some authentic records of the doctrine, which he taught. And if I had farther found, that he had left no such records written by himself, I should naturally have concluded, that he took effectual care, that some of his followers should be enabled to deliver down to posterity the system of religion which he taught, in the most accurate manner; with all such extraordinary assistance from God, as the nature of the subject required, in order to rendering their accounts exact. And I believe, every reasonable man would draw this inference: Because it is very apparent, that the great end of this vast and astonishing apparatus, for vast and astonishing it would appear, if what relates to Jesus alone were taken into the survey, must in the nature of things be frustrated, if no such records were provided: It being morally impossible, that unwritten tradition should convey a system of religion pure and uncorrupted, even to the next generation; and much more, that it should so convey it to the end of time. And it would seem, so far as we can judge, by no means worthy the divine wisdom, to suffer the good effects of such a great and noble plan to be lost, for want of so easy an expedient: Especially, since men of the age and country in which these things happened, were not only blessed with the use of letters, but were remarkable for their application to them, and for great proficiency in various branches of learning. And if I should not only have an abstract of this history of Jesus, which I judged credible, but should also be so happy as to have

the four gospels in my hand, with convincing evidences of their being genuine, which we here suppose; I should on these principles assuredly argue, that not only the leading facts, but likewise the system of doctrines and discourses delivered in them, might entirely be depended upon: Nor could I conceive the truth of such doctrines and discourses to be separable from the general truth of the leading facts referred to above; having, as I here suppose, proper evidences to convince me, that the penmen of these books were the persons, by whom the memory of these events was to be delivered down to posterity: Which is a farther principle, that none of common sense and modesty can pretend to contest; none appearing as their competitors, whose pretensions are worthy to be named.

But my apprehension of the full authenticness and credibility of these writers would, on the supposition I am here making, greatly increase, as I proceeded to that excellent and useful book, which the good Providence of God has now given me an opportunity of illustrating; the acts of the holy apostles: Since I learn from thence, that in a very few days after the ascension of Jesus into heaven, the Spirit of God was, according to his promise, poured out upon his apostles in an abundant manner, attended with the visible appearance of a lambent celestial flame; And that, in consequence of this amazing unction, the poor fishermen of Galilee, and their companions, were in a moment enabled to speak, with the greatest readiness and propriety, Latin, Greek, Arabic, Coptic, Persic, and a variety of other languages, the first rudiments of which they had never learnt; and also to perform all kinds of miracles, equal to those of their master, and in some circumstances, superior to them. My veneration for the writings of these men, and I here suppose, I know those of the New Testament to be so, must be unparalleled, when I think who and what they were: And I am so struck with this plain, but divinely powerful argument, that I must intreat my reader to review with me, a little more particularly, some of the actions and circumstances of these holy men, to whose writings I am labouring to conciliate his unreserved regard.

Let them all be considered, as preaching the gospel in that extraordinary manner, on the day of Pentecost; and a few days after, when some of their companions had been seized and threatened by the Sanhedrim, as anointed again with such an effusion of the Spirit, as shook the very house in which they were, and inspired them all at once with the same sublime hymn of praise. Let them be considered, as afterwards led out of

prison by an angel, and commanded by him to go and preach the gospel in the temple, under the remarkable phraseology of "the words of this life;" as if the whole life and happiness of the human race depended on their knowing and receiving it. Nor let us here forget that extraordinary power, common to all the apostles, of communicating the miraculous gifts of the spirit by the imposition of their hands. Had we nothing particularly to say of any one, more than these grand things which, we hear of them all, it must surely command our reverence to their writings, and set them at a vast distance from any of merely human original.

But through the singular providence of God it hath so happened, that we have the most particular history of the lives of those apostles, to whose writings we are generally most indebted: I mean, John, Peter and Paul.

With respect to John we know, that besides the concern he had in the cure of the lame man, he was favoured with the visions of God in the Isle of Patmos; where our Lord, after an abode of more than half a century on the throne of his glory at his Father's right hand, did him the unequalled honour to use him as his amanuensis, or secretary; expressly dictating to him the letters he was pleased to send to the seven churches in Asia. How easily then may we suppose him so to have presided over his other writings, as to have secured him from mistakes in them!

Consider Peter, as striking Ananias and Sapphira dead with a word; as curing, by the like powerful word, one cripple at Jerusalem, and another at Lydda; and calling back Dorcas, even from the dead. Let us view him in that grand circumstance, of being marked out so particularly by an angel to Cornelius, and sent to him as the oracle of God himself, from whom that worthy and honourable person was to hear words, by which he and all his house should be saved: And after this, let us view him, as once more delivered out of the hand of Herod, and from all the expectation of the people of the Jews, by an angel, who struck off his chains, and opened the doors of his prison, the very night before he was to have been executed. And let any one, with these particulars in his eye, added to the foregoing, in which he shared with all his brethren, say, what more could be necessary, to prove the divine inspiration of what he taught; so far as inspiration was requisite, to render it entirely authentic: Or let any one farther say, upon what imaginable pretence the authority of his writings can be denied, if that of his preaching be granted.

And to mention no more, let Paul, that great scribe, instructed in the kingdom of heaven, to whose pen we owe so many invaluable epistles, be considered in the same view: And let us endeavour to impress our minds with the various scenes, through which we know he passed, and the distinguished favours, with which his master honoured him; that we may judge, how we are to receive the instructions of his pen. Let us therefore think of him, as so miraculously called by the voice of Christ to the profession of his gospel, when he was persecuting it even to the death; as receiving a full and distinct revelation of that glorious, but to him quite unknown gospel, by the immediate inspiration of its divine author; which is a fact he expressly witnesses, and in which he could not possibly be mistaken. Think of the lustre of those astonishing works, which shone round him wherever he went, and of those wrought in his favour, which shewed him so eminently the care of heaven: Dæmons ejected; distempers cured, sometimes with a touch, and sometimes without, by a garment sent from him to the patient; his motions guided from place to place by a divine oracle; Elymas struck blind for opposing him; his bands loosed by an earthquake; his strength and vigour instantaneously restored, when the rage of the mutable and barbarous populace at Lystra had stoned him and left him for dead; and to add no more, his safety in a shipwreck, with that of near three hundred more in the same vessel for his sake, promised by an angel, and accomplished without the loss of a single person, when they had expected nothing but an universal ruin. Let us, I say, think of Paul in these circumstances; and with these facts full in our view, let us judge, whether it is at all probable, yea whether it be morally possible, that a man, sent out and attended with such credentials as these, should be so left of God, amidst all these tokens of his constant care, as to mingle error with sound doctrine, and his own fancies with the divine revelations, which we are sure he received: Or whether, if he were not left to such effects of human frailty in his preaching, but might have been regarded by his hearers with entire credit, he would be left to them in those writings, by which he was, as it were, to preach to all future generations of men, from one end of the world to the other, and by which, being dead, he yet speaketh, in all languages, and to all christian assemblies.

I cannot forbear thinking this plain argument, so well adapted to popular use, abundantly sufficient to carry conviction to every candid mind, in proportion to the degree of its attention and penetration. And I am almost afraid, that some

should think I have bestowed an unnecessary labour, thus particularly to state a matter, which hath such a flood of light poured in upon it from almost every page of the sacred story. But I have been obliged, in the course of this exposition, to meditate much on these facts; and under the deep impression I could not but speak, as out of the fulness of my heart.

Yet after all I have already said, I should be very unjust to this argument, if I did not endeavour to represent to my reader, how much it is strengthened, on the one hand, by the express and comprehensive promises, which our Redeemer made to his apostles; and on the other, by the peculiar language in which the apostles themselves speak of their preaching and writings, and the high regard they challenge to each; a regard, which nothing could justify them in demanding, but a consciousness that they were indeed under a full inspiration.

The promises of our Lord Jesus Christ must undoubtedly have a very great weight with all, that have reflected on that indisputable testimony, which God himself bore to him in numberless instances. And therefore, though they are so very well known, I must beg leave, not only to refer to them, but to recite the chief of them at large: And I entreat the reader to consider, how he can reconcile them with an apprehension, that our Lord Jesus Christ did at the same time intend to leave the persons to whom he made such promises, liable to mistake both in facts and doctrines; and being deceived themselves, to mislead such as should depend upon their testimony, where they professed themselves to be thoroughly informed.

In that copious and excellent discourse, which our Lord addressed to the apostles, just before he quitted the guest-chamber to go to the garden of Gethsemane, that is, but a few hours before his death, the grand consolation he urges to his sorrowful disciples, is this; that he would send his Spirit upon them. The donation of which Spirit is represented, as the first fruits of Christ's intercession; when after so long an absence, and such terrible sufferings, he should be restored to his Father's embraces. This is spoken of as the first petition preferred by him, and the first favour granted to his church for his sake: John xiv. 16. I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another comforter, that he may abide with you for ever. Yea, Christ declares, and he could not be mistaken in it, that the agency of this Spirit should so abundantly counter-balance all the advantages, they received from his bodily presence, that strong as their affection to him was, they would in that view

have reason to rejoice in his leaving them: (John xvi. 7.) I tell you the truth, that is, I say, what may be depended upon as a most important certainty, and very important indeed such a representation was; it is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you. Now from these expressions, were they alone, I think we might probable infer, that the apostles, after having received the Spirit, would be in no more danger of erring in their writings, than they would have been, if Jesus himself had been always near them, to inform them concerning any fact or doctrine, of which they might have occasion to speak.

This is farther confirmed by the title which is given him no less than thrice in this discourse, the Spirit of truth; almost in a breath with these great and weighty circumstances, that he should *abide with them for ever;* John xiv. 16, 17. that he should *guide them into all truth,* that he should *teach them all things,* yea, *and shew them things to come;* John xvi. 13. which must surely secure them from any danger of erring in relating things that were past. But lest any should be perverse enough to dispute the consequence, our Lord particularly mentions this effect of the Spirit's operation, that they should thereby be fitted to bear a testimony to him, as those who had long been conversant with him, and whose memories were miraculously assisted in recollecting those discourses which they had heard from him: John xv. 26, 27. *When the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me; and ye also,* being so assisted, *shall bear witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning.* And again, John xiv. 26. *The Holy Ghost shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you.*

Soon after this, our Lord, on the very day, in which he rose from the dead, in a dependance on the aids of this promised Spirit, gives them a commission, which nothing but its plenary inspiration could have answered, or have qualified them to fulfil: For coming to them, he declares, John xx. 21. *As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you: And* upon this *he breathed upon them, and said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost: Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted; and whosesoever ye retain, they are retained:* Which, whether it signifies a power of inflicting and removing miraculous punishments, or of authoritatively declaring that sins were in particular

instances forgiven or retained, must, either way, suppose such a constant presence of Christ with them, as it is hard, or rather impossible, to reconcile, with supposing them to err in what they wrote for the instruction of the church in succeeding ages.

These are the grand passages, on which I rest this part of the argument: Yet I think, I ought not to omit those, in which Christ promises them such extraordinary assistance of the Spirit, while defending his cause in the presence of magistrates; and it is the more proper to mention them, as the language in which they are made is so remarkable. On this occasion then he tells them, Mat. x. 19, 20. *When they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak, for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak, for it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you.* May we not therefore on the same principles conclude, that when they were to write for the use of all future generations of Christians, it was not so much they, who wrote, as the Spirit of the Father, who in effect wrote by them, and, as it were, dictated to them? For the occasion will surely appear as important, in one instance, as in the other; or rather much more important in the latter, than in the former; as an error in their writings would have a much more extensive and lasting influence, than a slip of their tongues in a transient pleading before a magistrate. Nay, to give this argument the greatest possible weight, we find that the same promise was made, almost in the very same words, Luke xii. 11, 12. to persons in the dignity of their office inferior to the apostles; I mean, to the seventy; which might have intitled their writings to such a regard, as I am now labouring to engage to those of their superiors.

I shall only farther remind the reader, that our Lord, when just ascending to heaven, refers to that effusion of the Spirit, which was quickly after to happen, even before they departed from Jerusalem, as the æra, from whence the grand accomplishment of the promises relating to the aids of the Spirit was to be dated. See Luke xxiv. 49. Acts i. 4, 5. And as all the apostolical writings which now remain, were written several years after that event, it plainly proves, they lie within the period, in which they were to expect all the assistance which these promises import.

The most plausible objection, which can be urged against the application of these promises to the matter now before us, is this: "That these promises only refer to the supernatural assistance, granted to the apostles on great and pressing occa-

sions: But that they might easily, without such assistance, have written a true account of the life and preaching of Christ, and of such other facts as they record; and consequently, that their historical writings at least, how credible soever we suppose them, might be drawn up without any inspiration at all."

To this I might reply, That if it be allowed, that the apostles, in the books which we have been endeavouring to explain, wrote the exact truth, and that in their epistles they have made a right and unerring representation of the revelation with which they were charged, so that we may safely make their writings a rule both of faith and practice, the remaining question would only be about the propriety of using the word inspiration, when speaking of them; and therefore would, on the principles I have laid down above, be comparatively of small importance. Yet I think it easy, in that view of the question, to prove that these writings could not have been thus entirely credible, if they had not been written under such a full inspiration of superintendency, as is stated in the first part of this discourse.

I do indeed allow, and no candid man can dispute it, that the penmen of the New Testament, supposing them able to write at all, might merely by the natural exercise of their memory, under the direction of the common sense and reason of men, have given us a plain, faithful, and very useful account of many extraordinary scenes, to which they had been witnesses during the time they conversed with Jesus on earth, and in which they were active after his ascension. And I cannot forbear saying, that supposing the truth of the grand leading facts, as, that Jesus of Nazareth taught a doctrine confirmed by miracles, and was himself raised from the dead, I should have esteemed such writings, supposing them merely an honest account of what such men must have known, to be beyond all comparison the most valuable records of antiquity. But when these writings came to be perused, it is evident to me, from the particular contents of them, that honest and worthy men would never have pretended to have written in such a manner, if they had not been conscious of superior direction, and extraordinary divine influence.

For the historians of whom we speak, do not merely give us a very circumstantial account of actions; as what journies Christ made, what miracles he performed, in what manner he was received, where, and how he died, and rose again, and ascended into heaven: But they do also, as we may reasonably expect they should, give us an account of the doctrine he taught: And indeed, if they had not done this, the knowledge

of his story, amazing as it is, would have been but an unprofitable amusement to us. Nor do they content themselves with giving us a short summary of his doctrine, or a view of the religion he intended to introduce, as the general result of their having attended so long on his instructions; but they presume to tell us his very words. And here, they do not merely relate some short sayings, the remarkable poignancy of which, or their propriety to the circumstances in which they were spoken, might have struck the memory with a peculiar force; but they insert long discourses, which he made on public occasions; though they do not pretend, that he left any copies of them, or that they themselves took them from any written memoirs whatsoever: And it is worth our notice, that, besides the many shorter sayings and replies, with which the history is interspersed, near one half of the four gospels is taken up with the insertion of these discourses *.

Now it was highly necessary, that if these speeches of our Lord were recorded at all, they should be recorded with great exactness: For many of them relate to the system of doctrines which he came to teach; and others of them are predictions of future events, referring to a great variety of curious circumstances, where a small mistake might greatly have affected the credit of the prediction, and with it the cause of Christianity in general: So that common prudence would have taught the apostles to wave them, rather than pretend to deliver them to posterity, if they had not been sure, they could have done it exactly.

But how could they have expected to have done this, merely by the natural strength of their own memories; unless we imagine each of them to be a prodigy in that respect, to which no one of them makes the least shadow of a pretence? It is well known, that several of those speeches of Christ which Matthew and John give us, not now to mention the other evangelists, contain several pages; and some of them cannot be deliberately and decently read over in less than a quarter of an hour. Now I believe, if my reader would make the experiment on any thing of that length which he read or heard yesterday, or even on one of those discourses of Christ, though perhaps he has read or heard it an hundred times; he would find, on a careful examination, many things would probably be

* If my computation does not deceive me, 93 of our 203 sections are taken up thus, and some of them are long sections too: And the number of verses contained in these discourses, to that of the whole, is as about 1700 to 3779, which is the number of verses in the four gospels.

omitted; many transposed; many expressed in a different manner: And were he to write a copy of such a discourse from his memory, and then critically to compare it with the original, he would find the sense, in many particulars, where there was some general resemblance, more different than he could perhaps have imagined; and variations, which at first seemed but inconsiderable, would appear greatly to affect the sense, when they came to be more nicely reviewed. If this would so probably be the case with ninety-nine out of a hundred of mankind, and I certainly speak within compass, when a discourse to be repeated, had been delivered but a day or an hour before; what could be expected from the apostles, with an interval of so many years? And especially from John, who has, in proportion to the length of his gospel, recorded more speeches than any of the rest, and wrote them, if we may credit the most authentic tradition, more than half a century after our Lord's ascension?

This argument would have great weight, with relation to a man, whose life was ever so peaceful, and his affairs contracted in the narrowest sphere: But it will be greatly strengthened, when we come to consider the multitude and variety of scenes, and those too the most interesting that can be imagined, through which the apostles passed. When we consider all their labours, and their cares; the journies they were continually taking; the novelty of objects perpetually surrounding them; and, above all, the persecutions and dangers to which they were daily exposed; and the strong manner, in which the mind is struck, and the memory of past circumstances erased by such occurrences; I cannot conceive, that any reader will be so unreasonable, as to imagine, these things could have been written with any exactness by the apostles, if they had not been miraculously assisted in recording them. And what is particularly mentioned by the last of these writers, of the promised agency of the Spirit to bring to their remembrance all things they had heard from Christ himself; John xiv. 26. must I think incontestably prove, that this was one purpose for which the Spirit was given; and therefore, we may be sure, that it was a purpose for which it was needed.

I hope, I have by this time convinced my reader, that it is agreeable to the other circumstances of the apostles' story, and to the promises which our Lord so largely and so frequently made to them, and the frequent repetition of the promise strongly intimates the importance of it, to suppose, that they were indeed favoured with a full inspiration in their writings.

But to complete the argument, it must be observed, that

these holy men, for such the history plainly shews them to have been, assume to themselves such an authority, and speak of their own discourses and writings in such peculiar language, as nothing but a consciousness of such inspiration could warrant, or even excuse.

To make us duly sensible of the force of this argument, let us hear Paul, Peter, and John, and we shall find the remark applicable to them all; though as St. Paul wrote much more than either of the latter, we may naturally expect to find the most frequent instances of it in his writings.

When the apostle Paul had taken notice to the Corinthians, that the subject of his preaching was the wisdom of God in a mystery, and related to things which transcended the sense and imagination of men, he adds, 1 Cor. ii. 10. *But God hath revealed them to us by his Spirit; for the Spirit searcheth all things, even the deep things of God*: And again, ver. 12. *We have received, not the spirit of the world*, so as to act in that artful way, which a regard to secular advantage dictates; *but the Spirit which is of God, that we may know the things that are freely given us of God.* Now it is natural to conclude from hence, that this knowledge being given them, not merely or chiefly for themselves, but for the church, in which view they speak of themselves and their office, as the gift of God to the church; compare Eph. iv. 11, 12. and 1 Cor. iii. 21—23. they should be assisted to communicate it in a proper manner; since otherwise, the end of God in giving it to them would be frustrated. But the apostle does not content himself with barely suggesting this; but he asserts it in the most express terms: 1 Cor. ii. 13. *Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth*, that is, not with a vain ostentation of human eloquence; *but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; comparing spiritual things with spiritual*; or, as some would render and paraphrase it, *adapting spiritual* expressions *to spiritual things**. And in the close of the chapter, when with a noble freedom, in a consciousness of the distinguished character he bore, he puts the question to the whole world besides; *Who hath known the mind of the Lord?* he adds, *But we have the mind of Christ.* Which last clause plainly determines the sense, in which we are to take those words at the close of chap. vii. *And I think also, that I have the Spirit of God*†; that is, "I certainly appear to have it;" or, "it is evident and apparent, that my pretences to it are not a vain boast." For, after having so expressly asserted it

* Πνευματικοις πνευματικα συγκρινοντες. † Δοκω δε καγω Πνευμα Θεου εχειν.

just above, none can imagine, he meant here to insinuate, that he was uncertain, whether he had it, or not. He appeals therefore to those whose gifts were most eminent, to dispute it, if they could: 1 Cor. xiv. 37. *If any man think himself to be a prophet, or spiritual*, that is, if he have ever so good evidence that he really is so, for it cannot be thought, he meant to appeal only to those, who falsely pretended to these endowments, *let him acknowledge, that the things which I write unto you, are the commandments of the Lord.*—In his second epistle to the Corinthians, chap. ii. 10. he speaks of *forgiving* offenders *in the person of Christ;* and amidst the humblest acknowledgments of *his own insufficiency*, boasts *a sufficiency of God, who had made him an able minister of the New Testament.* 2 Cor. iii. 5, 6. Of which he was so thoroughly sensible, that in the first epistle, which he ever wrote, so far as scripture informs us, to any of the churches, I mean, his first epistle to the Thessalonians, he ventures to say, chap. iv. 8. *He that despiseth*, that is, as the context plainly implies, he that despiseth or rejecteth what I now write, *despiseth not man*, only or chiefly, *but God, who hath given us his Holy Spirit:* Which manifestly intimates, that what he wrote was under supernatural divine guidance and influence, as in the second verse of that chapter he had spoken of commandments which he had given them by the Lord Jesus Christ; just as he afterwards declared to the Corinthians, 2 Cor. xiii. 3. how well he was able to give proofs of Christ speaking in him.—In his epistle to the Galatians, the apostle solemnly assures them, Gal. i. 11, 12. that the gospel which he had preached among them, was not after man, that is, not of any human original: And he gives this substantial proof of it, that he was himself taught it, no otherwise than by the immediate revelation of Jesus Christ. Agreeably to which assertion, when he gives the Corinthians an account of the institution and design of the Lord's supper, he says in so many words, 1 Cor. xi. 23. *That he had received of the Lord, what he delivered unto them;* that is, that he had his notion of that sacrament, and of the actions and words of Christ on which it is was founded, by an immediate inspiration from him, or, in the language we have used above, by suggestion. And he speaks of his brethren, as well as of himself, in these terms, Eph. iii. 3, 5. *That the mystery of Christ which was before unknown*, that is, the right of the Gentiles, on believing the gospel, to full communion with the Christian church, *was made known to the holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit*, and not merely by the natural recollection of what they had heard Christ say, or by their own reasonings upon it.

Most agreeable to this is the strain of Peter, who, in one epistle, joins the commandment of the apostles with the words of the holy prophets ; 2 Peter iii. 2. and mentions the epistles of Paul with other scriptures, verse 15, 16. no doubt, in allusion to the sacred oracles of the Old Testament, which so generally went by that name. And in his other epistle, he insists strenuously upon it, that *the gospel was preached with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven*, in exact conformity to the prophetic oracles of former ages, *not understood by those who uttered them* ; a circumstance, in this connection, highly worthy of our remark : And he seems strongly to intimate, that the angels themselves, did by these apostolical preachings learn some things, which, with all their superior faculties, they did not before so fully know : *Which things*, says he, *the angels desire to look into ;* 1 Peter i. 12. As Paul had also said, that, *to the principalities and powers in heavenly places, was made known by the church, the manifold wisdom of God.* Eph. iii. 10.

To conclude this argument, St. John, remarkable as he was for his singular modesty and ingenuity of temper, does not only tell us, that Jesus Christ shewed him the revelation ; Rev. i. 1. but speaks in his epistle, of an unction poured out from the holy one, by which they knew all things. 1 John ii. 20. And in another passage he in effect asserts, that he had, in concurrence with his brethren, given such abundant proof of his being under the divine influence and direction in his teaching, whether by word or letter, that an agreement or disagreement with his doctrine was to be made the standard by which they might judge of truth or error, and obedience or disobedience to his injunctions the test of a good or a bad man ; which is considerably more, than merely asserting the fullest inspiration. 1 John iv. 6. *We are of God : He that knoweth God, heareth us; he that is not of God, heareth not us : Hereby know we the spirit of truth, and the spirit of error.*

I might here add, if it were necessary, the several passages of the New Testament, in which the gospel preached by the apostles, is called *the gospel of God;* such as 2 Cor xi. 7. 1 Tim. i. 11. and the like : But I omit them, as the stress of the controversy does undoubtedly rest on these I have mentioned ; and the importance of the question must be my defence for so large an enumeration of texts, which are so well known.

I shall only remind my reader in a few words, of those many passages, in which the gospel as preached by the apostles, is so evidently equalled with, yea, and preferred to the law given by Moses, and the messages brought to the Jews by the

succeeding prophets. These afford a further illustration of this argument, which will appear with very considerable weight, when we reflect on the high opinion they had of the Old Testament, and the honourable terms in which they speak of it, as *the word* and *oracles of God*, Rom. iii. 2. as given by his inspiration, 2 Tim. iii. 16. and as that, *which holy men spake, as they were moved*, or borne on, [φερομενοι] by the Holy Ghost. 2 Peter i. 21. None can fail of observing, that they quote its authority on all occasions, as decisive; yea, our Lord himself strongly intimates, not only the strict truth of the whole, but which is much more, that it were intolerable to suppose it chargeable with any impropriety of expression; for this must be the sense of those remarkable words, John x. 35. that *the scripture cannot be broken;* and the whole force of our Lord's argument depends upon interpreting them thus. I might argue at large the improbability, and indeed the great absurdity of supposing, that such assistances were given to Moses and the prophets, as to make their writings an infallible rule of faith and practice, and that the subjects of God's only begotten Son, and the grand minister in his kingdom, should be left destitute of equal assistance in their work and writings. I think the argument would be unanswerable, if considered apart: But I now mention it in another view, as illustrating the persuasion, the apostles had of their own inspiration, when they speak of their teachings and decisions, as equally authentic with those of the illustrious prophets, for whom they had so great and so just a regard.

I am fully satisfied, that this last argument, from the manner in which the apostles speak of themselves in their writings, will strike the reader, in proportion to the degree, in which he reflects upon the true character of these excellent men, and especially upon that modesty and humility, in which they bore so bright and so lovely a resemblance of their divine Master. Let him ask himself, what he would think of any minister of Christ now, supposing him ever so eminent for learning, wisdom, and piety, that should assume to himself such an authority? Suppose such a man, under the influence of no miraculous guidance, to say, not with reference to what he might quote from others, but with regard to his own dictates, *The things which I write unto you, are the commandments of the Lord: He that despiseth, despiseth not man, but God: We have the mind of Christ;* and *he that heareth not us*, that receiveth not our dictates in religion, *is not of God:* Suppose, I say, such language as this to be used publicly by any christian minister

now on earth, and you must necessarily suppose his character from that very hour overthrown. The whole world would immediately join in loudly demanding miraculous proofs to verify such assertions; or in condemning, with just indignation, such a claim unsupported by them, as an unpardonable lording it over men's faith and conscience, and thrusting themselves into their master's throne. Let us not then charge the holy apostles with a conduct, of which we should not suspect any wise and good man now upon the face of the earth; and which if we saw in any of our friends, our charity and respect for them would incline us to enquire after some marks of lunacy in them, as its best excuse.

I have now given an easy and popular view of the principal arguments for the inspiration of the New Testament*, on which my own faith in that important doctrine rests; and such an one, as I hope by the divine blessing may be useful to others. I shall not enter into a particular consideration of the several objections against it, which chiefly arise from texts of scripture, in which some pretend to find, that the apostles were actually mistaken. I have considered most of these objections already, in my notes on the texts from whence they are taken: For almost all of them relate to passages in the historical books, and I don't know that I have omitted any of them; but have every where given, though as briefly as I could, such solutions as appeared to me in conscience satisfactory, though I have not stood formally to discuss them as objections against the inspiration of those books.

The reader will observe, that very few instances have occurred, in which I have judged it necessary to allow an error in our present copies: But as in those few instances the supposed change of a word or two makes the matter perfectly easy, I think it most respectful to the sacred writings, to account for the seeming difficulty thus, and to impute it to the transcribers; though it is certain, some of these mistakes, supposing them such, did happen very early; because, as Mr. Seed very properly expresses it in his excellent sermon on this subject †, which, since I wrote the former part of this dissertation, fell into my hands, a partial inspiration is, to all intents and purposes, no inspiration at all: For, as he justly argues against the supposi-

* I was desired by a friend, for whose piety and good sense I have a very great regard, to add a note here, on the inspiration of the Old Testament: But as it would require a large one, and might perhaps interrupt the reader, I chuse to throw it into a postscript at the end of this dissertation.

† See Mr. Seed's Sermon, vol. ii. page 322.

tion of any mixture of error in these sacred writings, "Mankind would be as much embarrassed, to know what was inspired, and what was not, as they could be to collect a religion for themselves; the consequence of which would be, that we are left just where we were, and that God put himself to a great expence of miracles to effect nothing at all: A consequence, highly derogatory and injurious to his honour."

The arguments brought from a few passages in the epistles, to prove that the apostles did not think themselves inspired, weak as they are, will be considered, if God permit, in their proper places. At present I shall content myself with referring the reader to Dr. Whitby, who I think has given a satisfactory solution to them all.

There are other objections of a quite different class, with which I have no concern; because they affect only such a degree of inspiration, as I think it not prudent, and am sure it is not necessary, to assert. I leave them therefore to be answered by those, if any such there be, who imagine that Paul would need an immediate revelation from heaven, and a miraculous dictate of the Holy Ghost, to remind Timothy of the cloak and writings which he left at Troas, or to advise him to mingle a little wine with his water.

Waving therefore the farther discussion of these topics, on which it would be more easy than profitable to enlarge, I shall conclude this dissertation with a reflection or two of a practical nature, into which I earnestly intreat the reader to enter with a becoming attention.

Let me engage him seriously to pause, and consider, what sort of an impression it ought to make upon us, to think that we have such a book; a book, written by a full divine inspiration: That amidst all the uncertain variety of human reasonings and conjectures, we have a celestial guide through the labyrinth: That God hath condescended to take care, that we should have a most authentic and unerring account of certain important, though very distant facts, many of which were wrought with his own hand; and with these facts, should have a system of most weighty and interesting doctrines, to the truth of which he makes himself a witness. Such a book must to every considerate person appear an inestimable treasure; and it certainly calls for our most affectionate acknowledgment, that God should confer such a favour on any of his creatures, and much more on those, who by abusing in too many instances their natural light, had made themselves so utterly unworthy of supernatural.

From this view of the inspiration of scripture, we may also infer our obligation to study it with the greatest attention and care; to read it in our closets and our families; and to search in the most diligent and impartial manner into its genuine sense, design, and tendency: which is, in the main, so evident, that no upright heart can fail of understanding it, and every truly good heart must delight to comply with it. This is indeed a most important inference, and that, without which, all our convictions of its divine authority will only condemn us before God and our own consciences. Let us therefore always remember, that in consequence of all these important premises, we are indispensably obliged to receive with calm and reverend submission all the dictates of scripture; to make it our oracle; and, in this respect, to set it at a due distance from all other writings whatsoever; as it is certain, there is no other book in the world, that can pretend to equal authority, and produce equal or comparable proofs to support such a pretension. Let us measure the truth of our own sentiments, or those of others, in the great things which scripture teaches, by their conformity to it. And O that the powerful charm of this blessed book might prevail to draw all that do sincerely regard it, into this centre of unity! That, dropping those unscriptural forms, which have so lamentably divided the church, we might more generally content ourselves with the simplicity of divine truths as they are here taught, and agree to put the mildest and kindest interpretation we can, upon the language and sentiments of each other. This is what I cannot forbear inculcating again and again, from a firm persuasion, that it is agreeable to the spirit of the gospel, and pleasing to its great Author: And I inculcate it in this place, and at this time, with peculiar affection, as the providence of God around us calls us loudly to do all we can with a safe conscience, to promote a union among protestants. And I heartily pray, that our mutual jealousies and prejudices, which some are so unseasonably labouring to exasperate, may not provoke God to drive us together by a storm of persecution; if peradventure the bond of suffering together may be strong enough to bind those, whom the endearments of the same christian profession, the same rule of faith, of manners, and of hope, have not yet been able to unite.

On the whole, Let me most affectionately invite and intreat every reader, whatsoever his rank in life, or his proficiency in learning may be, seriously to consider the practical design of these sacred oracles, the sense and authority of which I have been endeavouring to explain and assert. It is indeed a

mystery in divine Providence, that there should still remain so much difficulty in them, as that in many points of doctrine, thoughtful, serious, and I trust, upright men should form such different opinions concerning the interpretation of so many passages, and the justice of consequences drawn from them, on the one side, and on the other. But of this there can be no controversy, "That the great design of the New Testament, in delightful harmony with the old, is to call off our minds from the present world, to establish us in the belief of a future state, and to form us to a serious preparation for it, by bringing us to a lively faith in Christ, and, as the genuine effect of that, to a filial love to God, and a fraternal affection for each other:" Or, in one word, and a weightier and more comprehensive sentence was never written, *to teach us, that denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world; looking for that blessed hope, even the glorious appearance of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ.* Tit. ii. 12, 13. To his Almighty hand may our souls be committed, by a faith productive of these glorious fruits; and, under the sanctifying, quickening, and supporting influences of his Spirit, may we wait for his mercy unto eternal life! Then shall no terror of suffering, no allurement of pleasure, no sophistry of error be able to seduce us; but guided by that light and truth, which shines forth in the sacred pages, we shall march on to that holy hill; where, having happily escaped all the dangers of that dark path, which we now tread, we shall greet the dawning of an everlasting day, the arising of a day-star which shall go down no more. Amen!

POSTSCRIPT.

A SKETCH OF THE ARGUMENTS,

By which the Inspiration of the Old Testament may be proved in the easiest Method, and by the most solid and convincing Evidence.

IF the proof of the inspiration of the Old Testament be deduced in its full compass from its first principles, we must have recourse to a method, very nearly resembling that, which is taken in the three sermons referred to above, for proving the authority of the New; that is, we must first prove, That the books are genuine; and then, That the history, which they contain, is credible: From which premises the inspiration of the Old Testament may easily be inferred, by a train of arguments similar to that, which we have pursued in the dissertation above.

For proving the genuineness of the books, I should think it proper briefly to shew, what I think hardly any will be so ignorant and confident as to deny, That the Jewish religion is of considerable antiquity, and was founded by Moses about fifteen hundred years before Christ's time: And farther,——That the Jews, before and at the time of Christ, had books among them bearing the titles of those, which make up what we protestants call the canonical books of the Old Testament:—— And that these books, then received in the jewish church, were the genuine works of the persons to whom they were respectively ascribed:——From hence it is easy farther to shew, that they have not suffered, and, considering what a guard the Jews and Christians were upon each other, could not suffer, any material alteration since; and consequently, that the Old Testament, as now extant in the Hebrew and Chaldee languages, is genuine, and, in the main, such as it originally was.

In order to prove its credibility from this established medium, we may prepare the way, by shewing, that many material facts, which are there recorded, are also mentioned by very ancient heathen writers.——And it is yet more important to shew, as we very easily may, that there is room to go over the same leading thoughts with those insisted upon in the second of the three sermons mentioned above, and to argue the credibility of the story, from the certain opportunities, which the writers had of informing themselves as to the certain truth of the grand facts

which they assert, as having themselves been personally concerned in them; and from those many marks of integrity and piety to be found in their writings, which may do as much as any thing of that kind can do, to obviate any suspicion of an intention to deceive.——We may here also advance farther, and demonstrate beyond all contradiction, that the facts asserted were of such a nature, as could not possibly have gained credit, had they been false; yet that they did gain most assured credit, of which the persons receiving these books gave the most substantial evidence that can be imagined, by receiving, on the authority of these facts, a system of laws, which though considered as to be divinely supported, they were admirably wise, yet were of such a nature, that without such an extraordinary Providence, as nothing but an assurance of such an original could have warranted them to expect, they must necessarily have proved ruinous to the state they were intended to regulate and establish *,

A farther and very noble evidence of the truth of the grand facts attested in the Old Testament, and of the inspiration of a considerable part of it, may be drawn from the consideration of those numerous and various predictions to be found in it; which refer to a multitude of events, several of them before utterly unexampled, which no human sagacity could possibly have foreseen, and which nevertheless happened exactly according to those predictions †.

Having advanced thus far, we may take up a set of arguments correspondent to those insisted on above, to prove from its genuineness and credibility, now supposed to be evinced, that the Old Testament was written by a superintendent inspiration: And this we may argue, not merely, or chiefly, from the tradition to this purpose, so generally and so early prevailing in the Jewish church, though that is considerable; nor even from those very signal and glorious internal evidences of various kinds, which every competent judge may easily see and feel; but from surveying the character and circumstances of the persons, by whom the several books were written, in comparison with the genius of that dispensation, under which they lived and wrote. This may, in all the branches of the argument, be proved

* The reader will easily imagine, I here refer especially to the laws, relating to letting all the land lie fallow together once in seven years, and two years together at every jubilee; the desertion of their borders at the three great feasts, when all the males went up to the tabernacle or temple; and the disuse of cavalry; to omit some others.

† See Dr. Sykes's Connection.

in this way, with the greatest ease and strength, concerning Moses, and his writings: And when the authority of the pentateuch is established, that of the most material succeeding books stands in so easy and natural a connection with it, that I think few have been found, at least, since the controversy between the Jews and the Samaritans, who have, in good earnest, allowed Moses to have been a messenger from heaven, and denied the inspiration of the prophets, and of the books which we receive as written by them.

But it is obvious, that the illustration of all these propositions would be the work of a large volume, rather than of such a postscript to a dissertation, itself of so moderate a length. I have discussed them all with the most material objections which have been advanced against them, in that course of theological lectures, which I mentioned in the preface to the first volume of the Family Expositor; and which it is my continual care to render worthy the acceptance of the public in due time, by such alterations and additions as frequent reviews, in conjunction with what occurs to me in reading, conversation, or meditation, may suggest.

I shall conclude these hints with the mention of one argument for the inspiration of the Old Testament, entirely independent on all the former; which a few words may set in a convincing light, and which must be satisfactory to all, who see the reasonableness of acquiescing in what I have urged above. I mean,——That the inspiration, and consequently, the genuineness and credibility of the Old Testament, may be certainly inferred from that of the New*: Because our Lord and his

* It may be objected to this, that the authority of the New Testament, as stated in the sermons referred to, and in most other defences of Christianity, is, in part, proved from the prophecies of the Old; so that the argument here urged would be circular. To which I would answer, 1. That if we were to take this medium alone, we must, indeed, subtract from the proof of Christianity all that branch of its evidence, which grows from prophecies in the Old Testament; and then, all that arises from miracles, internal arguments, and the wonderful events, which have followed its first promulgation, would stand in their full force, first to demonstrate, I think, to high satisfaction, the divine original of the New Testament, and then to prove the authority of the Old. 2. That most of the enemies of the Mosaic and Christian revelations do nevertheless own those, which we call the prophetical books of the Old Testament to be more ancient than the New: And on this foundation alone, without first taking for granted, that they are either inspired or genuine, we derive an argument for Christianity, from their mere existence; and then may argue backward, that they were divinely inspired, and therefore genuine; and so, by a farther consequence, may infer from them the divine authority of the Mosaic religion, which they so evidently attest: Which is an argument something distinct from the testimony of the authors of the New Testament, but important enough to deserve a mention

apostles were so far from charging the scribes and pharisees, who on all proper occasions are censured so freely, with having introduced into the sacred volume any merely human compositions; that, on the contrary, they not only recommend a diligent and constant perusal of these scriptures, as of the greatest importance to men's eternal happiness; but speak of them as divine oracles, and as written by the extraordinary influence of the holy Spirit upon the minds of the authors.

I desire, that the following list of scriptures may be attentively consulted, and reflected on, in this view. I might have added a great many more, indeed, several hundreds, in which the sacred writers of the New Testament argue from those of the Old, in such a manner, as nothing could have justified, but a firm persuasion that they were divinely inspired. Now as the Jews always allowed, "that the testimony of an approved prophet was sufficient to confirm the mission of one, who was supported by it;" so I think every reasonable man will readily conclude, that no inspired person can erroneously attest another to be inspired: And, indeed, the very definition of plenary inspiration, as stated above, absolutely excludes any room for cavilling on so plain a head. I throw the particular passages, which I chuse to mention, into the margin below *; and he must be a very indolent enquirer into a question of so much importance, who does not think it worth his while to turn carefully to them, unless he has already such a conviction of the argument, that it should need no farther to be illustrated or confirmed.

* John v. 39. Mat. iv. 4, 7, 10. Mark xii. 24. Luke x. 26, 27. Mat. v. 17, 18. xxi. 42. xxii. 29, 31, 43. xxiv. 15. xxvi. 54, 56. Luke i. 67, 69, 70. xvi. 31. xxiv. 25, 27. John x. 35. Acts ii. 16, 25. iii. 22, 24. iv. 25. xvii. 11. xviii. 24, 28. xxviii. 25. Rom. iii. 2, 10. ix. 25, 27, 29. x. 5, 11, 16. xv. 4. xvi. 26. 1 Cor. x. 11. 2 Cor. iv. 13. vi. 16, 17. Gal. iii. 8. 1 Tim. v. 18. 2 Tim. iii. 15, 16. Heb. i. 1, 5—13. iii. 7. Jam. ii. 8. iv. 5, 6. 1 Pet. i. 10—12. 2 Pet. i. 19—21.

FREE THOUGHTS

ON THE

MOST PROBABLE MEANS OF REVIVING

THE

DISSENTING INTEREST.

OCCASIONED

BY THE LATE ENQUIRY

INTO THE

CAUSES OF ITS DECAY.

ADDRESSED TO THE AUTHOR OF THAT ENQUIRY.

TO

THE AUTHOR

OF THE

ENQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE DECAY

OF THE

DISSENTING INTEREST.

SIR,

YOU will probably be surprised at this address on occasion of your enquiry, so many months after the publication of it. But my distance from the town, and engagement in business hindered me from an early sight of it; and many accidents, which it is of no importance to mention, obliged me to delay finishing these papers, so soon as I intended, when I began to write them. On the whole, as I am not attempting to criticise on your performance, but only to offer some remarks, which I hope may be of common use, if what I say be just and important, it cannot be quite too late; and if it be either false or trifling, it appears, after all, too soon.

As I am persuaded, that the dissenting cause is founded on reason and truth, and that the honour of God, and the public good is nearly concerned in its support, you have my hearty thanks for that generous zeal, with which you have appeared for the defence of it. On this account, I should think myself highly obliged to treat you with decency and respect, how much soever my sentiments might differ from yours, as to the particular causes of its decay. And indeed, Sir, you have taken the most effectual method in the world to prevent any thing of a rude attack, by treating all, whom you mention, even the meanest and the weakest, with remarkable candor and humanity.

But I have the happiness of agreeing with you in far the greater part of what you advance. I will not now debate, whether the principles of our dissent are less known, than they formerly were; and consequently whether that be, properly speaking, a cause of the late decay of our interest: But I will readily

grant, Sir, that it is highly necessary, they should be known; and I think you have done us a great deal of service by setting them in so easy, and yet in so strong a light. I hope it may be a means of informing and establishing some, who are too busy or too indolent to give themselves the trouble of perusing, what Dr. Calamy, Mr. Peirce, and some others have written so copiously and so judiciously upon the subject.

I farther apprehend, Sir, that nothing can be said upon the case before us, of more certain truth or more solid importance, than, what you have frequently observed, viz. that our interest has received great damage from our acting in a manner directly opposite to our principles, by unscriptural impositions, and uncharitable contentions with each other. I hope, many of us have seen our mistakes here, and shall be careful for the future, to avoid, what has been attended with so many unhappy consequences.

After having thus declared my agreement with you in the greater part of your discourse, I hope, Sir, you will pardon me, if I add, that I cannot think that you have exhausted your subject. To speak freely, I think you have omitted some causes of the decay of our interest, which are at least, as important as those you have handled. It is the design of my present undertaking, to point out some of the most considerable of them, which have occurred to my thoughts: And I persuade myself, Sir, you will be no more offended with me for offering this supplement to your inquiry, than I imagine, I should myself be with any third person, who should fix upon others, which may have escaped us both.

You will the more readily excuse the freedom, which I take, as I imagine, that the scenes of our lives have been widely different *, and consequently I may have had an opportunity of making some useful observations which have not fallen in your way: Though I question not, but if you, Sir, had been in my circumstances, you would soon have remarked them: and perhaps have communicated them to the public with much greater advantage.

I shall add nothing more by way of introduction, but that I chuse the title, I have prefixed to these papers, rather than that of a farther enquiry into the causes of the decay of the dissent-

* As the author, to whom I write, is not certainly known, I take it for granted, he is, what he seems by his manner of writing, a gentleman of the laity; And though I have been told, since I drew up this letter, he is supposed by many to be a young minister in town, I have no evidence of it, which is convincing to me: And as I apprehend it would be ill manners to appear to know him under such a disguise, I thought it not proper to alter what I had writ with regard to the late report.

ing interest; partly, Sir, as it seemed most respectful to you, but principally, that I may not appear to advance any direct charge against any of my brethren in the process of this discourse. I am sensible that would be highly indecent on many accounts, and particularly, as it is from the example of several amongst them, whom I have most intimately known, that I have learnt many of those particulars of conduct, which I am now going to offer to your consideration, as the happiest expedients for the revival of our common cause.

But before I proceed to particulars, I would observe, what we immediately allow, but too quickly forget, that we are to be concerned for this interest, not merely as the cause of a distinct party, but of truth, honour, and liberty; and I will add, in a great measure, the cause of serious piety too. I would be far from confining all true religion to the members of our own congregations. I am very well aware, that there are a multitude of excellent persons in the establishment, both among the clergy and the laity, who are, in their different stations, burning and shining lights; such as reflect a glory on the human nature, and the christian profession. Yet I apprehend, some of these are the persons who will most readily allow, that, in proportion to the numbers, there is generally more practical religion to be found in our assemblies, than in theirs. This was surely the original, and this, if I mistake not, must be the support of our cause. It was not merely a generous sense of liberty, which may warm the breast of a deist or an atheist, but a religious reverence for the divine authority, which animated our pious forefathers, to so resolute and so expensive an opposition to the attempts, which were made in their day, to invade the rights of conscience, and the throne of God its only Sovereign. And if the cause be not still maintained on the same principles, I think it will hardly be worth our while to be much concerned about maintaining it at all. It must argue a great defect, or partiality of thought, for any with the Jews of old to boast of their being free from human impositions, when they are *The servants of sin* *. And all the world will evidently perceive, that it is the temper of a Pharisee, rather than of a Christian, to contend about *Mint, anise and cummin*, on one side of the question or the other, while there is an apparent indifference about *The weightier matters of the law* †. We that are ministers, may entertain ourselves and our hearers with fine harangues in defence of liberty; But I apprehend, that in the near views of death and eternity, we shall have little satisfaction in reflecting on the con-

* John viii. 33, 34. † Mat. xxiii. 23.

verts, we have made to that, unless at the same time, we have some reason to hope, that they are persons of true substantial piety; such as will be our crown in the day of the Lord, and our companions in the glories of the heavenly world. I cannot say, how trifling and contemptible our labours appear to me, when considered in any other view. And therefore, Sir, it will be my concern throughout this whole discourse, to point out those methods for the support of the dissenting interest, which, I imagine, will be most subservient to the cause of practical religion, and vital holiness in all its branches.

It was the observation of Dr. Burnet, almost forty years ago, in his incomparable discourse on the pastoral care*, "That the dissenters had then in a great measure lost that good character for strictness in religion, which had gained them their credit, and made such numbers fall off to them." Whether that good character has since been recovered, or has not been more and more declining, some others are more capable of judging; but I think it calls for our serious reflection. And if we find upon enquiry, that this our glory is departing, it surely deserves to be mentioned, as one cause, at least, of the decay of our interest: And that all, who sincerely wish well to it, should express their affection, by exerting themselves with the utmost zeal for the revival of practical religion amongst us.

This must be our common care, according to the various stations, in which providence has placed us: And as for ministers, nothing can be more evident, than that they, by virtue of their office, are under peculiar obligations to it. And, in order to pursue it with the greater advantage, I cannot but think that it should be their concern, to study the character and temper of their people; that, so far as they can do it with conscience and honour, they may render themselves agreeable to them, both in their public ministrations, and their private converse.

This, Sir, is so obvious a thought, that one would imagine, it could not be overlooked or disputed; yet it is certain, our interest has received considerable damage for want of a becoming regard to it, especially in those, who have been setting out in the ministry amongst us. It was therefore, sir, with great surprise, that I found you had entirely omitted it in your late enquiry, and had dropt some hints, which, though to be sure, you did not intend it, may very probably lead young preachers into a different and contrary way of thinking, than

* Cap. viii. p. 204.

which hardly any thing can be more prejudicial, either to them, or to the cause, in which they are embarked.

The passage of yours, to which I principally refer, is in the 33d and 34th pages of your enquiry. Where, amongst other things, you observe, that "a great many of those things that please the people, have often a very bad tendency in general." And you add, "the being pleased, which they so much insist upon, seldom arises from any thing, but some oddness that hits their peculiar humour, and is not from any view to edification at all, and therefore too mean to be worthy any one's study. The people do not usually know, wherein oratory, strength of speech, the art of persuasion, &c. consist; and therefore it is vanity in such to pretend to be judges of them. I wish I could deny, that amongst us, they generally fall into the falsest and lowest taste imaginable."

There is, no doubt, Sir, a mixture of truth and good sense in some of these remarks; but for want of being sufficiently guarded, they seem liable to the most fatal abuse. I frankly confess, that when I began to preach, I should have read such a passage with transport, and should very briskly have concluded from it, as many of us are ready enough to conclude without it, that, with regard to our public discourses, we had nothing to do, but to take care that our reasoning were conclusive, our method natural, our language elegant, and our delivery decent; and after all this, if the people did not give us a favourable reception, the fault was to be charged on a perverseness of humour, which they should learn to sacrifice to good sense, and the taste of those, who were more judicious than themselves; and in the mean time, were the proper object of contempt, rather than regard.

I say not, Sir, that what I have now been quoting from your letter, would lay a just foundation for such a wild conclusion; but I apprehend that a rash young man, ignorant of the world, and full of himself, might probably draw such a conclusion from it. And if such a conclusion were to be universally received and acted upon, by the rising generation of ministers, it must, in a few years, be the destruction of our interest, unless the taste of our people should be miraculously changed.

I am not so absurd and perverse as to assert*, that learning and politeness will be the ruin of our cause, nor have I ever met with any, that maintained so extravagant an opinion.

* Enq. p. 36.

But surely, Sir, a cause may be ruined by learned and polite men, if, with their other furniture, they have not religion and prudence too: And I hardly conceive how a minister, who is possessed of both these, can be unconcerned about the acceptance he meets with from the populace, or can ever imagine, that the dissenting interest is generally to be supported in the contempt or neglect of them.

I cannot believe, Sir, that a gentleman of your good sense intended to teach us such a contempt. Had religion, and the souls of men been entirely out of the question, and had you considered us only as persons, whose business it is to speak in public, you well know that such a thought had been directly contrary to the plainest principles of reason, and the rules of those amongst the ancients, as well as the moderns, who were the greatest masters in that profession. You will readily allow, what no thinking man can dispute, that a true, skilful, unpopular orator is a direct contradiction in terms. And I question not, Sir, but that you could, in a few hours, throw together whole pages of quotations, from Aristotle, Quintilian, Longinus, and especially from Tully, not to mention Rapin, Gisbert, Fenelon, and bishop Burnet, which all speak the same language. You know that Tully in particular, declares, not only "That he desired his own eloquence might be approved by the people,"* but that his friends might accommodate their discourse to them; and therefore says to Brutus, "Speak to me and to the people†." And this he carries so far, as to say, "That whatever the people approve, must also be approved by the learned and judicious‡;" and "That men of sense never differed from the populace in their judgment of oratory§." And that, "To speak in a manner not adapted to their capacity and the common sense of mankind, is the greatest fault an orator can commit ‖." These were the sentiments of Tully on a subject peculiarly his own. And few that have ever heard of Longinus, are strangers to that celebrated passage, in which he makes it the test of the true sublime, that it strikes persons of all tastes and educations, the meanest as well as the greatest ¶.

* Eloquentiam autem meam POPULO probari velim. Cic. Orationes, quas nos multitudinis judicio probari volebamus; POPULARIS enim est illa facultas, & effectus eloquentiæ est audientium adprobatio. Tusc. Disp. Lib. II. sub init. † Mihi cane & populo, mi Brute, dixerim. Ibid. ‡ Quod probat multitudo, hoc idem doctis probandum est. Ibid. §—Nunquam fuit populo cum doctis intelligentibusque dissensio. ‖ In dicendo, vitium vel maximum est a vulgari genere orationis atque a consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere. Cic.

¶ Ολως δε καλα νομιζε ὑψη και αληθινα τα διαπαντος αρεσκοντα και πασιν. κ. τ. λ. Dion. cap. VI. ad fin.

But indeed, as I hinted above, the necessity of an orator's accommodating himself to the taste of the people, depends not on the authority of the greatest writers, but on the apparent principles of reason, obvious to common sense: Since, without it, the ends of his undertaking cannot possibly be answered, as the people will neither be instructed nor persuaded by what he says.

Again, if the matter were to be considered merely in a political view, and with regard to the support of our interest, as a separate body of men, I can imagine nothing more imprudent, in present circumstances at least, than a neglect of the populace, by which I mean all plain people of low education and vulgar taste, who are strangers to the refinements of learning and politeness: It is certain, they constitute, at least, nine parts in ten of most of our congregations, and are generally the supports of the meetings, they belong to, by their subscriptions, as well as their attendance. In boroughs, especially, several of them have a vote for members of parliament, and are so numerous, as to have it in their power frequently to turn the balance, by throwing themselves into one scale or the other. Now to speak plainly, Sir, I apprehend it is chiefly this, that makes us considerable to many, who have no regard at all to our religious principles. And to the bulk of mankind there is something in the very idea of a large place, and a crowded auditory, which strikes the thought, and secures a society from that contempt, which might, perhaps, fall upon persons of the most valuable characters amongst them, if they stood alone as the support of the interest, and appeared in their assemblies but as an handful of men.

Now, Sir, as this is the case, as numbers make our interest considerable, and those numbers are principally to be found amongst the common people, would you advise us ministers to neglect the people; or could you wish that any thing you have writ, should be interpreted as an encouragement of such a neglect? When we have lost our interest in them, as we must necessarily do, if we take no care to preserve it, I would fain know what must become either of us or them. As for them, I imagine, that many of them would grow indifferent to all religion, and seldom appear amongst us, or in any other places of divine worship; and others of a warmer and more resolute temper, would find out ways of making us uneasy; and if they could not get rid of us any other way, would draw off to neighbouring congregations, or form new societies, and chuse ministers agreeable

to their own taste, who might, perhaps, think it their prudence to maintain and inflame their resentments against those they had left. Thus our common interest, as dissenters, would moulder and crumble away by our frequent divisions and animosities. And we, who by our contempt of the people, had been the occasion of them, shall have the great pleasure of being entertained with the echo of our own voices, and the delicacy of our discourses, in empty places, or amidst a little circle of friends, till perhaps, like some of our brethren, we are starved into a good opinion of conformity: And in the mean time, shall have the public honour of ruining the cause, we undertook to support. For the generality of people, who never reason accurately, will readily conclude, it was ruined by us, if it sink under our care: Though you, Sir, will be so complaisant as to own, it fell by the obstinacy and perverseness of a people, "whose humour was too mean to be worthy any one's study*."

But perhaps, Sir, you will tell me, that we need not be apprehensive of being driven to such extremities; for though some of the lowest of our auditors are lost, we shall gain over others to fill up their places, in a manner much more agreeable to ourselves, and more honourable to our cause in the eyes of the world. "Many gentlemen have left us, because they were ashamed of our interest, and nothing can recover them, but the study of learning and politeness†." I assure you, Sir, I am an enemy to neither; but heartily wish, they may both be cultivated, so far as is consistent with our being acceptable to the people, and I apprehend, as you will afterwards perceive, they are both in a very high degree consistent with it. But I imagine, it will never be worth our while, to neglect and displease the people, in order to bring over these gentlemen; or to make other proselytes of their rank, character and taste.

I shall, perhaps, surprise you when I say, that I am not much charmed with your proposal, allowing it ever so practicable, and the prospect of success ever so fair. You suppose, the gentlemen whom you describe, have not left us upon principles of conscience, on apprehension of our being schismatics, &c. for then no alteration in the manner of our preaching could bring them back, but merely from a delicacy of taste, and because they were ashamed to continue amongst so unpolished a people. You must then suppose, either that they acted in direct opposition to the dictates of conscience, or else, that they did not consult them at all in the affair, nor regarded any thing,

* Enq. p. 34. † Enq. p. 32.

more than fashion or amusement, in the choice of the religious assemblies, with which they have joined. The former supposition charges them with an outrageous contempt both of truth and of honour; and the latter, with a shameful mixture of pride and weakness, which has little of the gentleman, and less of the Christian. And I freely declare, that I think an honest mechanic, or day-labourer, who attends the meeting from a religious principle, though perhaps it may expose him to some ridicule amongst his neighbours, and be in some measure detrimental to his temporal affairs, which is often the case, is a much more honourable and generous creature, and deserves much greater respect from a Christian minister, than such a gentleman, with all his estate, learning and politeness.

In the sight of God, you will readily allow, that it is so; but perhaps, Sir, you will tell me, that I am now considering the matter in a political view. It is time to recollect it, and I ask your pardon for this digression.

I shall therefore speak more directly to the point when I answer, with all due submission, that I apprehend, this scheme of bringing back these gentlemen to our assemblies, is but wild and chimerical.

If their conformity entirely depended on the delicacy of their taste, we could never expect to recover them, till we could entertain them with more polite and elegant discourses, than those, which they hear in the churches they now frequent. Now, Sir, whatever your complaisance may suggest in our favour, I have not the vanity to believe, that, if we and the established clergy were to try our skill in the contest, we should generally exceed them. At least, I see no such certain evidence of our being superior to them here, as should encourage us to risk the whole of our cause upon this attempt; as I imagine we should do, if we were to neglect the people.

And farther, I think there is the less reason for making so dangerous an experiment, as it is very apparent to me, that those who have left us, have not been influenced merely by such a critical exactness as you suppose. I know not any among them of a more judicious and refined taste, than some, who still continue the ornaments and supports of our assemblies: And it is undeniably evident, that many who have quitted us, have acted on very different principles. Some have been influenced by secular views, in which they have not always been disappointed, and some by complaisance to their friends, and particularly those, who have married into families of a different persuasion, which has been a very fatal blow to our interest. Many more,

I fear, have forsaken us from a secret dislike to strict piety, and, with us, have abandoned all appearances of religion, and perhaps of common decency and morality. And I question not, Sir, but you very well know, that many others, who have broken off from us, and perhaps, make the greatest pretences to strength of thought, and politeness of taste, are sunk as low as deism itself, if not yet lower, and may probably enough reckon it matter of boasting, that having thrown off one fetter, they have had greater advantage for throwing off the other; i. e. the faith of the Christian, after the strictness of the dissenter.

And are these, Sir, the persons who are to be brought back by our learning and address? Some of them may, perhaps now and then, make an occasional visit to our assemblies for their own amusement, as they frequent the theatre; but surely they can never be depended upon as the support of an interest: Nor could you, on the whole, think it prudent for us to hazard the approbation and affection of our people, in a view of making ourselves agreeable to them.

But religion furnishes us with many considerations to the present purpose, of much greater importance than any, which could arise merely from prudential views. Surely there is a dignity and a glory in every rational and immortal soul, which must recommend it to the regard of the wise and the good, though it may be destitute of the ornaments of education, or splendid circumstances in life. Let us think of it in its lowest ebb of fortune, or even of character, as still the offspring and image of the great Father of Spirits, and as the purchase of redeeming blood: Let us consider, what an influence its temper and conduct may have, at least, on the happiness of some little circle of human creatures, with whom Providence has linked it in kindred, in friendship, or in interest; and especially, let us consider, what it may become in the gradual brightenings and improvements of the eternal state: Let us but seriously dwell on such reflections as these, too obvious to be missed, yet too important to be forgot, and we shall find a thousand arguments concurring to inspire us with a sort of paternal tenderness for the souls of the meanest of our people. This will teach us to bear with their prejudices, to accommodate ourselves to their weakness; and to consider it as a mixture of impiety and cruelty, to neglect numbers of them, out of complaisance to the taste of a few, who are, perhaps, some of them but occasional visitants, and whom we judge by their habits, rather than by any personal acquaintance, to be a part of the polite world.

Did I affect to throw together all, that might be said on this

subject, I might both illustrate and confirm what I have already written, by shewing at large, that Christianity is a religion originally calculated for the plainer part of mankind, by that God, who has *Chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world to confound the things, which are mighty*;* and consequently, that a neglect and contempt of the common people is far from being the spirit of the gospel. I might add many remarks, to this purpose, on the preaching and conduct of St. Paul, and fill whole pages with quotations from him and the rest of the apostles, and many more from some of the most ancient and celebrated fathers of the church. But I do not think it necessary for the support of my argument, and I am persuaded that you, Sir, in particular, have no need of being taught these things from me.

Permit me only to add, what you must frequently have observed, that our Lord Jesus Christ is a most amiable and wonderful example of a plain, familiar, and popular preacher. When we come to peruse those divine discourses, which extorted a confession from his very enemies, that he spake as never man spake, we find neither a long train of abstract reasonings, nor a succession of laboured periods, adorned with an artificial exactness; but the most solid and important sense, delivered in an easy and natural way, illustrated by similies taken from the most common objects in life, and enforced with lively figures, and the strongest energy of expression; which is well consistent with all the former. So that, upon the whole, it was most happily calculated, at once to instruct the most ignorant, and to awaken the most negligent hearer. I cannot but wish, that some judicious writer would attempt to set this part of our Lord's character in a clearer and a more particular light; and would shew us, how the whole of his conduct, as well as the manner of his address, was calculated to promote his usefulness under the character of a preacher of righteousness. I hope such an essay might be very serviceable to those of us, who have the honour to succeed him in that part of his work; and I persuade myself that it would furnish us with a variety of beautiful remarks on many passages in the evangelical historians, which are not to be found in the most celebrated commentators.

You will excuse me, Sir, for having insisted so largely on the necessity of endeavouring to render ourselves agreeable to our people; because I am fully persuaded, that it is of great importance to the support and revival of the dissenting interest.

* 1 Cor. i. 27.

I hope you already apprehend, that I intend nothing in this advice, which is below the pursuit of the most elevated genius, or the most generous temper; nothing inconsistent with the politeness of the gentleman and the scholar, or the dignity of the Christian and the minister. You cannot imagine, that I would recommend a popularity raised by quirks and jingles, or founded on affected tones, or ridiculous grimaces; and, much less on an attempt to inflame the passions of mankind about trifling controversies, and the peculiar unscriptural paraphrases of a party. Such a popularity as this, is almost the only thing that is more despicable, than the insolent pride of despising the people.

If any of my younger brethren were to enquire, how another popularity, of a far more honourable kind, is to be pursued and secured, I answer, that their own converse and observation on the world must furnish them with the most valuable instructions on this head. And though some of their particular remarks may differ, according to the various places and circumstances, in which they are made; yet I apprehend there are many things of considerable importance, in which they will all agree. As for instance:

They will quickly see, that the generality of the dissenters, who appear to be persons of serious piety, have been deeply impressed with the peculiarities of the gospel scheme. They have felt the divine energy of those important doctrines, to awaken, and revive, and enlarge the soul; and therefore, they will have a peculiar relish for discourses upon them. So that, if a man should generally confine himself to subjects of natural religion, and moral virtue, and seldom fix on the doctrines of Christ, and the Spirit; and then, perhaps, treat them with such caution, that he might seem rather to be making concessions to an adversary, than giving vent to the fulness of his heart on its darling subject; he would soon find, that all the penetration and eloquence of an angel could not make him universally agreeable to our assemblies.

Many of our people have passed through a variety of exercises in their minds, relating to the great concern of eternal salvation. And they apprehend, that the scripture teaches us to ascribe this combat to the agency of Satan, and the corruptions of our own heart on the one hand, and the operations of the holy Spirit of God on the other. It is therefore, very agreeable to them, to hear these experimental subjects handled with seriousness and tenderness. It raises their veneration for such a minister, as for one, who has himself tasted of the grace of God, and encourages their confidence in him, and their expectations

of improving by his labours. On the other hand, it grieves them, when these subjects are much neglected, and gives them the most formidable suspicions, if one word be dropt, which seems to pour contempt upon them, as if they were all fancy and enthusiasm; with which, it must be granted, they are sometimes mixed.

The greater part of most dissenting congregations consisting, as we before observed, of plain people, who have not enjoyed the advantages of a learned education, nor had leisure for improvements by after-study, it is apparently necessary, that a man should speak plainly to them, if he desire they should understand and approve what he says. And as for those, that are truly religious, they attend on public worship, not, that they may be amused with a form or sound, nor entertained with some new and curious speculation; but, that their hearts may be enlarged as in the presence of God, that they may be powerfully affected with those great things of religion, which they already know and believe, that so their conduct may be suitably influenced by them. And to this purpose they desire that their ministers may speak as if they were in earnest, in a lively and pathetic, as well as a clear and intelligible manner.

Such is the taste of the generality of the dissenters; a taste, which I apprehend they will still retain, whatever attempts may be made to alter it. And I must take the liberty to say, that I conceive this turn of thought in the people to be the great support of our interest, and not the little scruples, which you hint at in the 34th page of your letter, nor even those rational and generous principles of liberty, which you so clearly propose, and so strenuously assert. And I cannot but believe, that if the established clergy, and the dissenting ministers in general, were mutually to exchange their strain of preaching, and their manner of living, but for one year, it would be the ruin of our cause, even though there should be no alteration in the constitution and discipline of the church of England. However you might fare at London, or in some very singular cases elsewhere, I can hardly imagine, that there would be dissenters enough left in some considerable counties, to fill one of our largest meeting places.

We have then advanced thus far; that he who would be generally agreeable to dissenters, must be an evangelical, an experimental, a plain and an affectionate preacher. Now I must do our common people the justice to own, that when these points are secured, they are not very delicate in their demands,

with regard to the forms of a discourse. They will not, in such a case, be very much disgusted, though there be no regular chain of reasoning, no remarkable propriety of thought or of expression, no elegance of language, and but little decency of address. The want of all these is forgiven, to what they apprehend of much greater importance. Yet, Sir, I would not from hence infer, that these things are to be neglected; on the contrary, I apprehend it is absolutely necessary, that they should be diligently attended to, in order to obtain that universal popularity, which I think so desirable for the sake of more extensive usefulness. A man of a good taste will certainly take some care about them. It is what he owes to himself, and to the politer part of his audience, whom he will never be willing to lose in the crowd: And he need not fear, that a prudent regard to them will spoil his acceptance with the people. Few of them like a discourse the worse for being thoroughly good; and the accomplished orator will find, perhaps to his surprise, that they will not only know and feel the important truths of religion in the most agreeable dress he can give them, but that they will even applaud the order and regularity of his composures, the beauty of his language, and the gracefulness of his delivery, at the same time that they have the candour not to complain of the indigested rovings, the unnatural transports, and the aukward distortions of the pious, well-meaning, but injudicious preacher. For human nature is so formed, that some manners of thinking and speaking are universally agreeable and delightful. It is the perfection of eloquence to be master of these, and should, I think, be the care of every one, that speaks in public, to pursue them as far as genius and opportunity will allow *.

The man who forms himself upon such views as these, if he be not remarkably deficient in natural capacities, will probably be popular amongst the dissenters, as a preacher: But a thinking man will easily perceive, this is not the only character, under which a minister is considered. His people will naturally and reasonably expect a conduct answerable to his public discourses; and without it, he cannot be thoroughly agreeable to them. They will take it for granted, that a man so well acquainted with divine truths, and one, that seems to be so deeply affected with them, should be regular and exemplary in the whole of his behaviour, and free from the taint of vice, or of folly, in any remarkable degree. They will expect, that he should be far from being a slave to secular interest, or to the little trifles of food,

* This is that regard to the Sensus Communis, which Tully thinks so necessary.

dress, or domestic accommodation; and that he should avoid every thing haughty and overbearing, or peevish and fretful in his daily converse. They will conclude, that a desire of doing good to souls, will make him easy of access to those, who apply to him for advice, with regard to their spiritual concernments; and that it will likewise dispose him at proper times to visit all the people of his charge, the poor as well as the rich; and that not only under the character of a friend, but of a minister, in a direct view to their spiritual edification. And if a man desire the affections of his people, he must not disappoint such expectations as these.

The tenderness, with which parents interest themselves in the concerns of their children, and the earnest desire, that all religious parents must necessarily have, that theirs may be a seed to serve the Lord, will engage them very kindly to accept our care, in attempting to bring them under early impressions of serious piety. Catechising has therefore been generally found a very popular, as well as a very useful practice. And here I think it is much to be wished, that our labour may extend to the youth, as well as to little children; that in a familiar way they may be methodically acquainted with the principles of natural religion, and then with the evidences of the truth of christianity, and with the nature of it, as it is exhibited in the New Testament; both with regard to the privileges and the duties of Christians. As this might be a means of filling our churches with a considerable number of rational, catholic, and pious communicants, from whom considerable usefulness might in time be expected, so it would greatly oblige their religious parents, and lay a foundation for a growing friendship between us, and our catechumens, in the advance of life.

I once thought to have insisted more largely on these hints, but am happily prevented by the publication of Mr. Some's sermon, on the methods to be taken by ministers for the revival of religion. He has fully spoken my sentiments, with regard to many of those articles, on which I have only glanced. I persuade myself, Sir, you will read it with a great deal of pleasure; for, so far as I can judge, this sermon is almost as agreeable an example of that preaching, as his life is of that conduct, which he recommends. I am confident that a man of your good sense must necessarily approve the scheme, which I have briefly laid down, and which is there largely considered and recommended. Were you to chuse a pastor for yourself, I doubt not, but you would rejoice in such a one; and you would pro-

bably have the hearty concurrence of the weakest and most illiterate of your pious neighbours. My younger brethren, for whom alone I am now presuming to write, can have no reason to complain, that I have assigned them either a mean, or a severe task. I heartily desire to be their companion in all the most laborious, and self-denying parts of it; and I persuade myself, that we shall find it, on the whole, as delightful as honourable, and as advantageous to ourselves, as it will be serviceable to the public interest.

There seems to be but one material objection against all this; and it is an objection, in which, I doubt not, but your own thoughts have already prevented me. It may perhaps be pleaded, that we have a sort of people amongst us, whose approbation and esteem cannot be obtained by such honourable methods, as I proposed. For they, whom we call the rigidly orthodox, are so devoted to a peculiar set of human phrases, which have been introduced into the explication of some important doctrines, that they will hardly entertain a favourable thought of any, who scruple the use of them, or who do not seem to value them as highly as they, though they may, on all other accounts be ever so considerable.

You, Sir, hint at * a very expeditious remedy for uneasiness arising from this quarter; that persons of generous and bigoted sentiments, should meet in different places. In London it is certainly practicable, and may perhaps be most expedient; but to attempt any such separation in the country, would be the utter ruin of many of our societies, which now make some considerable appearance. But besides my regard to the ministers and societies, to which they are related, I must confess, I have too much tenderness for the persons themselves, to be willing entirely to give them up. I have been intimately acquainted with those who have been accused, and perhaps not unjustly, of this unhappy attachment to human phrases, and nicety in controversial points; and I must do many of them the justice to own, that I have found very excellent qualities mingled with this excess of zeal, which must, methinks, appear pardonable in them, when we consider how artificially it has been infused; and how innocently they have received and retained it, from a real principle of conscience to God. But, indulging them in this one article, several of them will appear to be persons of so much humility and piety, of so much integrity and generosity, of so much activity and zeal for the

* Page 44.

common interest, that, separate from all views to private advantage or reputation, one would heartily wish to do all he honestly can, to remove those prejudices, which give them so much uneasiness, and impair the lustre of so many virtues and graces. And if at the same time we can secure their esteem and friendship, it may have such an influence, both on our own comfort and usefulness in life, that it must be great ignorance or pride to despise it.

You will readily grant, Sir, that the thing is in itself desirable: The great question is, how it may be effected? And here I will venture to say freely, that I apprehend bigotry of all kinds, to be a fortress, which may be attacked by sap, more successfully than by storm. It is evident that we have most of us something of the humour of children, that grasp a thing so much the more eagerly, when an attempt is made to wrest it out of their hands by violence; and yet perhaps will drop it themselves in a few minutes, if you can but divert their attention to something else.

From such a view of things, I apprehend, we are to judge of the most proper methods of dealing with those, whose case is now under consideration. You Sir, may tell them again, and again, with your natural coolness and moderation, * "That it would be an instance of their modesty to resign their pleasures to the general notions and judgment——that instead of assuming the characters of judges and censors, they should put on the humble temper of learners——and receive the truth without being jealous of heresy in our younger preachers.—— And at the same time, that you are thus giving your advice, you may give your reasons as clearly and handsomely, as you have given them for nonconformity in this enquiry; yet after all, you will probably find, that the *civium ardor prava jubentium* will out-noise the voice of the charmer, charming ever so wisely. And should I exert myself with greater warmth and eagerness, should I grow a bigot in defence of catholicism, and load those of different sentiments with reproaches, because they have profited no better by so many solid arguments; I should indeed pay a very great compliment to them, in supposing them capable of knowing, and admitting truth, under so disagreeable a disguise; but it would be at the expence of my own character and ease, and I should run the risk of being severely scorched by that flame, which I pretended to extinguish by pouring on oil.

I cannot but think it much more adviseable, according to

* Enquiry, page 31, 37.

the apostle's maxim of becoming *all things to all men*, to study to accommodate ourselves in this respect, as well as in others, to the infirmities of our hearers, as far as with a safe conscience we may. If we can put a tolerably good sense on any of their favourite phrases, it would surely be a most unreasonable stiffness and perverseness of temper, to avoid it merely because they admire it. Or if we cannot go so far, we may at least lay aside any darling phrases of our own, which we know will be offensive to them. For if the bible be a complete rule, our human forms are no more necessary than theirs. Christians, as such, profess a reverence for the scripture, and many of these Christians have a distinguishing regard to it, as they have felt its divine energy on their souls. Now, Sir, with submission to the better judgment of my brethren, I think, we, who are ministers, should take them by the handle, and should labour to discover to them, more and more, the beauty and fulness of the word of God, not only with regard to this or that particular doctrine, but to the whole system of truth and duty contained in it. It is a subject on which we might speak, and they would hear with pleasure; and it would not only divert their attention, and their zeal from other things, which might give uneasiness, but would have a direct tendency to enlarge their views, and sweeten their tempers, beyond all our encomiums on liberty and catholicism, or our satires on bigotry and imposition.

I likewise apprehend, that a regard to what was said under the former heads, will farther conduce to this happy end. When these exact people hear us preaching in a truly spiritual and experimental strain, and at the same time, in such a rational and graceful manner, as may set our discourses above contempt, and make them agreeable to the younger and politer part of our auditory, as well as to others; they will quickly see, that it is not for their own interest, or that of their children, to drive us away with a rigorous severity. And therefore, instead of studying to find us heretics, they will rather put the most favourable sense on ambiguous expressions, and labour to believe us as orthodox as they can: Or, if they suspect us to be in the dark as to some particulars, yet they will charitably hope, that age and experience will perfect what is wanting; and that God will reveal it to us in his own time. With these views they will cheerfully commit themselves to our ministerial care, if Providence seems to open a way for our settlement amongst them. And when they find, that they are handsomely treated by us, that no direct attack is made upon their darling notions; but that the great concerns of practical religion, as dear to them as to any people upon earth, are plainly and faithfully pursued by

us, both in public and private, to the refreshment of their own souls, and to the evident advantage of many others, they will contract a tender, growing affection for us: And thus their bigotry will gradually wear away, till perhaps they come at last joyfully to embrace those more generous notions, from which they would at first have started back with horror.

Thus we may, after the example of our great Master, teach our followers, as they are able to bear it: And by this moderation, may be instrumental in healing the breaches, which we profess to lament, in rescuing many an excellent soul from a painful and dishonourable bondage; and in spreading a generous, candid, christian spirit, which will be the glory and happiness of our interest in general, as well as of the particular societies under our care. And in the mean time, another generation will be rising, whom we may hope to form, in a manner agreeable to our own sentiments, who may transmit to remote ages, those united principles of piety and catholicism, which they have happily learnt from us.

I cannot but think, that such rational and noble prospects may encourage us to submit to some restraints, which we should not otherwise have chose. But if, after all, we inflexibly insist on "* as unbounded a liberty of speaking our sentiments in public, as of forming them in private," or in the language of Solomon, of uttering all our mind, I think we shall dearly purchase the pleasure of hearing ourselves talk on a subject, on which we can do little more, than echo back a part of what has been so copiously and judiciously written, and so frequently repeated by others. The wiser part of mankind will look upon us as forward heirs, who spend our estate of reputation and importance in life, before we come to it; and upon the whole, we shall not only exceedingly injure ourselves in private life, which is comparatively but a trifle, but shall impair our future usefulness, and even wound the darling cause of liberty, to which we are so ready to sacrifice all. For I seriously declare, that if I could be so wicked as to form a design against it, and so base as to prosecute it by clandestine and hypocritical methods, I would only set myself to declaim in its favour, with imprudent zeal, and unbounded fury.

You have now, Sir, all that I think it proper to say, at present, concerning the methods, by which I apprehend those of us, who are employed in the ministry, may most effectually contribute to the revival of the dissenting interest. I can assure you, they are not the reveries of my own closet, but

* Page 27.

observations which I have drawn from life, as occasions have occurred in conversing with a variety of persons of different stations, relishes, and characters. I have the better opinion of many of them, as I know that they are thoroughly agreeable to the sentiments and conduct of some of the most considerable persons of all denominations amongst us, both in town and country; whose friendship is the honour and pleasure of my life. I am particularly confirmed in this way of thinking, by observing the success, which such measures have had in the congregations of my fathers and brethren in these parts. For I know, that in many of them, the number of dissenters is greatly increased within these twenty years; and the interest continues so to flourish, that I am confident some of our honest people, who converse only in their own neighbourhood, will be surprised to hear of an enquiry into the causes of its decay.

If what I have writ appear reasonable to you, Sir, I cannot but wish that you, and other gentlemen of the laity, who are heartily concerned for our interest, would endeavour to cultivate such sentiments as these in the minds of young ministers of your acquaintance. We are naturally very desirous of being known to you, and singled out as the object of your regard. Whereas we early begin to look with a comparative contempt upon the meaner sort of people, as an ignoble herd—*Fruges consumere nati*—Whilst engaged in our preparatory studies, we are indeed so generous, as to give up one another to the vulgar; but we have, each of us, the penetration to discover, that there is something uncommon in our dear selves, by which nature seems to have intended us to be, as we absurdly enough express it, orators for the polite. These arrogant and pernicious sentiments we sometimes carry along with us, from the academy to the pulpit; where perhaps, we make our first appearance infinitely solicitous about every trifling circumstance of a discourse, yet negligent of that which should be the soul of it. And if the people are not as much charmed with it as ourselves, we have then an evident demonstration of their incorrigible stupidity; and so resentment concurs with pride and ambition, to set us at the remotest distance from those, who ought to be the objects of our tenderest regards.

If an elder minister have so much compassion and generosity, as to deal freely with us upon these heads, and give such advice as circumstances require, it is great odds but we find some excuse for neglecting what he says——— "He is ignorant and unpolite; or perhaps, intoxicated with his own popularity, and

means his counsels to us as encomiums upon himself."——— Or if neither of these will do, some other artifice must be found out, to fix the blame any where rather than at home. And if in the midst of a thousand mortifications, we can but find out one gentleman of fortune, sense, and learning, that admires us, we are happy. A single diamond is worth more than a whole load of pebbles; and we perhaps adapt, with vast satisfaction, the celebrated words of Arbuscula in Horace*,

Men' moveat Cimex Pantilius, &c.

Without considering that what was highly proper in the mouth of a player, and a poet, would be extremely absurd in a heathen, and much more in a Christian orator.

Now, Sir, what I intend by all this, is, to shew that you gentlemen may have it in your power to do a great deal to correct these mistaken notions. If we plainly see that you regard us, not merely according to the manner, in which our performances are accommodated to your own private taste, but according to our desire and capacity of being useful to the public interest, we shall perhaps, be taught to place our point of honour right; and when that is once done, a moderate degree of genius, application, and prudence, may be sufficient, by the blessing of God, to secure the rest.

I would here, Sir, have ended my letter, but the hints you give in the conclusion of yours concerning academical education, lead me to add a few words on that head. I would be far from the insolence of pretending to teach tutors; but I apprehend that, if my former principles be allowed, it will follow, by the easiest consequence in the world, that it is a very important part of their business, to form their pupils to a regard for the people, and to a manner of preaching, and of converse, which may be agreeable to them.

There is hardly any thing which should be more discouraged in a young student, than such a mistaken haughty way of thinking, as I so freely described a little above, especially when it discovers itself in a petulant inclination to employ their talent at satire, in ridiculing the infirmities of plain serious Christians, or the labours of those ministers, who are willing to condescend to the meanest capacities, that they may be wise to win souls.

A young man of sense will easily enter into such plain reasonings as I have offered in the beginning of this letter, and be convinced by them, that if he ever appear under the character of a dissenting minister, he must not neglect the people. But

* Hor. Sat. Lib. I. x. v. 78, &c.

it is greatly to be desired, that our students may be engaged to regard them, not merely from political, but religious views.

It is therefore, no doubt, the care of every pious tutor amongst us, and may God make it a more constant and successful care, to possess his pupils, who are designed for the ministry, with a deep and early sense of the importance of the gospel scheme, for the recovery of man from the ruins of the apostacy, and his restoration to God, and happiness by a mediator.——To shew, as it may easily be shewn, that this has been the great end of the divine counsels, with regard to which, the harmony of nature in the lower world has been supported, and the various economies of Providence disposed:——To point out the Son of God descending from heaven in favour of this design, pursuing it by humble condescensions to the lowest of the people, and unwearied labours amongst them: and at last, establishing it by agonies and death:——To shew them the apostles taking up their Master's cause, prosecuting it with unwearied vigour and resolution, and sacrificing to it their ease, their reputation, their liberty, and their lives:——To trace out those generous emotions of soul, which still live and breathe in their immortal writings:——And then, when their minds are warmed with such a survey, to apply to the students themselves, as persons designed by Providence, to engage in the same work, to support and carry on the same interests, who therefore must be actuated by the same views, and imbibe the same spirit.

Something of this kind is, I doubt not, attended to; and I must take the liberty to say, that I think these the most important lectures a tutor can read. You cannot but see, Sir, that by the blessing of God, such addresses must have an apparent tendency to fill the mind with sublime and elevated views, and to make a man feel and own too, though it may appear something unpolite, that the salvation of one soul is of infinitely greater importance, than charming a thousand splendid assemblies, with the most elegant discourses that were ever delivered. A young minister under these impressions, will come out to his public work naturally disposed to care for the state of his people; and such sincere zeal and tenderness will form him to a popular address, abundantly sooner, and more happily, than the most judicious rules which it is possible to dictate.

As examples are the best illustration of precepts, it must certainly be a great advantage to pupils to hear such preaching, and see such pastoral care, as is recommended to them in the lecture-room. A prudent man, who is concerned in the education of young ministers, will be particularly careful to avoid those faults in preaching, which they are in the greatest danger

of falling into ; and particularly too abstracted a train of reasoning, and too great a care about the little ornaments of speech, when addressing to a common auditory. And if, where other circumstances may allow it, he sometimes engage the attendance of senior pupils in his pastoral visits, and introduce them to the acquaintance and freedom of some serious Christians in the society, it may be much for their improvement. A more intimate knowledge of their hidden worth, and perhaps, of those noble traces of natural genius, which they might discover amongst some of a very low education, would something increase their esteem for the populace in general. And from their observations on books and sermons, and their accounts of the various exercises of their minds, where our politer hearers are generally more reserved, a man may best learn how they are to be addressed, and form himself to that experimental strain, on which so much of his acceptance and usefulness amongst us will depend.

If you apprehend, Sir, that such a course will make them preachers for the vulgar, and for them only ; I think it sufficient to answer, that I entirely agree with you in what you say of the great advantages of an intimate acquaintance with the learned languages, and the classical writers both of the Romans and Greeks. I heartily wish our students may always be well furnished with it, before they leave the schools, and think it highly proper it should be carried on through the whole of their academical course. And I cannot imagine, that a man of tolerable sense, who is every day conversing with some of the finest writers of antiquity, and who is, as most of our students are, a little exercised in the mathematical sciences, to teach him attention of thought, and strength, and perspicuity of reasoning, will be in great danger of saying any thing remarkably impertinent, or contemptibly low.

As for being masters of our own language, it is a point which I think should be thoroughly laboured from the very beginning of their education. They should, to be sure, make themselves familiarly acquainted with those writers, which are allowed to be the standards of it, and should frequently be translating and composing. And if this be not only practised at school, but continued through four or five years of academical education, they will have formed a habit of expressing themselves gracefully, or at least tolerably well : So that in their ordinary composures, when they have digested their materials, and ranged their thoughts, they will often find proper, expressive, and elegant words, flowing in faster than they can write them.

And as composition is far from being the only business of an orator; so I heartily wish, that not only tutors, but schoolmasters, whose character and conduct, by the way, is of vast importance to our interest, would make a very serious business of teaching lads, who are designed for the ministry, to read well, and to pronounce properly and handsomely. Thus an early remedy would be provided on the one hand, against those unnatural tones and gestures, which, as you well observe, "are a grand cause of our reproach and contempt*;" and on the other, against that cold insensible air, which sometimes, amongst strangers at least, affects even the moral character of the preacher.

I think some care should be taken, both at the school and the academy, to engage students to a genteel and complaisant behaviour, not only as what is apparently conducive to their mutual ease and pleasure, and the convenience of the family where they are; but as what may render them more agreeable and useful in life, to persons of superior rank, and even to the populace themselves. For a well-bred man knows how to condescend, in the most obliging way; and the common people, such is either their good sense or their humour, are peculiarly pleased with the visits and converse of those, who they know may be welcome to greater company.

And now, Sir, I have done with my subject, and must conclude, with assuring you, that it is not the design of one line which I have writ, merely to prove, that you are mistaken in any thing that you have asserted; and therefore I have purposely avoided many citations from your letter, which might easily have been connected with what I have said. You will infer, from what you have read, that I differ from you in some other particulars, which are not mentioned, but they apparently depend on what I have debated at large; and I chose to omit them, not only because my letter is already longer than I intended, but from a general observation, which I have had frequent occasion to make; that if a man desires to do good by what he says, he must oppose and contradict as little as possible. If I am mistaken in what I have advanced, I shall be heartily thankful for better information; and, if it come from you, it will be peculiarly agreeable, as I shall have nothing to fear from your reproaches, and much to hope from your arguments.

I am, Sir, your most humble Servant,

P. DODDRIDGE.

* Enq. p. 43.

☞ This was printed in 1729, being the first piece the Doctor published.

THE

PRINCIPLES

OF THE

CHRISTIAN RELIGION,

EXPRESSED

IN PLAIN AND EASY VERSE,

AND

DIVIDED INTO SHORT LESSONS, FOR THE USE

OF

CHILDREN AND YOUTH.

JOHN XXI. 15.

JESUS SAID UNTO PETER,——LOVEST THOU ME?——FEED MY LAMBS.

PREFACE.

THE little verses now before the reader were written at the desire of my most worthy and honoured friend, the reverend Mr. Clark of St. Albans, and are published at his request, as what, he hopes, may by the divine blessing do some good in the rising generation. I was the more willing to undertake the task because I had often observed, with how much ease and pleasure children learn verses by heart, how fond they are of repeating them, and by consequence, how much longer they retain them, than they do what they learn in prose.

In this view Dr. Watts's songs for children have been a singular blessing to our land: And it is but justice to that great yet condescending writer to own, that if this light essay be of any service in it, a great part of the thanks will be due to him, who had digested the chief heads of christianity in so natural a method, and expressed them in such easy yet comprehensive language, in the first part of his second set of catechisms, that he had left me very little more to do under many of the articles, than to translate them into rhyme; for I can hardly presume to call it poetry.

That simplicity and ease, which may suit children, I have been always careful to maintain; and have endeavoured here and there, where I conveniently could, to strike the fancy with a little imagery, and especially to affect the heart of my dear little scholars, by giving a serious and practical turn to the several truths, which are delivered. It has also been my great care to insert nothing into these verses, but what I apprehend, the generality of serious christians believe, so that I hope they will suit different denominations; as indeed I could wish, the rising age might be instructed, in what is like to unite, rather than divide us. Their own comfort, as well as the credit of our common christianity, is much concerned in it.

Some will, no doubt, think this a trifling performance: But I have been told, that the familiar system of religion, which Grotius drew up in easy verse for the use of the Dutch sailors, was esteemed by him and others, one of his most useful works: And if I had not the patronage of such illustrious names, as have gone before me in such humble labours, I should think myself unworthy the honour of calling Jesus my Master, if I thought it beneath me to be desirous of doing good to the least child of the poorest of the people.

No nation under heaven appears to me so well furnished with helps for the christian education of children, as our own. I heartily pray, that parents may be diligent in using them, and that they may inforce their good instructions with a suitable example; and then I doubt not, but, through the divine blessing, the happy fruits will be visible: Nor will a gracious God, who taketh pleasure in the prosperity of his people, forget the least pious and benevolent attempt for promoting so good a work.

P. DODDRIDGE.

Northampton, October 31, 1743.

THE

PRINCIPLES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION,

EXPRESSED

IN PLAIN AND EASY VERSE.

LESSON I. *Of our own Nature, and its chief Glory and Happiness.*

NOW for a while, aside I'll lay
My childless trifles, and my play;
And call my thoughts which rove abroad,
To view myself, and view my God.
I'll look within, that I may see
What I now am, what I must be.

I am the creature of the Lord:
He made me by his powerful word.
This body, in each curious part,
Was wrought by his unfailing art.
From him my nobler spirit came,
My soul, a spark of heavenly flame:
That soul, by which my body lives,
Which thinks, and hopes, and joys, and grieves,
And must in heaven or hell remain,
When flesh is turn'd to dust again.

What business then should I attend,
Or what esteem my noblest end?
Sure it consists in this alone,
That God my Maker may be known:
So known, that I may love him still,
And form my actions by his will:
That He may bless me whilst I live,
And, when I die, my soul receive,
To dwell for ever in his sight
In perfect knowledge and delight.

LESSON II. *The Knowledge of God and our Duty, to be learned from the Bible.*

HOW shall a young immortal learn
This great, this infinite concern,
What my Almighty Maker is,
And what the way this God to please?

Shall some bright angel spread his wing
The welcome message down to bring?
Or must we dig beneath the ground,
Deep as where silver mines are found?

I bless his name for what I hear;
The word of life and truth is near,
His gospel sounds through all our land;
Bibles are lodg'd in every hand.
That sacred book inspir'd by God
In our own tongue is spread abroad:
That book may little children read,
And learn the knowledge, which they need.
I'll place it still before my eyes,
For there my hope and treasure lies.

LESSON III. *Of the Nature and Attributes of the blessed God.*

GOD is a Spirit, none can see;
He ever was, is, and shall be:
Present where-e'er his creatures dwell,
Through earth and sea, through heaven and hell.

His eye with infinite survey
Views all their realms in full display:
What has been, is, or shall be done,
Or here, or there, to him is known;
Nor can one thought arise unseen,
In mind of angels, or of men.
Yet far above all anxious cares
Serene, he rules his grand affairs;
While wisdom infinite attends
By surest means, the noblest ends.

Majestic from his lofty throne
He speaks, and all his will is done:
Nor can united worlds withstand
The force of his Almighty hand.
Yet ever righteous are his ways:
Faithful and true whate'er he says:

The holy, holy, holy Lord
By all the angelic host ador'd.

The bounty of his gracious hands
Wide as the world he made, extends;
And though himself completely bless'd,
With pity looks on the distress'd;
And by his Son our Saviour dear,
To sinners brings salvation near.

All that is glorious, good, and great,
Does in the Lord Jehovah meet.
Then to his name be glory given
By all on earth, and all in heaven.

LESSON IV. *Of God's Relation to us.*

THE Lord my Maker I adore,
Created by his love and power.
He fashion'd in their various forms
Angels, and men, and beasts, and worms;
And all their well-rang'd orders stand
Supported by his powerful hand.

Father of light! Amidst the skies
He bids the golden sun arise:
He scatters the refreshing rain
To cheer the grass, and swell the grain;
And every day presents the food,
That satisfies my mouth with good.

At home, abroad, by night, by day,
He is my guardian, and my stay;
And sure 'tis fit, my soul should know,
He is my Lord and Sovereign too.

Oh may that voice that speaks his law,
My heart to sweet obedience draw;
That when I see the Judge descend,
I in that Judge may see my friend!

LESSON V. *The Sum of our Duty to God and Man.*

THE knowledge which my heart desires,
Is but to learn what God requires.
Speak then the word, my Father dear,
For all my soul's awake to hear:
And oh, what joy my breast must move,
To hear, that all thy law is love!

This is the sum of every part ;
To love the Lord with all my heart,
With all my soul, with all my might,
And in his service to delight :
That I should love my neighbours too,
And, what I wish from them, should do.

How short and sweet, how good and plain,
Easy to learn, and to retain !
Oh may thy grace my soul renew !
And 'twill be sweet to practise too.

LESSON VI. *How our love to God is to be expressed.*

SINCE love is as my duty known,
How must this love to God be shown ?
Sure I the highest thoughts should raise
Of him, who is above all praise :
His favour most of all desire,
And still to please him should aspire :
To him be constant worship paid
And all his sacred laws obey'd !

If to afflict me be his will,
I'll bear it with submission still :
A tender father sure he proves,
And but corrects, because he loves.

His word with diligence I'll hear :
To him present my daily prayer :
And while new mercies I implore,
For blessings past, I will adore ;
And every action shall express
A heart full-charg'd with thankfulness.

LESSON VII. *How Love to our Neighbour should be expressed.*

I BY my love to men must prove
How cordially my God I love.
To those, whom He hath cloath'd with power,
I would be subject every hour :
To parents, and to rulers too,
Pay honour and obedience due :
In every word I'll truth maintain,
In every act shall justice reign.

In all my feeble hands can do,
The good of all I would pursue :

And where my powers of action fail,
Kind wishes in my heart prevail
For every man, whoe'er he be,
Stranger, or friend, or enemy.

Since by God's pardoning grace I live,
Well may I all my foes forgive;
And, as Christ's word and pattern shew'd,
Conquer their evil by my good.

LESSON VIII. *Sins to be avoided, in Thought, Word, and Action.*

GUARD me, O God, from every sin;
Let heart, and tongue, and life be clean!
Though with ten thousand snares beset,
I never would my Lord forget.

Fain would I learn to lay aside
Malice, and stubbornness, and pride,
Envy, and every evil thought;
Nor be my breast with anger hot.
Each other passion wild and rude
I long to feel by grace subdu'd.

When thus my heart is well prepar'd,
My tongue I easily shall guard
From every oath, and curse profane,
Nor take God's reverend name in vain:
No sacred thing shall I deride,
Nor scoff, nor rail, nor brawl, nor chide:
My soul will every lie detest,
And every base indecent jest.

This humble watchful soul of mine
Shall with abhorrence then decline
The drunkard's cup, the glutton's feast,
That sink the man down to the beast;
The injurious blow, the wanton eye,
The loss of hours, that quickly fly;
And that which leads to every crime,
The vain mispence of sacred time;
What brings dishonour on God's law,
Or what on man would mischief draw.

LESSON IX. *The Corruption of Nature, and Sins of Life acknowledged.*

LORD, when my wretched soul surveys
The various follies of my ways,

The guilt of every word and thought,
Every neglect, and every fault;
Well may I tremble to appear,
Laden with horror, shame, and fear.

Adam our common head, alas!
Brought sin and death on all his race.
From him my ruin'd nature came,
Heir to his sorrow, and his shame:
My body weak, and dark my mind,
To God averse, to sin inclin'd:
And oh! too soon the deadly fruit
Ripen'd from that unhappy root.

Duty requir'd my early care
Each fond indulgence to forbear;
Requir'd me, all the good I knew
With constant vigour to pursue.
But my vain heart and stubborn will,
In its own ways would wander still;
Like a wild ass's colt, would go
On to this wilderness of woe.
Vainly I seek to plead a word,
Silent in guilt before the Lord.

LESSON X. *Of the Misery which Sin hath brought upon us.*

WHO can abide God's wrath, or stand
Before the terrors of his hand?
Jehovah's curse what heart shall dare
To meet? or what be strong to bear?

He every good can take away,
And every evil on us lay:
Can by one single word bring down
The tallest head that wears a crown,
The statesman wise, the warrior brave,
To moulder in the silent grave;
And send the wretched soul to hell,
To the fierce flames, where devils dwell,
For endless years to languish there
In pangs of infinite despair.

I then, poor feeble child, how soon
Must I dissolve before his frown?
And yet his frowns, and vengeance too,
I by my sins have made my due.

Is there no hope? And must I die?
Is there no friend, no helper nigh?
Is it beyond repeal decreed,
That every soul, that sins, must bleed?
Oh let my longing, trembling ear
Some sound of grace and pardon hear!
My soul would the first news embrace,
And turn its tremblings into praise.

LESSON XI. *Of the Gospel, or the Good News of Salvation by Christ.*

WHAT joyful tidings do I hear?
'Tis gospel-grace salutes my ear:
And by thy gentle sound I find,
This righteous God is mild and kind.

Jesus, his only Son, displays
The wonders of his Father's grace,
The great salvation long foretold
By prophets to the Jews of old
Is now in plainer words made known,
As to the apostles clearly shewn.
By this blest message brought from heaven
Pardon, and peace, and grace is given.

Oh may I know that Saviour dear,
Whom God has represented there!
And that eternal life receive,
Which he was sent by God to give!

LESSON XII. *Who Christ is, and how he lived on Earth.*

JESUS! how bright his glories shine!
The great Emmanuel is divine.
One with the Father he appears,
And all his Father's honours shares.
Yet he, to bring salvation down,
Has put our mortal nature on.

He in an humble virgin's womb
A feeble infant did become:
A stable was his lodging made,
And the rude manger was his bed.

Growing, in life he still was seen
Humble, laborious, poor, and mean.
The Son of God from year to year
Did, as a carpenter, appear.

At length, when he to preach was sent,
Through towns and villages he went,
And travell'd with unwearied zeal
God's will and nature to reveal.

To prove the heavenly truths, he taught,
Unnumber'd miracles were wrought.
The blind beheld him; and the ear,
Which had been deaf, his voice could hear;
Sickness obey'd his healing hand;
And devils fled at his command;
The lame for joy around him leap;
The dead he wakens from their sleep.

Through all his life his doctrine shines,
Drawn in the plainest, fairest lines.
And death at length did he sustain,
Our pardon, and our peace to gain;
That sinners who condemned stood,
Might gain salvation by his blood.
All honour then ascribed be
To him, who liv'd and died for me!

LESSON XIII. *Of Christ's Death, Resurrection, and Ascension.*

JESUS the righteous! lo, he dies,
For sin a spotless sacrifice!
Justice has on his sacred head
The weight of our transgressions laid.
If God's own Son would sinners save,
He must be humbled to the grave;
That so a pardoning God might shew
What vengeance to our crimes was due.

Nail'd to the cross with torturing smart,
What anguish rack'd his tender heart!
Alas! how bitterly he cried,
Tasted the vinegar, and died!
Cold in the tomb that mournful day,
My Saviour's mangled body lay.
Well may I blush, and weep, to see
What Jesus bore for love of me.

But, Oh my soul! thy grief refrain,
Jesus the Saviour lives again.
On the third day the conqueror rose,
And greatly triumph'd o'er his foes;
Prov'd his recover'd life, and then
Ascended to his heaven again.

Exalted on a shining throne,
At God's right hand he sets him down,
To plead the merits of his blood,
And rule for all his people's good:

Wide o'er all worlds his power extends,
And well can he protect his friends.
May I in that blest band appear,
Secure from danger, and from fear!

LESSON XIV. *Of the Nature of Faith, and Repentance.*

THEY must repent, and must believe,
Who Christ's salvation would receive.
O may thy Spirit faith impart,
And work repentance in my heart!

Bless'd Jesus, who can be so base,
As to suspect thy power, or grace!
Or who can e'er so stupid be
To slight thy blessings, Lord, and thee!
With humble reverend hope and love
I to thy gracious feet would move,
And to thy care my all resign,
Resolv'd to be for ever thine;
Secure, if thou vouchsafe to keep
My feeble soul among thy sheep.

The sins and follies I have done
Humbled in dust I would bemoan;
And while past guilt I thus deplore,
I would repeat that guilt no more:
But by a life of zeal and love
True faith and penitence approve:
So shall thy grace my sins forgive:
Jesus shall smile, and I shall live.

LESSON XV. *Of the Assistances and Influences of the Blessed Spirit.*

'TIS not in my weak power alone,
To melt this stubborn heart of stone,
My soul to change, my life to mend,
Or seek to Christ, that generous friend.

'Tis God's own Spirit from above
Fixes our faith, inflames our love.
And makes a life divine begin
In wretched souls, long dead in sin.

That most important gift of heaven
To those that ask and seek is given:
Then be it my immediate care,
With importunity of prayer,
To seek it in a Saviour's name,
Who will not turn my hopes to shame.

God from on high his grace shall pour;
My soul shall flourish more and more,
Press on with speed from grace to grace,
Till glory end and crown the race.

Since then the Father and the Son,
And Holy Spirit, three in one,
Glorious beyond all speech and thought,
Have jointly my salvation wrought;
I'll join them in my songs of praise,
Now, and through heaven's eternal days.

LESSON XVI. *Of the Means of Grace, which God has appointed.*

WHAT kind provision God has made,
That we may safe to heaven be led!
For this the prophets preach'd and wrote,
For this the bless'd apostles taught;
Taught, as that Spirit did inspire,
Who fell from heaven in tongues of fire,
And gave them languages unknown,
That distant lands his grace might own.
His hand has kept the sacred page
Secure from men and devils' rage.

For this, He churches did ordain,
His truths and worship to maintain:
For this, He pastors did provide,
In those assemblies to preside:
And from the round of common days
Mark'd out our sabbaths to his praise.
Delightful day, when Christians meet!
To hear, and pray, and sing, how sweet!

For this He gives, in solemn ways,
Appointed tokens of his grace:
In sacramental pledges there
His soldiers to their General swear.
Baptiz'd into one common Lord,
They joyful meet around his board;
Honour the orders of his house,
And speak their love, and seal their vows.

LESSON XVII. *Of the Design and Obligation of Baptism.*

IN baptism wash'd we all must be,
In honour of the sacred Three,
To shew how we are wash'd from sin
In Jesu's blood, and born again
By grace divine; and thus are made
Members of Christ our common head.

The Father form'd the glorious scheme,
And we adopted are by him.

The Son, great Prophet, Priest, and King,
Did news of this redemption bring:
He, by his death, our life procur'd,
And now bestows it as our Lord.

The Holy Spirit witness bore
To this blest gospel heretofore;
And teaches those, he's purified,
Faithful and patient to abide.

Into these names was I baptiz'd;
And be the honour justly priz'd:
Nor let the sacred bond be broke,
Nor be my covenant-God forsook.
Thus wash'd I'd keep my garments clean,
And never more return to sin.
One body now all Christians are:
Oh may they in one spirit share!
And cherish that endearing love,
In which the saints are bless'd above!

LESSON XVIII. *On the Nature and Design of the Lord's-Supper.*

THE memory of Christ's death is sweet,
When saints around his table meet,
And break the bread, and pour the wine,
Obedient to his word divine.

While they the bread and cup receive,
If on their Saviour they believe,
They feast, as on his flesh and blood;
Cordial divine, and heavenly food!
Thus their baptismal bond renew,
And love to every Christian shew.

Well may their souls rejoice, and thrive:
Oh may the blessed hour arrive,

When ripe in knowledge, and in grace,
I at that board shall find a place!
And now, what there his people do,
I would at humble distance view;
Would look to Christ with grateful heart,
And in their pleasures take my part;
Resolv'd, while such a sight I see,
To live to him, who died for me.

LESSON XIX. *Of the Nature and Office of Angels.*

MY soul, the heavenly world survey,
The regions of eternal day!
There Jesus reigns, and round his seat
Millions of glorious angels meet.

Those morning stars, how bright they shine!
How sweetly all their voices join,
To praise their Maker! watchful still
To mark the signals of his will;
While with their out-stretch'd wings they stand,
To fly at his divine command.

All happy as they are, and great,
Yet scorn they not on men to wait:
And little children in their arms
They gently bear, secure from harms.

Oh may I, with such humble zeal,
My heavenly Father's word fulfil!
That I, when time has run its race,
May with bless'd angels find a place,
Borne on their friendly wings on high
To joys like theirs, which never die.

LESSON XX. *Of the Fall, and State of the Devils.*

WELL may I tremble, when I read
That sin did heaven itself invade;
Curs'd pride, with subtilty unknown,
Perverted angels near God's throne:
They sinn'd against his holy name,
And hateful devils they became.
But wrath divine pursu'd them soon,
And flaming vengeance hurl'd them down.

Now in the pangs of fierce despair,
Prisoners at large they range in air;

Walk through the earth, unheard, unseen,
And lay their snares for thoughtless men;
Tempt us to sin against our God,
And draw us to hell's downward road.

But God can all their power restrain:
My Saviour holds them in his chain,
Till at his bar they all appear,
And meet their final sentence there.

LESSON XXI. *On Death.*

LORD, I confess thy sentence just,
That sinful man should turn to dust;
That I e'er long should yield my breath,
The captive of all-conquering death.

Soon will the awful hour appear,
When I must quit my dwelling here;
These active limbs, to worms a prey,
In the cold grave must waste away:
Nor shall I share in all that's done,
In this wide world, beneath the sun.

To distant climes, and seats unknown,
My naked spirit must be gone:
To God its Maker must return,
And ever joy, or ever mourn.

No room for penitence and prayer,
No farther preparation there
Can e'er be made; the thought is vain:
My state unalter'd must remain.

Awake, my soul, without delay;
That if God summons thee this day,
Thou cheerful at his call mayest rise,
And spring to life beyond the skies.

LESSON XXII. *On the Resurrection of the Dead.*

WHAT awful ruins death hath made!
How low the wise and great are laid!
Alike the saints, and sinners, die;
Mouldering alike in dust they lie.
But there's a day, shall change the scene,
How awful to the sons of men!
When the arch-angel's trump shall sound,
And shake the air, and cleave the ground;

Jesus enthron'd in light appears,
Circled with angels, bright as stars.
" Rise ye that sleep," the Lord shall say :
And all the earth, and all the sea,
Yield up the nations of the dead,
For ages in their bowels hid.
Bone knows its kindred bone again,
All cloth'd anew with flesh and skin :
Each spirit knows its proper mate ;
They rise an army vast and great.

But Oh what different marks they bear,
Of transport some, and some of fear ;
When marshall'd in the judge's sight,
These to the left, those to the right,
That they may that last sentence hear,
Which shall their endless state declare!
My soul, in deep attention stay,
And learn the event of such a day !

LESSON XXIII. *Of Judgment and Eternity, Heaven and Hell.*

WHEN Christ to judge the world descends,
Thus shall he say to all his friends :
" Come blessed souls, that kingdom share,
" My Father did for you prepare,
" 'Ere earth was founded : Come, and reign,
" Where endless life and joy remain."

Then to the wicked,—" Cursed crew,
" Depart, heaven is no place for you :
" To those eternal burnings go,
" Whose pangs the rebel angels know."

He speaks, and strait, his shining bands
With fiery thunders in their hands,
Drive them away : Hell's lake receives
The wretches on its flaming waves :
Justice divine the gates shall bar,
And for a seal affix despair.

While Jesus, rising from his throne,
Leads his triumphant army on,
To enter their divine abode,
In the fair city of their God.
There everlasting pleasures grow ;
Full rivers of salvation flow ;
And all their happiness appears
Increasing with eternal years.

LESSON XXIV. *The Conclusion, in a practical Reflection on the Whole.*

AND now, my heart, with reverend awe
From hence thine own instruction draw.
I at this judgment must appear;
I must this solemn sentence hear,
(As I'm with saints or sinners plac'd,)
" Depart accurs'd," or " Come ye blest."
For me the fruits of glory grow;
Or hell awaits my fall below.

Eternal God! what shall I do?
My nature trembles at the view:
My deathless soul herself surveys,
With joy, and terror, and amaze.
Oh be thy shield around me spread,
To guard the spirit, thou hast made!
Save me from snares of earth, and hell,
And from my self preserve me well:
Lest all the heavenly truths I know,
Should aggravate my guilt and woe!

Thy power in weakness is display'd:
If babes by thee be conquerors made,
It Satan's malice shall confound,
And heaven with praises shall resound.

SOME ACCOUNT

OF THE

LIFE AND CHARACTER

OF THE

REV. THOMAS STEFFE,

PREFIXED

TO A VOLUME OF SERMONS PUBLISHED AFTER HIS DECEASE.

Τελειωθεις εν ολιγω επληρωσε χρονους μακρους. Αρεστη γαρ ην Κυριω η ψυχη αυτου· δια τουτο εσπευσεν——. *Sap.* iv. 13, 14.

TO THE REV. MR. JOHN BARKER.

REV. AND DEAR SIR,

If the dedication of a book be any token of gratitude and respect, or the patronage of it any instance of generosity and favour, you have the justest title to this volume in one view, and I the greatest encouragement to address it to you in the other. I know, Sir, that to enlarge on these topics, would, to a gentleman of your character, be making a very disagreeable kind of return: But you will allow me to let the world know, that I am inscribing these posthumous sermons of Mr. Steffe to one of the best of his friends, as well as of mine, and to him, to whom, had he been engaged to publish them himself, he would surely have chosen to present the first fruits of his labours. And permit me, Sir, thus publicly to thank you for all the pleasure you gave me in an opportunity of cultivating the mind of so worthy a youth, and for the foundation which you laid for that excellent example he gave, as well as for the wise and pious instructions he delivered, in circumstances and relations of life, which, unsupported by your bounty and care, it is probable he had never known. You, Sir, discovered this promising plant in its tenderest state, and presented it to the garden of God; and though we must not arraign the wise hand that removed it, every one will own it reasonable, that these early, yet pleasant and wholesome fruits which dropped from it should be presented to you. And I persuade myself, Sir, that, though they are not ripened to all that height of beauty and of flavour which a maturer growth might have given them, you will receive them with candor; and indeed, I am not without some cheerful hope, that they may afford you both delight and nourishment.

When I intimate, that Mr. Barker may not only be entertained, but edified by the productions of our young friend, I might seem to speak with too little caution, and to raise an expectation which a prudent friendship will always avoid, when it would introduce persons or books into the world with advantage. But it is the happiness of great wisdom and goodness (I had almost said, it is a part of its reward) to be entertained, and edified, by the writings of those who are much its inferiors, and most readily to exercise an indulgence which itself least needs. In this view you, Sir, would have read these sermons with pleasure, had they been the work of a stranger: But you cannot, and I think you ought not to forget, that you were, through the divine goodness, the instrument of giving them to the world. And you will be quickened to renew your bounties of this kind, and a more important kind is not easily to be named, when you so sensibly perceive, that, short as the date of our friend's life was, your labour, with regard to its present effects, hath not been in vain in the Lord.

They who know the relation in which I stood to Mr. Steffe will readily believe, that I have some peculiar share in your joys on such an occasion: But if there were not such a distinguishing tie as in the present case, I must be insensible to a long train of personal obligations, if I did not affectionately take my part in all your satisfactions and joys. I bless God that they arise from such a variety of springs; that they swell into so full a stream; and above all, that they are so faithfully, and so constantly returned back to him, from whom they originally proceed.

I do, Sir, in my conscience apprehend, that when addressing the ministers of the gospel, there is seldom reason to congratulate them on their distinguished circumstances in temporal life. When the more abundant gifts of the divine bounty seem to be received, as if, like those given to the Hebrew servants, they were a part of the ceremonial of their dismission from their Lord, they are indeed the calamity, rather than the happiness of the proprietors, be they ever so copious, or ever so splendid. That is really a poisonous draught, be it ever so luscious, which intoxicates the mind, and lulls it into a forgetfulness of the interest of Christ, and of immortal souls. But where affluent circumstances are considered as an engagement to serve God with greater cheerfulness and zeal in the abundance of all things; where the possessor considers himself as the steward of God in temporals as well as spirituals, and as the almoner who is to distribute the divine bounties to his indigent brethren, whether ministers or private Christians; and where all this is done in the easy, cheerful, en-

dearing manner of a heart that feels how much more blessed it is to give than to receive: This, Sir, is a most grateful spectacle, not only to the eye of an intimate and obliged friend, but of a stranger who understands any thing of the beauty of character; and is, I doubt not, venerable as well as amiable, in the eyes of those celestial spirits from whom it seems to be copied. Human acknowledgments on such an occasion are little things to the voice of an approving conscience, and an approving God. I hope therefore, Sir, that the many, whose burdens (to my certain knowledge) you have eased, and whose hearts you have gladdened, will express their gratitude in a nobler way, by endeavouring to serve the public with greater alacrity, while they are freed from the incumbrances which must otherwise have depressed and broken their spirits.

I heartily bless God, that while good Mr. Barker is possessed of these pleasures, which so few of his brethren in the dissenting ministry can have, he also shares with the most acceptable, and I hope I may add, the most successful of them, in those which immediately arise from the exercise of his sacred office. It is with unutterable delight, that I see so valuable a friend recovered from the remainders of that disorder, which seemed some years ago to threaten the speedy period of his public services. To be able to vent the fulness of your heart under a sense of the grace of the gospel, and to represent the important engagements to vital and universal holiness which so naturally arise from it, would give a nobler pleasure than money could purchase, though it were only in your own house, to a little circle which might fill one of its rooms. There indeed you might equally approve the sincerity of your heart in the presence of him that searches it: But you must give your friends, that is, as I should imagine, all the friends of virtue and religion who know you, leave to rejoice, that Providence having invigorated you for it, has called you out to constant service in one of the most numerous and important congregations which is to be found among us, even in London, that great support of our interest through the whole kingdom: There, my dear and honoured friend, may you long continue to delight, and to bless crouded, attentive, and serious auditories, growing daily more attentive, and more serious, while your doctrine drops upon them like the dew, and distils like the rain! May you have the pleasure to see, not merely that they are capable of relishing the dignity of sentiment, the propriety of language, and the gracefulness of delivery; but, which is infinitely more desirable, that they continually advance in faith, in holiness, and in love, to the glory of that God whom you serve with your spirit in the gospel of his Son, and to whom all that you are and have is so faithfully, and so zealously devoted!

For these great purposes may your important life be prolonged, and your health, with that of your valuable lady, be supported to many future years! May the secret blessing of the God of heaven sweetly mingle itself with all the concerns of both! May it fill your house with prosperity, and your hearts with that joy which a stranger intermeddleth not with, and which, though it were in a royal palace, can grow upon no stock but benevolence, friendship, and devotion! And may the various blessings of a long, and a happy life, be at length crowned with those of an infinitely happier immortality!

Whenever that solemn moment comes which is to remove you from time to eternity, I know that it must leave multitudes lamenting; so deeply lamenting, that it is painful to speak, or to think of it. But I rejoice, Sir, to reflect, how many friends above will then be waiting to receive you to everlasting habitations. I doubt not but the spirit of our dear author will be numbered and distinguished among them; and that your generous concern to promote the spread, and the acceptance of these his remains, will, so far as it may be known to him, increase his acknowledgment. In the mean time, Sir, I persuade myself, that among all your other good offices, you will join your earnest prayers for their success, with those of,

Reverend and dear Sir,

Your most obliged and affectionate brother,

And obedient humble servant,

Northampton, June 8, 1742. *P. DODDRIDGE.*

SOME ACCOUNT

OF

THE LIFE AND CHARACTER

OF THE

REV. THOMAS STEFFE.

THE pious author of these discourses was so early removed from our world, and made so short an appearance on any public stage of action, that there is no room for any to expect a variety of remarkable occurrences in his life. By far the greater part of those few years, which Providence allotted him, was spent in assiduous preparation for services, which alas! he was never permitted to accomplish. Nevertheless, as a person curious in the anatomy of vegetables would look with some satisfaction on a blossom yet folded up in the bud, while he traced the first rudiments of its future form, as well as that peculiar apparatus which was subservient to its preservation and growth in that infant state, though it never grew up to display its vivid colours, and diffuse its fragrancy; so I flatter myself, that something may occur in this narration, not unworthy the notice of survivors.

They who, like our author, in the years I shall principally describe, are growing up to the work of the ministry, may, I hope, learn in many instances, what it is to be desired they may be, while I am telling them what Mr. Steffe was; and if they go and do likewise, it may be for the benefit of multitudes who are yet unborn, that this little sketch has been drawn. And the generality of readers may, perhaps, be more disposed to edify by his writings, as they grow better acquainted with his character: For it is certain, that nothing adds greater authority to a minister's instructions from the pulpit or the press, than an apprehension that they are transcribed and uttered from his heart.

Our author was the son of a worthy clergyman of the established church, the Reverend Mr. John Steffe, once of Emanuel-College in Cambridge, and afterwards Rector of Wrentham in the county of Suffolk. This gentleman, remarkable for his piety, learning, and moderation, married Mrs. Martha Popland of Raydon, in Suffolk, by whom he had several children, who

survive their honoured father, I hope, to be long-lived blessings to their other pious parent, and to supply, as far as possible, the great loss she sustained, so soon after she became a widow, by the death of two most hopeful and delightful sons *.

Mr. Thomas Steffe was born April 6, 1716; and though he had a very weak constitution, so that his life was hardly expected from his infancy, (for he soon appeared subject to an asthmatic disorder, besides other infirmities;) yet he discovered such an early solidity of genius, seriousness of temper, and fondness for books, that his father soon determined to indulge his desire of being bred a scholar: And as he candidly referred it to himself, as his judgment advanced towards maturity, to judge for himself in religious matters, he generously acquiesced in the young gentleman's choice of pursuing his studies among the protestant dissenters.

I am informed that he had most of his education in the languages under his father, who was well acquainted with them, and especially a very accurate judge in the elegancies of the Latin, of which I had some remarkable proofs in my correspondence with him. It is not very material to mention the particular places in which our author improved and perfected his studies. It may suffice to say, that when he was judged nearly qualified for the academy, as he resolutely declined, from principles of conscience, those offers which a person of the first rank in the established church had kindly made of providing for him at the University, his case was accidentally mentioned to that excellent person to whom I have inscribed these fruits of his labours; who, ready to embrace all opportunities to serve the public interest, made a particular enquiry into his character and disposition, and in concurrence with another, and to me unknown benefactor, determined to assist this hopeful youth with a supply of twenty pounds a year, that his education might not be burdensome to his good father then far advanced in years, and charged with the care of a numerous family.

In the year 1733, Mr. Steffe was sent, at the request of his friends, to one of those little seminaries among the protestant dissenters, where attempts are used to supply, in the best manner we can, the want of more public advantages for education, and to guide the minds of young persons intended for the ministry into such preparatory studies as may in some measure qualify them for appearing properly in it. He was then in his

* The Rev. Mr. Steffe, of Wrentham, died August 7, 1737; one of his sons, December 23, 1738; and the other dear youth, the author of these sermons, June 4, 1740.

18th year; but as he well knew the importance of making himself master of the learned languages in younger life, he desired to be excused from entering upon the philosophical part of his course, till he had spent almost another year in applying himself to them; and particularly to Greek, which, I am sorry to say it, is not generally cultivated in private schools with that care and exactness which it deserves and requires. He prosecuted these studies with such resolution, and such success, that, on the whole, the most celebrated classics both of Greece and Rome were a delight rather than a drudgery to him; and thus a foundation was laid for that solidity, strength, and correctness both of sentiments and stile, which must seldom be expected, where those great originals are unknown or disregarded.

I cannot forbear mentioning two other precautions, which Mr. Steffe took in his entrance on this stage of life, which appeared to me remarkably prudent. The one was, that he endeavoured to gain an early acquaintance with the character of books, especially those of the little library to which he had access; and was ready to take the advice of more experienced friends in the choice of those he should read, that he might not throw away his time in those which were of little importance; and also that he might not anticipate the perusal of others, which might more properly be reviewed in some future time. And I must needs say, that the neglect of this caution, obvious as it is, may make a well-furnished library a snare rather than a benefit. The other particular I referred to, was his care immediately to learn short-hand, and that not merely in its first rudiments, with which too many content themselves, but to some degree of exactness, elegance, and readiness. In consequence of this, he became capable with great ease, and in a very little time, to make many valuable extracts from the books he read and consulted; not to mention the many hours which it afterwards saved him, in the composition of discourses for the pulpit.

I think it was also during the first year, that he laid a foundation for reading the Old Testament in its original language; a care so very necessary, that I wonder it should ever be omitted; or that any young gentleman in an age like ours should be judged competently qualified for the pulpit, who lies as much at the mercy of translators in studying the larger half of his bible, as any of the people he is to teach. It is, however, with pleasure that I observe, how seldom this is done among the protestant dissenters, so far as I have an opportunity to learn; and I am sorry to hear from many learned clergymen, with

whom I have the honour to be acquainted, how often it is totally neglected by those, whose advantages for literature are so very much distinguished.

I shall not here give a particular account of the method in which Mr. Steffe's education, and that of his companions, was carried on, while at the academy, though I have often been requested and importuned to write largely on this head. I content myself with observing in general, that he did not despise any part of polite literature, which seemed subservient to his honourable appearance in the ministry in so learned an age and country as our own; but, nevertheless, applied himself with the greatest assiduity to those things which appeared of the most eminent and immediate service; in which view he is worthy of being imitated by all that regard either their acceptance or usefulness in the churches.

In the former view, besides the general preparations of logic, rhetoric, and metaphysics, he made himself acquainted with the principles of geometry and algebra, and, I think also, of conic sections, and celestial mechanics. That steady command of thought, and attention of mind, for which our author was remarkable, and the traces of which were discoverable in his countenance, made these studies pleasant rather than fatiguing to him; and he soon saw the tendency they have to teach us to distinguish our ideas with accuracy, and to dispose our arguments in a clear, concise, and convincing manner. These introduced him into the easy knowledge of mechanics, statics, hydrostatics, optics, pneumatics and astronomy, so far as it was judged material to open to him the chief phænomena of each with their respective solutions. He added to these some other articles, which have their place in what is usually called the Encyclopædia of Learning, especially something of natural history, and a pretty large view of the anatomy of the human body, the knowledge of which he cultivated with peculiar care and pleasure, as well observing the tendency it has to promote our veneration and love to the great architect of this amazing frame, whose wonders of providential influence also are so apparent in its support, nourishment, and motion.

For all these studies Mr. Steffe had a relish, and a genius; but the far greater part of his time, especially in the last three years of his course, was employed in others more directly preparatory for the great work he had in view. In this number I must reckon a large and particular investigation of Jewish Antiquities, in which he met with the illustration of numberless texts in the Old Testament, which cannot be well understood

without them: As likewise his survey of Ecclesiastical History, of which Lampe's admirable Epitome was the ground-work; which I mention, because I wonder it is no more generally known, though so very far superior to any thing else of the like kind, for the vast variety of judicious hints which it contains, in a little room, and most beautiful order. His view of the doctrines of the ancient philosophers in their various sects, had been taken with greater advantage, had Buddæus's Compendium Historiæ Philosophicæ been then known; but something of this kind he surveyed, and it could not but serve to endear christianity to him, that glorious light which dispels their shades of learned and artificial darkness.

These articles took up some hours every week, in the latter years of his course; but by far the greater part of his time throughout this whole period, so far as it fell under the direction of his tutor, was employed in a series of about 250 lectures of divinity in the largest extent of the word, that is, considered as including what is most material in pneumatology and ethics *. In this compendium were contained, in as few words as perspicuity would admit, the most material things which had occurred to the author's observation, relating to the nature and properties of the human mind, the proof of the existence and attributes of God, the nature of moral virtue, the various branches of it, the means subservient to it, and the sanctions by which its precepts, considered as God's natural law, are enforced; under which head the natural evidence of the immortality of the soul was largely examined. To this was added some survey of what is, and generally has been, the state of virtue in the world; from whence the transition was easy to the need of a revelation, the encouragement to hope it, and the nature of the evidence which might probably attend it. From hence the work naturally proceeded to the evidence produced in proof of that revelation which the scripture contains. The genuineness, credibility, and inspiration of these sacred books were then cleared up at large, and vindicated from all the most considerable objections, which modern infidels (those sinners against their own souls) have urged. When this foundation was laid, the chief doctrines of scripture were drawn out into a large detail; those relating to the Father, Son, and Spirit, to the original and fallen state of man, to the scheme of our redemp-

* The manuscript, which was the plan of these, consists of axioms, definitions, propositions, lemmata, demonstrations, corollaries, and scholia, just in the method which mathematicians use, though without the introduction of those arbitrary marks, which some have affected on like occasions.

tion by Christ, and the offices of the Spirit as the great agent in the Redeemer's kingdom. The nature of the covenant of grace was particularly stated, and the several precepts and institutions of the gospel, with the views which it gives us of the concluding scenes of our world, and of the eternal state beyond it. What seemed most evident on these heads was thrown into the propositions, some of which were problematical; and the chief controversies relating to each were thrown into the scholia; and all illustrated by a very large collection of references *, containing perhaps, one lecture with another, the substance of forty or fifty octavo pages, in which the sentiments and reasonings of the most considerable authors on all these heads might be seen in their own words; which it was the business of the students to read and contract, in the intervals between these lectures, of which only three were given in a week, and sometimes but two. The mind of this excellent youth knew how to judge of the importance of this part of his course: It struck him strongly; and as he made it his early care to transcribe the manuscript with great exactness, so he studied both the lectures and references diligently, and made himself master of them to such a degree, as to be able to handle such points of theology as occurred to him in his course of preaching, not in a crude indigested manner, but with an accuracy and solidity, rather worthy of a divine, who had numbered more years of study, than he of life.

As he was always encouraged and exhorted to enquire freely, and to judge for himself, so it was particularly recommended to him to take his system of divinity, not from the sentiments of any human teacher, but from the word of God. This therefore he early studied, and set a great value on those critical lectures on the New Testament, which he weekly attended, and carefully transcribed; besides those daily expositions in the family, in which, within the five years he spent in this course, he had an opportunity of hearing almost the whole Old Testament explained from the original, as well as the New twice or thrice illustrated, partly, though not entirely, in a practical view. If I remember right, he soon took the wise precaution (which I would recommend to every young student) to get an interleaved bible, and a Wetstein's Greek Testament interleaved with good paper in quarto; in which he wrote memorandums of the most considerable remarks for the illustration of scripture, which occurred to him in reading, conversation, or reflection. And had

* See Fam. Expos. Vol. 1. Pref. p. iv.

Providence continued him a few years longer in that prudent and diligent course, I question not but these manuscripts would have been a rich repository of valuable materials; for he had a true genius for criticism, in those which I take to be its noblest and masterly parts; which are those which depend, not merely on dint of industry, but on sagacity, elevation, and vivacity of thought; to which I must add, a truly devotional temper of mind, without which it will be impossible for any man to relish, and therefore to be sure, impossible to point out the beauties of the sacred writers.

His great desire to appear in a becoming manner under the character of a preacher, as well as a concern to cultivate religion in his own soul, engaged him intimately to converse with the best practical writers our fertile country has produced; in which number, I know, he peculiarly esteemed Mr. Howe, and Mr. Baxter, not to mention any of those lights of the sanctuary, which through the great goodness of God to us, are not yet extinguished, and who will, I doubt not, preach with abundant success to generations long to come. I believe that day seldom passed, in which some of these writers were not in his hands, in whom he sought at once the improvement of the Christian, and of the minister; and I think it must argue a great defect of understanding, as well as of real piety, if any theological students are negligent of this.

The same good principle, which led Mr. Steffe to be very conversant with such books, engaged him also to attend with great diligence to those instructions which were largely given him, on the important head of preaching and pastoral care. And while I speak of this, I must not forget how gladly he embraced the opportunity, which the custom of the place gave him, to submit, first, the schemes of his sermons, and then several of the sermons themselves, to the examination and correction of that friend who had the charge of his education: A privilege which those that least need it, generally value most; and which, if I do not much mistake, may be more instructive to young preachers, than any general rules for composition, which can be offered them by those, who are themselves most eminent in their profession. An early care to get a due management of his voice, and to form himself to a just, animated, yet unaffected delivery, set an agreeable varnish on what was in itself much more important; and greatly contributed to that extensive, and well-merited popularity, which attended him, so far as I can learn, from the first sermon he preached to the last. Sad calamity to

the church, and the world, that the interval between the one and the other was so short!

Hitherto I have considered Mr. Steffe's character and conduct as a scholar, during the series of his academical studies: I must now describe him in another yet more important view, which will carry us a little farther into his life, as well as deeper into his heart, I mean, as a Christian. And here, I shall not mention a variety of particulars, which I comprehend in saying, "He was, as I am verily persuaded, a Christian indeed;" but shall only mention some of those exemplary effects, which the sincere and lively piety of his heart produced, in a beautiful correspondence to those circumstances of life in which he was placed. And this I attempt, not in a view of raising a monument to the memory of a dear deceased friend, I doubt not but the applause of his great Master has raised him high above all such; but rather of hinting instruction to others, by exhibiting him more fully in a point of light, which has seldom been enlarged upon by those who have written lives, whether from a very mistaken apprehension that it was of little moment, or, as I would rather hope, for want of materials. Providence has ordered it so, that it was almost all the history that can be given of Mr. Steffe, and has assigned this office to one, who had an opportunity of collecting materials from what he himself saw; though I must add, that in what I have farther to write, my personal observations have been much illustrated by a collection of his letters to his parents and other near relations, the originals of which are now before me.

No advantages of genius, and, could they have come into question, no views of preferment, could have engaged so worthy a clergyman as Mr. Steffe's father was, to enter into measures for his being brought up to the ministerial office, if he had not known him to be a blameless and a virtuous youth: But from some things which he has wrote of himself in papers now before me, the particulars of which it is not necessary to transcribe, I have reason to believe, that real religion was of a later date in his heart, than his first views of undertaking the sacred work in which he afterwards engaged. An awful text of scripture solemnly and seasonably dropped from the venerable lips of his pious father, a little before he quitted the family, seems to have given a most happy turn to his mind, and under divine influence to have been the immediate occasion of producing that sincere piety there, which afterwards grew so fast, and shone so bright.

I find, that when he first came to the academy, his religious

resolutions were seriously renewed and confirmed; and he was very early animated with a solicitous concern, to do good to the souls of others, as well as to secure the salvation of his own. This particularly appears in a letter which he then wrote to an elder brother, who was just then coming out of an apprenticeship, and entering on life; and it is pleasant to observe, what a mixture of prudence, fidelity, and tenderness runs through the whole of it. He was very apprehensive, from what he had observed in his brother's temper and conduct, as well as from the remarks he had even then made upon the world in general, that he would be in great danger of being ensnared; and though he was afterwards remarkably recovered by Divine Grace, some circumstances which followed too plainly shewed, how just those apprehensions were. Our author therefore plainly admonishes him of his danger, and seriously urges him to make religion his choice and his business, as the great point of wisdom both for time and eternity: Yet he mingles this with so many acknowledgments of his own imperfections, of his having neglected many early advantages of improvement, and having perhaps in some instances of sin and folly ensnared so intimate a companion, that it plainly shews, he did not forget the respect due to an elder brother, and that it was not pride, but cordial love, that dictated what he wrote. "I am," says he, "unworthy to be called a child of God; yet through his goodness I see and taste so much sweetness in religion, that I cannot but recommend it to others." And accordingly he does recommend it, by a variety of most weighty arguments; and concludes them all with such a serious representation of the uncertainty of youth and health, and the possibility of an early surprise by death, as is peculiarly moving, when one recollects that the person by whom this letter was written, and he to whom it was addressed, were both called into eternity in their blooming years.

It is with some difficulty that I forbear inserting the whole; but I fear swelling these memoirs to a disproportionate size: Nevertheless I find myself, as it were, constrained to transcribe great part of another letter, which he wrote much about the same time to a younger brother Mr. John Steffe, to engage him to resume those views of the ministry, which he seemed at that time inclinable to lay aside. It discovers much of the heart of the writer; and I hope, they who are training up for that office, whose benefit I have here particularly in view, will read it with some peculiar attention, as coming from one of their companions; if they will allow the name of a companion to one, who was as yet only in the pursuit of his grammatical studies. That was

Mr. Steffe's circumstance, when he wrote the following epistle; and yet I freely own, that while I read it, (such is the gravity, propriety, and spirituality, with which he writes,) I seem to be rather perusing the charge of a brother long experienced in the ministry, than the letter of a child who was but looking towards it.

Speaking of the ministry, he says, "I must acknowledge, that it was with great reluctance I was brought to comply with the proposals which were made to me in this view, from a sense of the greatness and importance of the work, and of my own insufficiency for it; which argument was strongly backed with frequent fears, lest I should not have had a work of grace wrought in my own heart, without which I saw an impossibility of becoming a faithful and successful minister; and I doubt not, but you have had some apprehensions like these. But I would not have you, nor myself, overwhelmed with these discouraging thoughts; since it is so delightful, so honourable a work, and has so great a tendency to the promotion of religion in the world.

"It is true, this is an office which is attended with great difficulties, even such as would be too considerable for any mortal creature to encounter with, if he had not inward supports from Christ, the chief shepherd and bishop of souls. The greatness and difficulty of the ministerial work will evidently appear, if we consider, that whilst they are engaged in their office, they are personating even the great God himself, whose mouth they are to the people: The purposes they serve are high and God-like: And besides, what greatly adds to the difficulty of it, is the opposition and discouragements which attend the faithful discharge of this duty. The prince of this world is active by temptations, to divert, and discourage every one from engaging in this work, often suggesting what may pervert and mislead their minds in it. If allurements, terrors, or reproaches will avail, they are sure to be tried: For ministers are the butt, against which Satan by these instruments levels his sharpest darts, well knowing that the strongest batteries against his kingdom are placed there; and therefore the most faithful are sure to be most assaulted. There are also our own indispositions, which render the work the harder. And besides all, there is a strict account to be given at the day of judgment, when the secrets of all hearts shall be revealed, when we shall hear Christ saying with an heart-impressing power, *Give an account of your stewardship.* He will demand an account of the souls he committed to our care, and the trust he reposed in us. There, if we be pro-

nounced faithful servants, we shall accordingly receive the reward of such; but if unfaithful, the blood of others will be required at our hands, and their misery will be an aggravation of ours.

" Now upon mature consideration of the great importance and difficulty of the work, as it is of so great consequence, we may justly cry out, *Who is sufficient for these things? Hic Labor, hoc Opus:* This is a work indeed. What piety, what prudence, what zeal, what courage, what faithfulness, and what holy-watchfulness is necessary, to the right discharge of this so great an office? The work is great; our strength is small: Yea, of ourselves we have no strength at all; but all our sufficiency is of God; to him therefore must we go for it. Here is our comfort, and our hope; *It hath pleased the Father, that in Christ all fulness should dwell;* fulness of merit and righteousness, of strength and grace, even a grace that shall be sufficient for us. God himself hath said, that *if any lack wisdom,* they should *ask it of him, who giveth to all liberally;* and he hath expressly added, *it shall be given.* Therefore let us make our application to him; let us come with an holy *boldness to the throne of grace,* deeply impressed with a sense of our weakness and folly; and thus let us ask wisdom, and then we need not fear being disappointed, but shall *of his fulness receive, and grace for grace.*

" In vain may we have recourse to the most refined and polite parts of human learning, to qualify ourselves for this work: All human arts, and the whole circle of the sciences, will be unable to furnish us for it, unless God, who first *commanded the light to shine out of darkness,* lay the foundation, in *shining* by his Spirit *into our hearts,* and displaying the invincible efficacy of his grace to work in us a true repentance and conversion *never to be repented of.* Not that I would have you neglect your studies, but use a double diligence in your earnest pursuit of them: Yet I write thus, that you may not rest in these, but be aspiring after more noble acquirements. Be very solicitous about *the one thing needful,* without which you can never expect to become a faithful or successful minister of Christ's gospel.

" My dear brother, I hope you will take in good part what I have here said; and though you do not want advice and direction in this affair from those that are with you, and are more capable of giving you better admonition than I, yet I hope you will have so much regard to me and yourself, as to bestow some time in reading over and considering these obvious thoughts,

which I have spent a few minutes in drawing up, hoping that as they are continually of use to me, they may be so to you.

"You intimate, that your inclinations are rather to be of a trade. It is true, in such a station of life, you would not find so much difficulty as attends the ministry: But then you will not have such prospects of being useful in your day. What more noble or honourable employment than this! Surely it may well be called a good work; a work of the greatest importance, and designed for the most extensive good; since it is conversant about no lower concerns than the life and happiness of immortal souls, and is designed to display and illustrate God's free grace and mercy in bringing many sons to glory. Are the ways of wisdom pleasant? then ministers of all men enjoy most real, solid pleasure; for they are always exercised in her ways, spending themselves, and being spent in the service of their Lord, who will not fail to reward them abundantly. Oh what pleasure will arise in our minds, if God shall call us to this work, and succeed our labours in it, when we shall, in the midst of those toils, see many coming to own us as their spiritual fathers? These will be *our joy, and crown of rejoicing, in the day of the Lord Jesus;* they will be as so many jewels in our diadem of glory. But then, what still more unspeakable pleasure and satisfaction will arise in our souls, when we come in the near views of an eternal world; that we can look back upon our past lives, and see that they were spent in the service of our Creator and Redeemer; that his glory was our chief aim in all we did; so that we can say, we have *fought a good fight*, we have *finished our course, and kept the faith;* and that what *remains* is, that *there is a crown of righteousness laid up for us, which the Lord the righteous judge shall bestow upon us in that day?*—But I must break off for this time; yet not without recommending you to God; once more desiring, you would be earnest and constant in your addresses at the throne of grace, that we may both *obtain mercy and grace to help in every time of need.*"

It may easily be imagined, that so lively a sense of piety in the heart of this good youth would be productive of such discourses and actions, as must naturally attract the observation and esteem of those around him; and how modestly soever conducted, would be (as Solomon expresses it) like a perfume held in the hand, which the more closely it is grasped, discovers itself so much the sooner, by the agreeable odours which it diffuses.

He was soon informed of a society of private Christians, who met at stated times for religious discourse and prayer, (the first of those formed, and since so happily increased, in the place

where he then dwelt;) and he was invited to enter himself a member of it. It consisted, as such societies generally, though blessed be God not always, do, of persons in lower ranks of life: But it is edifying, as well as delightful to me, to observe, in what humble strains this young gentleman expresses his admiration of the goodness of God, and of the condescension of his friends, that he should have the honour of being admitted among them, of which he seems to have apprehended himself very unworthy.

From this society he quickly passed to another, consisting only of senior students for the ministry, who used on the evening of the Lord's-day to visit neighbouring villages, and held private meetings for religious worship in some licensed houses there. Two of them generally went together; a serious sermon on some uncontroverted and important subject of religion was repeated; and one of them prayed before, and the other after it, with proper intervals of singing. This custom, still continued, and extended to many other places, hath, I hope, been very useful, both in exercising the gifts of the students, and in abating the prejudices which some have been ready to entertain against our ways of worship, as well as in spreading the knowledge of divine things; not to mention the relief it has given to some, whose circumstances have confined them from opportunities of attending, where they could have chosen to spend the sabbath. When the assembly was dismissed, a few serious people would often remain, to spend an hour or two more in conference and prayer with the persons who had been officiating; and they who appeared under the first religious impressions, or under dejection of spirit, were encouraged to open their cases, and their hearts, at such times as these.

It is not at all to be wondered at, by those who consider what Christian experience is, and how it is to be learned, that those students, who entered into these exercises with the greatest spirit and zeal, have appeared to distinguished advantage under a public character. And accordingly I am well assured, that many large and flourishing congregations, in which (having been unanimously and affectionately chosen) they are now labouring with great acceptance and success, are blessing God, that they were thus formed for more extensive service, and that they learnt in such schools as these, what no academical lectures alone could have taught them with equal advantage.

I will venture to say, that it would be well for the church of Christ, if all his ministers entered on the solemnities of their

ordination-day, with that deliberation, self-examination, and prayer, which Mr. Steffe's papers shew him to have used, when he first gave up his name to this repeating society: But he knew the worth of souls, and the importance of men's devotional moments! May none, who do not in some measure know both, venture to meddle with them, lest it be to their own hurt!

Well did this prudent youth apprehend, how absurd it is for any to undertake to officiate in Christian assemblies, before they are entered into full communion; and well did he consider, how great a duty and privilege it is, to commemorate the death of our great Lord at his table. Accordingly, in September 1734, some considerable time before he engaged in the society I last mentioned, he made his first approach to that ordinance, with the entire consent and approbation of the church, to whom he wrote an excellent letter on the occasion, which I would gladly insert, if I had convenient room to do it. But I cannot forbear transcribing a few of his reflections upon this head, in a letter which he wrote presently after; because I hope it may animate young Christians to attend an important duty, which I fear they are too ready to neglect.

"I did then," says he, (speaking of the preceding sabbath,) "give myself up to God, and seal my covenant with him; and it is with unspeakable pleasure that I look back on that solemn and awful transaction. I bless God, I can say, the day in which I made my first approach to the table of the Lord, was one of the best days, if not the very best, I ever lived. I then felt more sensible sorrow for sin, than I had ever done before. I was filled with admiration to think that I, who did not deserve to be set among the dogs of his flock, should have the honour of sitting among his children at his table. I hope, I had then some appropriating views of the blessed Jesus, and could call him my Saviour and my God; could esteem him the chief among ten thousand, and altogether lovely. And while I was by faith feeding on him in this ordinance, unspeakable transports of grief and joy at once seized on my soul: Grief, when I looked up, and saw my bleeding dying Redeemer bearing my sins in his own body on the tree; when I viewed him, as wounded for my transgressions, as bruised for mine iniquities, and enduring that chastisement which was the purchase of my peace: And proportionable joy, when I considered that my sins, though so great, and so many, and attended with such aggravated circumstances as gave them a scarlet and crimson dye, were all washed away in the over-flowing fountain of his precious blood. On the whole, I was enabled with delight to draw water out of this well

of salvation, and could with great pleasure enlarge on this head: But must conclude with intreating your prayers for me, that having vowed unto the Lord, I may never go back; but considering myself as bound by so many engagements, invited by so many encouragements, and obliged to God and godliness by so many ties of duty, interest, and gratitude, I may be running the Christian race with patience and alacrity, and continually adorning that profession, which I have in this ordinance so solemnly made."

In consequence of a resolution, so solemnly recorded in this ordinance, and often renewed and sealed in returning approaches to it, our author continued in a calm, resolute, and diligent prosecution of his studies, according to the plan laid down above; still conducting himself in a prudent and cautious manner, so as to cut off occasion, even from those that sought it, if such there had been, to bring any reproach on the society he belonged to, and the denomination of Christians in whose interest he had chosen to embark. Nor do I from this time meet with any incident relating to him, so remarkable as to require a particular notice, till August 1737, when it pleased God to remove his reverend and worthy father, by a stroke which his family and the church will have long cause to lament. This providence occasioned two letters, which have been so very pleasing to me, and to some pious and judicious friends to whom I have communicated them, that I cannot forbear inserting the greatest part of them here; as I think they are both a very lively and beautiful image of filial piety in its most genuine workings; and as the latter contains some such consolations on the death of friends, as the best of mankind in this dying world have, alas, frequent occasion to recollect.

The former of these was directed to his mother; but begins in this abrupt manner, without any appellation to mark the person for whom it was particularly intended.

" Last night the most melancholy letter came to my hands that ever I received, and I am now sitting down to write an answer to it. But to whom shall I address myself? and what shall I make the subject of my letter?

" Had I sufficient encouragement to hope, that my dear father could read it, or hear it read, I should not be long in determining whether I should direct a part of it to him. But the account I have had of his extreme illness discourages me from it: If he was a week ago so low and weak, as to be incapable of holding a pen to write a few lines to me, there is too too much

room to suspect, lest that disease, which made his hands so feeble, should by this time have cast a mortal veil over his eyes, and stopped his ears, so that he can neither read, nor hear, what I write. Oh could I meet with some one that is able to resolve the question! With what eagerness should I address myself to such a person, in the language, though not in the sentiments, of Joseph, *Doth my father yet live?* But oh, with what fear and anxiety should I attend the answer? How should I fear, lest my present uncertainty should be changed into a melancholy certainty; and that uneasy situation of mind, which between hope and fear concerning my father's life I am now in, should be succeeded by the deepest sorrow from hearing, *He does not live!*

"In the midst of such uncertainties, what shall I do? What course shall I take? Shall I venture to write to him? Shall I tell him, that notwithstanding the prevalence of his disease, and his extreme weakness, I have yet great hope of his recovery? Alas, there is little room for that. What hope can I have, when a physician, whose skill enables him to form a more certain judgment, than his tenderness and unwillingness to grieve will permit him to impart, does yet say, If he does recover, it will be a considerable time first? Where is the strength to hold out a considerable time under such a disease? Do the young and vigorous often fall a prey to a fever, after a few days, or a few hours struggle? And can the aged and infirm grapple with, and conquer, so powerful an invader?

"Shall I then endeavour to administer some divine consolations to a dear parent, in the near views of death and eternity? Blessed be God, that I have so much reason to believe, this would be an unnecessary task, as I have good ground to hope, that that God whom he has served with so much faithfulness and constancy in his life, will not with-hold from him the comforts of his Spirit in his death; and that God concerning whom he has so often said in the time of health and prosperity, *Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire besides thee;* will be the strength of his heart now when his flesh and his heart fail him, and will be his portion for ever. I doubt not, that vital active principle of love to God, and delight in him, which spread such a calm and serenity over his mind during life, will dart a cheerful ray to enlighten the dark valley of the shadow of death.

"Once more, shall I yet suppose him alive, and capable of reading or hearing my letter, though just on the brink of the grave, and almost panting out his last breath? And shall I write to take my last solemn farewel of him, till we meet in eternity?

Oh how can I do that? It is a task too melancholy for me; my heart even melts at such a thought. No, though I have too much reason to believe, that if my dear father does live, to see or hear this, it will be the last that he will see or hear from me, yet I will not, cannot write it as the last. However, my uncertainty about him is so great, that I cannot prevail upon myself to address it immediately to him, too much afraid lest I should be writing to a pale corpse, instead of a living tender father.—In this dubious frame of mind, to thee, Oh my God, would I turn. I know, that thou livest, and wilt ever live: Thou art the great arbiter of life and death; thou bringest down to the borders of the grave, and thou only canst say with a prevailing voice, Return. Let us join in saying, if there is yet room for prayer, do thou hear it on the behalf of thy servant: Do not so lay our sins to our charge, as to take away our father and husband: Oh spare him a little, that he may recover strength, &c. But if he is out of the reach of prayer, dispose us cheerfully to acquiesce in this afflictive dispensation of thy wise Providence: Adored be thy name, that supposing this, we have so much reason to mingle our praises with our tears; and though we should lament the loss of a most tender, valuable, and important relative; yet we may rejoice to think, that we mourn not as those without hope for him, to whom to live was Christ, and consequently to die must be gain. Amen."

He then addresses his mother in a very tender strain, on a supposition that she might possibly be a mournful widow before this letter reached her: But as many of the considerations he there touches upon are more largely inserted in the consolatory address which next follows, I omit them, only here transcribing the following expressive lines.

"Now is the time especially, to reflect upon God as your constant friend, and never-failing portion. Now is the time to recollect his many exceeding great and precious promises. Look back on former experiences, and draw encouragement from them: Look forward, and view that divine principle of grace implanted in your souls, by which you are united to God, and to Christ, in the bonds of an everlasting covenant.

"This, my dear mother, may be a source of calm serenity, and even of joy and transport, in circumstances, which in other respects wear the most gloomy aspect. And if you are tempted to entertain any anxious thoughts about those difficulties, which may attend us in our passage through life, now the channel through which the greatest part of its supports and enjoyments flowed down to us is dried up, let us remember, that *the earth*

is the Lords, and the fulness thereof: And now the streams are cut off, let us rise to the fountain of all good."

This letter was dated the first of August, 1737, and his father died on the seventh; so that according to the usual course of the post, it must, I suppose, come to hand, while he was yet alive: And a pious and tender parent will judge perhaps better than any one can, what a noble consolation it must add to the last days and hours of his life, to hear such a letter from such a son. I question not but his generous mind would rejoice for others, as well as himself; not only thinking, what an ornament and support such a son might prove to the surviving branches of the family; but also how useful his maturer age might be to the world, who was capable of administering such consolations to the afflicted, before he had yet gone through the studies of his youth.

A few days more brought our young friend the melancholy tidings, that his father was dead; which occasioned the following letter, dated the 15th of August, 1737; which I doubt not, has also proved a very great support to the worthy person to whom it was addressed, when mourning over the remains of this dear son by whom it was written; who seems therein to have been providentially led to lay in, if I may so speak, a cordial against his own approaching funeral. If the reader be affected with it, as I myself have been, there will be no need to make an apology for inserting it at large: And I am persuaded it must afford every believer of christianity a secret triumph, to compare this epistle of a youth instructed in the gospel, with those of the most learned and celebrated philosophers of antiquity, and particularly of Seneca, Tully, and his correspondent friends, on melancholy occasions, which bore some resemblance to that on which this was written.

"*My dear dear Mother,* *Aug.* 15, 1737.

"You may easily imagine with what sad surprise I received the last account from Wrentham. I have indeed been in an uneasy state of uncertainty ever since I left you: Yet the letter which I had a few days ago, written with your hand, and which gave me an account of my father's small revival, gave me withal some comfortable hope of his recovery; so that the interval between that and the last letter, was spent in some greater degree of cheerfulness, than I was willing to allow myself before. But oh, how soon was it turned into sorrow! And I was lifted high in my hopes and expectations, only to be sunk the lower by that sad message which I received by the hand of my sister

last Friday night. How did I tremble, when I saw the letter! How many melancholy fears did my forboding heart suggest, even before I opened it! But when it was opened, oh, what did I see! Words that could not but cut me to the very heart, Our dear dear father is dead. Tears prevented me from reading any further; and the repetition of the cutting sentence calls up my tears afresh: You must give me leave then to weep awhile, and I will endeavour to proceed.——

"It will be painting too melancholy a scene, to tell you what a variety of gloomy thoughts passed through my mind on this occasion. No, I will not renew, or increase your sorrow, by aggravating the loss we have sustained, in the death of such an husband and father. But I would fain turn my thoughts to the brighter side, and by divine assistance endeavour to suggest such things as may be of use to reconcile us to this very heavy stroke of Providence, and to form us to such a suitable disposition of mind, as that if any one should ask us, *Is it well with thy husband? Is it well with thy father? Is it well with thee?* We may even with a smile reply, it is well.

"I omitted writing the last post, that I might have time to settle and compose my own mind, and consequently be the more capable of administering consolation to you, and others, who are intimately concerned in my dear father's death. Had I wrote immediately after the reception of my sister's letter, while my mind was almost overwhelmed with sorrow, you might indeed have seen a sheet of paper filled with the most passionate expressions of tenderness and grief; but perhaps they would only have served to open your wounds afresh; whereas my design in what I now write, is, if possible, to pour in balm to heal them.

"Blessed be God, the storm that was first raised in my mind, has been by him commanded into a calm; and the consolations of God have not been few, nor small to me on this occasion. And I am not without good hope, that if you are not yet brought to a settled composed state of mind, those considerations which religion suggests, and which have been the happy means of reviving my spirits, and introducing some considerable measure of tranquility into my mind, may answer the same end, and have the same effect upon you.

"The dear, dear man has taken his final leave of us, with regard to this world; and we cannot but mourn his departure. The desire of our eyes is taken from us; and it would argue a stupid, insensible, savage temper, not to drop a tear, or feel any tender concern under so sad a stroke. The wise author of our

nature did not place these melting emotions of soul, for no other purpose, but to be rooted out as weeds: And the noblest examples of faith and holiness, courage and magnanimity, which are recorded in the Old and New Testament, are represented as dropping a tear upon such an occasion. Even the spotless Jesus wept over Lazarus.—But the greatest danger is, lest we abandon ourselves to immoderate sorrow, so to mourn as to refuse to be comforted. We are not, with Jacob, to resolve to *go down to the grave mourning*, because we are deprived of this, or that comfort of life.—That you, my dear, and now only parent, may not sink under the weight of your sorrow, let me lead your thoughts to the following reviving considerations.

"Let us consider for our comfort, how long our dear relative was continued to us. It is not the *withering of a gourd*, which *sprung up in a night*, and *perished in a night*, whose friendly shade failed us when we had most need of it, that we now mourn. No, we lament the fall of a full-grown tree, under whose wide spreading shadow we have long rejoiced. Now in order to make this affliction sit the lighter, let us compare it with what it would have been, had he been taken from us at a time when we his children had all been young, and unable ourselves to make our way through the world; which we now all have a pretty fair prospect of doing with comfort, by the blessing of God, and the kindness of surviving friends. Is it not some alleviation to our sorrow, to think he lived to bring up his children *in the nurture and admonition of the Lord?* And may I not add, to see the good effects of a religious education upon most of them?

"However it must be confessed, that the loss is great to us all: But then, let us not confine our thoughts so much to this mournful part of the subject, as to forget how great a gainer the dear departed spirit is by this separation from us. Let us lift up the eye of our faith to the invisible world, and take such a view of the *happiness* and *glory of those who die in the Lord*, as our imperfect state will allow; and then let us say, whether there is any room to grieve and mourn on his behalf. Surely when we consider his present advantageous situation, from what he is delivered, and what he now enjoys, we could not wish him back again without the greatest breach of friendship. Indeed, as others have well observed on the like occasion, we form a very wrong judgment of the condition of our departed friends, when because we see their breathless corpses laid in the ground to become food for worms, we are overwhelmed with grief, and bitterly mourn over them. This is owing to our ignorance of their

state; as *Jacob mourned over the rent garment of* his son *Joseph*, and concluded he was *devoured by some evil beast*, when indeed he was gone to *reign in Egypt*. Our dear relative is gone to reign in heaven; and would we cling so fondly about him, as to pull him from his throne? He is gone to possess a part of the *land of Canaan* above; and can we wish him back, to struggle again with the difficulties of the wilderness? Can we call ourselves his friends, and not rather rejoice in his happiness?

"This consideration, taken in conjunction with that which is drawn from his being removed from us by the hand of an all-wise and sovereign God, should be allowed to have a due influence upon us, to bring us cordially to acquiesce in this dispensation of Providence. So that I may say to you, and myself, as the great Mr. Howe did to one in the like circumstances, *If God be pleased, and his glorified creature pleased, who are we that we should be displeased?* Oh my dear mother, I have had such lively views of the happiness of the dear deceased, that if I have felt any sentiment of grief at that particular instant, it was because I was not in the like circumstances.

"Another consideration which has been a means of quieting and composing my mind upon this occasion, and which I would recommend to you, is this, that though our dear relative is taken from us, yet our best friend is still continued to us. Let us remember, that *though our house be not so with God*, as we could wish it to be, *yet he has made with us an everlasting covenant, ordered in all things, and sure.* Therefore let us *encourage ourselves in the Lord our God;* and when *creature comforts* are like *broken reeds*, and *broken cisterns*, let us fix our dependance more and more on *the rock of ages*, and have more affectionate recourse to the overflowing *fountain of living waters.* Let us reflect a little on what it was that rendered our departed relative so amiable and desirable to us; and then let us further consider, *Was not God the author of all?* And cannot he make up our loss abundantly? I am persuaded, I need not tell one, who has enjoyed so much communion with God, as you, Madam, have done, that we may hope and expect infinitely more from him as *our covenant God*, than from the most wise, tender, and powerful friend upon earth: Let this stroke of Providence then engage us to walk closer with our God, to centre in him as our portion and happiness, and to derive all our expectations from him.

"My dear mother, if the communicating to you my experience on this melancholy occasion may be of any service to you,

I will take the freedom here to assure you, that if ever I could call God my Father, with any considerable degree of filial joy and confidence, it has been since I have had no other, to whom I could apply that endearing title.—On *this God and Father* then let us *cast all our cares and burdens;* cheerfully confiding in him, who has furnished us with the most powerful antidote against immoderate grief and anxiety in such circumstances as ours, by declaring himself *a Father of the fatherless, and Judge of the widow, in his holy habitation**.

"But I must by no means omit another thought, so full of consolation upon this occasion; that in a little time we shall be restored to this dear husband and father again, and meet, and converse with him, on terms of much greater advantage. Though the separation be grievous, yet it is but short. Our days and years are rolling away apace; and every year and day brings us nearer to our home; and so brings us nearer to the house of our heavenly Father, and to the mansions of glory, one of which is inhabited by that happy spirit, to which we so lately claimed a near relation.

"Surely, my dear mother, when we consider, where he is, and where we are; we may abundantly satisfy ourselves with this consideration, so much more forcible in such a case, than in that to which it was applied, *We shall go to him, though he shall not return to us.*"

I believe the reader will easily apprehend, that a person capable of writing in this manner upon such an occasion, was well qualified to compose for the pulpit; and though his tutor did not see this letter, he had a very agreeable proof of it much about this time, (I think, the October, or November following;) when Mr. Steffe bore a part in the course of homilies, (as they were called, to distinguish them from sermons,) delivered in the lecture-room, upon the being and attributes of God, and the chief points of natural religion. The subject allotted to him was, the imitation of God's moral perfections: And I cannot recollect, that I ever heard a better academical discourse from any of the young students with whom I have been acquainted. It was finished with an accuracy, both of thought, and language, which would have engaged me to have added it to this collection of his remains, if I had found it amongst his papers. But as I did not, I only mention it to shew the reason upon which they acted, who out of regard to the necessity of several neighbouring congregations then destitute, advised him to offer himself to the

* Psal. lxviii. 5.

examination of a committee of ministers deputed for that purpose, in order to his preaching in public. He past that examination highly to their satisfaction, as they declared by a proper testimonial. And my illness engaged him to preach his first sermon at Northampton, on the first of January, 1737-8.

The subject of it was those words, *Who am I, O Lord God? and what is my house, that thou hast brought me hitherto*?* As I have inserted it the first in this collection, which is now in the reader's hand, I need say nothing more to prove, that the general acceptance it met with was very well grounded; and all I shall add concerning it, is, that I find in a blank page of the notes the following memorandum, dated April 16, 1738. "I have heard that this sermon was made peculiarly useful to several persons at Northampton, the first time of its being preached, and the first time of my preaching at all. *Bless the Lord, O my soul,* for the honour he has done to thy poor worthless attempts of service in this instance! O may it be an happy specimen of far more abundant success to attend my future labours in the ministry!

It was before the end of January this year, that the Reverend Mr. Stodden of Taunton, and the heads of the congregation under his care, wanting an assistant, thought proper to apply to Mr. Steffe's tutor, who knowing the importance of that place, judged it convenient to send him thither as a candidate. His labours were universally acceptable to that numerous society; insomuch that after having spent two or three sabbaths among them, he received an unanimous and pressing invitation to settle there, which invitation, by the advice of all his friends, he accepted, only reserving to himself the liberty of continuing where he was till his academical studies were completed, which they were by Midsummer, 1738.

The last day, in which he appeared in the congregation to which he had so long stood related, was the 4th of June, 1738, when he preached that excellent sermon with which this little collection concludes; a day, which I cannot forbear mentioning on two accounts: The one is, that it was the last in which I ever enjoyed the pleasure of his labours and conversation, though he lived till that day two years: The other, that I find it was made, by the divine goodness, remarkably comfortable and refreshing to him. "This morning," says he, in a letter from which I must borrow a few lines, "I took my leave of the

* 2 Sam. vii. 18.

pulpit here; and have this afternoon been at the table of the Lord, reviewing with a grateful surprise the various instances of the divine goodness to me; especially in fixing me in this place, and making my abode here so comfortable and advantageous: I have now been renewing my covenant-engagements to my Father and my God; and in this respect, I would not alter the thing that is gone out of my lips, or which has been expressed in the secret language of my heart. I would not be excused from loving the great author of all my mercies; I would not be discharged from his service, if I might. I would not wish for any thing to lessen my obligations to my dear Redeemer, but for every thing to increase my sense of them." And then he goes on to express his tender sympathy to his mother then under confinement by illness, and his longing desire, if it were the will of God, to share the entertainment of God's house and table with her, and to dwell with her again, though in the lowest circumstances: In which, I believe, he alluded to a scheme which he had, of bringing her to Taunton, which, had God spared his life, might have perhaps succeeded.

What pleasure she had in an interview with him, and in attending his ministry in that visit which he quickly after made her at Wrentham, may be more easily imagined, than described. From thence he went to Taunton, and was very joyfully received by his worthy friend, the Reverend Mr. Stodden, and the whole congregation under his care. How he acted in this more public scene of life, I have not an opportunity particularly to say; but am in the general fully satisfied, that he behaved in such a manner, as there was reason, from what we have already seen of him, to hope and expect, and as entitled him to the affection and esteem of his valuable pastor, of the society to whom he preached, and also of many neighbouring congregations, among whom he soon came to have an influence, far beyond what could have been imagined, considering his years.

I think, I have before me all the sermons he composed during the two years he continued in this situation, which was all the remainder of his valuable life; and they are so fairly written, and, so far as I can judge, so carefully finished, that I cannot but suppose, they had all, except the last, which was made when his illness began, been written out twice. They are every one of them, so far as I can recollect, upon practical and important subjects; and if I may judge from what I have seen, they are such, both for method, thought, and language, that I should have found no difficulty in furnishing out several volumes of discourses, equal to most of these which are here published. I

cannot find any one of them, in the review of which a wise and good man might not have had reason to rejoice on the borders of eternity: For all are calculated to promote a reverence for God, and love to him; to convince men of their sin and misery by their apostacy; to point out the only method of their recovery, by faith in the righteousness and grace of the blessed Redeemer, and a sincere devotedness of soul to God through him; to awaken careless sinners, to re-animate slumbering Christians, to encourage the weak and timorous; and in a word, so far as was possible, in every discourse, to give to every one his portion of meat in due season: Nothing of that solemn pomp of profound reasoning, with which the dullest and emptiest discourses often abound; none of those affected and puerile ornaments, which make preaching the play of the imagination, and turn the church into a theatre: nothing arrogant, nothing petulant, nothing censorious; nothing intended to kindle the unhallowed flames of party-zeal, and lead men either to judge, or despise their brethren: But all serious, spiritual, and candid; and, on the whole, such as became a preacher, who considered that his sermons were written in the book of God's remembrance, and that he must shortly render an account to him, in whose name and presence he had the honour to speak.

As he was well convinced that religious visits made a considerable part of the care of souls, he did not imagine, that his being only an assistant preacher could excuse him from it. He was willing to assist his honoured pastor in this, as well as public work: And as the congregation was so numerous, that he perceived he should be a long time going through it, he had his appointed times for visiting some of the poorer families, in which they used to call in their neighbours to share the happy opportunity; and as pious instruction was the great end of these visits, they seldom or never concluded without prayer: A labour of love, in which he was greatly animated by the writings and example of the great and excellent Mr. Joseph Allen his predecessor; to whose Alarm to the Unconverted, our author by the way acknowledges, he was under God indebted for some of the first serious impressions that were made on his mind.

In the mean time, his care of those with whom he was, did not lead him to forget his absent friends, especially the dear family at Wrentham, and that of his tutor. To the latter he wrote several letters, expressing the most lively and affectionate acknowledgment of the care which had been taken of him, though to be sure no more than the duty of such an important trust had

required. To his friends at home he always expressed the kindest regard, in a variety of instances which I must not here enumerate: Nor must I even insert that important letter which he wrote to one of his brethren, who was removed by death the winter after he came to Taunton. I must content myself with saying, that he shewed not only a pious care, but an admirable skill and dexterity in the manner of that address; omitting nothing that might tend, on the one hand, to awaken his mind, and to secure him from all presumptuous and mistaken hopes; and on the other, to encourage him to lay hold on the grace of the gospel, in a manner that might be effectual to his eternal salvation. It is merely from the fear of extending these memoirs too far beyond their proper bounds, which I fear they have already transgressed, that I refrain from inserting this letter at large. But I must with great pleasure add, that his pious care was so successful, that his brother died in such a truly Christian manner, as to leave in the mind of his surviving relatives a most cheerful hope, that God had shewn him the path of life.

He carried on a very affectionate correspondence with several of his fellow-students; in which he expressed the sincerest desire to maintain upon their minds a lively sense of religion, and an active zeal in the service of God. And in such offices of piety and friendship of various kinds, he continued till the close of his life.

I remember, about the beginning of May, 1740, he wrote me the last letter I ever received from him, indeed not quite a month before he died; in which he expressed himself to the following purpose. "The small-pox prevail much in Taunton, and carry off considerable numbers. My friends express a very tender obliging solicitude on my account; and I endeavour to take all prudent precautions to avoid danger. But I bless God I find my spirits entirely calm, and composed, as to the event: I cheerfully commit myself to the all-wise and gracious disposal of my heavenly Father; and hope I have no uncertainty before me, but whether I shall be serving Christ in this world, or in a better."

Thus prepared that illness found him, which ended in his death. On the first symptoms of it, he composed a very serious discourse on those words: *He feedeth on ashes; a deceived heart hath turned him aside, that he cannot deliver his soul, nor say, is there not a lie in my right-hand?** concerning the deceits which sinners practice on themselves, and those

* Isa. xliv. 20.

lies which they carry in their right-hands, to support a foolish and dangerous hope. This was the last sermon he ever preached; and had he finished the whole of his plan, the reader would not have failed of the pleasure of perusing it. In the mean time I heartily pray, an impression of its important design may remain on the hearts of all that heard it, and of all for whose benefit it was designed.

When he fell ill, it evidently appeared, how much he was valued by persons of all denominations, in that continued solicitude which all that knew him expressed for his recovery; as well as afterwards, in the universal lamentation occasioned by his death. He himself, though the symptoms soon appeared dangerous, maintained the same composure of mind, that he had expressed in the more distant prospect, through all the stages of his distemper; in which the exercise of his reason was continued, though he did not die till the 22d day after he was seized. He gave very particular directions for the disposal of his affairs a fortnight before his death; and was frequently, throughout the whole time of his illness, employed in earnest prayer as he lay in his bed, even beyond the strength of his nature: And as he was accustomed to use his voice, he was heard (by one of the family from whom I had this account) to express himself thus: "Oh Lord, preserve me in the use of my rational powers and faculties, that I may not only perform those things which are necessary to the health of my body, but may also be capable of conversing with thee, and of stretching my thoughts towards the heavenly world;" and then, after a solemn pause, added, "where perhaps I may quickly be! I had rather, if it might be for thy glory, continue longer in this world for the good of thy church; but if thou hast determined, this sickness shall end in death, thy will be done!" or words to that effect.

Some physician, it seems, had unhappily told him, while he was very young, that if ever he had the small-pox, he would die. On the other hand, his friends did all they could to keep up his spirits, by expressing their hope of his recovery: He acknowledged their affection in it, and interpreted it as an instance of their respect; but intimated his own apprehensions as to the issue, that it would be as it proved. He, on his part, expressed his tender regard for them, by pouring out earnest prayers to God, on their account, as well as on his own; intermingling his prayers with his praises. And when he was desired not to spend himself so much, he answered, "As long as I have tongue, I will use it for my Redeemer's praise and service."

These are the most remarkable circumstances of his illness, which have been transmitted to me from a pious friend, in whose house he lived. He calmly resigned up his soul to God, on Wednesday, June 4, 1740, having lately entered on the 25th year of his age. Not only the mourning habits, but the tears of vast numbers in that numerous congregation, in which his lot was cast, testified their sorrow for his death; and we in these parts, as well as his friends in Suffolk, had a share, a large share in it. I am sure, no wise and pious reader will need to be told at large, that not only Taunton, but the wide neighbourhood around, had a loss in the removal of a person of such a character and abilities, and that it was a stroke long and deeply to be lamented.

I cannot conclude without acknowledging the divine goodness to my friends amongst whom he laboured, not only in still sparing their valuable pastor, but likewise in sending them from the same place another worthy and excellent assistant, the Rev. Mr. Benjamin Fawcett, if I am capable of judging, not on the whole inferior to Mr. Steffe. I should have esteemed his near neighbourhood an important blessing to these parts, and to me: But a sense of the importance of the interest at Taunton, and a compassion to my afflicted friends under that grievous loss they had sustained, inclined me to concur with all their measures for fixing him among them. May God multiply the years of his usefulness there, and make him an instrument of everlasting good to multitudes that are yet unborn!

Having said thus much of the author, it may be expected I should say something concerning these sermons; but I shall give no additional recommendation of them at all. My love to the person that wrote them may lead me to judge more favourably than they deserve: But the reader may be assured I had a good opinion of them, when I proposed the publication: A project, not contrived merely with a view of serving his sorrowful mother, though if any advantage be made by them, it will be shared, as it ought, between her and the printer, who runs the hazard of the edition; but designed to prolong the usefulness of this dear and lamented youth beyond the narrow limits of his life. I did indeed think, that, considering his age, and considering also that they were composed in no view of publication, they would do some honour to his memory, and would meet with encouragement in various places where he was not personally known. But I especially depended on it, that those at Taunton, and in the neighbouring parts, who knew and loved him so well,

as I am sure many hundreds there did, would read them with peculiar pleasure and improvement: And the happy disposition prevailing in the young persons of that congregation to which he belonged, to associate themselves together for religious purposes, in hours when these sermons will give them a delightful employment, has further encouraged this hope.

As to the particular reasons which determined me to chuse these discourses, and to omit others which some of his friends desired to see, it is not material to enter into them. I had not time to read all; and therefore took generally those, of which there was not a large number upon a single text, and those which had been most blessed to the good of souls; some of which I had heard myself, and had peculiarly struck my mind.

What I have done in reviewing them, was but little. I have here and there added a clause, and very seldom, a sentence or two by way of illustration. I have also corrected the style a little in some places: Sometimes I have contracted a period, which seemed rather too diffuse; and in one place abridged two sermons into one. But I have made no essential or very material alterations at all, either by way of omission or addition: And the greatest liberty I have taken with any, is used with respect to the last. That sermon I myself heard, and it impressed me exceedingly. I afterwards found, that it was the first plan of some discourses, branched out into a considerable number at Taunton. I could not publish them all; and I was so well pleased with what I had heard, that I could not persuade myself to omit it. I was therefore obliged to have recourse to those notes, which I had taken while he was preaching; which were generally short hints of sentences, only setting down a few particular expressions, the beauty and energy of which struck me with some peculiar pleasure. The consequence is, that here, though the whole scheme and almost all the thoughts are Mr. Steffe's, the language is often my own. I could much rather have given it to the world in the very words of the author: But as that was impossible; and as on account of throwing two of those transcribed from his notes into one, we wanted another sermon to make up the number proposed; I verily thought, I could not do better than to present it to the world as it is; at least without employing too much time in reviewing and comparing those few single sermons, which might have been considered as proper upon this occasion: And the great pleasure with which my friends had attended upon this sermon, and recollect in general the remembrance of it, engaged me to oblige them with this

opportunity of reviewing it, for which I am sure of their thanks.

Nothing further remains, but to commit these discourses to the attentive perusal of all into whose hands Providence may bring them, especially of those to whom the author was dear by any peculiar bonds, and to the blessing of that God, with regard to whose honour, I am well satisfied, they were first composed, and are now published.

P. DODDRIDGE.

A

COURSE OF LECTURES

ON

THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS

IN

PNEUMATOLOGY, ETHICS,

AND

DIVINITY:

WITH

REFERENCES TO THE MOST CONSIDERABLE AUTHORS

ON EACH SUBJECT.

TO WHICH ARE NOW ADDED,

MANY ORIGINAL NOTES.

ADVERTISEMENT.

FROM Dr. DODDRIDGE's life prefixed to the first volume of this edition of his works, as well as from the first editor's advertisement, it appears, that the author had bestowed upon these Lectures no small share of his time and attention, and that he designed to have them published. But whatever advantage may be derived by a student, while engaged in the laboratory of investigation, from the *mathematical* form in which they were originally composed and afterwards published, it may be justly questioned whether this uncommon mode be not calculated, from an appearance of stiffness, to deter the greater number even of inquisitive readers from perusing them; yet, to deviate much from the original aspect would frustrate, in some degree, the author's design, and, for that reason, prove to the judicious reader unsatisfactory.

The method now adopted, it is hoped, will be found a just medium, in which are preserved the chief uses of the author's arrangement and terms, with as little offence as possible to the eye of a reader unaccustomed to such a page. All the *references* contained in the first edition are preserved; but at the bottom of the page, as much more pleasant to the eye, and not less convenient. To these are now added many others, some of which are taken from Dr. KIPPIS's edition, in the form of *notes*.

Though many important points of theology are discussed in these Lectures, the reader should not expect, what was never intended by the author, a complete body of divinity. Of *such* publications there are many, truly excellent and comprehensive; among which we may venture to recommend the admirable work of FRANCISCUS TURRETINUS entitled *Institutio Theologiæ Elencticæ*, and *The Lectures* of Dr. THOMAS RIDGLEY on the Assembly's Larger Catechism, *instar omnium*. But the present work claims more originality of design, and used judiciously may answer a very valuable end.

Were the present Editors to hazard a sentiment on the principal advantage that may be derived from this work, they

would say, that it should be considered as a *book of reference*, when investigating the *history of opinions* on Pneumatology, Ethics, and Divinity. We presume it is the most complete syllabus of controversial theology, in the largest sense of the term, ever published in the English language. Viewed in this light, the work should not be considered as useful to students almost exclusively, but inquisitive readers of every class may find no small advantage from them; and particularly that part which treats of the evidences of revealed religion, a subject of the first importance at a time when infidelity dares to present its objections to society of every class.

Some readers may feel a dislike to one term in particular that frequently occurs in this course of Lectures; we mean, DEMONSTRATION, when placed at the head of a series of *probable arguments*. We acknowledge that this objection is not without some force. In works of *natural* philosophy we expect mathematical forms of demonstration; but at the same time we expect the highest kind of evidence, which leaves the mind no room to object or hesitate. In *moral* philosophy, however, and many parts of Pneumatology and Theology discussed in this work, *probability* is quite sufficient, and to require more is unreasonable. The term, therefore, as used sometimes in this work, by exciting too much expectation, tends to generate a proportionable disappointment. The distinction, indeed, between *Solution* and *Demonstration* has been preserved; but this does not wholly remove the objection. When the proposition is laid, the reader should judge how far the particulars which follow it are calculated to *demonstrate*, except in cases where the evidence is remarkably strong. The evidence itself is precisely the same whether the term be used at the head of the series or not. When the arguments amount to a bare *probability* only in the reader's mind, a valuable end is answered; whereas the *same* evidence proposed as a *Demonstration* would be met with prejudice, and reflected upon with dissatisfaction. For these reasons, were the editors to follow their own views of preference, the term itself would be omitted; yet, reflecting that the work has passed through three editions, they presume not to omit even this one word. The other terms, *Axiom*, *Definition*, *Scholium*, *Corollary*, and *Lemma*, are not liable to the same objections. To AXIOM no one *can* object, it being only a statement of a *self-evident truth;* to an accurate DEFINITION no one *ought* to object, as every author has a right to shew *in what sense* he uses a term, or understands a proposition; SCHOLIA are only *commentaries* on subjects connected with the text or pro-

position; COROLLARIES only *inferences* from what is defined or proved; and LEMMAS previous propositions *assumed* to prepare the way for higher evidence.

The notes to this edition are more various and numerous than those in any of the former ones. Mr. CLARK, the first editor, inserted very few; Dr. KIPPIS's notes consist almost entirely of references to authors; but the present edition includes a considerable number of these, some with new references, and several on controverted subjects of great importance. The notes contained in the last edition (which include those of the former ones) are marked by the initials of their authors respectively, DODDRIDGE, CLARK, SAVAGE, and KIPPIS. For those which have the signature W, the present editors are responsible.

It is presumed that, through the assistance and obliging readiness of the Rev. Mr. PARRY of Wymondley, theological tutor of that institution over which our author originally presided, the present edition will have an advantage over all the former ones, by having many errors in the references corrected.

EXTRACT

FROM DR. KIPPIS's PREFACE.

IN the life of Dr. DODDRIDGE, prefixed to the seventh edition of his Family Expositor, it is observed, that in a future impression of the author's Course of Lectures it would be extremely useful to enlarge the list of references, by introducing the names and productions of those writers who have treated upon the several matters in question since the Doctor's decease. It is added, that to a person conversant in the history of controversies this would be no very difficult task; and that it might, in particular, easily be executed by any gentleman who, as a tutor, has made use of the Lectures as a text book, and who consequently has been in the habit of referring to succeeding authors.

Though I do not completely answer to the whole of this description (having only been occasionally a reader on a few detached parts of Dr. Doddridge's Lectures) I was, nevertheless, readily induced to undertake the business suggested, from a consciousness of the utility of the design, and from the hope that I had so far attended to the progress of literature as to be in some degree qualified for the employment. At the same time, I entertained no doubt of my being able to obtain assistance from the manuscript references of such tutors as had regularly gone through the Doctor's Course. In this respect I have happily succeeded.

There is one thing which I wish particularly to be remembered, and that is, that it is no part of my design to give general illustrations of the subjects treated upon, or either to confirm or to gainsay the opinions of Dr. DODDRIDGE. This would have been the creation of a new work. It is the business of individual tutors *to enlarge upon the Lectures in that way which accords with their own sentiments.* My sole aim is to mention, with freedom and impartiality, the writers on all sides of the different questions which are the objects of discussion, that thereby the mind of the student may be duly enlarged, and that he may be able, with the greater advantage, to prosecute his searches after truth.

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BY THE FIRST EDITOR.

THIS work was originally drawn up for the use of the students under the author's care; but it appears by a clause in his will, that it was his intention it should be published after his decease. And though it would, no doubt, have appeared to much greater advantage, if the author had prepared it himself for the press; yet it is hoped, that it will not be thought even in its present form unworthy of the public view.

The transcript from which it was printed, I have carefully compared with the original short hand copy; and the public may be assured, that the author's sentiments have been every where scrupulously preserved; no other alterations having been made, than such as are necessary in all posthumous works, that have not had the author's last hand. A few references have been added, particularly to some books published since the author's death, and others omitted, that seemed less important.

If the reader should think the references under the same head are sometimes too much alike; he will please to consider, that though the sentiments in each may be nearly the same, yet the different manner of expression will often serve more fully to explain and illustrate the subject: besides, that one author may be at hand, when the other is not.

In order to assist the reader in consulting particular passages referred to, the reference is always made to the chapter and section, where that could be done; and as in many cases it could only be made to the page, an account is added at the end, of the editions, to which such references are made, (where the books could be procured) with the number of pages in the volume, which, by the rule of proportion, may be some direction to find the passage in any other edition.

As to the work itself, it may be proper to acquaint the public, that the mathematical form, into which it is thrown, was taken from a work of the same kind, in manuscript, drawn up in latin, by the author's tutor, the Reverend Mr. JOHN JENNINGS, of Hinckley, from whom he has borrowed some of the propositions and demonstrations, especially in the former part. But he has so much enlarged and improved upon the original plan, that the whole may properly be considered as a new work.

As my regard to the author's memory, and my apprehension of the usefulness of the work itself, led me to comply with the request of the author's widow, to inspect the publication of these Lectures, I thought it necessary to give this general account of what has been done in relation to them, for the satisfaction of the public; and heartily wish they may subserve the cause of learning, religion, and moderation.

S. CLARK.

Birmingham, Jan. 31, 1763.

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CXXXIV. The scripture account of the fall stated	165	1
CXXXV. That Adam's sin is in some degree imputed to his descendants	167	1
CXXXVI. That Christ has made satisfaction for the sins of all true penitents	169	4
CXXXVII. That faith is required in the gospel as necessary to salvation	171	8
CXXXVIII. A view of the controversy between Foster and Stebbing	173	1
CXXXIX. That faith and obedience are produced by the operation of divine grace upon the soul	175	6
CXL. The question concerning the saints' perseverance examined	179	1
The doctrine of perfection, of the assurance of salvation, and extraordinary divine influences on the mind, treated of Schol. 5—7.	181	5 &c.
CXLI. Inquiry into the scripture doctrine of the unpardonable sin	183	1
CXLII. The scripture doctrine of predestination unto life stated	184	4
CXLIII. The tenor of the covenant of redemption explained	185	3
CXLIV. The scripture doctrine of Christ's intercession stated	186	1

PART IX.

A Survey of the chief Duties required in the Gospel; and more particularly of its positive Institutions; in which the Doctrine of the Christian Sabbath, the Sacraments, and the Constitution of the Church are particularly considered.

Prop.	Lect.	Sect.
CXLV. The constitution of the covenant of grace explained	188	5
CXLVI. The principal heads of christian duty enumerated	189	1
Under this proposition the christian doctrine concerning polygamy, divorce, the use of oaths, obedience to governors, &c. is considered in the Scholia	—	9 &c.
CXLVII. That the precepts in the New Testament remain in force, no longer than the reasons on which they are founded continue	192	1
Under this head the prohibition of eating blood is considered, Schol. 1.	—	6 &c.
CXLVIII. The means of virtue recommended in scripture enumerated	193	1
The question concerning liturgies is handled, Schol. 3 & 4	194	3 &c.
CXLIX. A survey of the officers appointed by Christ in his church	195	6
CL. The arguments in defence of Diocesan episcopacy examined	196	1
CLI. The obligation to observe the Christian sabbath proved	198	1
CLII. That baptism is an institution of Christ	200	2
The question concerning the continuance of water-baptism, and baptizing those descended from Christians, considered, Schol. 1, 2.	201	1 &c.
CLIII. Inquiry into the mode of baptism	202	1
CLIV. A view of the arguments for and against infant-baptism	203	1
CLV. The nature and obligation of the Lord's supper stated	206	1
The question concerning infant communion examined, Schol. 5.	207	9
CLVI. That the Mosaic law is not obligatory on Christians	209	5

PART X.

Containing the Scripture Doctrine of good and bad Angels, and of a future State, including the Doctrine of the Resurrection, with the most remarkable Events to precede or attend it.

CLVII. That the scripture asserts the existence of created spirits superior to men, called angels, some of whom are holy and happy, and others wicked and miserable	210	1
CLVIII. The chief properties of good angels enumerated	211	1
CLIX. The chief properties of wicked angels	—	11
CLX. Inquiry how far good angels are concerned in human affairs	212	1
CLXI. Instances in which evil spirits interfere in human affairs enumerated	213	4
The question concerning the dæmoniacs in scripture, the heathen oracles, and magical operations examined in the Scholia	214	1 &c.

Prop.		Lect.	Sect.
CLXII.	The scripture account of what shall pass at the end of the world	216	1
	Under this proposition, amongst other questions, the following are treated of, viz. Whether the doctrine of a future state was revealed in the Old Testament: How far the resurrection-body will be the same that was laid in the grave: What will be the place of the blessed and the damned after the resurrection: Whether in the intermediate state the soul will be insensible or not: Whether there will not be different degrees of future happiness: The popish doctrines of purgatory and prayers for the dead shewn to be unscriptural. Vid. Scholia.	—	9 &c.
CLXIII.	The arguments for and against the eternity of future punishments considered	221	1
	The hypothesis of an universal restoration considered, Schol. 3.	224	1
CLXIV.	The scripture doctrine of the general conflagration stated	—	3
	Various hypotheses of learned men as to the causes of this conflagration, and the circumstances attending it, may be seen in the Scholia	—	8 &c.
CLXV.	The supposition of a renovation of the earth examined	226	1
	The doctrine of the Millenium, with the different schemes concerning it, represented in the Scholia	—	7
CLXVI.	A view of the chief prophecies relating to the conversion of the Jews, and its consequences to the Gentile world	228	1
	The question concerning the time of the rise of Anti christ, the number of the beast, &c. considered, Schol. 7.	—	12
CLXVII.	A survey of Mr. Lowman's scheme for interpreting the book of the Revelations	229	1
CLXVIII.	A view of the internal evidence with which Christianity is attended	230	1

A TABLE OF THE DEFINITIONS.

Def.	Subject.	Lect.	Sect.
I.	An idea	1	2
II.	A being	—	4
III.	The properties of a being	—	6
IV.	Body	—	9
V.	Spirit	—	11
VI.	Natural philosophy	—	16
VII.	Pneumatology	—	17
VIII.	Ethics	—	18
IX.	The human mind	2	1
X.	Action	—	7
XI.	Agent and patient	—	11
XII.	Natural good and evil	—	12
XIII.	The faculties of a being	—	16
XIV.	A man's own body	4	1
XV.	The seat of the soul	5	3
XVI.	An innate idea or proposition	6	1
XVII.	Time	10	12
XVIII.	Primary and secondary qualities	11	1
XIX.	Instinct	16	1
XX.	Mental habit	17	1
XXI.	The perfections of a being	—	12
XXII.	Natural liberty	18	1
XXIII.	External liberty	—	4
XXIV.	Philosophical liberty	—	7
XXV.	Moral freedom	—	9
XXVI.	Complete liberty	—	11
XXVII.	A self-existent being	23	2
XXVIII.	Simply infinite and infinite secundum quid	—	11
XXIX.	An essential quality	27	1
XXX.	God	29	1
XXXI.	Proofs à priori and à posteriori	32	6
XXXII.	The presence of a spirit in a place	40	1
XXXIII.	A contingent event	—	9
XXXIV.	Speculative and practical wisdom	42	1
XXXV.	Place of a body	46	2
XXXVI.	Moral fitness and unfitness	52	3
XXXVII.	Obligation in reason and interest	—	10
XXXVIII.	Moral rectitude or virtue	—	12
XXXIX.	Holiness	54	1
XL.	Perfect goodness	55	1
XLI.	Divine, social, and personal virtues	64	1
XLII.	Ethical and logical truth	68	1
XLIII.	A lie	—	3
XLIV.	A promise	69	1
XLV.	A covenant	—	2
XLVI.	An oath	70	1
XLVII.	Perjury	—	4
XLVIII.	Marriage	71	1
XLIX.	Concubinage	74	1
L.	A community	76	1
LI.	A state of nature	—	2
LII.	A law	—	11
LIII.	The supreme civil power	—	13
LIV.	The principal kinds of government	—	14
LV.	Civil and municipal laws	—	16
LVI.	Laws of nations	83	1
LVII.	War	—	7
LVIII.	Public and private war	—	17
LIX.	Justice in a governor	89	6
LX.	Repentance	90	1
LXI.	Law of nature, and the natural laws of God	—	4
LXII.	The light of nature	—	5
LXIII.	The death of the man	91	1
LXIV.	The death of the mind	—	3
LXV.	When the mind may be said to be corporeal, explained	94	1
LXVI.	Theology	101	1
LXVII.	A miracle	—	3
LXVIII.	A divine revelation	102	1
LXIX.	An uncontrouled miracle	105	9
LXX.	Internal and external evidence	107	1
LXXI.	Positive institutions	108	1
LXXII.	Divine inspiration	137	1
LXXIII.	Inspiration of superintendency	—	2
LXXIV.	Plenary superintendent inspiration	—	5
LXXV.	Inspiration of elevation	—	8
LXXVI.	Inspiration of suggestion	—	11
LXXVII.	Supernatural gifts and powers	141	1
LXXVIII.	The books of the Apocrypha	153	1
LXXIX.	Person	159	4
LXXX.	Imputation of one person's actions or sufferings to another	167	1
LXXXI.	A satisfaction or atonement	169	1

Def.	Subject.	Lect.	Sect.
LXXXII.	Faith in Christ	171	1
LXXXIII.	Grace	175	1
LXXXIV.	Special grace	—	3
LXXXV.	Common and preparatory grace	—	5
LXXXVI.	A state of salvation	178	7
LXXXVII.	Perseverance of saints	—	8
LXXXVIII.	Predestination	184	1
LXXXIX.	The covenant of redemption	185	1
XC.	The covenant of grace	188	1
XCI.	The covenant of works	—	2
XCII.	The church of Christ	195	1
XCIII.	Divine right of Diocesan episcopacy	—	13
XCIV.	Seals of the covenant	200	1
XCV.	A sacrament	208	4
XCVI.	A type	209	1

A TABLE OF THE AXIOMS.

Ax.	Subject.	Lect.	Sect.
I.	Existence; the idea gained by consciousness and observation	1	1
II.	Thought; the idea gained by reflection	—	10
III.	That men have not one common consciousness	2	4
IV.	Volition; the idea gained by reflection	—	6
V.	Power active and passive, the idea how obtained	—	15
VI.	Succession, how the idea of it is obtained	10	1
VII.	Duration; the idea how obtained	—	10
VIII.	Some degree of desire necessary to action	15	9
IX.	Nothing can of itself arise into being	23	1
X.	A being must be at least equally excellent with the being produced by it	28	1
XI.	Space, in what manner we get the idea	46	1
XII.	Two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time	47	1
XIII.	The differences and relations of things, how we acquire the idea	52	1
XIV.	Actions are fit or unfit	—	2
XV.	How the mind judges of the beauty or turpitude of moral actions	—	7
XVI.	The moral turpitude of any being proportioned to his knowledge and freedom from temptation	54	3
XVII.	That gratitude is due for favours received	75	1

INTRODUCTION*.

It may be not improper, in the entrance of this work, to give some general account of the plan of it, and some directions for studying it in the most useful manner.

The work itself, contains an abstract of the most important and useful thoughts I have any where met with, on the chief subjects which can be supposed to come under consideration, in the review of Pneumatology, Ethics, and Divinity. And as these sciences do insensibly run into each other, I judged it not proper to treat of each separately, and so to divide the whole into three distinct parts, the first Pneumatological, the second Ethical, and the third Theological; but have chosen to consider them in such a connected view, as might convey to the mind, with the greatest ease and advantage, the principal truths relating to each. The whole work is divided, therefore, into ten parts, and contains in all 230 Lectures. The first part, (Lect. 1—22.) considers the powers and faculties of the human mind.—The second, (Lect. 23—51.) the being of a God, and his natural perfections.—The third, (Lect. 52—90.) treats of the nature of moral virtue in general, and of the moral attributes of the Deity: of the several branches of virtue, and the nature of civil government.—The fourth (Lect. 91—100.) of the immortality and immateriality of the human soul, with its original; as also our general obligation to virtue, and the state of it in the world.—The fifth (Lect. 101—110.) considers the reason to desire and expect a revelation, and the external and internal evidence with which we may suppose it should be attended.—The sixth (Lect. 111—153.) asserts and vindicates the genuineness, credibility, and inspiration of the Old and New Testament.—The seventh (Lect. 154—163.) contains an account of the scripture doctrine, relating to the existence and nature of God, and the divinity of the Son and Spirit.—The eighth (Lect. 164—187.) treats of the fall of human nature, and our recovery by the mediatorial undertaking of our Lord Jesus Christ, with the nature of faith in him, and of the covenant of grace established through him. So that the doctrine of Christ's atonement, and the Spirit's influences are also comprehended in this part.—The ninth (Lect. 188—209.) is a survey of the chief duties which the gospel requires; and more particularly of the positive institutions; in which the doctrine of the Christian sabbath, the sacraments, and the constitution of the church are considered.—The tenth and last part, (Lect. 210—230.) contains the scripture doctrine of angels, and of the future state, including the resurrection, and the most remarkable events to precede or attend it.

These are the great subjects of the work, and I believe the very mention of them is sufficient to shew, how important a part of an academical course it must make, and how much it must be the concern of every prudent and judicious student to give it a large share of his application.

For the more profitable studying this course of lectures, it will be advisable, that, as soon as possible after the lecture has been given, it be carefully reviewed, and the chief references read and contracted. But in contracting

* This introduction is to be considered as the author's address to his own pupils, when they entered upon this course of Lectures, which will shew the propriety of some of the directions, which might otherwise appear too particular and minute. C.

them, it will be unnecessary to transcribe those passages, the substance of which is already inserted in the lecture: it will be sufficient to take some general hints of their contents; and to transcribe only those parts, which are very peculiar and observable. And here some distinction is to be made between those books, which may very probably be always at hand in reviewing the lectures, and those which may not so probably be within your reach.

A diligent attendance on the course will, I hope, be both a pleasure and improvement: yet I would advise every pupil, if he can, to go over it twice; for though the subjects themselves, at the second review, will want the advantage of novelty, yet more thoughts will often arise in lecturing, and the whole will be made more familiar to the mind: besides, that the student will by this means have an opportunity of reading and studying some things, which accidental causes might have obliged him before to pass over without due attention.—And for this purpose, it may be very convenient to keep a catalogue of those lectures, which by absence, illness, or any other accidental circumstance, were not studied so carefully as might be wished; as likewise of those things, which did not, in the course of lecturing, appear solved and explained in a satisfactory manner. And if any difficulties arise, which seem peculiar, let them be drawn out in writing, to be lodged in the tutor's hands, or made the subject of a thesis, to be canvassed at large. In the mean time, full liberty will be given to make any objection or inquiry, from time to time, which will be examined in the hours of lecture, so far as the limits of time and other employments will allow.

Yet let it be remembered, that the student is supposed to be already acquainted with many things here brought into question. It would be a most fatal mistake, to act as if nothing were known of God and Christ, till the chief doctrines relating to both come to be examined in this course. Many small treatises, which may be read in a few hours, contain evidence enough, both of the being of a God, and the truth of the Christian religion, to satisfy an upright mind: though it may be convenient, that those who are to be the teachers and guardians of these truths, or those who may be exposed to peculiar temptations to doubt or disbelieve them, should be acquainted with their evidence in a larger extent. Let the great vital truths of Christianity taught in scripture be constantly regarded. As to matters of controversy, let them be referred to their proper place, without any eagerness to anticipate them; which often produces great bigotry and error, as well as a neglect of what is proposed to immediate inquiry. And may it never be forgotten, that matters of abstruse speculation and laborious inquiry, are not, even to Theological students, the *one thing needful*, though they may be important in subordination to it.

I would remind you, dear Sir, whoever you are, that are going over these lectures, that you may enter into eternity long before you can have attended, or even transcribed them: and therefore, I would beseech and charge you, by all your hopes and prospects there, that it be your daily and governing care, after having solemnly devoted your soul to God through Christ in the bonds of the Christian covenant, to live like his servant, to keep yourself in the love of God, and to endeavour in all things to adorn his gospel. So will you be most likely to succeed in your inquiries, through the communication of light from the great Father of lights: and so will you be prepared for the infinitely nobler discoveries, enjoyments, and services of the future state; even though you should be deprived of the residue of your days here, and cut short, as many of your brethren have been, in the intended studies and labours of this course.

LECTURES

ON

PNEUMATOLOGY, ETHICS, AND DIVINITY.

Parts First and Second, on Pneumatology.

PART I.

OF THE POWERS AND FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND.

LECTURE I.

Axioms and Definitions—Existence—Idea—Being—Properties—Body—Thought—Spirit—Natural Philosophy—Pneumatology—Ethics.

§ 1. *Ax.* EXISTENCE is a simple idea, which we get both by consciousness and observation [a].

§ 2. *Def.* Whatever our thoughts are immediately employed about, whether as simply perceiving it, or as asserting or denying any thing concerning it, is called an IDEA *.

§ 3. *Schol.* The definition more frequently given is, that an *idea* is the representation of a thing in the mind, which the mind immediately perceives; and the thing itself supposed to exist without our thoughts is called the *archetype* of the idea. But we do not yet choose to assert or deny any thing concerning the external existence of such supposed archetypes, and for this reason have not thought it so proper to use this definition.

§ 4. *Def.* Whatever exists is called a BEING.

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. vii. § 7. l. iv. c. ix. § 3.
BURNET at Boyle's Lect. vol. i. p. 2, 3.
GROVE's Posth. Works, vol. iv. p. 3, 4.

* This definition of idea is attended with some inconvenience; as it confounds *consciousness*, mental *notions*, and the *representation* of a thing in the mind, which last is generally and very properly called an *idea*. The author, however, had a right to use it in the sense here ascertained, though his reason for it may be questioned. W.

§ 5. *Schol.* We do not here enter largely into the distinction which the metaphysicians make between *Ens reale*, which exists without any dependence upon our thoughts, and *Ens rationis*, which owes its existence to its being the object of them; nor into the question between the *Realists* and the *Nominalists* *; but by *Being* in the process of this discourse we mean *Ens reale* [a].

§ 6. *Def.* Whatever is contained in the adequate idea of any being, is called its PROPERTIES.

§ 7. *Cor.* 1. A being is the same with all its properties taken together. And therefore

§ 8. 2. We can have no conception of any substance distinct from all the properties of the being in which they inhere; for this would imply that the being itself inheres, and so on to infinity [b].

§ 9. *Def.* BODY is an extended solid being [c].

§ 10. *Ax.* THOUGHT is a simple idea which we get by reflecting on what passes in our own minds [d].

§ 11. *Def.* SPIRIT is a thinking being, or a being which has the power of thought [e].

§ 12. *Cor.* 1. We have as clear an idea of spirit as we have of body; the essential properties of each being equally known, and the inward constitution equally unknown [f].

§ 13. 2. We are at least as certain of the existence of spirit as of body; the former we know by consciousness, which is always infallible; the other by the senses, which may be mistaken [g].

§ 14. *Schol.* 1. The *Cartesians* thought that those primary and essential properties of body and spirit, mentioned § 9, 11, of this *Lect.* were the respective substances from whence all their other properties flow: and Dr. *Watts* maintains the same opi-

a WATTS's Ontology, c. xvi.
WATTS's Logic, p. 27, 28.
b JENNINGS's Logic, Def. 15.
LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. iv. § 18. ib. l. ii. c. xiii. § 19, 20. ib. c. xxiii. § 2, 3, 6.
WATTS's Philos. Ess. ii. § 1.
c GRAVESEND's Phys. l. ii. c. iii. § 9, 12, 18.
LE CLERC's Phys. l. v. c. iii. § 1—3.
LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. iv.
d Camb. sur. l'Exist. p. 277, 278.
CROUZAZ's Log. vol. i. p. 10.
e LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 18.
f LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 15.
Proced. of Understand. p. 74—78.
g DES-CARTES's Princ. part i. § 7 and 11.
LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 31.

* The *Realists*, the chief of whom among the school divines were OUDARD, ALBERTUS MAGNUS, SCOTUS, and AQUINAS, maintained that *universals* and at least some modes have a *real* existence. The *Nominalists*, at the head of whom were JOHN the Sophist, ROBERT of Paris, ROSELIN, ARNOUL, and especially OCHAM, held on the contrary that universals and modes had not a real, but only a *nominal* existence; and that *names* not realities were the proper objects of logical and metaphysical disquisitions. For further information see Dr. ENFIELD's History of Philosophy, Dr. REES's Cyclopædia, Encyclopædia Britannica, and other works. W.

nion; urging that they agree with the received definition of substance, as they support the accidents of figure, size, colour, &c. in bodies, and doubting, fearing, willing, &c. in spirit; and both subsist independently on human power. He farther pleads, that we have no idea of the support of these properties, and that if these be destroyed, nothing will remain * [a].

§ 15. 2. A power of communicating motion by impulse is improperly mentioned by Mr. LOCKE among the essential properties of body, and that of moving body by volition among those of spirit † [b].

§ 16. *Def.* NATURAL PHILOSOPHY is that branch of learning which relates to *body*, giving an account of its various phenomena, and the principles on which the solution of them depends.

§ 17. *Def.* PNEUMATOLOGY is the doctrine of *spirits*, or that branch of science which relates to them.

§ 18. *Def.* ETHICS is that branch of learning by which our faculties are directed to that manner of acting, by which we may obtain the highest happiness, i. e. the supreme enjoyment of which our natures are capable.

LECT. II.

Of the Human Mind—Consciousness—Volition—Action—Agent—Patient—Natural Good—Natural Evil—Power—Faculties.

§ 1. *Def.* THE HUMAN MIND is that in or of a man which thinks [c].

§ 2. *Cor.* The human mind is a spirit. Comp. *Lect.* i. § 11.

§ 3. *Schol.* DES-CARTES in his definition calls it "a thinking, incorporeal, inextended substance, which shall survive the body to which it is united, and with which it was immediately created by God, in order to form a perfect man." It is evident that on this definition it will be matter of much

[a] DES-CARTES, Princ. part. i. § 53. WATTS's Ess. ii. præsert. § 2, 3.

[b] LOCKE Ess. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 17, 18.

[c] WATTS's Ess. ii. p. 59.

* This opinion, strenuously maintained by DES-CARTES and WATTS is now pretty generally, if not universally received. W.

† These are *accidental*, rather than *essential* properties of body and of spirit. W.

controversy whether man has a mind or not *. Yet he defines it something otherwise in his principles [a].

§ 4. *Ax.* It is evident that men have not one COMMON CONSCIOUSNESS.

§ 5. *Cor.* Every one has a mind peculiar to himself [b].

§ 6. *Ax.* VOLITION is a simple idea which we get by reflection.

§ 7. *Def.* ACTION signifies volition with the effect which we will.

§ 8. *Cor.* 1. Nothing can act but spontaneously.

§ 9. 2. Nothing but a thinking being can act; for spontaneity implies an idea of the action to be performed †.

§ 10. *Schol.* Action is commonly, though in a less proper sense, applied to irrational, and even inanimate beings, when the body immediately employed in producing a new effect, is said to act upon that in which it is produced, as the sunbeams upon the earth, the fire upon fuel [c].

§ 11. *Def.* As that being which acts is called the AGENT, so that which is acted upon is called the PATIENT, whether sensible or insensible, or whether the action produced be a pleasing or displeasing effect.

§ 12. *Def. Pleasure* and *pain* are simple *ideas:* that which tends to produce the former is called NATURAL GOOD, and that which tends to produce the latter NATURAL EVIL.

§ 13. *Cor.* The loss of good is evil, and the removal of evil is good.

§ 14. *Schol.* See an unnecessary description of *pain* in COLLIER'S Ess. part iii. p. 1 ‡.

a DES-CARTES Princ. part i. § 8.
b MORE'S Immort. of the Soul, l. iii. c. xvi. p. 212—216.
DITTON on the Resurrect. p. 467—471.
c WATTS's Ontology, p. 342.

* To avoid controversy, the definition should have been "A thinking, incorporeal, unextended substance;" the other parts, its being immediately created by God, and surviving the body, form separate questions; though by our author, from other considerations, admitted as important facts. If the whole of the definition be defended in the aggregate, those who hold that the soul is derived *ex traduce*, and those who maintain that it has no separate existence from the body, but is revived at the resurrection, must alike *deny that man has a mind.* But this consequence would not follow from the first part of the definition, though the *materialists* would still cavil at the terms *incorporeal* and *unextended.* W.

† It may be objected that our author does not here distinguish, with sufficient accuracy, between rational *volition* and *spontaneity.* This latter term belongs more properly to a brute than a man; but, has every brute, an oyster, or a moving animalcule "an *idea* of the action to be performed?" W.

‡ All descriptions of simple ideas and self-evident truths are, for the most part, unnecessary; and this instance is properly exposed as absurd. W.

§ 15. *Ax.* Power whether *active* or *passive* is a SENSIBLE IDEA, which we get by observing the changes produced in the beings about us by *agents* and *patients* [a].

§ 16. *Def.* Those *properties* or *powers* of any spirit, whereby it is rendered capable of action, enjoyment, or suffering, are called FACULTIES.

§ 17. *Prop.* To take a survey of the *principal faculties* of the human mind.

§ 18. *Sol.* 1. We find within ourselves a *power* of perceiving, abstracting, compounding, comparing, discerning, judging, reasoning, which all lead us on in the pursuit of truth, i. e. in the right apprehension of the nature of things, and are called by the common name of UNDERSTANDING [b].

§ 19. 2. The power of retaining and recollecting our *ideas* in the absence of their *archetypes* is what we call MEMORY. But when ideas or trains of ideas occur, or are called up by memory in a lively manner, and without regard to the order of former actual impressions and perceptions, it is said to be done by the power of the IMAGINATION or FANCY [c].

§ 20. 3. We perceive on many occasions various commotions in our minds; (which also produce changes and impressions, not only on the nerves of the brain, but in the exterior parts of the body,) which commotions we call PASSIONS. *Pleasure* and *pain* are the great hinges on which they turn, and the more particular modifications of them will be considered, Lect. xiv.

> Dr. WATTS describes them thus: "They are sensible commotions of our whole nature, both soul and body, which are occasioned by the perception of an object according to some special property that belongs to it." (WATTS on the Passions, p. 5.) To excite them, it must appear rare and uncommon, good, i. e. agreeable, or evil, i. e. disagreeable.

§ 21. 4. A power of forming *volitions;* which LOCKE defines to be the act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any particular action: but what that exerting its dominion is, can only be known by consciousness. § 6 [d].

a LOCKE'S Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 1, 2.
b DUNCAN'S Logic, ap. Precept. vol. ii. l. i. c. i. § 4. ib. l. ii. c. i. § 1. ib. l. iii. c. i. § 1, 2.
c HARTLEY on Man, vol. i. Introd. p. 8.
BALGUY'S VI. Serm. p. 44—46. Ibid. Serm. vol. i. p. 357—359.
d LOCKE'S Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 15.

§ 22. 5. A power of moving some parts of the body. Others it has no immediate power over, the motion of some being always involuntary, as that of the heart. In other parts, it is sometimes voluntary and sometimes otherwise, as in the lungs and intestines [a].

§ 23. *Dem.* We find by experience, that these faculties are in our own minds, and we perceive by their effects, they are in the minds of others.

§ 24. *Cor.* 1. Man is a being of great abilities and excellencies; so that if it shall hereafter appear that he was produced by any other intelligent being, it may reasonably be concluded, that he was designed for great and important purposes *.

§ 25. 2. While these faculties continue in a degree of vigour, he must be capable of great and noble improvements; so that much of the difference between persons in other respects equal, will depend upon the degree in which this natural furniture is cultivated or neglected.

§ 26. *Schol.* 1. It is not proper to speak of the understanding and other faculties of the soul as if they were distinct principles of action: the understanding is the soul understanding, the will is the soul willing: and to represent them as distinct agents produces confusion in our ideas [b].

§ 27. 2. The power which the mind evidently has of moving the various parts of the body by nerves inserted in the muscles, is truly wonderful, seeing the mind neither knows the muscles to be moved, nor the machinery by which the motion in it is to be produced: so that it is, as if a musician should always strike the right note on a very complex instrument, which he had never seen before. That no laws of mechanism can produce this, is proved by its being voluntary, as well as by other considerations [c].

§ 28. 3. It is questioned, whether there be any motion in the human body which depends upon the mind, and yet is involuntary †.

a DES CARTES de Pass. l. i. § 13, 16.
b WITSII Œcon. Fœd. l. iii. c. vii. § 4, 5.
LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 17—20.
CROUZAZ's Logic. vol. i. part i. c. viii. § 6. p. 144.
c CHEYNE's Princ. c. ii. § 12. p. 29—35.
MATHO, vol. i. p. 359. &c.

* Our author's mathematical form professes to take nothing for *granted*, but the *Arioms*, which are self-evident. It may be observed, once for all, that such a cautious, hypothetical mode of speaking, is not expressive of the evidence as it stood in the author's *mind*, but relates to the order of *evidence* in the course of investigation. W.

† The affirmative seems most *probable*; from a due consideration of some complaints which are, in a great measure, both generated and removed by the in-

§ 29. 4. BERKELEY entirely denies the power of abstraction, as an evident absurdity and inconsistency, and says, we have only a power of making one particular idea a representation of all the rest. But this is all grounded upon an unwary expression of Mr. LOCKE. The truth is, that we do not positively exclude, but only overlook a part of the idea from which we abstract: v. g. when I conceive of a line by abstraction, I do not deny that it is either straight or crooked, but only think of the flowing of a point without determining its direction *[a].

LECT. III.

Of Brute Animals, and their Powers.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO survey those phænomena observable in *brute animals*, which seem to bear some resemblance to the faculties of the human mind.

§ 2. *Sol.* 1. They seem to have a power of perception; v. g. to see, to hear, to smell, to taste, and to feel; and it seems, that it is by this power, that those bodies, which we call animal, are distinguished from those that are inanimate [b].

§ 3. 2. They seem also to have memory; which appears by the marks of their recollecting a train of ideas, when one that has a relation to the rest is by sensation presented anew; and especially by birds perfecting themselves by practice in tunes they have imperfectly learnt [c].

§ 4. 3. They appear capable of exerting volitions, and of putting them into execution by correspondent motions of their bodies.

§ 5. 4. They appear to be impressed with passions, as joy, sorrow, fear, hope, desire, gratitude, anger, &c. and sometimes in a very violent degree.

a LOCKE ib. l. ii. c. xi. § 9. Procced. of Underst. p. 186—188. BERKELEY's Princ. Introd. § 6—20.

b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. ix. § 11.

c LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. x. § 10. Procced. of the Underst. p. 158—162.

voluntary state of the mind, and of the different motions of the fluids in the hours of sleep, arising from the state of the mind, where volition is excluded. This also seems to be our author's opinion, who in defence of it appeals to anger and blushing, Vid. Lect. iv. § 4. W.

* For a farther elucidation of this subject, recourse may be had to REID's "Intellectual Powers of Man;" and Mr. DUGALD STEWART's "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind." K.

§ 6. 5. They appear not to have a power of abstraction, because they do not use articulate sounds as the signs of their ideas, though the organs of some are capable of pronouncing them[a].

§ 7. 6. They are incapable of any high degree of reasoning, since that evidently depends upon abstract ideas.—*Object.* Many of their actions seem *rational.*—*Ans.* They are, and in so high a degree, that if they were governed by any reason of their own, they would exceed the sagacity of the generality of men: yet in other instances they appear mere *idiots;* and in the actions of the same species there is so little variety, that we cannot imagine this to be the case. This must therefore be granted to be a very strange phænomenon[b].

§ 8. Cor. 1. The Cartesian hypothesis, that brutes are *mere machines,* is very incredible; since these phænomena can by no means be accounted for on any mechanical laws, nor upon any principles, which will not prove it possible, that those which appear to us human creatures may be mere machines, and not only irrational but insensible too[c] *.

§ 9. 2. It is evident that man is a creature superior to the brutes, though some authors have endeavoured to sink him to a level with them[d]. Vid. Lect. ii. § 17, &c.

§ 10. *Scol.* That plants are a species of animals, and have some sort of sensation, is strongly maintained, though with no appearance of reason by REDI and EDWARDS[e] †.

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xi. § 10, 11.
Proced. of the Underst. p. 188, 189.
b Spectat. No. 120. vol. ii. p. 139.
Spectac. de la Nat. vol. i. part ii. p. 70, 71.
COLLIB. Inq. into the Exist. p. 86, 87. Ed. 1. p. 100, 101. Ed. 3.
BEATTIE's Dissertations, p. 60—71.
REIMARUS's Dissertations, p. 216—218.
c DES-CARTES de Method. § 5. p. 34—36.
LE CLERC's Phys. l. iv. c. xii. § 9—13.
RAY's Wisdom of God, p. 54—57.
Proced. of Understand. p. 170—174.
Ess. upon Hunting, p. 52—92.
Relig. Philos. Contemp. xxii. § 42.
DITTON on the Resur. p. 392—400.
WATTS's Ruin and Recov. Append. Ess. i.
d BLOUNT's Anima Mundi, p. 40—46.
ORIG. adv. Celsum, l. iv. p. 217—222.
GELLI's Circe by Layng, pass.
DITTON on Resur. p. 395.
e REDI de Generat. Insect. p. 245—249, 257—260.
EDWARD's Exercit. No. viii. ad finem.

* The difficulty on the other side must not be concealed. If brutes are *more* than machines, what evidence have we from nature, that men *differ* from them except in the degree of intelligence? After all, it is difficult satisfactorily to ascertain, on natural principles, which is most honourable to man or worthy of God; the opinion of DES-CARTES, MALEBRANCHE and FENELON, which represents God as acting, not first on some brutal mind, which may move their bodies, but immediately on their organized frames, or that which our author endeavours to establish. W.

† This idea has lately been revived, and seems to be rather growing into fashion. See an ingenious Essay on the subject, by Dr. PERCIVAL, in the Manchester Philosophical Transactions. K.

LECT IV.

The Mind's Dependence on the Body.

§ 1. *Def.* THAT may be called a man's own BODY, which is the animal system over which his will exercises an immediate power, and by the organs of which, ideas are transmitted to his mind; and that is to be accounted a VITAL part of it, which partakes of its vegetation.

§ 2. *Prop.* To enumerate the principal phænomena of the *dependence* of the human mind on the body.

§ 3. *Sol.* 1. When the nerves of the body are moved, ideas are presented to our minds whether we will or no, according to the different senses, to which those nerves serve, which are put into agitation; that is, certain ideas in the *mind* succeed to certain motions in the *brain* [a].

§ 4. 2. Passions are often excited by bodily motions; and on the other hand, when raised, produce changes in the body, sometimes even contrary to our volitions; v. g. in *anger* and *blushing* [b].

§ 5. 3. When the body is indisposed, the mind is often disabled from using its faculties: v. g. the understanding is disabled by drunkenness and sleep, motion by the palsy, memory by diseases, &c.

§ 6. 4. When the senses are gently and naturally shut up, and the command over the body intermitted, as in sleep, if we think at all, we are said to dream; and generally wander through airy tracks of thought, which have no agreement with each other, nor are at all corrected by the judgment. Ideas fetched out of the memory, seem to us to be produced anew; and out of *mere simple ideas* laid up in the memory, *new imaginary ideas* of substances are formed, and seem to be produced by external objects. When the senses are obstructed in a violent and unnatural manner, as in a swoon, if we think at all, we may observe the same phænomena, but in a still more languid degree [c].

§ 7. 5. In a frenzy, though the senses be not shut up, nor the command of the mind over the body suspended, yet the same

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. i. § 25.
CHEYNE's Princip. c. iii. § 39. p. 228, 229.
DES-CARTES de Pass. § 34.
—— Prin. part iv. § 197. p. 216.

b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xx. § 17.
DES-CARTES de Pass. § 97—106, 113—135.

c Lime-street Lect. vol. ii. p. 442, 443.
DES-CARTES Dioptics, c. vi. § 17.
ROHAULT's Phys. l. iv. c. xix.
LUCRET. l. iv. ver. 905—1044.
HERVEY's Med. vol. ii. p. 43. note.

phænomena are found as in sleep, only in a more vivid and pathetic degree[a].

§ 8. 6. Sometimes by very intense thinking, we do not attend to impressions made on the organs of sensation, nor receive ideas from them. This, in a very high degree, may be called a trance or ecstasy[b].

§ 9. *Cor.* Man is a very feeble creature, and we have little reason to boast of those intellectual powers, the exercise of which, by the very constitution of our nature, does not only depend upon an animal system, but is necessarily subject to frequent long interruptions, as in the state of sleep[c].

LECT. V.

Of Men's Intellectual Capacities—The Seat of the Soul.

§ 1. *Schol.* 1. IT is queried to what we are to ascribe the difference to be found in the intellectual capacities of men.

Answ. The principles of physiognomy, the decay of the faculties in old age, the destruction or restoration of them by corporeal accidents, and many of the phænomena mentioned in the proposition, may convince us, that the temperature and constitution of the body has a great influence on the mind. It must also be allowed, that the circumstances of education and conversation may make a considerable difference between persons in other respects equal. Yet if we attend to the variety there is in all the works of nature, we may be inclined to think, there is a like variety in the internal constitution of human souls: which conjecture is confirmed by observing, that no visible difference has yet been discovered between the brain of the weakest and the most sagacious of mankind; as well as, that persons in the same circumstances, and with the same opportunities, often make very different improvements *[d].

a ARETÆUS de Morb. Acut. l. ii. c. iv, v. p. 17. Boer. Ed. Vid. Boer. Not. in loc.
b PLUTARCH's Lives, vol. ii. p. 435, 436. LOCKE's Essays l. ii. c. ix. § 3, 4. ib. c. ii. § 19. FLAVEL's Pneumat. ap. Opera, p. 276, 277. Edin. Ed.—Vol. i. p. 475, 476. Lond. Ed. GUALTHERIUS in Acts x. 10.
c COL. GARDINER's Memoirs, § 30—32. BURNET's Theory, vol. ii. p. 164. CAMB. sur l'Exist. p. 176, 177. HERVEY's Contempl. vol. ii. p. 39, 40, 48—50.
d DES-CARTES de Method, sub init. p. 1. WATT's Death and Heaven, p. 97—102.

* These objects of speculation, being more curious than immediately useful, may well be referred by young students to future consideration.——K.

Much attention has been paid of late to the form of the human head, and the conformation of its parts; in order to ascertain a correspondence between these and the qualities of the mind. Dr. GALL, who lately lectured at Vienna, thinks he can

§ 2. 2. Some have distinguished between the *rational* and the *animal* soul, as if they were two distinct beings, calling the former the spirit, the latter the soul They suppose the intellect and will are seated in the former, the passions and appetites in the latter; and that the soul is a principle common to brutes, which therefore they sometimes call by very contemptible names, as the horse, the brute, &c. whereas they think the spirit is peculiar to man. Vid. Lect. 2. § 26[a].

§ 3. *Def.* The SOUL is said to be *seated* in that part of the body where sensation terminates, and voluntary motion begins.

§ 4. *Prop.* The SOUL is seated in the brain.

§ 4. *Dem.* 1. The nerves, on which sensation and motion evidently depend, terminate in the brain, or in the *medulla spinalis*, which is derived from thence, and whose fibres are probably all continued to it.

§ 5. 2. If a strait ligature be made on any nerve, or it be cut asunder, sensation continues in that part nearest the brain, and ceases in that which is more remote.

§ 6. 3. In men, and in most other animals, death immediately ensues, if the head be cut off, or the brains taken out, or the cerebellum wounded.

§ 7. 4. All known distempers that immediately take away sensation, are seated in the head. Therefore,

§ 8. 5. The SOUL is seated in the *brain**[b]. Q. E. D. Vid. Lect. 4. § 1.

§ 9. *Cor.* The ancients were mistaken in placing it in the heart; and VAN HELMONT in the mouth of the stomach. It may be observed by the way, that PHILO, who, with many ancients, supposed the sensitive soul to be subdivided into the irascible

a Proced. of the Underst. l. ii. c. x. p. 367, 370—377.
MARC. ANTON. l. ii. § 2. l. iii. § 16. l. xii. § 3. with Duc. Notes.
DES-CARTES de Pass. part i. § 47.
POPE's Iliad, l. xviii. ver. 122. vol. vi. p. 61, 62.
HALLET on Script. vol. i. p. 39—49.
SAURIN's Dissert. vol. ii. p. 527.
COLLIB. Ess. i. § 1.
MASON on Self Knowledge, l. i. c. ii. p. 14.
VITRING. Obs. l. iii. c. iv. præs. § 2—8.

b KEIL's Anat. c. vii. § 1.
MORE's Immort. of the Soul, l. ii. c. vii. § 10.
WATTS's Ess. iii. p. 78—80.

assign to the brain the place of each of the faculties of the soul. But his theory is too full of assumption, fancy, and conjecture, to be ranked among the discoveries of real science.——W.

* The question concerning the seat of the soul, for a long time excited the attention of philosophers, and has been the subject of various discussion. At present, we believe that it is deemed of little importance.——K.

The force of this demonstration depends on the form of the definition; but a previous question is, Whether we ought to say, that the soul is *seated* where sensation terminates? or, properly speaking, in *any part* of the body? In other words, whether *ubiety* belongs to the soul?——W.

and concupiscible, placed the former in the heart, the latter in the belly, while he thought the rational was seated in the head[a].

§ 10. *Schol.* 1. It must still be matter of controversy, in what part of the brain the soul is seated. There is no reason to think, as some have imagined, that it is in the meninges; but, whether it be in the pineal gland, as DES-CARTES supposes; or as Dr. MORE thinks, among the animal spirits in the fourth ventricle, or in the corpora striata, as has been lately maintained in France, or in some part different from any of these, we cannot certainly say *[b].

§ 11. 2. The constitution of some animals may perhaps be different from that of men in this respect. It is certain, the phænomena mentioned § 3. are not always to be found in them; for wasps will live a long time after their heads are cut off; eels are soonest killed by striking them on the tail; and vipers will live some hours after their heads are cut off, and their bowels taken out[c].

LECT. VI.

Of Innate Ideas.

§ 1. *Def.* ANY *idea* or *proposition* is said to be innate, when it is not acquired by the use of the faculties, but so implanted in the mind from its original, as to be common to the whole species, independently upon any circumstances in which individuals may be placed †.

§ 2. *Prop.* There are no *innate ideas* in the human mind.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. There can no SIMPLE idea be assigned, but may be traced up to sensation or reflection, or both: v. g. to one sense alone; as seeing green, hearing the sound of an organ, smelling a rose, tasting a peach, feeling solidity, &c. or more; as extension, motion, rest: to reflection only, as percep-

a VITRINGA ubi supra, § 4. sub fin.
MORE, ibid. l. ii. c. vii. § 5—10.
DES-CARTES de Pass. § 38.
COLLIB. on the Soul, Ess. i. § 3.

b DES-CARTES de Pass. § 32.
MORE, ibid. l. ii. c. vii. § 12—18. c. viii. per tot.
c MORE, ibid. l. iii. c. xv. § 1, 2.
BACON's Nat. Hist. Cent. 4. No. 400.

* Dr. GALL pretends to find the *seat* of the faculty of observation immediately behind the forehead; and the organ of courage a little above the ear. Who knows but the time will come, when we shall have exact representations, exhibited to the eye, of the residence of each faculty of the mind in the human body, even as now our dwellings are seen in a full map!——W.

† There is a wide difference between an innate *proposition*, and an innate *idea*, according to our author's definition of "Idea." While the former is denied the latter may be allowed, since *consciousness* is included in it.——W.

tion, volition, duration: or sensation and reflection both, as existence and various kinds of pleasure and pain. Vid. Lect. I. § 1[a].

§ 4. 2. We see that *simple* ideas are acquired gradually, and the furniture of various persons differs according to their various circumstances in life[b].

§ 5. 3. When the organs of sensation are destroyed, *simple ideas proper to them* are no more acquired; and those, who from their birth, want proper organs, want correspondent ideas, even though they be ever so important to the comfort and usefulness of life[c]. Therefore,

§ 6. 4. It is needless and unreasonable to suppose, that any simple ideas are innate.

§ 7. 5. COMPOUND ideas are made up of *simple* ones, nor can we, by any operation of the mind, produce any idea how chimerical soever, the materials of which we are not already possessed of[d]. Hence,

§ 8. 6. It is needless and unreasonable to suppose any of our ideas *innate*[e]. Q. E. D*.

a LOCKE, l. ii. c. iii, v—vii. Ibid. c. i. § 2, 7—9.
b LOCKE, l. ii. c. i. § 2, 5, 7, 20—23.
c LOCKE, l. i. c. iv. § 20. Ibid. l. ii. c. iii. § 1.
d LOCKE, l. ii. c. ii. § 2. Ibid. c. xii. § 8.
e Proced. of Underst. p. 382—384. MORE's Philos. Works, l. i. c. 5, 6.

* The force of this demonstration, it may be objected, depends on a *petitio principii*, that every simple idea may be traced to either sensation or reflection. If we admit this principle, it must be in favour of a definition of "idea" different from what our author has given. According to that, consciousness is an idea; but to say that *all consciousness* is derived from either sensation or reflection, in the proper sense of these words, is inadmissible. If by *innate* be understood any whatever source of ideas which is not included in sensation or reflection, then it may be urged, that our notion of positive infinity, or of God, is innate; for our idea of *growing* infinity which is derived from sensation and reflection, is essentially different. Besides, that *notion* which is itself the measure of compatibility or incompatibility actually presides over *all* sensations and reflections, and therefore cannot be the offspring of either.

The chief question at issue is, and which is of greater moment in religion than is commonly imagined, is our just notion of the divine essence derived from either sensation, or reflection, or both? Many, no doubt, have their ideas of what they *call* God from thence; but they will, probably, be found false and dangerous. That notion which is attained by magnifying finites *ad infinitum* has an object essentially and infinitely different from the divine essence; but the only idea we can have of infinity from sensation and reflection is that of a FINITE EVER-GROWING. If our notion of God have not a *more innate* origin than this, it concerns us to know whether we have any notion of him at all but what is *idolatrous*.

A mind properly disposed may, by a just comparison of ideas, attain to a certainty that there is a God; but this certainty implies that there is an adequate ground for it in one of the ideas compared, yet this cannot be, if *positive* infinity, existence, independance, &c. be not *perceived* (though not *comprehended*) as *implied* in one of the ideas. It follows therefore, that though *every* man *do not* clearly per-

§ 9. *Schol.* 1. Dr. WATTS supposes, there are three sources of our ideas, viz. sensation, reflection, and abstraction; but since he grants that the materials of the last are derived from the two former, this cannot be reckoned a third primary source, any more than compounding[a].

§ 10. 2. BROWN, in his Procedure of the Understanding, maintains that we have all our *ideas* originally from sensation: but his proof depends entirely upon his definition of the word idea, which he takes for a picture or representation of some sensible object laid up in the imagination; which is different from our definition of it[b]. Vid. Lect. 1. § 2.

§ 11. 3. Most of those ideas which arise from reflection, come into the mind later than those which arise from sensation[c].

§ 12. 4. Many errors in our ideas of sensation are rectified by reflection[d].

LECT. VII.

Of Innate Propositions.

§ 1. *Prop.* THERE are no *innate propositions* in the human mind.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. All propositions consist of ideas: therefore innate propositions would imply innate ideas, contrary to Lect. 6. § 2[e].

§ 3. 2. If any propositions could be supposed innate, it must be those that are intuitively discerned; but these, though assented to as soon as proposed, are not known before such proposal, even by those whose minds are least corrupted by education and custom: which shews, by the way, that they cannot be the principles of all our knowledge, not being themselves first known[f].

§ 4. 3. All propositions relating to *identity* and *diversity* of ideas may be intuitively discerned, and consequently must be

a WATTS's Phil. Ess. iii. § 16. p. 93—97.
b Proced. of Underst. p. 55, 63—66.
PRICE's Rev. of Mor. c. i. § 2.
MONBOD. on the Orig. and Progr. of Lang. vol. i. p. 1—184.
c LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. i. § 8.
d LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. ix. § 8, 9.
SMITH's Optics, vol. ii. Append. p. 27, 28.
LOCKE's Fam. Lett. p. 134—138.
WATTS's Logic, part ii. c. iii. § 3.
REID on the Hum. Mind, c. vi. § 3, 9.
e LOCKE's Ess. l. i. c. iv. § 19.
f LOCKE's Ess. l. i. c. ii. § 4, 16, 21—27.

ceive a being *absolutely* great and excellent, yet every man who perceives this conclusion with *certainty*, "that there is such a being," must perceive, or have *such* an idea of him, as is included in the premises of that conclusion. To which may be added, that *every* man *may*, if it be not his own fault, have that idea of God's *absolute existence*, as implied in the consistent *belief* of the true God.——W.

innate, if intuitive discerning were the mark of an innate proposition. But this would imply, that all our ideas were innate, which is evidently absurd[a].

§ 5. 4. Propositions supposed innate cannot be distinguished from others, so that a complete catalogue of them should be made: yet this might reasonably be expected, if any were so, and would be necessary to render them useful[b].

§ 6. 5. Several of those propositions which are of greatest importance in morality, and seem most evident, and are therefore most likely to be innate, are unknown to some, and expressly contradicted by others, and all need proof. *Valet propositio*[c].

§ 7. *Schol.* 1. It may be granted, that there are certain circumstances, in which it is impossible for the mind to avoid receiving certain ideas, and assenting to certain propositions, and even taking them for granted in all its reasonings: and this is the necessary consequence of its constitution. It may also be granted, that there is something in natural temper disposing to gratitude, compassion, &c. as effectually, as if propositions recommending them were inscribed upon the soul. But this is by no means inconsistent with what has been said above: and in this sense Mr. LOCKE owns innate practical principles, as the desire of happiness[d].

§ 8. 2. The dream of *innate ideas* seems to have arisen on the one hand, from the desire of teachers to impose their own sentiments upon their disciples, as sacred truths stampt on their minds by the author of nature; and on the other, from the ease with which such principles have been early received, and the assurance with which they have been assented to, so that people cannot remember, that they have ever doubted of them[e] *.

a LOCKE's Ess. l. i. c. iv. § 4, 5. Ibid. l. iv. c. vii. § 4.
b LOCKE's Ess. l. i. c. iii. § 14. Ibid. c. iv. § 21.
c LOCKE's Ess. l. i. c. iv. § 4—13.
SALE's Pref. to the Koran, p. 131, 132.
WATTS's Ess. iv. § 1.
BAXTER's Works, vol. ii. p. 381.
d LOCKE's Ess. l. i. c. iii. § 3.
WATTS's Ess. iv. § 2—4. p. 100—102, 104—107.
LAW's Theory of Rel. p. 8, &c.
SHAFTSB. Lett. to a Stud. viii.
e LOCKE's Ess. l. i. c. iii. § 21—26. Ibid. c. iv. § 24.

* On this important subject Mr. LOCKE was not guarded; and some of his many admirers have but too naturally drawn consequences from his doctrine not a little prejudicial to the interests of true piety. He did well to expose monkish ignorance, and the arbitrary imposition of dogmas on the Human Mind, to the exclusion of appropriate evidence; but in so doing he should not have opened a door for a greater evil, a species of refined idolatry.

From the advocates of Mr. LOCKE in this view of the subject, we fain would learn, whether the conclusion of a syllogism that teaches knowledge or certainty can legitimately contain *more* than both the premises: and whether, on his principles, it

LECT VIII.

Of Different Ideas excited—Memory.

§ 1. *Prop.* THE same external qualities in objects may excite different ideas in different persons.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. If the organs of sensation be at all different, the ideas of the same object must be proportionably so, while the same laws of nature prevail.

§ 3. 2. It is probable, there may be some degree of difference in the organs of different persons; v. g. in the distance of the retina and chrystalline humour of the eye; in the degree of extension in the tympanum of the ear, in the acrimony of the saliva, &c. And the variety, which is observable in the faces, the voices, and the bones of men, and almost through the whole face of nature, would lead us to suspect, that the same variety might take place here.

§ 4. 3. Those things which are very pleasing to one, are extremely disagreeable to another.

§ 5. 4. Those things which are at one time very agreeable, are at another very disagreeable to the same person, when the organs of his body are indisposed, or when other disagreeable ideas are associated with those that had once been grateful.—*Valet propositio*[a].

§ 6. *Schol.* Though the causes mentioned above may probably produce ideas which differ in degree in the minds of different persons, there is no apparent reason to suppose they differ in their kind; v. g. that what appears green to one, should constantly appear red to another, and vice versâ[b].

§ 7. *Prop.* To survey the phænomena of the HUMAN MEMORY, with the solutions that have been given of some of them. Lect. 2. § 19.

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxxii. § 15.
Ars Cogit. par. i. c. i.
LE CLERC's Log. par. 1. c. i. § 15.

b MALEBRANCHE's Research. l. i. c. xiii. § 5, 6.
ROHAULT's Phys. par. i. c. xxvii. § 6. vol. i. p. 197.
Philos. Trans. vol. lxviii. par. ii. 1778.

is possible to come at a *certainty* that there is *absolute* infinity, independence, power, &c. in a word, that there is a God?

The principles of LOCKE are, 1. That we have no idea or notion at all, from whence to reason with certainty, but what is derived from sensation or reflection; and, 2. That we have no idea of infinity, existence, power, wisdom, &c. but what we derive from finite objects.—But if so, the *premises*, or ideas of these finite objects, are but *finite* ideas ever-growing; how then can the conclusion *assert absolute* infinity, absolute existence? Or must we say that absolute infinity is *included* in that which is not so, in order to render the conclusion valid?——W.

§ 8. *Sol.* 1. A vast stock of ideas are treasured up in the *memory*, which it easily produces on various occasions.

The Cartesians say, that objects coming in by sensation, and ideas got by reflection, make traces in the brain.—But how exquisitely fine must these be, when in so small a compass the names and images of so many objects, as well as so many propositions and arguments are inscribed. Who can sufficiently admire it, not only in such extraordinary cases as are mentioned by DERHAM, &c. but in those cases which are most common[a]?

§ 9. 2. We can distinguish ideas brought out of the memory from those, that come in by sensation or reflection; perhaps by the liveliness of the impression, or by the train of relations[b].

§ 10. 3. Ideas, of which we have but a general and imperfect remembrance, may often be recovered by recollection[c].

§ 11. 4. Memory in a great measure depends upon the body, and is often much injured by a disease, and afterwards recovered with recovering strength, which, on the Cartesian hypothesis, is accounted for by supposing, that those parts of the brain on which these characters are written, are by such disorders relaxed, in the same manner as the nerves in the other parts of the body are liable to be weakened or disabled.

§ 12. 5. The memory differs at different ages. Children soon forget, as they soon learn: old people learn with difficulty, and remember best what they learnt when young. That is, say the Cartesians, because the brain growing by degrees more dry retains old characters, but does not easily admit new[d].

§ 13. 6. Dreams generally make little impression on the memory: because, say some, the animal spirits are then but gently moved[e].

§ 14. 7. An idea attended with great pleasure or pain makes a deep impression on the memory, i. e. a deep trace on the brain, the spirits being then violently impelled[f].

§ 15. 8. The power of recollecting differs extremely at different times: and it is generally strongest, when we are most brisk and lively.

§ 16. 9. We remember that best in the morning, which we

a DERHAM's Phys. Theol. l. v. c. i. p. 262.
DES-CARTES de Pass. § 42.
CICERO's Tusc. Disp. l. i. § 24, 25.
WATTS's Ess. iii. § 13, 14.
ROLLIN Manière, &c. vol. i. p. 275—277.
AUGUST. Confes. l. x. c. 7.
SENEC. Controv. l. i. sub init.
RAMSAY Princip. vol. i. p. 36.
MELMOTH's Pliny, vol. i. b. vi. ep. ii. note.

b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. vi. § 5, 6.
DES-CARTES de Pass. § 26.
c WATTS's Ess. iii. § 15.
LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. x. § 7.
d WATTS's Improv. p. 255, &c.
BAXTER on the Soul, v. 13.
CAMB. Educ. des Filles, p. 25, 26.
e WATTS's Ess. v. § 2.
f LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. x. § 3.

learnt just before we went to sleep: because, say the Cartesians, the traces made then are not apt to be effaced by the motions of the spirits, as they would, if new objects of sensation had presented themselves; and during this interval, they have, as it were, time to stiffen.

§ 17. 10. Sensible ideas gradually decay in the memory, if they be not refreshed by new sensations; the traces perhaps wearing out: yet they may last many years [a].

§ 18. 11. When a train of ideas is very familiar to the mind, they often follow one another in the memory without any laborious recollection, and so as to arise almost instantaneously and mechanically; as in writing, singing, &c. the traces between them being worn like beaten roads [b].

§ 19. 12. The memory is a faculty, which is almost incessantly exercised, while thought continues; (though the instances of laborious recollection are comparatively few:) nor do we ever find the human mind entirely stript of it, though it be often impaired.

LECT. IX.

Of Memory, according to Cartesius.

§. 1. *Dem.* THE probability of the Cartesian hypothesis will appear from considering,

§ 2. 1. How well it agrees with the various phænomena mentioned above.

§ 3. 2. The analogy upon this hypothesis between sensation and memory, the one arising from impressions made on the brain, the other depending on traces continued there.

§ 4. 3. The instances in which memory has been almost wholly lost at once by a sudden violent blow upon the head; insomuch that a great scholar has entirely lost the knowledge of letters by it, and has been forced with infinite labour to begin again from the elements of them: and in other instances the recollection has been gradual, and the events of childhood and youth have been recovered first [c].

§ 5. *Cor.* The memory is a useful faculty, which deserves

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. x. § 4, 5.
b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxviii. § 6.
c COLLIB. on the Soul, Ess. i. § 9. CLERICI Pneum. l. iv. 8—17. HARTLEY on Man, c. iii. § 1.

to be carefully cultivated by attention and exercise, frequent reviews and conversation [a].

§ 6. *Schol.* 1. The artificial methods which some have proposed must be allowed to be very ingenious; but perhaps are rather calculated to improve a memory already good, than to help a bad one [b].

§ 7. 2. The excellency of the memory consists partly in its strength of retention, and partly in its quickness of recollection [c].

§ 8. 3. If the *Cartesian* hypothesis should be admitted, memory will still continue a great mystery: for it must be acknowledged impossible thoroughly to explain how either that or sensation should be affected by any impression on the brain, or what connection there can be between such impressions and thought in any of its modes.

§ 9. 4. Mr. LOCKE accounts for the association of ideas, which is the cause of antipathies and many errors, with other strange phænomena, by memory; supposing such traces are worn on the brain as unite ideas, so that when the mind turns to one it should almost necessarily fall on the other too [d]. *Lect.* 8. § 18.

§ 10. 5. If the *Cartesian* hypothesis be admitted, it must be owned that nothing gives a greater idea of the minuteness of the parts into which matter may actually be divided, than the smallness of those traces, by which so many dictionaries, histories, poems, &c. are transcribed, and so many pictures exactly drawn in miniature *.

§ 11. 6. It is probable the weakness of memory in infants may be one chief cause of their being so long before they come to the use of speech, as well as the want of dexterity in using the organs of it.

a Free-Thinker, No. 72.
ROLLIN's Man. &c. vol. i. p. 277—279.
WATT's Improv. of the Mind, part i. c. xvii.
b ROLLIN's Man. &c. vol. i. p. 279, 280.
GREY's Memoria Technica.
BRUEN's Life, p. 56—58.
c LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. x. § 8.
d LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxxiii. § 7—18.
HARTLEY on Man, Prop. X. XI. vol. i. p. 65—72.

* That memory is an original faculty given us by the author of our being, of which we can give no account, but that we are so made, is maintained by Dr. REID, in his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man," p. 303—310. For an account of the different theories concerning memory, see the same author, p. 338—356. K.

LECT. X.

Of Succession, Duration, and Time.

§ 1. *Ax.* WE get our ideas of SUCCESSION, by observing the train of ideas passing through our minds one after another [a].

§ 2. *Prop.* The swiftness and slowness of the succession of ideas in the human mind have certain limits.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. Some motions are so swift, and others so slow, that they cannot be seen.

§ 4. 2. Motion is always successive.

§ 5. 3. Could our ideas succeed each other as fast as the bodies move in one case, and as slow as they move in the other, the motion would become visible.

§ 6. 4. The swiftness and slowness of ideas coming in by sight have their limits.

§ 7. 5. There is equal reason to believe it with regard to other ideas; as some of the like phænomena may be observed concerning some ideas that come in by hearing.

§ 8. 6. We are not able to retain one idea long in the mind without any variation; nor can we call up any given number of ideas, in any given time; v. g. we cannot think over ten verses between one vibration of the pendulum, and another [b]. *Valet propositio.*

§ 9. *Schol.* It is evident there are various degrees of velocity in the ideas of different persons, and of the same person at different times; partly according to the temper in which he is, and partly according to the degree in which he exercises his volitions: and where the velocity is the same, it will seem greater, in proportion as the kinds of ideas are more various [c].

§ 10. *Ax.* The idea of DURATION is a simple idea, which we get by reflecting on the succession of our ideas [d].

§ 11. *Cor.* When we are insensible of the succession of our ideas, we are also insensible of duration [e].

§ 12. *Def.* TIME is a part of duration measured by some supposed equal succession, a certain number of which makes a period or epocha [f].

a LOCKE'S Ess. l. ii. c. xiv. § 4.
b LOCKE'S Ess. l. ii. c. xiv. § 6—14.
c WATTS'S Ess. No. xii. § 2. Elem. of Crit. vol. i. c. 9.
d LOCKE'S Ess. ib. § 1—3.
e LOCKE'S Ess. ib. § 4. 5.
f LOCKE ib. § 17. AUGUST. Confess. l. ii. c. xiv. apud JACKSON'S Works, vol. i. p. 883. YOUNG'S Night Thoughts, p. 34. WATTS'S Ontology, c. iv. and xii. HERMES, p. 104—114.

§ 13. *Schol.* 1. The revolutions of the heavenly bodies serve for a convenient measure of time, seeing they are long, various, publicly visible, and nearly equable. Yet any phænomena returning periodically and regularly, (v. g. the freezing of water, the blowing of flowers, a fit of the ague, &c.) might with regard to any particular person answer the same end [a].

§ 14. 2. Nevertheless, in the absence of such assistance, the train of ideas passing through a man's mind may be to himself the measure of time: though neither this nor any other measure can be demonstrated entirely equable [b].

§ 15. 3. When the duration of any being is said to be either long or short, it is only as compared with that of other beings [c].

§ 16. *Cor.* 1. The same part of duration may appear of different lengths to different persons, and to the same persons at different times [d]. See *Lect.* 8. § 6.

§ 17. 2. Hence we may learn the reason why years (*cæteris paribus*) appear longer to us while very young, than as we grow up to riper age; because the objects being newer, strike the mind more forcibly, and so the succession is more observed than when they grow more familiar to the mind. The like may be observed of the day we spend in a strange place, or a road we are not used to travel. Yet if by frequent repetition a thing is grown tedious to us, it appears of a longer duration; because we mingle many other ideas with it, and therefore on the whole there is a greater succession.

§ 18. 3. If an almighty power be supposed, it may make that part of duration, which appears but a moment to one, appear a thousand years to another, or a much greater period, and *vice versâ*; which is indeed an amazing thought.

§ 19. 4. Time is not (as it has often been said to be) the measure of motion, but motion is one, though not the only measure of time: for if there were no material world, and so no motion, there might still be time, if there were any intellectual beings, whose ideas succeed each other [e]. See § 13.

a LOCKE ib. § 19, 20.
b LOCKE'S Ess. ib. § 21.
c Free-Thinker, vol. iii. No. 114.
LE CLERC'S Logic, part i. c. iv. § 6.
d Spectator, vol. i. No. 94.
MALEBR. l. i. c. 8.
Elem. of Crit. vol. i. c. 2. App.
e LOCKE'S Ess. ib. § 22, 23.
JACKSON'S Works, vol. i. l. v. c. xiii. § 2. p. 881, 882.
REID'S Intellect. Pow. of Man, p. 310—314. 322—331.

LECT. XI.

The Primary and Secondary Qualities of Bodies—The Imperfection of Human Knowledge.

§ 1. *Def.* THOSE PROPERTIES or QUALITIES of bodies, are called PRIMARY, which are in them, whether we perceive them or not: (v. g. bulk, number, figure, situation of their solid parts, motion, rest, &c.) But those ideas, which by means of these primary qualities are excited in our minds, as colours, sounds, smells, tastes, &c. (being vulgarly but falsely supposed to be in bodies) are called SECONDARY QUALITIES [a].

§ 2. *Schol.* Mr. LOCKE farther divides secondary qualities into those that are *immediately* perceivable, i. e. by the ideas which the bodies themselves produce in us; and those that are *mediately* perceivable, i. e. by the changes which we see them produce in other bodies [b] *.

§ 3. *Prop.* To enumerate several instances and causes of the imperfection of human knowledge.

§ 4. *Sol. and Dem.* 1. We are ignorant of many things for want of ideas, perhaps wanting proper organs for such kind of ideas, and certainly wanting such an intenseness of those organs which we have, as would be necessary to discover many things which are now concealed from us by their distance or minuteness. This occasions great imperfections in our knowledge both of body and spirit [c].

§ 5. 2. We are not able to discern the connection between many of those ideas which we have, particularly that between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies, which is a great impediment to physical enquiries [d].

§ 6. 3. Few important propositions are intuitively known; and all demonstrative knowledge depends upon the memory, which, being fallible, brings some degree of uncertainty on what we learn by it [e].

§ 7. 4. We are often obliged to judge by analogy, the par-

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. viii. § 8—22.
WATT's Ess. No. iii. p. 81—85.
ROHAULT's Physics. vol. i. c. 10.
b LOCKE's Ess. ib. § 23—26.
c LOCKE's Ess. l. iv. c. iii. § 23—27.
d LOCKE's Ess. l. iv. c. iii. § 9—17. ib. c. vi. § 11—15.
WATT's Ess. No. iii. § 9.
e LOCKE's Ess. l. iv. c. ii. § 4—7. ib. c. iii. § 3. c. xi. § 9—11.

* See this whole matter amply discussed by Dr. REID, in his "Intellectual Powers of Man." p. 75—302.

ticulars of which are generally very imperfect, and come vastly short of a complete induction[a].

§ 8. 5. The various avocations of life, an indolent temper, and wrong methods of pursuing knowledge, hinder our attaining what might otherwise come within our reach[b].

§ 9. *Cor.* Since our knowledge is so limited, it must be of great use and importance to know the limits of it[c].

§ 10. *Schol.* 1. Nevertheless, we are not destitute of capacities and opportunities for coming to the knowledge of those things on which our happiness most evidently depends[d].

§ 11. 2. The question, whether there be any material world or not, will come in with greater advantage hereafter: yet were the negative to be granted, (which Bishop BERKLEY maintains,) the same difficulties with those above-mentioned would occur, with a little alteration of phrase.

LECT. XII.

Of Personal Identity.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO enquire wherein PERSONAL IDENTITY consists *

§ 2. *Sol.* 1. Mr. LOCKE supposes it consists in a continued consciousness of the same actions; and from thence infers, that, if the consciousness of one spirit were to be transferred to another, they would both make but one person; and that, if any spirit should lose all consciousness of its former actions, it would from that time become a different person. To confirm this, he pleads that, when it is evidently apparent that consciousness is lost, i. e. in case of phrenzy, when a man is besides himself, the sober man is not punished for the actions of the mad-man, nor the mad-man for the actions of the sober man. But I think this

a LOCKE's Ess. l. iv. c. xii. § 9. c. xvi. § 12.
b LOCKE's Ess. l. iv. c. iii. § 30.
c LOCKE's Ess. l. i. c. i. § 5.
MASON on Self Knowledge, p. 62.
BUTLER's Sermons, No. xv.
d LOCKE's Ess. l. i. c. i. § 5. ib. l. iv. c. xi. § 8.
JONVAL's Lect. in Nat. Displayed, vol. i. p. 277—290.

* *Identity* seems to be a simple idea, no less so than unity, and essence; therefore a definition of it is extremely difficult. But perhaps it may be best described by saying, It is that which in some respect differs from every other. For, if you *suppose two* things in all respects the same, then in proportion as the thought proceeds in discarding difference they will become *idem*, the *same* thing or person. Were the writer of this note to hazard a definition of identity, it should be, *that existence, or mode of existence, which excludes all difference.*

Cor. To assert that *two* or more persons, things, or systems, exist, or even are possible, and yet are in *no respect different*, is a contradiction.——W.

may be accounted for another way, without supposing that the law looks upon them as different persons[a].

§ 3. 2. To this Dr. WATTS very justly objects, that fancied memory might make two men born in the most distant places and times the same person, or real forgetfulness might make the same man different persons: v. g. LEE the tragedian when distracted might be successively ALEXANDER, SOCRATES, TULLY, VIRGIL, LUTHER, Queen ELIZABETH; and therefore LEE when distracted might justly be rewarded or punished for all the different actions which he ascribes to himself: and finally, several men might become the same persons. This he thinks is contrary to the common forms of speech and to true philosophy[b].

§ 4. 3. He therefore concludes, that the same person, in an incomplete sense, is the same intelligent substance or conscious mind, but in a more complete sense, is the same soul united to the same body; or in other words, that, while a spirit is united to a body, the same continued animal life, in union with the same spirit, generally attended with the same consciousness, goes to constitute the same person. If the question be started relating to a supposed resurrection, it is answered, that if the resurrection precedes the dissolution of the body, it does not alter the common forms of speaking; but if the body be dissolved, we may refer it to an after enquiry how far and in what cases it may be said to be the same. Mr. LOCKE also acknowledges this to be most probable: so that the chief question between them is only about the application of the word person in a case that is never likely to happen, i. e. of transferred consciousness. Yet for this very reason I think Dr. WATTS's notion is to be preferred. And to conclude, if God should utterly destroy the soul and body of any man whom we know, and afterwards create a new spirit, united to a new body and in form resembling the other, and give to it the exact consciousness of the man whose body and soul was destroyed, and should reveal to us what he had done, we could not converse with this new produced man as the same man we formerly knew, or approve that as an equitable conduct, by which he should be rewarded or punished for the actions of the annihilated man. This abundantly shews the impropriety of Mr. LOCKE's manner of stating the question, and how much Dr. WATTS's is to be preferred to it[c].

§ 5. *Schol.* 1. Mr. LOCKE seems to have been led into this

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxvii. § 9—27.
b WATTS's Ess. No. xii. § 7. p. 294,—303.
c WATTS's Ess. ib. p. 301—306, 308—313.

LOCKE's Ess. ib. § 25.
LE CLERC's Ontology. c. ii. § 7.
BUTLER's Analogy, Diss. I. p. 439—450. Oct. Ed.

mistake, by considering what we commonly call ourselves, rather than what we call the same person when speaking of another. (Vide LOCKE ubi supra, § 16.) Yet it is plain we do not make consciousness the only rule even here, since no one is conscious of his having been born, nor of many other events and actions of his life, which nevertheless upon the evidence of reason and testimony, without consciousness, he would not at all scruple to apply to himself.

§ 6. 2. If we have two ideas of body in all respects the same, for instance, of a book, or watch, we judge that they have the same archetype, if each of the ideas have the same relation to certain times and places; for we know that two bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place. As for the question, whether two spirits may or not, it depends upon the doctrine of the immateriality; and it is proper to defer the examination of it, till we have proved that there is some immaterial spirit[a].

LECT. XIII.

Of the Soul always Thinking.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO enquire whether men think always without intermission.

§ 2. (1.) *For the Affirmative.* If there be a time when the soul does not think, the existence of it as a spirit is destroyed: and we can imagine nothing to remain, unless it be something merely material. Now there is no apparent reason to think the soul thus exists by intervals; and therefore we must conclude it always thinks.

§ 3. To this it is replied, that such a definition of the soul, as implies *continual actual thought*, is begging the question in dispute. When actual thought is suspended, there may remain some secret power of thinking resulting from the constitution of the soul, which will exert itself when the obstruction is removed. As a bow when bent, has a disposition to straighten itself again, or a clock to strike, though the hammer be held back.

§ 4. To this it is answered, we can have no idea of this power. If the power of thinking be not the very substance of the soul, there must be some unknown substance in which the power inheres: nor can we imagine how it awakes itself again to actual thought.

a Ess. on Personal Identity. pub. 1769. Defence of Mr. LOCKE's opinion, pub 1769. | REID's Intellect. Powers of Man, p. 315—321 p. 334—337.

§ 5. It is farther objected, that the various degrees of intenseness of thought, which we all perceive, seem to prove that thought is not the essence of the soul; for then it must be uniform and constant. (LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xix.)

§ 6. But it may be replied, that the least degree of thought is thought, as the finest particle of matter is matter. On the whole it must be granted, that, if it be hereafter proved without this proposition, that the human soul is immaterial, there will be some considerable weight in the argument; if the contrary be proved, there will be very little [a].

§ 7. (II.) *For the Negative.* 1. If we think in our sleep, we think in vain; and it is not to be thought we are so constituted as that this should be necessary.

§ 8. *Ans.* If all our forgotten thoughts are in vain, many of our waking thoughts are so; for how few can we perfectly recollect. We may as well argue against our existing at all without thought, as a useless thing. Besides, there is perhaps in sleep, some continued sense of pleasure, which the wise author of nature might connect with so necessary a support of life as sleep is. To which we may farther add, that the uninterrupted thought of every rational spirit, whether remembered or forgotten, may make a part of a scheme, in the general right and useful, though the advantage of it in some particular instances may not appear. As we may suppose with respect to those minerals or metals in the bowels of the earth, which are never in fact discovered [b].

§ 9. 2. Infants, who have but few ideas, sleep much; probably before, and to be sure after their birth: but is it to be imagined they are all that while necessarily employed in thinking?

§ 10. *Ans.* It is allowed they have few, or no ideas by reflection: (for the thought of a learned Scotch anatomist, who pretends they are then forming the heart and lungs for their respective offices, seems too extravagant to be particularly examined.) But ideas of sensation they have early; perhaps some strong sensations of the mother communicated to them before the birth: but when the soul is first united we know not [c].

§ 11. 3. As we fall asleep we seem gradually to approach to a state of insensibility; it is therefore probable that at length we arrive at it.

a WATTS's Ess. No. v. § 1. p. 116—118.
LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. i. § 10—19.
b LOCKE. ib. § 15.

WATTS's Ess. ib. § 3. p. 127, 128.
c LOCKE's Ess. ib. § 17, 21, 22.
WATTS's Ess. ib. p. 128.—131.

§ 12. *Ans.* If by insensibility be meant incogitation, the phænomenon is denied: the same kind of argument may prove, that matter might be annihilated by continual division[a].

§ 13. 4. We do not remember that we think in many of our sleeping hours, therefore how can we know that we do?

§ 14. *Ans.* Dreams may be entirely, or but imperfectly, or not at all remembered, according to the various degrees in which the nerves are impressed by the motion given to the animal spirits in sleep. Besides, daily experience shews us, that occurrences of the day bring to mind dreams, which in the morning we had forgotten; and we have often a general remembrance that we have dreamed, though we know not of what: to which it may be added, that people sometimes in their sleep discover marks of great emotion, when, if asked in the morning what it was that disquieted them, they do not perhaps know; so that though it would be very ridiculous to argue from universal experience that we always think in our sleeping hours, this will not be an unanswerable objection against any other argument; nor can it possibly prove that we ever cease from thinking, any more than breathing, which we also forget; or than forgetting the circumstances of our birth will prove we were never born[b].

§ 15. 5. It might be expected that those operations of the soul should be most rational, in which it is most abstracted from the body; whereas, by what we remember of our dreams, we perceive the contrary.

§ 16. *Ans.* It may be a law of the creation, that, during our union with the body, a certain disposition of the nerves generally wanting in sleep, should be necessary to rational and connected thought; and that such a wild play of the animal spirits as arises from the obstruction of the nerves should cause roving imaginations, which therefore, by the way, it is no dishonour or detriment to forget[c].

§ 17. 6. If a man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two different persons.

§ 18. *Ans.* If by knowing it, be meant remembering it, (which it must mean if it be at all to the purpose) they cannot be different persons, according to Mr. LOCKE's principles of identity, unless every instance of forgetfulness makes a man a new and different person: and then how many thousands and

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xix. § 3, 4.
b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. i. § 13, 14, 18. WATTS's Ess. ib. § 2. p. 120—125.
c LOCKE's Ess. ib. § 16. WATTS's Ess. ib. § 3. p. 126, 127.

millions is every man. This objection would suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting in the same body by intervals, as in sleeping and waking; which none ever maintained[a].

§ 19. 7. If the soul always thinks, there must be some innate ideas, contrary to *Lect.* 6. § 2.

§ 20. *Ans.* There must be some one idea at least or perception; but that it is this rather than that, does not arise from the original constitution of the soul, but from the circumstances in which the body to which it is united is placed: (thus it might have been the idea of colour as well as heat.) So that supposing the soul at the first moment of its union with the body to have the idea of heat, this would not prove heat to be an innate idea[b]. *Lect.* 6. § 1.

§ 21. *Schol.* It may not be amiss here to mention the argument which Mr. A. BAXTER has drawn from the phænomena of dreams, to prove the existence of some immaterial spirits by which they are suggested; though the particular manner, in which that strange and seemingly inconclusive argument is managed, cannot here be largely represented, and need not be particularly confuted[c].

LECT. XIV.

Of Dr. Watts's Survey of the Passions.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO take a more particular survey of the PASSIONS of the human mind, according to Dr. WATTS's distribution of them. See *Lect.* 2. § 20.

§ 2. *Sol.* An object may be considered as rare and uncommon, as good or evil in the general, or with respect to the various kinds of good or evil, and the particular circumstances that attend it.

§ 3. 1. If an object be in the general considered as rare, it excites admiration: sudden wonder is surprise, great wonder is astonishment. This passion has no opposite. If an object appear good in the general, it excites love; if evil, hatred[d].

a LOCKE's Ess. ib. § 12. c. xxvii. § 23.
WATTS's Ess. ib. p. 125, 126.
b LOCKE's Ess. ib. § 17, 20, 21.
See on this subject, BAXT. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 389—390. and note (a) Oct. Ed.

c BAXTER on the Soul, c. x. passim. Oct. Ed. vol. ii. § 1.
FORDYCE on Educ. vol. ii. Dial. 16.
d HARTLEY on Man, vol. i. c. iv.
TUCKER's Light of Nat. vol. i. c. xxi.
GROVE's Mor. Phil. vol. i. par. ii. § 1. c. 8—10.

N. B. These are primary passions, and those under the next head are derived from the two last of these.

§ 4. 2. As to the various kinds of good and evil; considering an object merely and absolutely as valuable, it excites esteem, which in a very high degree is veneration, and in a supreme degree is adoration. If it be considered as worthless, it excites contempt, especially if it be proposed as excellent. If it be considered as fit to receive good from us, it is the object of benevolence or good-will; if fit to receive evil, of malevolence or ill-will. But it is to be observed that this passion centers only on sensible objects, i. e. on objects capable of perception. If the object be considered as fit to do me good, or afford me any present pleasure, it produces complacency, if the contrary, displicency. Complacency in any very high degree towards an inferior, or on considerations not adequate to that degree of regard, is fondness; the opposite to which is disgust or loathing.

N. B. There may be benevolence where there is no complacency, but a high degree of complacency without benevolence is hardly conceivable*.

§ 5. 3. As to the various circumstances in which the good or evil object is considered, it may be either present or absent.

§ 6. (1.) Future good considered as possible excites desire, which is the great spring of action: if evil be considered as possible, it excites aversion.

§ 7. (2.) If there be a probable prospect of obtaining absent good, it excites hope; if evil be likely to come upon us, it produces fear. The highest degree of hope is confidence or security; when little remains, there is despondency; and when hope is entirely banished, despair succeeds. Fear joined with foresight, is anxiety; with careful contrivance to avoid it, is solicitude; mingled with surprise and rising to a violent degree on a sudden, is terror; and a high degree of aversion attending the idea of any object we apprehend or reflect on, is horror.

§ 8. (3.) Good obtained awakens joy: evil actually endured brings sorrow. Moderate joy is gladness: sudden and

* This remark is of great importance in order to form a just view of the divine character. The love of God to sinners, as such, is a love of benevolence; but to saints, as such, a love of complacency. Christ loved the church, so as to give himself a ransom for it, from benevolence; but he loves it with complacency when made, in its measure, conformable to himself. A christian loves his enemies with benevolence; but the brethren, with complacency.——W.

high joy is exultation: habitual joy is cheerfulness. Moderate sorrow is trouble: great sorrow is distress and anguish: habitual sorrow is melancholy. Congratulation is the sentiment and expression of joy arising from the happiness of another. Pity and compassion is sorrow arising from the distress of another. Sympathy comprehends both: Envy is the contrary of both. Jealousy is a species of envy, arising from an apprehension of preference given to another person in the affections of one for whom we have a peculiar regard. Shame may be reckoned as a species of sorrow, attended frequently with blushing, arising from a consciousness, imputation, or apprehension of any thing that appears to be matter of disgrace in ourselves, or others we are concerned for, i. e. when likely to expose us or them to the contempt of others.

§ 9. (4.) When any intelligent being designedly brings good upon us, it excites gratitude; when evil, anger. With respect to our fellow-creatures, gratitude is a mixture of complacency and benevolence; anger is displicency with some degree of malevolence. When anger rises to an excessive degree, it is rage and fury; when it is deeply rooted, it is rancour and spite; when arising on trifling occasions, and expressed in little tokens of resentment, it is peevishness. When an affront is apprehended, beneath us or any other person to whom it is offered, it excites indignation; and when anger is attended with a desire of hurting another it is called malice; and when this is in consequence of an apprehended injury, revenge[a].

§ 10. *Schol.* 1. DES-CARTES divides the primary passions into six, viz. admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy and sorrow: And though this is by no means an accurate distribution, yet his description of the passions contains many excellent passages[b].

§ 11. 2. As pain is useful for preserving the animal body from those injuries which might prove fatal to it, so many of the passions, which are disagreeable in their present operations, are useful and even necessary, both to individuals and societies[c].

a WATTS on the Passions, § 2. p. 4—9. Ed. 2.
FORDYCE'S Mor. Philos. b. i. § 2—4.
POPE'S Ethic Epist. ii. ver. 93—204.
LOCKE'S Ess. l. ii. c. xx.
HUTCHESON'S Treatise on the Passions.
LE BRUN, Of the Character of the Passions.

b DES-CARTES de Pass. part ii. § 69. p. 81.
c WATTS on the Passions, p. 85—88.
BUTLER'S Serm. No. viii. p. 150—154.
LOCKE'S Ess. l. ii. c. vii. § 4.
FOSTER'S Serm. vol. ii. p. 122—125, and 128.

LECT. XV.

Concerning the Original of our Passions.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO enquire into the original of our passions.

§ 2. *Sol.* 1. They may arise either from the motion of the body, impressions on the senses, or operations of the mind by which ideas are produced: as the sight of beauty, hearing of music, or understanding a proposition.

§ 3. 2. From ideas recollected by the memory, which may be accompanied with some degree of pleasure or pain, which they at first gave. *Lect.* 8. § 14.

§ 4. 3. From the exercise of reason, which apprehends a probability of approaching good or evil [a].

§ 5. *Schol.* 1. The second and third source arise from the first; since there could have been no memory nor reasoning, without ideas presented to the mind as the ground-work of its operations.

§ 6. 2. Some think the passions may be raised by means of the body, when no particular idea is presented to any one of the senses; that is, only from the temperature of the body: v. g. when we find ourselves cheerful or sad, and cannot assign any reason for it: which if it be admitted, may in the judgment of some make it dubious, whether the first idea in the human mind be, as Mr. LOCKE maintains, an idea of sensation. But it may perhaps be answered, we have a sense of the temperature of the body; and that we are seldom in our waking hours destitute of some sensible impressions, which are at different times painful or pleasant, in different degrees, according as our organs are disposed [b].

§ 7. 3. The passions cannot be immediately excited or suppressed by our volitions, but consequentially they may; especially those arising from the third spring, by which some arising from the two former may be balanced [c].

§ 8. 4. It is queried, why objects are often found to affect the passions less when they are grown familiar, than they did before.—To this it may be answered, that admiration in a great measure proceeds from the novelty of objects. Perhaps in other

a DES CARTES de Pass. part. ii. § 51. WATTS on the Pass. § 3. p. 10—17.

b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. i. § 23, 24.

c DES-CARTES de Pass. § 45—47.

instances it may be owing to some unknown connection between making the first impression on the brain and the excitation of the passions. Yet it is observable, that the degree in which we are impressed, is by no means proportionable to the novelty of objects alone; it depends much more upon the temperature of the body, and a variety of other particulars.

§ 9. *Ax.* We find by experience that our minds are so constituted, that some degree of passion or desire is necessary to action; so that an entire suspension of them would be attended with a stagnation of all our faculties [a].

§ 10. *Cor.* It must be of the greatest importance, in order to influence men to a due course of action, to know how to awaken or moderate their passions by proper application to them; and those who act as if they desired entirely to eradicate the passions, are ignorant of the constitution of human nature, and can expect but little success in their attempts to work upon the mind [b].

§ 11. *Schol.* 1. Mr. LOCKE maintains that desire is always a state of uneasiness: but it is certain, that in many cases the uneasiness is abundantly overbalanced by a probable prospect of the immediate enjoyment of good: and if some degree of uneasiness be universally necessary to action, it is very difficult, if not impossible to conceive, how any active being can be perfectly happy [c].

§ 12. 2. We cannot mistake in judging of present pleasure or pain, as the incentives of desire or aversion; but in judging of future, we often do * [d].

LECT. XVI.

Concerning the Instinct of Brutes.

§ 1. *Def.* WHEN a being is determined to the performance of any action, not by a view of the beneficial consequences that may attend it, but merely from a strong impulse leading to the action itself, that being is said to act by INSTINCT.

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. vii. § 3.
DES-CARTES de Pass. § 40.
Spectat. vol. iv. No. 255.
b DODDRIDGE's Dedication of 1 Serm. p. 10.
c LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 32—34.
WATTS on Liberty, p. 23—25.
GROVE's Posthum. Works, vol. iv. p. 136, 137.
d LOCKE's Ess. ib. § 61—65.

* With Dr. WATTS's Doctrine of the Passions, compare a short Theory of the Passions, by Dr. THOMAS BALGUY, in the appendix to his "Divine Benevolence Asserted," an octavo pamphlet, published in 1781. K.

§ 2. *Cor.* 1. There are many remarkable *instincts* in mankind, which greatly tend both to the good of individuals and the species. Those which are called natural appetites plainly come under this class; to which may be added parental affection, and some workings of compassion and gratitude: though it must be granted the force of all these is very different in different persons [a].

§ 3. 2. Brutes are governed by *instinct* in many of their actions, as was observed above, *Lect.* 3. § 7. The reason upon which many of their actions depend, could not be discovered without a penetration far beyond what is to be found in the gerality of men. See particular instances of this in the bee [b], in the ant [c], in the wasp [d], in the raven [e], in the formica leo [f], in the galli sylvestres [g], in the bohaques [h], in the fox [i], in the beaver [k], in the turkey hen [l], in the common hen [m], besides many others [n].

§ 4. *Schol.* 1. That *instinct* is not mere imitation, see proved by a remarkable story in GALEN, *apud* RAY's *Wisd. of God, p.* 349—353. 2 *Ed. p.* 133—135.

§ 5. 2. It is probable, that in most instances if not in all, the actions to which any being is determined by *instinct*, are accompanied with immediate pleasure.

LECT. XVII.

Of mental Habits—Perfections.

§ 1. *Def.* A MENTAL HABIT is a facility of thinking or willing any action acquired by frequent acts.

a BAXTER's Works, vol. i. p. 379. col. 2.
ANDRY apud Mem. of Literat. vol. i. p. 15.
HUTCHESON's Syst. p. 144—147, 195—199.
Elem. of Crit. vol. i. p. 43, 44.
KING's Orig. of Evil, Præl. Disc. p. 88. 3d Ed.
Guardian, vol. ii. No. 126—130.
MORE's Immort. of the Soul.
b RAY's Wisdom of God, p. 132, 133. 2 Ed. p. 122—124.
Nat. Displ. vol. i. p. 168—178, 182—184, 194—202.
c Guardian, vol. ii. No. 156, 157.
Plin. Nat. Hist. xi 30.
d Nat. Displ. part i. p. 126—148.
e Albert. Magnus, apud Crad. Harm. part ii. p. 67. note in the margin.
f Nat. Disp. part i. p. 234—240.
g DERHAM's Phys. Theol. p. 229.
h ——— Ib. p. 212.
i ——— Ib. p. 204.
k Nat. Displ. part ii. p. 106—114.
l ——— Ib. p. 23, 24.
m Spect. vol. ii. No. 120.
n CICERO de Nat. Deor. l. ii. § 48—50.
CAMBRAY sur l'Exist. § 23. p. 46, 47.
SCOTT's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 211—220.
Essay on Hunting, p. 53, 54.
POPE's Ethic Epist. iii. ver. 172—198 *.

* Great light has been thrown upon the properties and instincts of animals by many recent authors. See particularly BUFFON's Natural History, PENNANT's Arctic Zoology, and GEORGE EDWARDS's Works; to which several other productions might be added. Many of the Voyages and Travels that have lately been published are worthy of being particularly studied in this view. The information given by Captain COOK, and the other circumnavigators of the globe, must not be forgotten. K.

§ 2. *Prop. Mental habits* do very much depend upon the memory.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. Memory, furnishing us with ideas and relations, makes it easy for us to think upon any subject.

§ 4. 2. Furnishing us with motives, it makes it easy to will it.

§ 5. 3. When memory ceases, we see that *mental habits* are destroyed[a]. *Valet propositio.* *Vid.* § 1.

§ 6. *Cor.* 1. *Mental habits* must very much depend on the body, since memory plainly does so. *Lect.* 8. § 11.

§ 7. 2. The facility with which the body obeys the command of the mind, is a thing different from *mental habit*: yet it may have some affinity to it, as bodily motion depends upon volition.

§ 8. 3. No habits can in strict propriety of speech be said to be infused; since it is impossible the first act of any kind should be the effect of habit, according to the definition. Yet a disposition may be given to perform acts at first with as much readiness, as if they had been learnt by long practice *. Neither can any habit be properly said to be hereditary: yet there may be, and it is plain in fact that there are certain *hereditary* dispositions towards contracting habits of one kind rather than another.

§ 9. *Schol.* 1. On these principles some account for the phænomenon which has frequently been observed, that a great degree of wit and judgment seldom meet in the same person; because wit is an habit of finding out the resemblance of ideas, and making an agreeable assemblage of them; whereas judgment is the habit of distinguishing accurately between those that have some resemblance, though they really differ. It is not to be wondered at, if two such different habits do not ordinarily occur in the same mind. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged highly probable, that habit is not the only thing that makes the difference between various persons in this respect, though it may serve very much to increase it[b] †. See *Lect.* 5. § 1.

a CLERICI Pneum. l. i. c. iv. § 18—22.
b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xi. § 2,
POPE's Ess. on Crit. ver. 53—60.
Ess. on the Genius of POPE, p. 115—118.
WATTS's Improv. of the mind, p. 247—254.

* This probably was the case with the apostles and others, who spoke languages which they had never learnt. W.

† For the different accounts which have been given of wit, recourse may be had to the SPECTATOR, vol. 1. No. 58—63; to Mr. DAVID FORDYCE's Dialogues on Education; and to Lord KAIMS's Elements of Criticism, vol. ii. chap. xiii. p. 60—84.——K.

§ 10. 2. Idiots reason very little, and make few propositions; whereas the madman reasons very much, and often justly, but upon very precarious and false principles[a].

§ 11. 3. The force of *habit* both *mental* and *corporeal* is so great, that it is an evident part of wisdom to take care how habits are formed; and it is worth our while to use great labour to turn and fix them on the right side[b].

§ 12. *Def.* Those properties of any being are called PERFECTIONS, which directly tend to promote its happiness.

§ 13. *Cor.* Only spirits are capable of perfection, since a capacity for happiness implies perception, i. e. thought.

§ 14. *Schol.* Nevertheless, in an inferior sense, or by analogy, insensible beings may be called perfect, i. e. as they are fitted to answer the purposes intended by them[c].

LECT. XVIII.

Of Liberty, Natural, External, Philosophical, Moral and Complete.

§ 1. *Def.* THAT mind is said to be possessed of NATURAL LIBERTY, or liberty of choice, which is so constituted, as that its volitions shall not be invincibly determined by any foreign cause or consideration whatever offered to it, but by its own sovereign pleasure.

§ 2. *Cor.* 1. If any instance occurs, in which the mind can chuse no otherwise than it does, it is not in that instance naturally free; though it chuses with the greatest delight, and executes its volitions without any restraint[d].

§ 3. 2. *Natural liberty* as before defined, includes what some have called *a liberty of contrariety*, as well as of *contradiction*; i. e. supposes the mind able to chuse the contrary, as well as to defer its choice: if indeed these two expressions do not signify in fact the same thing, which in some connections at least they may *[e].

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xi. § 12, 13.
b TILLOTSON's Serm. vol. i. No. 29. p. 301—304.
DODDR. Præcept. vol. ii. p. 519—526.
Spectator, vol. vi. No. 447.
WILLIS, De Anim. Brut. p. 163, 164.
c WATTS's Ontol. c. viii. p. 354, 355.
d WATTS on Liberty, p. 8, 9.
COLLINS on Liberty, part ii. Ed. 2.
LIMBORCH's Theol. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 20.
HARTLEY on Man, p. 500.
GROVE on Lib. § 10.
e HUTCHESON's Metaph. p. 22.
CONYB. against TYND. p. 75.

* The subject of LIBERTY and NECESSITY is involved in considerable darkness from its very nature, but this definition, with due deference to our author, seems to

§ 4. *Def.* EXTERNAL LIBERTY, or liberty of action is opposed to a constraint laid on the executive powers; and consists in a power of rendering our volitions effectual.

render it still more obscure; especially the last clause, "but by its own sovereign pleasure." The first part of the specific difference, "Its volitions not invincibly determined by any foreign cause or consideration whatever *offered* to the mind," may be admitted as essential to moral agency; but to say that the volitions of the mind are determined "by its own sovereign pleasure," is language neither serviceable to moral agency, nor even consistent with itself. Volition an effect of sovereign pleasure, or pleasure without cause are incompatible ideas.

There are three questions on this intricate subject, the true solution of which seems to have been but little if at all noticed:

I. *What is the* IMMEDIATE CAUSE *of determining the mind's* VOLITIONS? In general, it is admitted by all that as the proper object of the understanding is truth, so the proper object of the will is *good*. Yet,

1. Were it always the *real* good that the mind perceived, the volitions would always be accurate; but this is contrary to universal experience. A good infinitely real is proposed in words, but the mind often chooses what is of little or no value in preference to it.—Nor is it enough to say,

2. That the mind chooses the greatest *apparent* good, which is the common answer to the question. This is insufficient, because it leaves us in the dark respecting the true *cause* why real good does not appear to be so? Therefore,

3. It is submitted to the attention of the learned, whether *the actual state of the mind in the scale of* RECTITUDE be not the *immediate cause* of determining the will. I take "rectitude" here as applicable to all acts both natural and moral. I said, the "cause" of determining the will, not the *occasion*. The *object*, whether it be really or only apparently good, is not the cause; for, from an *exhibition* of the same object, yea the *contemplation* of the same object, *contrary* effects follow in different minds, and the same mind at different times. The object therefore is only an *occasion* of determining our volitions. A rectified mind, or a mind in a right state, perceives objects presented to it for moral choice *as they are*, and the volitions will be accordingly. With these remarks the next question stands closely connected:

II. *What is the* IMMEDIATE CAUSE *of the mind sinking or rising in the scale of* RECTITUDE? The true answer to this question will bring us to the root of the subject. But how has it been commonly answered?

1. Some, from supposed experience, from the acknowledged fact of much evil existing, and the high improbability that God should determine those volitions which are wicked, and perceiving no medium between ascribing *all* determinations to God or to ourselves, have strenuously maintained, according to our author's definition, that the mind is determined "by its own sovereign pleasure." According to this hypothesis, the state of the mind, in reference to the scale of rectitude, is caused by (αυτεξουσια) *self-sovereignty*, or a *self-determining power*. According to them, by a wrong choice our minds become erroneous, criminal, and wretched; but by a right choice they become rectified, virtuous, and happy.

2. Others, perceiving the incongruity of such an hypothesis, which ascribes to the human mind what they do not experience, and which denies to God the honour of directing, with infallible certainty, the universe he hath made to a happy issue, have adopted the doctrine of *universal* necessity. According to this hypothesis, as commonly held, the immediate cause of the state of the mind, as found in the scale of rectitude, is the *object itself*, which begets first sensations or consciousness, then ideas and associations, and hence volitions, habits, and character. It is not surprising that those who think thus should also maintain that God sees no evil in the world, and therefore that *there is none* but in our *feelings*; that sin, an evil improperly so called, shall be at length annihilated, and therefore men and devils will be made ultimately happy. For, how can that be evil which GOD CAUSES? Or why should

§ 5. *Cor.* There may be *external* where there is not *natural* liberty, and *vice versa*[a].

[a] WATTS on Lib. p. 4, 5.

God cause evil, as felt by us to be so, but in order to make us thereby, as by a wholesome discipline, finally happy?

On the *pro* and the *contra* of these hypotheses what loads of learning, ingenuity, quibblings, and quarrels have been committed to paper and issued from the press! During the last century the advocates of liberty have been weakened, and those of necessity have gathered strength by the labours of EDWARDS, TOPLADY, PRIESTLEY, CROMBIE, and a host beside, against WHITBY, FLETCHER, GREGORY, &c. On the principles hitherto employed to bring the controversy to a decisive issue, it is much more difficult to discover the source of the truth than it is to find the source of the Nile.

3. With deference, which in no instance is more becoming than in this, after the labours of so many eminent characters on the subject, it is proposed to consideration, whether every *right choice* has not one uniform cause of determination; and a *wrong choice* another uniform cause totally different from the other? My answer to the question is, the *immediate cause* of the mind *sinking* in the scale of rectitude, or, which is the same, deviating from the line of rectitude into errors or crimes, is *liberty*; and the immediate cause of the mind maintaining its rectitude, or else rising in the scale, is *necessity*.

If this be admitted, as I believe it must, every human being on earth is at once, in different respects, the subject of liberty and necessity. All *decretive* necessity is from God, and its object is all natural and moral good, in its various degrees and combinations, to the utter exclusion of all moral evil. But all HYPOTHETICAL necessity is not of God, which necessarians in general seem to overlook. The evil of imperfection and the evil of sin, are of hypothetical necessity, but not of God, any more than a shadow is of the light, or falsehood of the truth. Again, *passive power* (by which I mean *a tendency to defection*, essential to every *contingent* existence, physically, as to *being*, and morally, as to *well-being*) is not of God, yet of hypothetical necessity; and so is the *origin* of moral evil.

Decretive necessity does not *exclude* liberty but *employs* it; yet liberty may exist without decretive necessity, and the result will be hypothetically certain. *This* hypothetical certainty arises, not from positive appointment, but from the ascertainable tendency to defection, perceived by the divine mind with infinite precision, as a relative contrast.—Another question remains:

III. *Is there any one instance in which the mind can choose otherwise than it does?* A solution of this question, founded on our author's *first Corollary*, will explain the chief difficulty. To this end observe,

1. In *every* instance of *wrong* choice the mind is uninfluenced by *decretive* necessity, and consequently free from all "foreign cause or consideration whatever offered to it." Yet,

2. In every such instance there must be a cause *in the mind itself* which renders the event subject to hypothetical necessity. If the mind stand high in the scale of rectitude from decretive necessity, it is hypothetically necessary that the choice will be good in the same proportion. But IF the mind stand low in the scale (as it always will, from its freedom and passive power, when not decretively supported) it is hypothetically necessary, or absolutely certain, that the choice will be wrong. Hence,

3. If the mind be placed *exactly in the same state*, the object and the representation being the same, the choice cannot be *different*. This is a law of universal application. To be free from it would be no excellence, but the reverse. It is the glory of God that he *cannot* lie, and the disgrace of the offender that he *cannot* cease

§ 6. *Schol.* The liberty of which Mr. LOCKE generally treats, is a liberty of action not of choice, and that COLLINS expressly allows[a].

§ 7. *Def.* PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY consists in a prevailing disposition to act according to the dictates of reason, i. e. in such a manner, as shall, all things considered, most effectually promote our happiness. A disposition to act contrary to this is MENTAL SERVITUDE: and when the mind is equally disposed to follow reason, or act contrary to it, it is then said to be in a state of INDIFFERENCE[b].

§ 8. *Cor.* Philosophical liberty is a perfection of the mind; (See *Lect.* 17. § 12.) since much of our happiness depends on our conduct, and by acting according to reason, much good may be obtained, and much evil avoided.

§ 9. *Def.* A man is said to be MORALLY FREE, when there is no interposition of the will of a superior being to prohibit or determine his actions in any particular under consideration[c] *.

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 7—13, 21—30, 71. COLLINS on Lib. p. 115—118. SEARCH on Free Will, p. 1—71.
b TILLOTS. Serm. vol. ii. p. 617, 618. PERS. Sat. v. ver. 124—191. CLARKE's Serm. vol. iii. No. 1. p. 5—13. Ed. 12mo.
c WATTS on Liberty, p. 4.

from sin. While God is infinitely holy, for that very reason his choice will be infinitely right. As the *existence* of God is of *absolute* necessity, and therefore infinitely glorious; so his *volitions* are of *hypothetical* necessity, and infallibly good.

4. From these remarks we see how far, or in what respect, a liberty of *contradiction*, and of *contrariety* can be applied to the human mind. When the *state* of the mind is *meliorated* by a necessitating cause or influence, a *real* good will be chosen, which, identically considered, would otherwise have been rejected. On the contrary, when the *state* of the mind is *deteriorated* by passive power and an abuse of liberty, the evil which otherwise would have been rejected will be chosen. In these cases we have a liberty not only of contradiction but of contrariety, if we regard the *object itself*. That is, a man may not only cease to choose, but choose the contrary, if he be *otherwise minded* or *disposed*. If he be otherwise minded for the *better*, it must be from a decretive, necessitating cause, otherwise God would not be the cause of *all* good; but if for the worse, it must be from passive power and the exercise of liberty, else man would be self-sufficient. But to suppose that any man has a power of choosing the contrary at the *same instant*, without being otherwise minded, seems equally incompatible with fact and reason.

Cor. Decretive *necessity* (that is, the purpose, energy, and gracious influence of God) is the *sole* parent of good; but *liberty*, in union with *passive power*, the parent of all moral *evil*.——W.

* From this definition another *Corollary* may be drawn, i. e. That to be morally free, in some cases at least, is a great evil; so it was to *Ephraim*, Hos. iv. 17. "Ephraim is joined unto idols, let him alone:" and to be deprived of this freedom, in some instances, must be a great blessing; so it was to *Saul* the persecutor when arrested in his mad career on the way to Damascus.

From what has been advanced in the preceding notes it would also follow that in *no case*, if we consult *merely* the happiness of the agent, is the freedom above defined desirable, though the ends of moral government may be answered by it; and

§ 10. *Cor.* As the same man may be subject to the controul of various superiors, one of which may allow what another prohibits, he may as to the same action be said to be or not to be morally free, according to the persons whose will is in question. Nevertheless, where there is one who has a much greater power and authority over him than any of the rest, it is proper to judge of his moral freedom by considering the will of such a superior person.

§ 11. *Def. Complete liberty* consists in the union of natural, external, moral and philosophical liberty, without any struggle or difficulty [a].

§ 12. *Cor.* 1. Complete liberty on the whole is a perfection. See § 8 *.

§ 13. 2. Complete liberty seems to consist in a certain symmetry or subordination of the faculties; and, when applied to such beings as ourselves, supposes a serene understanding, moderate passions rising in proportion to the nature of objects, the will chusing to follow such regular impressions, and the executive powers readily and vigorously performing its dictates.

§ 14. 3. When we speak of complete liberty, it is not so proper to enquire whether the *will* be free, but rather whether the *man* be so. (See *Lect.* 2. § 26.) Yet natural liberty evidently belongs to the *will* [b].

§ 15. *Schol.* What some call a *liberty of spontaneity*, consists merely in *chusing* to perform any particular action: nor does it at all enter into the question, whether we can chuse or perform the contrary. But since this is nothing more than *willing*, it does not deserve the name of liberty.

For the *Cartesian* notion of it, see DES-CARTES Princ. Par. i. § 37—39. WATTS on Lib. p. 6.

a WATTS on Lib. p. 9—12. COLLIBER's Inq. p. 47—59. Ed. 3.

b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 14—19. WATTS's Ess. No. xii. § 5.

that an infringement of it from divine interposition is *always* desirable in order to our security and happiness, as being that alone by which an abuse of liberty is prevented, and which is never exercised, properly speaking, but for our good. In strictness, actions are determined by the will, the will by the disposition, and this last by either God's efficient energy, or by passive power. W.

* The propriety of this *definition*, and the force of the *Corollary* drawn from it, must stand or fall with what went before. W.

LECT. XIX.

Of Natural Liberty.

§ 1. *Prop.* THE mind of man is possessed of natural liberty, i. e. liberty of choice.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. We are conscious to ourselves, that we have a power of chusing otherwise than we do in a multitude of instances *.

§ 3. 2. We universally agree that some actions deserve praise and others blame; and we sometimes condemn ourselves as conscious of the latter: for which there could be no foundation at all, if we were invincibly determined in every volition, and had it to say, we had done the best we possibly could †.

§ 4. 3. The laws of all nations agree to punish some actions in a man who is master of his reason, for which they would not punish one whom they knew to be distracted.

§ 5. 4. When equal objects are proposed to our choice, we sometimes determine to chuse one of them rather than another, without being able to assign any reason for such a preference [a] ‡. *Valet propositio.*

a GROVE of Hum. Lib. § 13—16.
WATTS on Liberty, § 3. p. 28—39.
Religion of Nature, p. 63, 64. Ed. 4to.
CLARKE against COLLINS, p. 42—44.

* Perhaps no one is conscious of this without supposing a change of mind as the basis of the other supposed choice. W.

† This second step of the demonstration is extremely ambiguous; we will suppose, however,

1. That we are invincibly determined to good by a meliorated state of mind; instead of *lessening* desert of praise, this invincibility of determination would *increase* it. The more *holy* the *state* of any rational mind is, the more invincible the determination to good. And surely *goodness* or *holiness* of mind is praiseworthy. This alone can justify *confidence* in a good man, or supreme trust in God. Again,

2. Suppose a man had it to say, that he had done the best he possibly could; this would not exculpate him except he could say moreover, that his *having a bad state of mind* was not blameworthy. A man cannot be sober at the same instant when he is drunk; a man in the height of malevolence *cannot* be benevolent the same instant; a man who is passionately furious *cannot* be meek; one who hates God and his neighbour *cannot* love either; eyes full of adultery cannot be chaste. But is this invincibility to evil excusable? Rather should we not say, the more *invincible* the determination to evil, the more heinous the evil?

3. In fact our author does not distinguish properly between a *decretive* and *hypothetical* necessity. Not the latter would take away blame, as may be specified in a thousand instances, in addition to those above mentioned, however invincible the determination may be, but the former only. When he speaks of "the best we possibly could," he overlooks different kinds of possibility and impossibility, yet a difference must be admitted.——W.

‡ Here are two things *inadmissible*; that two or more objects may be perfectly, or in all respects *equal*; and there is no ground of preference, except we can *assign*

§ 6. *Cor.* The will is not determined, as some have asserted, by the last dictate, or rather assent of the understanding, nor the greatest apparent good, nor a prevailing uneasiness, which last seems to coincide with the former[a] *.

§ 7. *Schol.* 1. To this it is objected, that we are formed with a necessary desire of happiness, and consequently cannot chuse any thing but what in present circumstances appears most conducive to it: and experience is appealed to as confirming the assertion, since we are always in fact most inclined to what we chuse. This must be acknowledged a considerable difficulty. It is granted that what we chuse must have some appearance of good: but the mind appears in fact, as well as from the reasoning in the proposition, to have a power of preferring a smaller present to a greater absent and future good, though at the same time it condemns itself of folly in such a choice; which it could never do, if what it chose always appeared to be the greatest good; since then in every choice it would act according to the necessary impulse and constitution of its nature. And though we allow that there is always a greater inclination to what we chuse than what we refuse, yet till this inclination be proved invincible, the proposition may hold good[b].

§ 8. 2. To the argument from self-accusation COLLINS replies, that it is only the sense of having acted against some rules, which on reflection we apprehend it would have been better for us to have followed, though it did not appear so when we did the action.—But how then could conscience condemn us, not only in our after reflections, but in the act itself? or how could we condemn ourselves for having done foolishly in chusing what did appear to us the greatest good, and could not but so appear[c]?

§ 9. 3. It is objected to the argument, § 4. that punish-

a WATTS on Lib. p. 17—23, 25—27.
LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 35, 36.
CLARKE and LEIBNITZ's Lect. p. 97—100.
CLARKE and LEIBNITZ, p. 403—415.

b TURRETINE, vol. i. Loc. x. Qu. ii. § 7, 15, 16.
COLL. on Lib. p. 40—44.
BURN. on the Art. p. 117, 118.
WATTS on Lib. p. 70—74.
GROVE on Lib. § 1st, 19.
GROVE's Mor. Philos. vol. i. p. 205—214.
MACLAURIN's Newtonian Philos. p. 81—84.
CLARKE and LEIBNITZ, Append. No. 3.
LAW's Theor. p. 9—11. Note.
CATO's Letters, vol. iv. No. 3.

c COLLINS, ib. p. 105, 106.
GROVE's Post. Works, vol. iv. p. 93—148. pass. § 3—7, and § 21.

it. Yet however *like* two objects may be in the view of an objector, he must allow that he was *differently* minded towards what he chose, than he was towards the other; and this is an *assignable cause* of the choice. Besides, to deny a *difference* is to establish *identity*. W.

* If the objections made to the demonstration be well founded, the doctrine of this *Corollary* must of course fall. W.

ments are often inflicted where it is granted there is no liberty at all, as on lunatics, drunkards, and brutes.

Ans. It may be debated how far it is proper to call the severities used with them in some cases punishments, or how far they may be destitute of all natural liberty. But as for COLLINS's argument, that were man a free creature, rewards and punishments would signify nothing, because it would lie in his own breast to slight them; it is most evidently weak: for nevertheless, they would be a probable means of answering their end, and that they are not always effectual, is evident in fact[a].

LECT. XX.

On Liberty of Indifference.

§ 1. *Schol.* 4. TO the fourth argument (which is generally called *choice* εν αδιαφορια) it is answered by the opposers of natural liberty, that no such case can occur that two objects should appear entirely equal: and if there did, then a choice would be impossible; for that would imply an effect without a cause, or a balance turning when the weights are equal.—But this is evidently taking the question for granted: for it will not be allowed that *willing* is a necessary effect, which must imply a compelling efficient cause; or the mind like a balance to be moved with weights. And as to the fact in question, a cause which we *cannot assign* is to us *no* cause: and yet in many such cases we determine[b].

§ 2. 5. It is farther pleaded that such a liberty would be an imperfection to the human soul; because it would suppose it in some instances to act without reason.

Ans. Our scheme of liberty supposes a power of chusing rationally in all instances; of seeing and preferring a greater good; and chusing of two objects equally good, one, where there is reason for taking *one*, though not for taking *this* rather than *that*: whereas to deny this is plainly to limit the mind in its power of choice and capacity for happiness in some instances. Yet I think (though we allow that some particular pleasure may arise from the consciousness of having used this natural liberty aright, when it might have been abused) it must be

a COLLINS ib. p. 86—88, 91—98. LEIBNITZ Theod. § 67—72.
b COLLINS, ib. p. 44—52, 57—59. WATTS on Lib. p. 68—70. CLARKE and LEIBNITZ, p. 38, § 1. p. 93—95, 121—123, 169, 173—177, 291. Append. No. 4, 9. p. 165, § 14, 15, p. 284—287. CICERO de Fato, § 24, 25. JACKSON on Liberty, p. 193—196.

granted, that a power of chusing worse rather than better, is not necessary to the happiness of any being. But is mankind in such a perfect state, that we are under a necessity of maintaining that it could not have been greater or happier than it is[a]?

§ 3. 6. The sentiments of many considerable moderns may be seen in COLLINS on Lib. p. 14—31. and those of several ancients in COLLINS, ib. p. 59—62. JACKSON on Lib. p. 82—91, 98—113. LUCAS's Enquiry, vol. i. p. 163—185, 130—135. HUTCH. Metaph. Syn. c. iv. p. 22, 23. compared with p. 57.

§ 4. 7. What Mr. LOCKE's notion of Liberty on the whole was, is much debated. The truth of the matter seems to be, that he changes his idea of it; sometimes meaning external liberty, of which he generally speaks, (see *Lect.* 18. 6.) sometimes philosophical, (as in the place quoted above, l. ii. c. xxi. § 49.) and sometimes he seems to recur to the notion of natural liberty again, especially when he says in so many words, that freedom consists in not being under a necessary determination of our will in any particular action, (§ 51.) and in a power of suspension, (§ 52.) by which last manner of stating it, he seems not to throw any light upon the question; since all the difficulty attending a possibility of determining to act one way or another, will attend a possibility of determining to act or not to act[b].

§ 5. 8. Those who believe the being and perfections of God, and a state of retribution, in which he will reward and punish mankind according to the diversity of their actions, will find it difficult to reconcile the justice of punishment with the necessity of crimes punished. And they that believe all that the scripture says, on the one hand, of the eternity of future punishments, and, on the other, of God's compassion to sinners, and his solemn assurance that he desires not their death, will find the difficulty greatly increased. But as many of the words here used are not yet strictly defined, nor the evidence of the propositions stated, it may suffice briefly to have suggested the thought[c] *.

a COLLINS, ib. p. 62—83.
WATTS, ib. p. 70—74.
COLLIER's Enquiry, p. 50, 51.
LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 48—52.
CLARKE and BOLTON's Lect. p. 119—121.
b LOCKE's Fam. Epist. p. 474, &c. præsert. p. 480.
c CATO's Letters, vol. iv. No. 110.
JACKSON's Repos. passim.
HARTLEY, on Man, vol. i. p. 500—511 †.
STERRY on Free Will.
WEST's Serm. No. iii.
NYE on Nat. and Rev. Rel.
SEARCH on Free Will, p. 36—42
RAMSAY's Phil. Princ. vol. i. prop. 36.
DUCHAL's Serm. vol. i. p. 163.
EDWARDS on the Will.

* To notice all the particulars of the *Scholia* under this proposition which call for animadversion, would swell these notes too much; and it is presumed, if the principles of the preceding ones be duly considered, that it is needless. The studious reader, if not already master of the work, will not fail to peruse Mr. JONATHAN EDWARDS on the Freedom of the will; a work, as far as it relates to the subject of these two Lectures, of interesting importance. W.

† Since the preceding Lectures were written, the question concerning liberty

LECT. XXI.

On Philosophical Liberty.

§ 1. *Prop.* THE philosophical liberty of the mind is much impaired, and we are obnoxious to a lamentable degree of servitude. *Lect.* 18. § 7.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. The understanding is often so far influenced by the passions, as to be unwilling to enter on reasonings, which may seem to lead to a conclusion contrary to our interest.

§ 3. 2. The passions and prejudices of our minds insensibly mingle themselves with the whole process of reasoning when it is undertaken, leading into many embarrassments and inconsistencies, obscuring truth and gilding error; so that frequently the judgment is formed upon a very unfair hearing, agreeably to the bias the mind is under, and contrary to the evidence that might have been obtained.

§ 4. 3. We often find it difficult to excite our passions at the command of reason, and to fix them on objects, which appear to our understanding most worthy of regard: on the contrary, they are often excited by such objects, as the understanding has been by irresistible evidence compelled to disapprove, and thereby we are led to commit actions, which, while we do them, we condemn ourselves for.

§ 5. 4. Bodily constitution and appetite have sometimes almost a constraining power to hinder the execution of the

and necessity has again received a most copious and acute discussion. See JONATHAN EDWARDS's Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will;—The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated, by Dr. PRIESTLEY;—A Free Discussion of the Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity, in a correspondence between Dr. PRICE and Dr. PRIESTLEY;—Observations in Defence of the Liberty of Man, as a moral agent, by the Rev. JOHN PALMER;—Dr. PRIESTLEY's Letter to Mr. PALMER, in Defence of his Illustrations;—Mr. PALMER's Appendix to his Observations;—Dr. PRIESTLEY's second Letter to Mr. PALMER;—Mr. JACOB BRYANT's Address to Dr. PRIESTLEY, upon his "Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated;" Dr. PRIESTLEY's Letter to Mr. BRYANT;—DAWES's Free Enquiry into the Merits of a Controversy between Dr. PRICE and Dr. PRIESTLEY;—The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity briefly invalidated;—REID's Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 267—368.—The notes to the new edition of HARTLEY on Man;—BELSHAM's Essays, Philosophical, Historical, and Literary, vol. i. p. 1—15;—Essays, Philosophical and Literary, by Dr. GREGORY of Edinburgh;—and Enquiry concerning Political Justice, vol. i. p. 295—317.—ROTHERHAM's Essay on Human Liberty;—Dr. BENJAMIN DAWSON's "Necessitarian;"—Remarks on Dr. GREGORY's, of Edinburgh, Philosophical and Literary Essays;—BUTTERWORTH's Thoughts on Moral Government and Agency;—and Mr. CROMBE's Vindication of Philosophical Necessity. K.

wisest volitions. Yet it must be acknowledged, this impulse is not invincible: we may stop ourselves in the career; and enter upon a contrary course: so that upon the whole, the way to happiness is rather difficult than impossible [a]. See *Lect.* 17. § 11. and *Lect.* 19. § 1.

§ 6. *Cor.* It is plain from these phænomena, of which experience may convince us too surely, that the symmetry of the soul and subordination of its faculties mentioned *Lect.* 18. § 13. in which complete liberty consists, is in a great measure violated in the human soul. But whether it were originally in the same state, cannot be determined till we have examined other previous propositions [b].

§ 7. *Schol.* 1. It is greatly debated, how far the will has, in our present state, any influence on the judgment, in assenting to any proposition in question. Some maintain that it cannot have any influence at all, but I think experience proves the contrary: and though there must be some shew of argument to determine the judgment, yet it seems to be the consequence of that natural liberty asserted, *Lect.* 19. § 1. that the mind can divert itself from examining proofs, which are likely to establish a disagreeable proposition; and by labouring to confirm and embellish arguments on the favourite side of the question, can bring itself to assent to what it wishes to find true, though vastly superior evidence on the contrary side were fairly within its reach. Yet it must be acknowledged, that this remark only takes place in propositions which have some certain limited degree of evidence, since there are some cases in which the truth will invincibly force itself upon the understanding, and no artifice can be sufficient to evade it [c].

§ 8. 2. Many actions of brutes seem to discover some degree of liberty; but how far they are possessed of it, seems impossible for us to determine, since all the principal proofs of the natural liberty of the human mind arise from what passes within ourselves, and what we learn by discoursing with other men; and not merely from what we observe in their most rational or capricious actions [d].

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 47, 56—59.
b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 52—55.
SEED's Serm. vol. ii. p. 339—344.
c COLLINS on Lib. p. 35—36.
CLERICI Pneumat. l. i. c. iii. § 14.
LAW's Theory of Rel. p. 15—17. Note m.
WATTS on Lib. p. 13—16.
LOCKE's Ess. l. iv. c. xx. § 6, 12—16.
CLARKE and LEIBNITZ, p. 403—415.
d REYNAUD's Philos. Convers. vol. iii. p. 82—87.

LECT. XXII.

On the Imperfection of our Knowledge.

§ 1. *Prop.* THERE are many particulars in which the knowledge we have of our own minds is very imperfect, and we are as it were a mystery to ourselves.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. We know not what our soul is, otherwise than by its operations; but are not able to determine what that constitution is, from whence those operations proceed, or what particular and distinct idea is to be affixed to the word *principle*, if we call it, as many do, an intelligent or conscious principle. See *Lect.* 1. § 8. § 14. *Lect.* 2. § 1.

§ 3. 2. We know not how the soul is united to the body, or what connection there is between impressions made upon the organs of sensation and the ideas arising in our minds, or between the volitions of our minds and the consequent motions of our bodies. *Lect.* 2. § 27.

§ 4. 3. We know not certainly how ideas are laid up in the memory: it is not demonstrably evident that there are traces in the brain correspondent to those ideas: *Lect.* 8. § 7. but if it were, how recollection is performed, and in many cases why one idea is recollected rather than another, is not possible for us to say. *Lect.* 9. § 8.

§ 5. 4. It still remains in some degree an uncertain question, whether we think always or only by intervals. *Lect.* 13.

§ 6. 5. It is extremely difficult to remove all the objections against liberty of choice, especially against that which is stated *Lect.* 19. § 7.

§ 7. 6. The question wherein personal identity consists, how plain soever it may have appeared to some, has been differently determined by different persons of great learning and abilities; and is after all attended with some perplexities, perhaps chiefly arising from what is mentioned above. *Vid.* § 2. *Lect.* 12.

§ 8. 7. The phænomenon of dreams does also contain some very unaccountable things. How ideas are then suggested to the mind, in the reception of which we are entirely passive; how dialogues are formed; and how the moral principles of action seem to be suspended, even while we continue to reason, (though often after a wild and inconclusive manner) upon circumstances and events in which we imagine ourselves to be engaged [a]. *Vid. Lect.* 4. § 7.

[a] BAXTER on the Soul, vol. ii. § 1. 8vo Ed.

§ 9. 8. The phænomenon of phrensy is likewise very unaccountable, and how the state of the nerves and uices of the body at that time should so strangely affect our rational powers, and make us creatures so very different from ourselves. *Lect.* 4. § 8. *Valet propositio.*

§ 10. *Schol.* 1. The like may in some degree be said of the imperfection of the knowledge we have concerning our own bodies: in which, though great improvements and discoveries have been made, some very important questions still remain undecided, v. g. By what mechanism animal secretion, respiration, and muscular motion are performed: whence the systole and diastole of the heart arises: what is the use of the spleen and the cœcum: not to mention the rationale of many distempers, about which many celebrated physicians are much divided; and almost the whole doctrine of the nerves.

§ 11. 2. The phænomena mentioned in the proposition and the preceding scholium serve to illustrate *Lect.* 11. § 3. and add a very important article to it.

§ 12. *Cor.* 1. It becomes us to maintain a deep and constant sense of the ignorance and weakness of our own minds, when we always carry about in the very constitution of them and our bodies, such affecting demonstrations of it.

§ 13. 2. Since such a modest sense of our weakness and ignorance will have a great tendency to promote the honour and happiness of our lives, by teaching us to avoid many instances of arrogance and self-conceit, which expose men both to enmity and contempt; therefore pneumatology, which leads us into this humbling view, is a noble and useful study. (Compare *Lect.* 4. § 9. *Lect.* 11. § 3. and *Lect.* 21. § 1.

§ 14. 3. If we should hereafter prove the existence of any being vastly superior to us, and especially of a being possessed of infinite perfections, it must be expected that there will be many things relating to him, which it is not possible for us fully to explain or comprehend; and our enquiries concerning such a being ought to be pursued with great modesty and humility[a].

a BUTLER's Serm. p. 303—305. Spectator, vol. viii. No. 590. | JONVAL's Letter, apud Nat. Displ. vol. i. part 2. p. 293, &c.

PART II.

OF THE BEING OF A GOD AND HIS NATURAL PERFECTIONS.

LECT. XXIII.

On the Existence of God.

§ 1. *Ax.* IT is impossible that any thing should of itself arise into being; or that it should be produced without some producing cause, existing in order of time, as well as of nature, prior to the thing so produced: or in other words, which must not only be *considered* before the effect, in order to understand it thoroughly, but must also be supposed to have *existed* before it.

§ 2. *Def.* That is said to be a SELF-EXISTENT, or NECESSARILY EXISTENT BEING, which does not owe its existence to any other being whatsoever, either as its cause or its support, but would exist, or be what it is, were there no other being in the whole compass of nature but itself[a].

§ 3. *Schol.* It seems safer, in this momentous argument on which we are now entering, to acquiesce in this general and simple idea of self-existence, gradually deducing from thence other ideas connected with it, than to state it, as Dr. CLARKE has done, "That which cannot so much as be imagined not to exist, or that which has necessity for the cause of its existence;" * since if there be any self-existent being at all, it seems not proper to ascribe its existence to any cause whatsoever[b].

§ 4. *Cor.* 1. If any self-existent being does now exist, it has existed from all eternity: for if it ever began to exist, it must (by § 1.) have owed its existence to some prior being as its

a CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 17, 18.
BURNET ib. vol. i. p. 7, 8.
KING's Orig. of Evil, p. 18, 19. No. 4.

b LAW's Enquiry, p. 147—150.
ABERNETHY's Serm. vol. i. p. 191—193. Dubl. Ed. p. 203—205. Lond.
KING's Orig. of Evil, p. 67—71.

* It is more accurate to say, "that which has *absolute* necessity for the reason of its existence;" for every *other* existence claims *some* necessity for its cause, i. e. *hypothetical*.——W.

cause, which is plainly contradictory to the notion of self-existence stated above.

§ 5. 2. If there be or ever has been any self-existent being, it is also *everlasting*, i. e. it will never cease to be. For dissolution must arise from something external or internal: but nothing external can dissolve that which depends upon no other being for its support: and no imaginable reason can be assigned, why there should be any internal cause of dissolution in that being which has (by § 4.) existed from eternity, or which was indeed in any single past moment self-existent and independent: which is so plain, that, whoever may have denied the existence of a self-existent being, none have ever asserted, that there was such a being, and that his existence is now extinguished and lost; or that there is some self-existent being, which, though now subsisting, will at length be destroyed or dissolved of itself. Yet it must be owned that a late writer, who seems determined to carry scepticism to the greatest excess, has presumed to call this matter into question [a].

§ 6. 3. If there be any self-existent being, it is also *immutable*. For since a being is the same with all its properties taken together, (*Lect.* 1. § 7.) if any property were taken away from it, a part of the being would perish, which is inconsistent with its being necessary; (§ 5.) or if any properties were added, the being itself would not be eternal, and therefore not necessarily existent [b]. (§ 4.)

§ 7. 4. There is no medium between a self-existent and derived being: or in other words, whatever exists at all is either self-existent or derived.

§ 8. 5. The existence of every derived being may at length be traced up either mediately or immediately to what is self-existent, which in order to its producing it, must according to the Axiom have existed before it. (§ 1, 7.)

§ 9. 6. From the *Corollary* above it will follow, that whatever is eternal is self-existent.

§ 10. 7. To maintain a *series* or succession of derived beings from eternity, is most absurd: for every series supposes some first, and to suppose that first to be derived is self-contradictory, (as above, § 8.) with this farther absurdity, that the greater the series, the greater support it will need, as a chain consisting of many links will need a greater support than one

a HUME's Philos. Essays, p. 253.
b CRUSIUS, Log. vol. i. p. 436.

ABERN. vol. i. p. 196—200. Dubl. Ed. p. 209—215. Lond.

consisting but of a few such links: and should a *circle* of causes be supposed, instead of solving it will if possible increase the absurdity; since this would suppose every cause in the circle to have produced itself, and all the other causes too[a].

§ 11. *Def.* That is said to be *simply infinite* in its kind, which has no bounds; or than which nothing in its kind can be conceived greater: but if it be conceived as bounded in some respects and unbounded in others, then it is said to be only infinite *secundum quid*, as a line infinitely produced one way from a given point: but this is a very improper sense of the word[b].

§ 12. *Cor.* Whatever is self-existent, has all its properties infinite. (See § 2.) For if it be necessary in any time or place, (if it be its nature to exist in time and place) it must be necessary at all times and in all places; and since, whatever its other properties are, to set bounds to them, is to assert its non-existence beyond those bounds, whether of power, wisdom, &c. it seems extremely probable, not to say certain, that what hinders its existence beyond those bounds might hinder its existence entirely. But it could not be a self-existent being, if its existence might have been hindered, or could be destroyed[c].

§ 13. *Schol.* 1. On much the same principles, Mr. GROVE directly infers, that a being necessarily existent must be infinitely perfect. Some perfections it must have, or it could not be any thing at all; and for the same reason that it has any one perfection, and in any one degree, it must be possessed of all possible perfections, and in all possible degrees. But this is a point of so great importance, that we chuse rather to infer it from other mediums of argument, than to rest the whole stress of it upon such a deduction: especially as upon the principles of *Lect.* 17. § 13. this argument can have no place, till it be proved that whatever is self-existent is percipient, or endued with thought[d].

§ 14. 2. It is disputed, whether our idea of infinite be a *negative* or *positive* idea. Some have pleaded, that *bounds* imply a negation of continued existence beyond them, and consequently by removing this negation we form a positive idea[e].

§ 15. 3. It may also be queried, whether our idea of infinite be a *simple* or *compound* idea: yet I think it may more properly be said to be a simple idea, as no addition of finites

a CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 11—14.
WOOLASTI. Rel. of Nat. p. 65—68.
KING's Orig. of Evil, p. 42, &c.
b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 1—3.
WATTS's Ontol. c. xvii.
c CLARKE ib. p. 458, 459, 462, 463, 465, 466, 469—476.
d GROVE's Post. Works, vol. iv. p. 7.
HOWE's Living Temple, part I. c. iv. § 2, 3.
e CAMBRAY sur l'Exist. p. 379—383.
LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 13, 16—19.
KING's Orig. of Evil, p. 14, 89.
RAMSAY's Princ. iv.

can make up an infinite. It will be difficult to find out any idea more simple.

§ 16. *Prop.* Something has existed from eternity.

§ 17. *Dem.* 1. It is evident that something does actually exist: v. g. we know that we ourselves do. *Lect.* 1. § 1.

§ 18. 2. If something has not existed from eternity, the things which now are must have arisen absolutely from nothing, and without any producing cause, contrary to § 1. Therefore,

§ 19. 3. We are certain something has existed from eternity[a].

§ 20. *Schol.* It must be acknowledged extremely difficult to conceive of any thing having existed from eternity; yet since there are such evident proofs of it, we learn that a thing may be true, the manner of which is entirely inconceivable to our limited minds, or against which some objections may lie which to us are unanswerable[b].

§ 21. *Prop.* There has from eternity existed some self-existent or necessary being.

§ 22. *Dem.* 1. There has from eternity existed something, either self-existent or derived. See § 7, 16.

2. If there were not so evident an absurdity as there seems to be, in supposing a derived being eternal, yet its existence, (even granting its eternity, and much more evidently supposing it not to be so,) may be traced up to a self-existent being, which as self-existent is eternal[c]. *Valet propositio.* § 2.

§ 23. *Schol.* The proposition follows directly from § 9. but we chuse to keep it in its present form; that if any should think there may be an eternal necessary emanation from a self-existent principle, as many have maintained, the foregoing proposition might rest on a foundation not to be affected by such an apprehension[d].

a CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 8, 9. ABERN. Serm. vol. i. p. 184—187. Dubl. Ed. p. 195—198. Lond.
b CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 9—11.
c RAMSAY's Princ. Pr. 1.
d Universal Hist. Ancient Part. Introd. p. 5, Oct. Ed.

LECT. XXIV.

The World not Eternal.

§ 1. *Prop.* THE system of things which we call the material world, did not exist from eternity in its present form, but had a beginning.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. We may not only conceive of many possible alterations which might be made in the form of it, but we see it incessantly changing; whereas an eternal being, for as much as it is self-existent, is always the same[a]. *Lect.* xxiii. § 6.

§ 3. 2. We have no credible history of transactions more remote than six thousand years from the present time: for as to the pretence that some nations have made to histories of greater antiquity, as the Egyptians, Chaldeans, Phœnicians, Chinese, &c. they are evidently convicted of falshood at large in STILLINGFLEET's Orig. Sacr. p. 15—106. MILLAR's Propag. of Christ. vol. i. p. 100—112. PEARSON on the Creed, p. 58—60. JENKINS of Christianity, vol. ii. preface, p. 4—11. ALLIX's Reflections, vol. i. p. 95—120. WINDER's Hist. of Knowledge, vol. ii. passim. LUCRETIUS, l. v. ver. 325—330*.

§ 4. 3. We can trace the invention of the most useful arts and sciences; which had probably been carried farther, and invented sooner, had the world been eternal[b].

§ 5. 4. The origin of the most considerable nations of the earth may be traced; i. e. the time when they first inhabited the countries where they now dwell: and it appears that most of the western nations came from the east[c].

§ 6. *Schol.* If it be said that deluges, pestilences, conflagrations, &c. destroy men with their inventions, it may be answered, (1.) If the world were eternal, there must have been an immense number of these devastations, and it is amazing (if there be, as this hypothesis supposes, no superior being that presides

a CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 22, 23.
COLLIB. on Souls, Ess. v. § 1.

b PLIN. Nat. Hist. l. vii, viii.
LUCRET. l. v. ver. 331—339.
NICHOLS Conf. vol. i. p. 76—87. 12mo. p. 45—51. Oct.
CHEYNE's Princ. c. ii. § 24. p. 63—68.
BURNET's Theory, vol. i. p. 54—59.
COLLIB. ib.

c NEWTON's Chronology passim.
PATRICK on Genesis, c. x.
WELLS's Geog. of the Old Test. vol. i. c. iii.
PEARSON on the Creed, p. 60, 61.
PEREZON. Cumberland, de orig. Gent. & BOCHART's Phaleg. passim.
MICHAELIS's Specilegium Geographiæ Hebræorum, passim.

* The Hindoos make great pretensions to a very high antiquity, and credit has been given to their assertions. But the extravagance of their chronology has been shewn by the best of all judges, Sir WILLIAM JONES, as may be seen in his Dissertation on the subject, published in the second volume of the Asiatic Researches.——K.

over them, that they should not have destroyed the whole human race. (2.) If any had survived, the most useful arts would have been preserved [a].

LECT. XXV.

The World not Eternal; continued.

§ 1. *Dem.* 5. THE projectile force of the planets is continually diminishing, by the resistance of the fluid through which they pass, i. e. the rays of light; which are every where diffused through all parts of their orbits in so vast a quantity, that multitudes of them fall on bodies too small to be discerned by the naked eye, as appears by microscopical observation. Now if we allow this diminution in the projectile force in one year or age to be ever so small, there must be a finite time in which it will be utterly destroyed; and consequently had the present system of things been eternal, (since on this supposition the same laws of nature must have prevailed) the planets would long ago have fallen into the sun [b].

§ 2. 6. The sun is continually losing some of its light, and consequently must long ere this time have been reduced to utter darkness, if the world had been eternal. If it be said, that every ray of light after a certain elongation falls back into the sun; we answer, some of them must in their return strike on the planets, falling on their dark hemisphere, by which means they would be absorbed, and the decay would be real though more gradual, according to the reasoning above. If it be answered, that there may be some kind of fewel provided, as suppose comets, by which the sun is fed; we reply, that fewel is or is not exactly adjusted to the expence of his flame; if it is not exactly adjusted, if too little, the consequence urged above will at length though still more slowly follow; if too much, the sun growing continually hotter, the earth and other planets must have been burnt up, and so an argument against its eternity will arise in another form, from the ever-growing heat of the sun: but if the adjustment be exact, it will be such a proof of design and government in the works of nature as would be so greatly

a LUCRET. l. v. ver. 339—352. PEARSON on the Creed, p. 61. margin. Religion of Nat. p. 91, 92.

b WATTS's Ess. No. x. § 1. p. 242—245. CHEYNE's Princ. c. ii. § 20. p. 53—56.

serviceable in another view, that any friend of religion might willingly spare this argument against the world's eternity, when there are so many others unanswerably strong. And it may be observed, that a similar train of reasoning may take place as to some following particulars [a].

§ 3. 7. Since it is probable that the fixed stars and the sun attract each other, had they been eternal, they must long ere this have met in the centre of gravity common to the whole universe. And nearly akin to this, is the argument which may be drawn from the effect of the nearest access of the earth to Mars, or any other superior planet; in consequence of which it might be supposed to be drawn by such attraction a little from its orbit; the eccentricity of which would by this means be continually increased, till the earth were utterly destroyed. The like argument may be applied to the other planets, and especially to Saturn: but the thought is in general so much the same, that it has not been judged necessary to insist upon it [b].

§ 4. 8. Sir WILLIAM PETTY has attempted to prove that the number of mankind doubles in 360 years: but though the exactness of his computation should be doubted, if there be any periodical and constant increase at all, it will prove the world not to be eternal; as from a limited distance of time it must e'er now have been over-run with human inhabitants. Some have indeed maintained a decrease since the *Augustan* age: but if it could be proved that mankind do actually decrease periodically, or that the increase is exactly balanced, this argument will stand on the same footing with § 2. As for plagues, by which some suppose the balance to be made, if we may judge by what we know of their history, the diminution of mankind by them bears but a very small proportion to its increase, as computed by PETTY [c].

§ 5. 9. Many substances are continually petrifying and ossifying; so that, had the world been eternal, the whole earth would have been but one stone, or the petrifaction must have ceased of itself. But if it be said that these stones dissolve, and so there may be a kind of circulation; it is answered, that stones grow in one year, which do not dissolve in many centuries.

The argument from the waste of fluids by the growth of animal and vegetable bodies is much the same as this, so far as

a CHEYNE's Princ. c. i. § 42. p. 95—98. c. ii. § 19. p. 51, 52
WATTS's Ess. No. x. § 2.
b CHEYNE's Princ. c. i. § 22. p. 58—60.
c NICH. Conf. vol. i. p. 62—76. Oct. Ed. p. 36—44.
CHEYNE's Princ. c. ii. § 25. p. 68—72.
Phil. Lett. vol. ii. p. 148—158.
Refl. on Polyg. Diss. vii.
COLLIB. ib. Ess. v.

there is any solidity in it: but it may be queried, whether the dissolution of those bodies, and separation of their consistent fluids in a series of years, may not answer this [a].

§ 6. 10. Hills are continually subsiding, which will in some finite time reduce the world to a level. If it be objected, that this is balanced by earthquakes, &c. which raise mountains; it is answered, the number of these so raised is comparatively small, and they being hollow would soon be washed away [b].

§ 7. 11. According to the best calculations which have been made, comets appear on an average at least in 30 years; but whether this account be exact or not, if their return be periodical, there would within an imaginable time have been more than a thousand millions cutting the earth's orbit in various directions; in consequence of which the earth must have been exposed to such danger, either of being drawn into the sun or separated from it, that, without a particular providence, which this hypothesis opposes, its destruction must have happened long since.

§ 8. 12. If the world be eternal, it is hard to account for the tradition of its beginning, which has almost every where prevailed, though under different forms, among both polite and barbarous nations [c].

LECT. XXVI.

Spinoza's Doctrine confuted.

§ 1. *Cor.* 1. THERE must have been some great and excellent being, superior to this whole material system, by which it was reduced into that beautiful order, in which it now appears.

§ 2. 2. Hence we may infer the vanity and falsehood of SPINOZA's doctrine, who asserts, that the whole and every part of the material world is a self-existent being: for he expressly says, that one being or substance could not be produced by another, and that all things could be in no other order and manner than they are, i. e. that all things in their present form are necessary, and therefore eternal [d]. *Lect.* 23. § 4, 6.

a NICH. Conf. vol. i. p. 51—55. Oct. p. 30—32.
COLLIER, ib.
CLARE on Fluids, p. 271, 272.
b NICH. conf. vol. i. p. 55—62. Oct. p. 32—35.
RAY's Misc. No. iii. p. 344—364.
MOUNTAUG. Treat. p. 377, 378.
BURN. Theory, vol. i. p. 51—53.
c HALES Orig. of Man, § 2. c. xii. § 3. c. i.
GROT. de Ver. l. i. § 16. p. 26—40.
BURNET's Arch. l. ii. c. i. p. 273—285.
DU-PIN's Hist. of the Church, vol. i. c. i. 12mo.
d CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 29—39.
CAMB. Str. Pneu. p. 202—207.
TOLAND's Pantheisticon, p. 7—8, 54, 55. apud SYKES's Connect. c. iv. p. 64—83.
ORPH. Carm. ap. Apul. Op. (de Mundo,) p. 190.
RAMSAY's App. to Phil. Princ. vol. i. p. 497, &c.
CAMPBELL's Necess. of Rev. p. 368.

§ 3. *Schol.* 1. Those arguments which REDI, MALPHIGIUS, and several modern philosophers have advanced against the doctrine of equivocal generation either of animals or plants, have often been urged as conclusive against the eternity of the world: and if they will prove, that every animal or plant of the present generation was not only contained in its immediate parent, but together with that parent in the remoter generation, and so on perpetually, it might indeed prove, that, how small soever the bodies now grown up might be at any given time, there is a certain distance of generation, at which the organized body containing them and all intermediate generations, each bigger than the embryo in question was at that time, must have been bigger than even the whole mass of the earth. But it may be answered, that allowing no animal or plant to rise into visible form but from pre-existent parents of the same kind, it may nevertheless in its first stamina be formed anew, from some fluid before making an unorganized part of the adult parent; and in that case there will be no peculiar force in this argument, as lying against the eternity of the world; for that which arises from the exquisite workmanship of an animal body, and the absurdity of supposing it produced from any fluid or solid merely by mechanical laws, properly belongs to another question[a].

§ 4. 2. Neither do we argue from the probability that the torrid zone would have taken fire; which is examined in RAY's 3 Disc. p. 381—388.

§ 5. 3. We likewise wave those arguments which are taken from the supposed absurdity and impossibility of the world's having been actually eternal, or having existed through an infinite succession; because the same objection seems to lie against every thing which is said to be eternal, and the argument turns on the supposition, that an infinite is made up of a number of finites[b].

§ 6. 4. Some of the ancients, who speak of the eternity of the world, do not seem to intend it in the sense in which SPINOZA asserts it. The arguments are designed to prove either that something must be eternal, which is all that those of OCELLUS LUCANUS amount to, or that the world is a necessary eternal effect flowing from the energy of the divine nature, which ARISTOTLE seems to have thought; or that it was an eternal voluntary emanation from a supreme and infinitely perfect cause,

a REDI de Gen. Insect. pass.
NIEUWENT. Rel. Phil. vol. i. c. xvi. § 9.
RAY at BOYLE's Lect. Serm. iv. p. 127, ad fin.
CLAYTON's Princ. c. i. § 23. p. 69—85.
Jenk. Wisd. of God, p. 308—326.

VAREN. Geog. vol. i. p. 226. Engl.
BURNET on the Soul of the World, p. 30—38.
b BURNET on the Art. p. 19, 20.
CLERKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 35—37.
COLLIB. ib. arg. 5.

which was the opinion of PLATO's followers. Nevertheless there is reason to believe, that some of them were properly *Pantheists*, in the same sense in which the term may be applied to the present followers of SPINOZA[a]*. Compare § 2.

§ 7. 5. If any objection should be brought against the seventh argument, from the supposed infinite number of celestial bodies, which would occasion an equal attraction every way; we must refer the examination of that till we have proved that matter is not infinite, to which we shall quickly proceed.

LECT. XXVII.

Motion and Self-existence not essential to Matter.

§ 1. *Def.* THAT is said to be an ESSENTIAL QUALITY, which cannot cease, unless the being itself should be supposed to be destroyed[b].

§ 2. *Prop.* Motion is not essential to matter.

§ 3. *Dem.* (I.) 1. It is evident that when we have abstracted the idea of motion from any particle of matter, there will still remain the idea of extended solid substance, i. e. it will still be matter. See § 1. and *Lect.* 1. § 9.

§ 4. 2. If motion be essential to matter, then motion must either be an equal tendency every way, or a prevailing tendency one way.

§ 5. 3. An equal tendency every way would certainly produce rest.

§ 6. 4. A prevailing tendency one way rather than another must arise from some external cause, and if these motions were various, from causes that act in various manners, and not from the necessary nature of body or matter itself. Therefore, § 7. 5. Motion is not essential to matter[c]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 8. *Dem.* (II.) Another proof may be drawn from the *vis inertiæ*, which BAXTER has proved to be essential to matter, and which is directly contrary to necessary motion. This argument is stated at large in BAXTER *on the Soul*, and as it cannot conve-

a. CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 23—35.
NIEUWENTIT's Cont. vol. i. p. 22—35. Oct. vol. i. p. 12—20.
RAMSAY's Princ. Pr. 17.

b. WATTS's Log. p. 17, 18.
c. TOWNSEND's Lect. to SERJ. No. 5. p. 186—202.
CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 24, 25.

* A concise and elegant view of the different opinions of the ancient philosophers on this subject, may be read in DR. ENFIELD's History of Philosophy. K.

niently be contracted here, we chuse to refer to the author himself [a].

§ 9. *Cor.* Since it appears that matter does move, (still supposing the reality of the material world) it is evident there must be some first mover, i. e. some superior immaterial being, from whom its motion is derived.

§ 10. *Schol.* The argument which TOLAND brings, in the passage cited above, to prove motion essential to matter, amounts to little more than the universal gravitation observed to prevail in it; but this may be sufficiently accounted for, by supposing it always impressed upon it by the Creator, and that it might at his pleasure be suspended, though no single particle of the whole material world should be now exempted from the influence.

§ 11. *Prop.* Matter is not self-existent or necessary.

§ 12. *Dem.* 1. Tangibility, solidity, or resistance is essential to matter. *Lect.* 1. § 9.

§ 13. 2. If all space were full of matter, how fine soever the particles were, there must be on every side an invincible resistance to the motion of any one of those particles.

§ 14. 3. But we plainly see that there is motion in the corporeal world.

§ 15. 4. There is therefore a vacuum; as will be farther illustrated in the scholium.

§ 16. 5. But if matter were self-existent or necessary, there must be an universal plenum. *Lect.* 23. § 12.

§ 17. 6. Matter is liable to continual changes in its place, contexture, situation, &c. which is inconsistent with its being self-existent. *Lect.* 23. § 6.

§ 18. 7. Matter is not self-existent [b]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 19. *Cor.* There must be some immaterial self-existent being, by whom matter was at first created, supposing it now really to exist. See *Lect.* 27. § 9. *Lect.* 23. § 8.

§ 20. *Schol.* A vacuum may further be proved from the different specific gravity of bodies, compared with the vibrations of pendulums of unequal bulk and equal length in equal times: v. g. one of ten pound vibrates just as fast as another of one pound whose rod is of the same length; it has therefore just ten

a BAXTER on the Soul, c. i.
b CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 507, 704, 25, 26. COCHLAEUS Enq. p. 258—261. Part. 3. BENT. at BOYLE's Lect. 6. p. 211—213. HOWE's Living Temple, part ii. c. 2. § 5. BAXT. on the Soul, Vol. ii. § 3. prop. p. 345—351, 356—359, 373—382.

times the momentum or force of motion, i. e. ten times the gravity; for here it is gravity, that gives it the force; or in other words, the gravity is as the quantity of matter: when therefore the gravity under the same bulk is unequal, it proves there is more matter in one mass than in the other, and consequently pores (at least) in the lighter, though the heavier were to be supposed entirely solid: and the experiment of the feather and guinea descending together in the exhausted receiver establishes the argument on the same principles[a].

LECT. XXVIII.

On Thought not the Effect of Matter, but of a Self-existent Spirit.

§ 1. *Ax.* IF any being be the producing cause of another being, not merely occasionally, but by its own power, it is very reasonable to suppose, that it was more excellent or perfect than its production, or at least equally so.

§ 2. *Cor.* Seeing a thinking substance as such is more excellent than a substance destitute of thought, it is not to be imagined that spirit should be produced by a being which is not possessed of thought.

§ 3. *Prop.* It is in the nature of things utterly inconceivable and incredible that thought should necessarily arise from matter.

§ 4. *Dem.* 1. If thought could proceed from matter, it must either arise from the general nature of it, or must be peculiar to matter in some certain configuration and agitation.

§ 5. 2. Thought cannot arise from the nature of matter in general; for then every particle of matter would have thought, which is evidently false and ridiculous to affirm.

§ 6. 3. Any supposed alteration in the figure of the particles of matter, v. g. from squares to cubes, or cones, &c. has no apparent influence on the production of thought.

§ 7. 4. Motion in general added to matter cannot produce thought; for then almost all matter known to us, being actually though not necessarily in motion, and some of it in a wonderful swift agitation, must be cogitative, contrary to fact.

[a] CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 503, 504. | MUSCH. Nat. Phil. c. iii. § 81—86.

§ 8. 5. The change of its motion, v. g. from a straight line to any kind of curve, or *vice versa*, or its collision against other particles of matter, seems to have no tendency to produce thought [a]. *Valet propositio.*

§ 9. *Cor.* Since we are sure there is such a thing as thought, *Lect.* 1. § 10. this is another argument independent on *Lect.* 27. § 19. to prove that there is some immaterial being [b]. See *Lect.* 23. § 1.

§ 10. *Schol.* 1. It is to no purpose to object, that there may be some unknown connection between certain modifications of matter and thought, from which thought may necessarily result, or that it may be produced from some unknown properties of matter, though not from those which are known; seeing many things are utterly incredible, which cannot be proved to be absolutely impossible.

§ 11. 2. If it be further objected, that it is as inconceivable that matter should arise from thought, as thought from matter; it may be answered, that we are sure in fact, that, if there be any material world, matter is moved by thought, though we know not how it is done, and that it was actually produced by some immaterial being, *Lect.* 27. § 19. but it cannot be proved in fact that thought is necessarily produced by matter, or that any thinking being has been mechanically produced from matter itself; though we allow that according to the constitution of some superior being thought is occasioned by it, i. e. that there is a certain wonderful harmony between impressions made on the material parts of our frame, and thought; and that thinking beings are produced by a superior cause on certain concurrences in the material world [c].

§ 12. 3. It may not be improper here to collect the proof we have had of the existence of an immaterial being, which arises partly from the motion of matter, *Lect.* 27. 9, and its existence, § 19. and also from the existence of thought, which mere matter could not produce, § 9. compared with § 2 of this.

§ 13. *Prop.* We are not ourselves necessary or self-existent beings *.

a ABERN. Serm. vol. i. p. 107—117.
BENTLEY at BOYLE's Lect. Serm. 2 p. 15—26. Oct. Ed. p. 52—68.
CLARKE ib. p. 52—57.
LOCKE's Ess. l. iv. c. x. § 10.
b BENTLEY ib. p. 29—36. Oct. p. 68—74.
c SHAFTS. Char. vol. ii. p. 296.
BAXT. on the Soul, vol. ii. p. 350, note.

* A formal demonstration of a proposition so extremely plain may be justly thought unnecessary. W.

§ 14. *Dem.* 1. It is evident, we are lately born into this world and there is no proof of our existence before.

§ 15. 2. We evidently appear to be dependent on every thing about us.

§ 16. 3. The capacity and sentiments of our minds, as well as the powers of our bodies and our external circumstances, are almost continually changing.

§ 17. 4. But every self-existent being is eternal, independent, and immutable. *Lect.* 23, § 4, 6.—Therefore,

§ 18. 5. We are not self-existent[a]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 19. *Cor.* 1. There is some self-existent being, from whom we mediately or immediately derive our existence, and to whom ultimately we owe all the faculties of our nature and all the enjoyments of our lives. *Lect.* 23. § 8.

§ 20. 2. There is great reason to believe that this being is naturally much more excellent than we.

§ 21. 3. It is evident that as we are already under great obligations to this being, so we have a constant dependence upon him for every future period and circumstance of our existence.

§ 22. 4. It must be of the greatest importance for us most attentively to enquire after him, and to study his nature and properties, that we may if possible secure an interest in his favour[b].

§ 23. *Prop.* That self-existent being, from whom our existence was ultimately derived, § 19. is a spirit.

§ 24. *Dem.* 1. Originally and primarily to produce a being is an action. *Lect.* 2 7.

§ 25. 2. That must be a spirit, whereby any being whatsoever is originally and primarily produced. *Lect.* 2. § 9.

§ 26. 3. Our spirits were produced by some self-existent being. § 19.

§ 27. 4. To suppose a thinking being produced by an unthinking cause, would be more evidently absurd than to suppose an unthinking being so produced. § 2.

§ 28. 5. That self-existent being, from whom our existence was ultimately derived, is a spirit[c]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 29. *Schol.* Though it seems more proper to state the evi-

a CAMB. sur l'Exist. p. 185—188.
b CAMB. sur l'Exist. p. 188, 189.
c CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 49—54. ABERNETHY, vol. 2. Serm. iv.

dence of this important proposition thus largely, it is in effect contained in § 20. since nothing that is not a spirit can be more excellent than our minds.

LECT. XXIX.

The Being of God proved from the existence of the material World and universal Consent.

§ 1. *Def.* THAT self-existent spiritual being, by whom we and the material world about us were originally formed, we call God [a].

§ 2. *Cor.* It appears from this definition that our idea of God is very complex, and is made up of many ideas arising both from sensation and reflection [b] *.

§ 3. *Prop.* There is a God.

§ 4. *Dem.* (I.) 1. The matter, of which this world or system consists, was originally created by a self-existent immaterial being. *Lect.* 27. § 19.

§ 5. 2. This matter was first put into motion by some superior, i. e. self-existent being. See *Lect.* 27. § 9. and *Lect.* 23. § 8.

§ 6. 3. This material world was reduced into the beautiful form wherein it now appears by some being superior to it. *Lect.* 26. § 1.

§ 7. 4. There is no reason to assert, nor has it ever that we know of been maintained by any, that the being, by whom the matter of our world was at first produced, was a different being from that by which it was at first moved and brought into the order in which it now appears.

§ 8. 5. Our spirits were also derived from some self-existent spirit of superior excellence and perfection. *Lect.* 28, § 19, 20.

§ 9. 6. There is no apparent reason to believe that the spirit, by whom our spirits were originally produced, is a being different from that, by which this material world about us was created and formed.

a VANINI Amph. p. 8—10. apud COLLIN. Inq. p. 243, 244. CUDWORTH's Intel. Syst. c. iv. p. 207.

b SHAFT. Char. vol. ii. p. 10, 11. LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 33—36.

* On the subject of this corollary see *Lect.* vi. § 8. Note.

§ 10. 7. There is some self-existent spiritual being, by whom we and this material world were formed; i. e. there is a God[a]. § 1. Q. E. D.

§ 11. *Cor.* 1. God is a being more excellent than the material world, or than we, or than any other spirit, which may hereafter appear to be derived from him. See *Lect.* 28. § 1.

§ 12. 2. There is something so great and excellent in self-existence, joined with a degree of other perfections superior to those which we can discover in any derived being whatsoever, that it seems most safe and reasonable, in all our further inquiries into the nature of God, to ascribe to him what appears to us most noble and excellent, and to separate from our ideas of him whatever is defective or contemptible; i. e. in other words, to conceive of him as a being of infinite perfections: but of this more fully hereafter[b]. See *Lect.* 23. § 12, 13.

§ 13. *Dem.* (II.) The being of a God proved from universal consent.

1. Almost all men of every place and age have acknowledged a God, learned or unlearned, polite or barbarous, pious or wicked, fearful or courageous; and nations that have differed most in their genius and customs have generally agreed in this important point.

§ 14. 2. This opinion must arise from prejudice or from right reason.

§ 15. 3. It is exceeding difficult or rather impossible, to find any prejudice common to all who have embraced this opinion. Fear could not affect the courageous, nor the invention of politic princes, princes themselves, or barbarous nations; blind credulity would not affect the most philosophic inquirers, nor religious hopes men of impious characters; and as for the authority of one person affirming it, how could the notion have been so universally propagated, or merely on this authority so universally believed? If education infused it through succeeding generations, why has it been so much more uniform than any thing else which is supposed to be so transmitted *?

§ 16. 4. It does not appear that particular prejudices can be assigned to suit the case of all particular persons.

a LOCKE's Ess. l. iv. c. x. § 1—6. YOUNG's Night Thoughts, No. ix.

b HOWE's Liv. Temp. part 1. c. iv. GROVE's Posth. Works, vol. iv. p. 7.

* How far the universal consent of the being of God is a fact, may now particularly be traced from the number of late voyages and travels to all parts of the world, and to men in all the forms of society.——K.

§ 17. 5. This opinion does not appear to arise from prejudice.

§ 18. 6. It seems founded on right reason: i. e. there is a God[a]. Q. E. D*.

§ 19. *Schol.* The different notions that men have maintained of the deity, and the opinion of many concerning a plurality of Gods, is urged as an objection against the argument stated above: but it may be answered, that their difference in other things makes their agreement in this great principle so much the more remarkable; and it is certain there is not such an agreement in any false notion of the deity, or plurality of Gods, as there is in his existence in general: to which we may add, that the wrong notions particular persons have entertained concerning him may often be accounted for by the variety of their genius, condition, education, &c[b].

LECT. XXX.

The Being of God proved from the works of Nature.

§ 1. *Dem.* (III.) IN which the being of a God is proved from a brief survey of the works of nature.

§ 2. *Lem.* This system of things, which we call the visible world, is full of beauty, harmony and order.

§ 3. *Dem. of Lem.* 1. This appears by a survey of the heavenly bodies: in which we may distinctly consider their magnitude, number, due situation, that they may not interfere with one another, and may lay a foundation for certain astronomical discoveries, which would otherwise have been impossible, had there been a perfect similarity in situation and size: especially in our system we may remark the sun, that glorious fountain of light and vital influence, by which most of the other beauties of the creation around us are discovered; and the various planets with which he is surrounded; in which we may more particularly

a WILK. of Nat. Rel. p. 41—49. p. 52—61.
TILLOTS. Works, vol. i. p. 14—17.
LOCKE's Ess. l. i. c. iv. § 8, 9.
LOUBIERE's Siam, part 3. c. xxii, xxiii. p. 130—132.
BURNET on the Art. p. 17, 18.
CASTREL of Nat. Relig. p. 29—33.
RIDGLEY's Divin. vol. i. p. 12—14.
MILLAR's Prop. of Christ. vol. ii. p. 161.
Spectat. vol. v. No. 389.
b WILK. Nat. Rel. p. 49—52.
BURN. on the Art. p. 18, 19.
TILLOTS. Works, vol. i. p. 17, 18.

* Whether we ascribe this universal, or at least general consent, to tradition, to intuitive perception, or to reason, still there must be some idea of *positive infinity* as the ground of conviction, except where idolatrous notions have been held.——W.

observe the correspondence between their distance from the central body about which they revolve, and the times in which their revolutions are performed, i. e. that the squares of their periodical times are as the cubes of their distances; the supply of moons to most of the distant planets, with the addition of a ring to Saturn; the agreement both of primary and secondary planets in a spherical figure; as well as the agreeable variety that is observable in their size, and other phænomena relating to them [a].

§ 4. 2. The proposition appears from a view of the globe of the earth: in which, not to urge the gravitation of bodies on or near its surface towards its centre, which is common to our whole system at least, if not to the whole material world, and is the great cement of it, we may more distinctly consider its diurnal and annual motion; the atmosphere with which it is surrounded; its constituent parts, as it is a terraqueous globe, and composed of bodies of very different kinds, lodged upon or beneath its surface [b].

§ 5. 3. The vegetable productions, with which the earth is furnished, so various, beautiful and useful [c].

§ 6. 4. The animal inhabitants of it: in which we can never sufficiently admire the organs of sensation, especially the eye and ear, the organs of respiration, of motion, those for receiving and digesting the aliment, and those intended for generation and the nourishment of the fœtus. In the inferior animals, it is wonderful to observe, how their different organs are fitted for those different circumstances in life for which they are intended, and especially to the elements in which they are chiefly to live. To this head may be referred what was before said of their various instincts, *Lect.* 16. § 3. to which we may farther add the limitation of their instincts, as well as animal sensations, within such degrees, as the convenience of the animal requires. (Vid. Ess. on Man, part 1.) But above all, in human creatures we may justly admire the faculties of the mind, as well as the structure of the body, both which have been largely considered elsewhere [d].

§ 7. 5. On the whole it may be observed, that the more

a DERHAM's Astr. pass.
NIEUWENT. Rel. Phil. vol. iii.
RAY of Creat. p. 61—68.
Nat. Disp. vol. iv.
BANT. Matho.
ABERN. vol. i. Serm. i.

b BENTLEY at BOYLE's Lect. p. 264—272.
NIEUW. Rel. Phil. vol. ii. Cont. 7. p. 367—413.
DERHAM's Phys. Theol. p. 4—18.
KEIL's Astron. Lect. xxi. sub init. 298, 299.

c Nat. Disp. vol. i. Dial. 14, 15. part 2. p. 1[illegible]—2[illegible].
RAY's Wisd. of God, p. 100—114, 207—212.
DERH. Phys. Theol. p. 401—424.
DENNE's Serm. on Veget.

d MONRO's Compar. Anat. pass.
DERHAM's Phys. Theol. pass.

philosophy is improved and enquiries pursued, the more is the harmony and regularity of the works of nature illustrated, and the more evidently does it appear, that objections formerly made against them were owing to the ignorance of those that advanced them[f].

§ 8. 6. As these things are wonderful when considered apart, so when the whole is considered as a system, and in reference to man, for whose use this earth and what it contains seems principally to have been designed, many comparative beauties arise, which in a separate view, could not have been discovered[b].

§ 9. *Schol.* 1. These arguments are set in so strong and beautiful a light in the works of RAY, DERHAM, NIEUWENTYT, BAXTER in his Matho, and in DE LA PLUCHE's Nature Displayed, especially in the first and fourth volumes, that they deserve a most attentive perusal at leisure[c].

§ 10. 2. As to those objections, which are brought from the noxious qualities of some vegetables, animals, or exhalations, from the limitation of our senses, from the helpless circumstances in which human infants are born; as well as from our being subject to diseases and death; besides those arising from the asperities of the surface of our globe, and the inclination of the axis of the earth to the plane of the ecliptic; they are most of them so evidently weak, and capable of being retorted as beauties rather than defects; and they are all so well considered and confuted in the following references, that we shall not more distinctly examine them here[d].

§ 11. 3. The noble powers and properties of the human mind are well worthy of being mentioned here, as a production incomparably more glorious than any thing in the vegetable or brutal creation. It may something assist our thoughts here, to consider how the face of nature is embellished and improved by the arts which mankind have introduced into life, and how much

a CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 57, 58, 108—111. Nat. Disp. vol. i. p. 13—15.
b SHAFT. Char. vol. ii. p. 285—290.
c RAMSAY's Cyrus, b. ii. Zoroast. 1st Disc.
d LUCRET. l. v. ver. 196—235.
BLACKM. on the Creat. p. 78—92.
BENTLEY at BOYLE's Lect. Serm. iii. p. 10—17. Oct. Ed. p. 83—90.
Ibid. Serm. viii. p. 22—40. Oct. Ed. p. 93—90.
SHAFT. Char. vol. ii. p. 298—309.
RAY on the Creat. p. 249—255.
KEIL's Exam. of Burn. Theory, pass.
POPE's Ess. on Man, Epist. i. ver. 165—198.
WILKINS's World in the M on.
C UDLIB. Enq. p. 92—94.
POLIGNAC Anti-Lucret. pass.
CLARKE on the Origin of Evil, p. 160. ad fin. pass. p. 169—202, 283—294.
MORE's Div. Dial. No. ii. 24—14.
REMARKS on Nat. Relig. pass*.

* The many curious volumes which have recently been published in the different parts of natural history may be read in this view, though they are not, in general, applied by the authors of them to the purposes of religion. K.

entertainment is given mankind by producing them as the effect of their own art and labour, beyond what they could find in them merely as the product of nature[a].

LECT. XXXI.

Proofs of the Being of a God from the Works of Nature and Divine Interpositions.

§ 1. *Dem.* III. PROOF of the being of a God from the works of nature.

1. Seeing the world was made, it is universally allowed that it must have been produced by chance, or design. *Lect.* 24. § 1.

§ 2. 2. Chance is entirely an unmeaning expression, unless we ascribe that to it which is produced by mechanical laws, without the contrivance and purpose of the thinking being, whose agency may be the means of producing it[b].

§ 3. 3. It may generally be expected, that whatever is thus produced should be very confused and imperfect, especially when the effect is very complex.

§ 4. 4. This world, though a very complex system, is full of beauty, harmony and order, incomparably superior to any work which we see produced by the design of the most curious artist. *Lect.* 30. § 2.

§ 5. 5. It is most incredible that it should be produced by chance.

§ 6. 6. It was produced by the design or counsel of some intelligent agent.

§ 7. 7. If any derived being were supposed the immediate former of the world, he must ultimately owe his wisdom and power to some original and self-existent being*. Therefore,

a DERHAM's Phys. Theol. b. v. c. i. p. 226 & 61—65.
LOCKE on Government.
ABERNETHY's Sermons on the Being and Attributes of God.

b WATTS's Ontol. p. 332.
BENTLEY at BAYLE's Lect. Serm v. p. 9—12.
Ocl. Ed. p. 147—155.
ABERN. on Attrib. vol. i. p. 18, 19.

* ST. PAUL draws a similar conclusion, in order to shew that the Heathens are inexcusable, Rom. i. 19, 20. An eternal power and Godhead *may* be clearly *inferred*, because clearly *seen*. But *who* sees this? Man, not the brute; man, to whom an intuitive perception of positive infinity is accessible, when he is not overpowered

§ 8. 8. The frame of the world proves that there is a God[a].

§ 9. *Dem.* IV. A deity proved from the marks of divine interposition which appear in the support and government of the world.

§ 10. *Lem.* The author of Matho has illustrated this topic of demonstration with incomparable strength and beauty: but some of his arguments are of such a nature as to be more properly mentioned in another place.

§ 11. 1. This appears in the continuance of the centripetal and projectile force of the planets, as a mutual balance to each other; neither of which appears necessary in itself, though a failure of either would be attended with a general ruin: and this thought appears with a force greatly increased, when we consider the various composition of that four-fold motion, by which a secondary planet revolves about its primary, while both revolve about the sun[b].

§ 12. 2. In preventing the alteration of the obliquity of the earth's axis, or its receiving any other detriment from the approach of comets or any other cause; and likewise in preventing the inclination of the moon's orbit from becoming greater, or the moon itself from being brought nearer to or carried farther from the earth; any of which alterations would be attended with fatal consequences, especially the two last of them, which might be most easily effected by a comet's approach[c].

§ 13. 3. In regulating the winds, so as may be for the preservation and benefit of the earth; though we are not able to assign any certain laws by which it is effected[d].

§ 14. 4. In the due proportion which is observed between

a LUCRET. l. v. ver. 417—449.
CAMB. sur l'Exist. p. 4—6. § 5—8.
BENT. ib. Serm. v. p. 12. and fine, Oct. Ed. p. 153—177.
HOWE'S Works, vol. i. p. 29—34.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 74—84.
Rel. of Nat. p. 79—85.
ABERN. on Attrib. vol. i. p. 20—25.

b BAXT. Matho, vol. ii. Conf. vii. p. 4—18.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 119, 120. Ed. 3. p. 143, 144.
BENT. ibid. Serm. 7.
BAXT. on the Soul, § 2. No 6. p. 46, 47. 4to. vol. i.

c MATHO, vol. ii. § 118, 119. p. 143, &c. § 110. p. 91, &c.
COLLIB. ib. p. 144.

d ROHAULT by CLARKE, part 1. c. xii. § 41. Note.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 144.

by prejudice and passion, and without which even revelation itself would preach to him in vain.

The "visible things of God" indeed, and still more gloriously the revealed system of his grace, serve as *means* to remove a false, and to *excite* a true notion of the Supreme; they testify, and give a verbal representation of the true God; they expose the folly of idols and idolaters; but all this light shines in darkness, and these representations are made without effect, if there be no consciousness of positive infinity.——W.

males and females in the several species of animals, and especially in mankind[a].

§ 15. 5. In preserving the balance of the several species of animals, so that none should over-run the earth and none be lost[b].

§ 16. 6. In keeping the species of animals and vegetables the same through succeeding ages, and preventing their being corrupted by undue mixtures[c].

§ 17. 7. In keeping the faces, voices and hand-writing so wonderfully distinct as they appear to be[d].

§ 18. 8. The regularity and steadiness with which the world is governed by the same laws in the most distant ages, is a further noble argument of the divine interposition; and is perhaps in nothing more conspicuous than in this, that the instincts of animals are still the same[e].

§ 19. 9. If in any instance these laws have been interrupted, and effects have been produced beyond the common course of nature; as these instances do not appear to have been so frequent as to overthrow the argument § 18. so they afford a further argument of a being superior to this system of things, and prove that he attends to the affairs of his creatures[f].

§ 20. 10. It appears that the world is under the goverment of some being of great power and exquisite contrivance, art and conduct; who is himself either necessarily existent, or derived from some other who is so.

LECT. XXXII.

Other Arguments in Proof of a Deity.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO give a view of those other arguments in proof of a deity, which seem not of equal force with the former, and yet are urged by persons of considerable note.

§ 2. *Sol.* 1. CARTESIUS argues that there must be a God, because necessary existence is contained in the idea of a God,

a NIEUWENT. ib. vol. i. p. 351—363.
COLLIB. ib. p. 147.
DERH. Phys. Theol. p. 176. 177. Note.
b COLLIB. ib. p. 125. Ed. 3. p. 147.
DERH. Phys. Theol. p. 176. 177.
Nat. Disc. serv. Cyclop. p. 44—46.
c COLLIB. ib. p. 122, 123. Ed. 3. p. 148, 149.
d WILKINS's Works, vol. iv. p. 12, 13.
DERH. ib. p. 308—310.
RAY'S Wisd. p. 245—247.
e SHAFT. vol. ii. p. 337.
SCOTT's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 228, 229.
f LIMB. Theol. l. i. c. ii. § 17, 19, 25.
CARTESIUS de DEO. p. 83. in his Works, vol. v.

as three angles are in the idea of a triangle; so that though essence and existence are in other things distinct, yet when considered with regard to the deity they are the same.

To this it is answered, that there is a difference between the notional truth of propositions and the real truth of ideas. In plainer terms, the fallacy lies in the ambiguity of those words, *God is a necessary existent being:* If the meaning of them be, *q. d.* "By the word GOD, I understand a being that is supposed to be self-existent," they will be allowed; but then they prove not his real existence: but if they signify, "It is most certain there is such a being," the sense is changed, and the proposition may still be disputed[a] *.

a CARTES. Princ. I. i. § 14—16. CAMB. Exist. p. 197—199. Voyage to the World of CART. p. 159—164. COLLIB. Inq. p. 130—132. Ed. 2. p. 156—159. KING'S Orig. of Evil, p. 49, 50. No. 11.

* To this it may be replied, that our author's objection applies only to *contingent* existence, and does not affect the argument of CARTESIUS. The latter affirms, that essence and existence are the *same* with regard to *Deity*, and our author shews they are different as to *other* things. What CARTESIUS, FENELON, WATTS and many others maintain, is not merely, "God is a necessary existent Being," but "it is most certain there is such a Being," from the very idea of his essence.

"Let men accustomed to meditate abstruse truths, and trace things to their first principles, endeavour to know God by his idea, I will not deny, that this is a sure way of arriving at the source of all truth. But the shorter and directer it is, the more inaccessible and rough it must be to the generality of men, who depend only on their senses. It is so simple a demonstration, that by its very simplicity, it escapes minds incapable of operations purely intellectual. The more perfect this method of investigating the Supreme Being is, the fewer there are capable to make use of it." FENEL. Demonst. § 1.

"There is but one being which includes existence in the very essence of it, and that is *God;* who therefore actually exists by natural and eternal necessity: but the actual existence of every creature is very distinct from its essence, for it may be, or not be, as God *pleases.*" WATTS, Log. Part I. Chap. ii. § 1. See also Part II. Chap. v. § 2.

PROPOSITION.

Hypothetical possibility, which may be called essence, implies *some* existence, which can be no other but God, the supreme will, and first cause.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Hypothetical possibility is the mere *supposition* of a *fact*. And we may *suppose* a thousand things that never have, and never will *exist*. But

2. In every *supposition* of a contingent fact a supreme *will* is implied, with which the *supposed* fact is either compatible or incompatible. Or a *cause* is implied, which is either adequate or inadequate. But

3. This will or cause can be no other than a being who exists of *absolute necessity*. Q. E. D.

In other words, every *hypothesis* implies something *absolute;* every *change* implies something *unchangeable;* as every *effect* implies a *cause*, and every *number* an *unit*. A contingent event may be, or not be, as it is consistent or inconsistent with a causing will; but were there no causing will, there could be no idea of contingence. Hypothetical possibility, of whatever kind, would be the greatest absurdity imaginable, without the idea of a first cause, i. e. God. I cannot even *suppose*, not to say,

§ 3. 2. CARTESIUS further argues, "The greater the objective perfection of any idea is, the more perfect must its cause be: but we have the idea of a being infinitely perfect, therefore there must be some infinitely perfect being to cause and produce it."

But this seems still to take for granted the thing to be proved, i. e. the objective reality of the idea, or the reality of the object supposed to be represented by it. And it may be pleaded, that, without any such archetype at all, an idea of an infinitely perfect being might be produced by the operation of our minds upon ideas arising from inferior objects, seeing we do not comprehend infinity, but only deny the bounds of an object which we suppose infinite[a]*.

[a] CARTES. ib. § 17, 18, 22. CAMB. ib. p. 189—191. Voyage to the World of CART. p. 166—169. COLLIB. Inq. p. 132, 133. Ed. 3. p. 159, 160. CLARKE at BOYLE'S Lect. p. 20—22. LOCKE'S Ess. l. iv. c. x. § 7.

be conscious of my own existence, without admitting at the same time, as a self-evident fact, something uncontingent, something absolute, or *absolutely necessary*, i. e. GOD.

Hence it appears, that though "there is a difference between the *notional* truth of propositions and the *real* truth of ideas" respecting *contingent* objects, it is not so respecting a *first cause*; for, without this, the very *supposition* of a difference between real and notional would be absurd. Essence and existence *here* have *no conceivable medium*; in every *contingent* object they have. Here the very hypothesis implies the fact; or, without the *fact* the hypothesis could not be made. Here the Atheist is caught in his own net; his very act of *supposing* there is no God is an appeal to *some cause* of that supposition, i. e. a *first cause*, and demonstrates an *absolute essence*, or necessary existence.——W.

* To this answer it may be replied, that "the objective reality of the idea" is proved by the very *supposition*, in the present case; for were there nothing real, nothing could be *supposed*; were there nothing *absolute*, there could be no idea of something *contingent*. Even Atheistic ideas and suppositions *prove* "the objective reality" of a *cause*, a *first* cause; and to suppose "a being infinitely perfect," proves the same, with this addition, that the grandeur of the supposition implies a cause which is adequate to that effect.

SCHOLIUM.

From all *suppositions* which imply nihility, deformity, and evil of every kind, the inference extends only to *some cause* acknowledged, or an appeal to a *first cause* as the basis of hypothetical possibility. But from *suppositions* which imply goodness, beauty, and excellence of every kind, the fair inference extends to the *nature* of that cause. The reason is, that evil has no *positive* cause, and its existence can be known only in contrast with good.

Cor. 1. Good has *absolute* or *necessary* existence, as well as contingent, but evil *hypothetical* or contingent only.

Cor. 2. As evil of any kind exists only as a contrast of existing good, hence not only the existence of good, but also that of evil proves that the first cause is *good*.

To the latter part of the objection, viz. "that without any such archetype at all, an idea of an infinitely perfect Being might be produced by the operation of our minds upon ideas arising from inferior objects," it may be replied, that such an idea

§ 4. 3. EPICURUS, and many others, particularly Lord SHAFTSBURY, have argued, that the idea of God is universal as being innate, and therefore that his existence is certain. EPICURUS therefore supposes it natural to admit it; and those who believe man to be God's work, argue, from his having stampt his character of himself upon all his human creatures. But the foundation of this argument has been removed in *Lect.* 7. § 6. and the references [a] *.

§ 5. 4. TILLOTSON argues thus, "The idea of a God is possible, seeing it involves no contradiction to suppose a being of all possible perfections, therefore it is necessary: for if there be no God now, there never can be a God, seeing eternity is a part of our idea of him; so that on this supposition the existence of a God is impossible, contrary to the hypothesis." But this argument, which seems nearly equal to the first in a plainer dress, may be sufficiently answered by the known distinction between an *hypothetical* and an *actual* possibility: v. g. It may be said to be *hypothetically* possible that the first man should have been created with wings, but since he was in fact created without wings, it is not *actually* possible: and this seems to be an instance parallel to the other [b] †.

§ 6. *Def.* Those arguments which are brought from the existence of some of the attributes of God to prove the existence of a God, are called proofs A PRIORI: those taken from the phænomena observable in the works of nature, are called proofs A POSTERIORI.

[a] COLLIB. Inq. p. 128—130. Ed. 3. 154—156.
SHAFTSB. Lett. to a Clerg.
KNIGHT on the Being and Attr. of God, p. 10—15.

[b] TILLOTS. Works. vol. i. p. 19.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 133, 134. Ed. 3. 161, 162.

as is here supposed, is not that of a *first* cause, i. e. God, but of magnified or multiplied contingent existence, which is *essentially different* from the objective perfection of CARTESIUS. W.

* See also *Lect.* vi. and the *Notes* there.

† In one view, however, the argument of TILLOTSON has great force. It will be allowed by all, that *if* there be a God, he must be a Being of infinite perfections; for the dispute relates to no other supposed objects. If such a Being be *hypothetically* possible, he must be *actually* so, for there is no *medium* between the hypothesis and the act; an eternal being who is not actual is in *every* respect impossible. Consequently, no one can be a consistent atheist until he has demonstrated the *absolute impossibility* of theism. This is the fair *onus probandi*, which probably no one will ever deliberately cope with—till he becomes a maniac.

To the answer founded on the "distinction between a *hypothetical* and an *actual* possibility" it may be replied, that the distinction itself is applicable only to a *contingent* existence. True, indeed, "it may be said to be *hypothetically* possible that the first man should have been created with wings"——if you admit a *first cause* and *suppose well*, not otherwise. On the contrary, if there were no first cause, it is *not possible* there should be a creature in any form. W.

§ 7. *Schol.* 1. The question, whether there be any proof of the being of a God *a priori*, depends upon the reality of space and duration, and their being the properties of some substance, which will be examined hereafter.

§ 8. 2. The proof of the *attributes* of a God *a priori*, is the arguing them from self-existence, shewing them to have a necessary connection with it: and in this sense some have denied there can be any proof *a priori*; because nothing can be prior to a self-existent being, and because all our proofs of the attributes of such a being are ultimately drawn from the consideration of some being derived from him. But this objection is evidently founded on a mistake of the sense in which these words are used by the most accurate writers.

§ 9. 3. On the whole, it may be proper to distinguish the various ways of proving the being and attributes of God thus,

§ 10. 1. *Both* are proved *a priori*, when from the real existence of space and duration we infer the existence of a self-existent being whose properties they are, and from necessity of existence prove his wisdom, power, goodness, &c *.

§ 11. 2. *Both* are proved *a posteriori*, when we argue from a survey of the system of nature, that there must be a wise, powerful and benevolent author.

§ 12. 3. The proof is *mixed*, when from the observed existence of any one derived being, whether material or immaterial, more or less perfect, we argue the existence of a self-existent being, and thus infer his attributes from a necessary connection with self-existence, as in the first case[a] †.

LECT. XXXIII.

Of the chief Sects of Atheists.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO take a survey of the chief sects of ATHEISTS amongst the ancient *Grecian* philosophers.

[a] CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 494—498. and p. 501, 502. | WATERLAND's Dis. on the Arg. a priori, apud LAW's Enquiry, p. 55—58, 96—100.

* Amidst the various attempts to prove the being of a God *a priori*, one of the most curious, and which seems to approach the nearest to a demonstration, is a short tract, written by the Rev. MOSES LOWMAN of Clapham. The piece is now become very scarce, and indeed is almost forgotten. We mention it, that, in case it should be met with in any catalogue or sale of books, its value may be known. K.

† The subject of the above *Scholia* is treated in a masterly manner by the acute PRIESTLEY in his notes on HARTLEY, p. 580—594. Quarto Ed. W.

§ 2. *Sol.* 1. They all agreed in asserting, that there was nothing but *matter* in the universe: but differ as to the question, whether it was animate or inanimate.

§ 3. 2. Those who held matter to be *animated*, were in general called ὑλοζοικοι; who, (as they darkly expressed it) maintained that matter had some natural perception, but no animal sensation, or reflection in itself considered; but that this imperfect life occasioned that organization, from whence sensation and reflection afterwards arose.

§ 4. 3. Of these, some held only *one life*, which they called a *plastic nature*; and these were called the *Stoical* atheists, because the *Stoics* held such a nature, though they supposed it the instrument of the deity: others thought that every particle of matter was endued with life, and these were called the STRATONICI, from STRATO LAMPSACENUS: and HOBBES seems to have been of this opinion[a].

§ 5. 4. Those atheists who held matter to be *inanimate* were called ἀτομικοι. Of these, some attempted to solve the phænomena of nature, by having recourse to the unmeaning language of *qualities* and *forms*, as the *Anaximandrians*, who thought they were produced by infinite active force, upon immense matter, acting without design: others by the figure and motion which they supposed to be essential to those atoms: these were the DEMOCRITICI; whose philosophy differed but very little from the *Epicureans*, who evidently borrowed many of their notions from DEMOCRITUS.

§ 6. 5. DIAGORAS and THEODORUS among the ancients, as VANINUS among the moderns, are reckoned martyrs for atheism[b].

§ 7. *Schol.* 1. Sir WILLIAM TEMPLE is said to have been an atheist of a kind different from any of these, and to have thought the present system of things necessary and eternal; consequently his notion has been confuted by all the arguments brought to prove the world in its present form not to have been eternal, and that matter is not self-existent, nor motion essential to it, or thought producible from it alone[c].

§ 8. 2. The *Chinese* have been represented by some as a nation of atheists; and BURNET represents it as the opinion of Sir WILLIAM TEMPLE, that CONFUCIUS and his followers are to

a CLARKE at BAYLE's Lect. p. 57. marg.

b COLLIER or BAYLE in Nom.
BUDDÆI Hist. Phil. c. iv. § 43—46, and 48.
CUDWORTH's System l. i. c. iii. prælect. § 34—36. 102, 151—156.

CYRUS's Trav. vol. ii. p. 27, 28. 31, 32
FENEL. Phil. Lives, p. 110, and 265, 266.
HALES' Orig. of Man, § 4, c. iv. p. 340—342
Univ. Hist. vol. i. p. 17—25, fol.

c BURNET's Hist. vol. ii. p. 670. Oct.

be reckoned amongst those who were atheists themselves and left religion to the people. But COUPLET (in his *Declaratio Proemialis*, p. xxxviii.) has largely endeavoured to prove, that though their modern writers, i. e. those from about the tenth century of christianity, have entertained and propagated atheistical notions among the philosophers of that nation, CONFUCIUS and their earlier teachers were notwithstanding votaries to pure religion. But it is very observable, that CONFUCIUS (if the writings, which COUPLET and his brethren, the Jesuit missionaries, have published as his, do really contain a just representation of what he taught,) says little of those branches of duty which immediately relate to God; which leaves too much room for suspicion: though he does indeed speak of spirits surrounding men when they sacrifice, in such a manner, as to agree very well with the heathen notion of good dæmons, which perhaps differs not much from the christian doctrine of angels. (CONF. *Morals*, l. ii. p. 50—52.) Yet I have not been able to find any part of his work in which he speaks expressly of God: for that very remarkable passage, (l. ii. p. 88—90.) in which he says so many sublime things of *him who is supremely holy*, must (when the whole of it is taken together) be understood of his *wise man*, and in that view is so impious and profane, as to leave a great deal of room to imagine, that Sir WILLIAM TEMPLE was not mistaken in the judgment he formed concerning him; nor will what he says of *the great spirit of heaven and earth* be sufficient wholly to remove the suspicion; as it is most probable, that it coincides with the notion of a plastic power, which some of the *Grecian* atheists held.

§ 9. 3. Besides the objections against design in the universe, *Lect.* 30. § 10. other objections against a deity have been urged; the chief of which amount to this, that there is something in his nature, operations and conduct which we cannot fully comprehend: but if this argument be allowed as conclusive, we might be brought even to doubt of our own existence. See *Lect.* 22. § 14.

Many other arguments or excuses brought for atheism do not deserve a particular place here, as will appear by consulting the passages here referred to[a].

§ 10. 4. It seems reasonable to conclude, that the fear of punishment from a divine being, and a desire of seeming wiser than others, have been the chief causes of atheism; and perhaps the absurd notions which some have entertained of the

[a] CUDWORTH's Syst. I. i. c. ii. § 5—22. | GASTREL of Nat. Rel. p. 187—212.

deity, and the unworthy manner in which those who profess to believe in him have acted, may be reckoned among the most fatal occasions of it[a].

§ 11. 5. It may not be improper here to hint at the strange conduct of TULLY in his celebrated book *De Natura Deorum*, who only slightly touches on the opinion of ANAXAGORAS, that all things were produced by one infinite mind, and gives no patron to that opinion, nor so much as spends one page or section in discussing it; though he assigns proper advocates to defend at large the *Stoical* and *Epicurean* principles, as well as the *Academical;* and after all, leaves his reader under the impression of the *Epicurean* objections against Providence; only coldly telling us, that they were not on the whole in his opinion so probable as the contrary doctrine. It is observable that the most religious passage in all TULLY's works is only a fragment preserved by *Lactantius*[b].

§ 12. 6. Having thus established the proof of the existence of God, we now proceed in the following propositions to consider the chief of his perfections.

LECT. XXXIV.

Of the divine Eternity and Omnipotence.

§ 1. *Prop.* GOD is eternal, i. e. he has existed and will ever exist.

§ 2. *Dem.* Whatever is self-existent is eternal. (*Lect.* 23. § 4.) God is self-existent. (*Lect.* 29. § 1.) Therefore God is eternal[c]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 3. *Cor.* God is immutable[d]. *Vid. Lect.* 23. § 6.

§ 4. *Schol.* It must be acknowledged there is something to us incomprehensible in the divine eternity, in whatever view we attempt to conceive of it.——A *successive* eternity is what the mind can form no consistent idea of: for it seems, that, if there have been a fifth, a tenth, or hundredth, there must have been some first; and there can be nothing absolutely infinite, to which a continual addition is making. On the other hand, it is

a GASTR. ib. p. 230—248.
SCOTT's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 84, 85.
b MIDDLETON's Life of Cic. vol. iii. p. 350, 351.
BENTLEY against Collins on Free-Thinking, p 77—82.
c WILKINS's Nat. Rel. p. 120—123.
ABERN. vol. i. p. 182—191.
d WILKINS ib. p. 115—117.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 56, 57. Ed. 3. 66, 77.
ABERN. ib. p. 196—200.
HARRIS's Hermes, p. 359, &c. a. 3

impossible for us to conceive of an eternity so *instantaneous*, as to exclude all past and future, and to be but one point of duration: this would make that space of time, to which millions of years are as nothing, but a small part of an hour or a minute, and is in effect declaring that God is now creating the world, and also now destroying it, supposing it ever to be destroyed. Indeed if all that were meant by an instantaneous eternity when applied to God were this, that all things whether past or future are as open to his view, as those things which exist in the present moment, this would be intelligible, but would not remove the difficulty of a successive eternity: and to reply (as some have done) that this eternity is not to be considered as duration at all, but as necessary existence, to which neither succession nor instantaneousness have any relation at all, more than colour to sound, leaves the question I think under the same darkness as before.

Nevertheless it is to be remembered, that this difficulty does not arise from the doctrine of the deity alone, but is common to every scheme that supposes any thing eternal, as something must certainly be; *Lect.* 23. § 16, &c. and it would follow from supposing one atom to be so, besides all the other absurdities arising from the denial of an intelligent self-existent cause [a].

§ 5. *Prop.* God is omnipotent; i. e. no effect can be assigned so great, but he is able to produce it.

§ 6. *Dem.* 1. The very act of creating any being out of nothing, implies a power so great, that we can imagine nothing impossible to a being who can perform it by his own power. *Lect.* 29. § 1.

§ 7. 2. The amazing greatness and variety of the works of nature serve still more sensibly to illustrate the power of the creator. *Lect.* 31. § 1, &c.

§ 8. 3. We see nothing which betrays any marks of impotency or weakness in the deity.

§ 9. 4. We have no reason to believe that any *internal* defect limits the divine power.

§ 10. 5. If there were any other being capable of controul-

a CAMB. sur l'Exist. p. 469—490.
CLARKE'S Serm. vol. i. p. 81, 82. Oct.
COLLIB. In. p. 204—211. Ed. 3 p. 245—253.
BURN. on Art. p. 19, 20.
RAMSAY'S Cyrus, B. ii. p. 33, 34.
RAMS. Principles, vii.
KING'S Orig. of Evil, p. 60—66.
CUDW. Intel. Syst. p. 644, &c.
BOLTH. de Consol. Philos. v. 6.
Rel. of Nat. p. 69, 70.
WATTS'S Hymns, l. ii. No. 17 and 67.
WATTS'S Ontology, c. iv.
ABERN. vol. i. p. 201—207.
SOAME JENYNS'S Disquis. No. 4.

ing him in the execution of his volitions, this being must be superior to him, and might (for any thing that appears) have prevented or destroyed his being as well as his operations, which would be inconsistent with the idea of God, *Lect.* 29. § 1. as a self-existent being.

§ 11. 6. There is no *external* power to limit the operations of the divine being. Therefore,

§ 12. 7. His power is unlimited, and consequently can produce any effect be it ever so great [a]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 13. *Cor.* If God be omnipotent, then nothing can be necessary to the production of any being in any supposed circumstance of time or place, but that God should will its existence in this circumstance [b].

LECT. XXXV.

Concerning divine Power.

§ 1. *Schol.* 1. ANOTHER argument to prove that God is infinite in power is drawn from *Lect.* 23. § 12. for it is certain he has some degree of power. A third from *Lect.* 29. § 12. since it is evident that to conceive of God as omnipotent, is much more honourable than to conceive of him as a being of limited power.

§ 2. 2. If it be objected to the fifth step of the preceding demonstration, that a power merely equal to that of God's might be sufficient to controul him in the execution of his volitions, and that we have not yet proved there is no being equal to him; it may be replied, that in some cases to controul the acts of another must argue some superiority; v. g. if A will that a creature should exist, and B that it should not exist, if it does not exist, then B. in that instance triumphs over A, and appears superior to him. But if this answer should not be judged satisfactory, then it must be remembered, that we have shown that God's power is not limited by any internal defect, and that no external limiting power has yet been proved; and if it should hereafter be proved, by any argument not depending upon his omnipotence, that there is but one such self-existent being as we call God, then this proposition will be demonstrated in all its extent.

a WILKINS of Nat. Rel. p. 145, 146.
CLARKE's Serm. vol. i. p. 119, 120, 206—216.
HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 106, 107, 67—69.
Living Temple, vol. i. 8vo. p. 207—215.
ABERN. vol. i, No. 8.

b JEN. Pneum. Prop. 30.
RALPHS. de Spat. reali, p. 67.
RAMS. Princip. xv.
HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 23. Note.
Liv. Temp. p. 50, 51.

§ 3. 3. It must be owned we have no conceptions of a creating power otherwise than by its effects: nevertheless that will not prove that there is no such thing; a blind man might as well argue against the existence of light[a].

§ 4. 4. It is no limitation of the divine power, to assert that God is not able to do what implies a contradiction, for that is in effect to do nothing at all, and consequently, a pretended power of doing it, is no power at all[b].

LECT. XXXVI.

Of God's continued Agency and Energy.

§ 1. *Prop.* ALL the creatures of God, whether they be corporeal or incorporeal, sensible or spiritual, owe their efficacy for producing any effect to the agency of a divine power in and upon them, at the very time when such effect is produced.

§ 2. *Dem.* I. 1. Whatever is derived from another does not necessarily exist in the first moment of its being. *Lect.* 23. §. 2.

§ 3. 2. Whatever does not necessarily exist in the first moment of its existence, cannot necessarily exist in the second, or in any following moment; but must owe its continued existence to the will of the being by whom it was at first produced: for by supposing its existence to continue when that will ceased, we should suppose it to be without the cause of its being.

§ 4. 3. All the creatures of God do every moment depend upon God for the continuance of their existence[c].

§ 5. 4. The power of action implies something more than continued existence.

§ 6. 5. Whatever is created by God depends continually upon him for the continuance of its active powers.

§ 7. 6. If from any constitution of nature whatsoever, there could necessarily arise any act of power independent on the concurrent volition of God, it is difficult to say where that independent power would stop; and for aught appears that being might be omnipotent.

a COLLIB. Inq. p. 60—64. Ed. 3. 70—75.
On the Soul, Ess. v. § 2—4.
RAMS. Princip. xiv.

b COLLIB. Inq. p. 180, 181. Ed. 3. p. 217, 218.
CROUZ. Log. vol. i. p. 403, 404.
CLARKE's Serm. vol. i. p. 216—219.
HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 104.
Living Temp. 8vo. vol. i. p. 339—343.
TILLOTS. Works, Serm 99.

c COLLIB. Inq. p. 64, 65. Ed. 3. p. 75, 76.
HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 65.
BURNET on Art. p. 30.
WATTS's Ess. I. IX. § 2. p. 201—208, 213.
Ib. No. xi. p. 267, 268.
CHEYNE's Princ. part. i. § 9.
BAXT. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 225—227.
SHERLOCK on Provid. 9th Ed. p. 19, 20.

§ 8. 7. The wisest and greatest philosophers have not been able to trace any connection between solidity and gravitation, or motion and thought: therefore a perpetual omnipotent agency seems to be the most probable way of accounting for those otherwise unaccountable phænomena[a]. *Valet propositio.*

§ 9. *Dem.* II. To those who allow the universality of divine providence on principles independent on this proposition, which many do, another argument has been proposed; which will stand thus.

§ 10. 1. God must will that any creature should, or should not exist, with any given power, in any given moment; for not to will that it should so exist, would on the present supposition be in effect willing that it should not.

§ 11. 2. If he will that it should not so exist, it will not: otherwise God would not be omnipotent, contrary to *Lect.* 34. § 5.

§ 12. 3. Therefore its existence in such circumstances, i. e. its efficacy for producing any effect in question, is owing to the divine volition, i. e. to the agency of God in and upon it*. Q. E. D.

LECT. XXXVII.

On divine Energy; continued.

§ 1. *Cor.* 1. WHAT we generally call *second causes*, are not causes in the strict propriety of speech; and what we call the *laws of nature*, are only certain rules and methods, by which

a BAXTER's Matho, vol. i. Conf. iv. § 44—49.
BAXT. on the Soul, vol. i. § ii. prop. p. 94—101. & note p. 101—108, 128—130.
CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 300.
VIRG. Æn. vi. ver. 724, &c.
OWEN on Sp. p. 138—140. p. 77. p. 465, 466.
CAMB. Exist. p. 111.
CLARKE's xvii. Serm. No. 7. p. 171.
BAXT. Works, vol. ii. p. 15, 27, 189.
THOMS. Spring, ver. 346—360.
SOUTH's Serm. vol. iii. p. 461.
REYNOLD's Works, p. 7.
JENK. Reason. of Christianity, vol. ii. p. 484.
MARC. ANTON. l. v. c. 40.
ABERN. vol. i. Serm. vii. p. 240—244. Lond. Ed. p. 225—229.
PRICE's Four Dissertations, No. I.
STEBBING on Providence.

* N. B. I lay but little stress upon this *second* demonstration, though it once appeared plausible: for perhaps the universality of divine providence cannot be demonstrated on principles independent of this proposition; so that at best it is but *argumentum ad hominem:* and the force of this reasoning may be so probably retorted with respect to the irrational volitions of free creatures, that it seems on the whole best to wave it, and to allow, that even while providence is attentive to an event, there may be a medium between absolutely willing either that it should, or should not exist, which is inconsistent with the first step. *D.*

God generally proceeds, in those of his actions which fall under our cognizance. Nevertheless, creatures may in an inferior sense be called causes, as certain events commonly follow certain changes in their condition and will[a].

§ 2. 2. It evidently appears that the providence, i. e. the notice and care of God extends itself to all events, even the smallest as well as the greatest[b]. *Vid. Lect.* 31. § 9, &c.

§ 3. 3. We hence learn, into what we are to resolve the power which our minds have of moving our bodies, viz. into a divine volition in such and such instances to produce motions in our bodies, correspondent to the volitions of our minds. To this agree the ease and swiftness with which those motions are performed on the act of our will, and the constancy of other involuntary, but always needful motions, which cannot be solved by any mechanical laws[c]. *Lect.* 2. § 27.

§ 4. 4. The wonderful instances of instinct in brutes may most probably be accounted for this way: God, by some unknown impression upon them, moving them to and assisting them in such actions, as on the whole are most convenient; though the rationale depends on principles, which they cannot know[d]. *Lect.* 16. § 3.

§ 5. 5. Hence we infer the absurdity of the doctrine of a *plastic nature*, which some have thus described. "It is an incorporeal created substance, endued with a vegetative life, but not with sensation or thought; penetrating the whole created universe, being coextended with it; and under God moving matter, so as to produce the phænomena, which cannot be solved by mechanical laws: active for ends unknown to itself, not being expressly conscious of its actions, and yet having an obscure idea of the action to be entered upon."

As the idea itself is most obscure, and indeed inconsistent, so the foundation of it is evidently weak. It is intended by this, to avoid the inconveniency of subjecting God to the trouble of some changes in the created world, and the meanness of others: but it appears from this proposition, that even upon this hypo-

a BOYLE's Inq. into Nat. apud
RAY's Wisd. of God, p. 53, 54.
SEED's Serm. vol. ii. p. 132—134.
CHEYNE's Princ. part. i. § 4. p. 4—6.
BROWNE's Rel. Med. p. 15.
Nat. Disp. vol. iv. p. 50—52.
RAMSAY's Princ. vol. i. p. 251—255.
BAXT. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 179—181.
WATTS's Ontology, p. 329 and 365.
CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. part ii. p. 222. 6th. Ed.

b Rel. of Nat. p. 95—98.
SCOTT's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 162—166.
PRICE's Dissert. p. 8—11.
BAXT. on the Soul, p. 182, 183.
FITZOSB. Lett. No. 8.

c CLARKE and LEIBNITZ, No. v. App.
CLERICI Pneum. § 1. c. vi. § 12—16.
CAMB. Exist. § 46, 47.
Matho, vol. i. Conf. 6. § 79.
SEED's Serm. vol. ii. p. 150.

d Spect. vol. ii. No. 120. sub fin. No. 121. sub init.
CAMB. Exist. § 23. p. 46—48.
Nat. Disp. vol. i. p. 285, 286. Ed. 2. p. 197, 198.
RAMS. Princ. p. 381—384.
Matho, vol. i. Conf. vi. § 82, 83.
ORIGIN adv. Cels. l. iv. p. 217.
SEED's Serm. vol. ii. p. 143, &c.

thesis he would still be the author of them; besides that to omnipotence nothing is troublesome, nor those things mean, when considered as a part of a system, which *alone* might appear to be so [a].

LECT. XXXVIII.

On divine Energy; continued.

§ 1. *Schol.* 1. IT is objected, that if God be thus the author of all our ideas and of all our motions, then also of all our volitions, which would be inconsistent with that liberty of choice asserted, *Lect.* 19.

Ans. On the principles laid down above, the will is not properly an effect of any necessary efficient cause; but rather a tendency towards the production of an effect, so far as we apprehend it to be in our power; (*Prop.* 1. *gr.* 4.) and for any thing which appears in the objection, or is asserted in the proposition, when all the requisites to volition are supposed, it lies in our own breasts to determine one way or another: and though God, upon such a determination of ours, adds efficacy to the volition, even when it is most foolish and pernicious, that does not properly make him the author of the action. (*Vid. Lect.* 2. § 7.) And they who suppose a stock of power lodged in the hand of the creature by virtue of its original constitution, (God at the same time knowing in every particular how it will be used,) will labour under the same difficulty in this respect with us; nay, their hypothesis at last will be found equivalent to ours: and if we allow that universal presence and inspection of God, which all who are not atheists admit, it will be nearly as difficult to account for his not interposing to prevent such actions, as for his adding efficacy to them in a natural way [b].

§ 3. 2. It is further objected, that if God produce all our ideas by his own impression on the mind, then a material world was not necessary, and consequently it would be unbecoming the nature and character of God to produce it. *Vid. Lect.* 34. § 13.

a CUDW. Int. Syst. p. 149—172. præs. 178—181.
MORE's Imm. of the Soul, l. iii. c. 12.
RAY's Wisd. of God, p. 51, 52.
CHEYNE's Princ. c. 1. § 3. p. 3, 4.
PRICE's Dissert. p. 47—50. note.
b CAMB. Exist. § 67.
HOWE of Prescience, § 6. 7. Op. vol. ii. p. 500—503.
WATTS's Diss. on Trin. No. 3. p. 142, 143.
MANDEVILL's Free Thoughts, p. 108, 109.
BANT. on the Soul, p. 205—220.
COLLIE. Inq. p. 195—198. Ed. 3. p. 235—238.

§ 4. *Ans.* 1. The denial of any material world at all, according to BERKLEY's and COLLIER's scheme, would remove the foundation of this objection: nevertheless, for reasons which will afterwards be mentioned, we do not chuse to have recourse to that solution; but add,-

§ 5. 2. Allowing the creation of a material world to be to us utterly unaccountable on this supposition, we cannot therefore certainly say that it was in vain: and as for its not being absolutely necessary, it will not easily be granted, that any thing that God does, is so.

§ 6. 3. If we grant that God has a power of producing any idea in our minds without an external archetype, (of which dreams seem to be an evident proof, and which is so certainly included in omnipotence, that few deny it) then it will be as hard to account for the creation of the material world, as if we admit the proposition to be true.

§ 7. *Schol.* 3. It is further objected, that it is a dishonour to the divine being, to suppose him immediately concerned in the most mean and trifling events; and that it would be exceeding ridiculous, were our discourse commonly to be formed upon the principles of this proposition.

§ 8. *Ans.* We before *Lect.* 37. § 5. observed the usefulness and beauty of many things *on the whole*, which, when considered *in themselves*, may appear mean and vile: (of which the discharge of the fœces from animal bodies is a remarkable instance) and we may further add, that there is no occasion at all for introducing a change in our common forms of speech, seeing there is a sense, in which those things may be said to be the actions of the creatures, which are done by the intermediation of their volition, though not by an active force of their own, at that time independent on the concurrent volition of God: (*Lect.* 37. § 1.) so that upon the whole, they may be sufficiently distinguished from those, which are, with full propriety and in the highest sense, called the actions of God [2].

[2] CROUZ. Log. vol. i. p. 436—440, 442. | WATTS's Ess. c. iii. § 10—15. p. 87—90.

LECT. XXXIX.

On divine Energy and Omniscience.

§ 1. *Schol.* 4. IT is further objected, that it would be a dishonour to the divine being, that, whereas a common workman can make a machine, which shall go on for some time without his interposition, God should not be able to produce what can operate without his perpetual agency.

§ 2. *Ans.* 1. All human arts are but the means of altering some circumstances in the form and disposition of matter, which before existed under certain laws, entirely independent on the will of the artist; but it is the peculiar glory of God, to have a whole world of creatures in a perpetual dependence on himself.

§ 3. 2. That when we assert a perpetual divine agency, we readily acknowledge that matters are so contrived, as not to need a divine interposition in a different manner, from that in which it had been constantly exerted. And it is most evident, that an unremitting energy, displayed in such circumstances, greatly exalts our idea of God, instead of depressing it; and therefore by the way is so much the more likely to be true. *Vid. Lect.* 29. § 12.

§ 4. 3. We may add, that this argument tends to prove, contrary to the opinion of most that have advanced it, that God might make a creature, which should subsist without his supporting presence and agency[a].

§ 5. *Prop.* God is a being of perfect KNOWLEDGE: i. e. he knows in the most certain and perfect manner whatever can be the object of knowledge, i. e. whatever does not imply a contradiction.

§ 6. *Dem.* I. 1. God is a spirit, i. e. a thinking being. *Lect.* 29. § 1, 3, &c.

§ 7. 2. God must have some degree of knowledge.

§ 8. 3. There is no reason for setting bounds to his knowledge, i. e. he knows all things in the most perfect manner. *2. E. D.* See *Lect.* 23. § 12.

§ 9. *Dem.* II. 1. God has made all the creatures, and con-

a BURN. on Art. p. 23.
WATTS's Ess. No. ix. § 2. p. 201—208.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 195—198. Ed. 3. p. 235—238.
CLARKE and LEIBNITZ, p. 3—7. § 4. p. 13—17. § 4. p. 27—31. § 6—9. p. 43—47. § 6—9. p. 363—365.
PRICE's Dissert. p. 48—53.
RAMS. Princ. prop. xix.

tinually actuates and supports them. *Lect.* 29. § 1, 3, &c. *Lect.* 36. § 1, &c.

§ 10. 2. He must know all that relates to them.

§ 11. 3. He must by consciousness know himself. Therefore,

§ 12. 4. He must know all things. *2. E. D.*

§ 13. *Schol.* To this it may be objected, that there may be some other self-existent creator, and that this being with his creatures may be unknown to God: and it is allowed, that the argument of this second demonstration cannot appear in its full evidence, till we have proved the unity of the Godhead: nevertheless the second step alone would be sufficient to prove, that he knew all things that belong to us; which is that in which we are chiefly concerned.

§ 14. *Dem.* III. 1. Knowledge is an attribute of so great importance, that without it, whatever conceptions we could form of the deity, would be very low and imperfect.

§ 15. 2. It is reasonable to conceive of God in the most honourable manner. *Lect.* 29. § 12.

§ 16. 3. It is reasonable to conceive of God as a being of great knowledge; and to remove from our idea of him, as much as possible, all degrees of error, ignorance and uncertainty.

§ 17. 4. There is no apparent reason for limiting his knowledge, so as to exclude from it any thing which can be the object of intelligence to us or any other being. Therefore,

§ 18. 5. It is reasonable to conclude that he is a being of perfect knowledge [a]. *2. E. D.*

§ 19. *Schol.* That God is a being of boundless knowledge as well as power, was the opinion of the wisest heathens; as appears from the custom of swearing, as well as from many passages quoted from their writers in the references above [b].

§ 20. *Cor.* 1. Hence it appears that God knows all the secrets of the heart, and therefore is most able to judge of the real characters of men.

§ 21. 2. It appears that any hypocrisy, when we are dealing with him, or addressing to him, is very great folly, though it may be most artfully disguised [c].

a CLARKE's Post. Serm. vol. i. p. 241—252. No. 11. WILKS Nat. Rel. p. 178—185. TILLOTS. vol. ii. p. [illegible]. HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 104, 105.

ABERNETHY, vol. i. No. 9. p. 290—305.
b [illegible] Mem. lib. IV. 19.
c HOWE's Medit. vol. ii. p. 23—25.

LECT. XL.

Of the Divine Omnipresence—Contingency.

§ 1. *Def.* A SPIRIT is said to be PRESENT IN ANY PLACE, when it is capable of perceiving and immediately operating upon the body which fills that place, or on spirits united to such bodies, i. e. spirits perceiving and acting by them [a].

§ 2. *Prop.* God is OMNIPRESENT, i. e. present in every place.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. God perceives the changes of bodies in whatever place they are, and of all spirits united to them. *Lect.* 39. § 5.

§ 4. 2. He is capable of operating upon them. *Lect.* 34. § 5.

§ 5. 3. It is much more honourable to God, to conceive of him as present in all places, than as excluded from any. § 1. and *Lect.* 23. § 12. Therefore,

§ 6. 4. God is omnipresent [b]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 7. *Schol.* 1. The first of these arguments only proves that God is where any of his creatures are; and it is only on supposition that there is *but one* God, that it will follow from hence, that he is every where. But it is to be remembered, that the argument, *Lect.* 23. § 12. if allowed, will prove, that what can by a necessity of its own nature act upon a body in *any* place, may by a necessity of its nature act upon bodies in *every* place; which will be so far a proof of God's omnipresence, independent on his unity: and if it be his property to fill space, he must for the same reason fill all space.

§ 8. 2. It is a great question, whether God be so present as to fill space. This depends upon another question, whether it be the property of an immaterial spirit to fill space: with reference to which I must confess, that when I conceive of spirit as diffused through any part of space, I immediately conceive of it as something *corporeal;* and consequently cannot conceive how it can be asserted of the divine being, by those who grant his immateriality, as most of the patrons of this doctrine do. But this will be more largely considered below [c].

§ 9. *Def.* An event not come to pass is said to be CONTINGENT, which either may, or may not be. What is already

a WATTS's Philos. Ess. p. 165, 166.
b HOWE, ib. vol. i. p. 108—110.
TILLOTS. vol. ii. p. 756, 757.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 71, 72. Ed. 3. p. 84, 85.
ABERN. vol. i. Serm. vii.
Spect. vol. viii. No. 565, 571.
c NEWT. Princip. p. 483.
SAUR. Serm. vol. ii. p. 60—64.
WATTS's Ess. No. vi. § 5. p. 165—169.
RAMS. Phil. Princ. Prop. 8. vol. i. p. 57—72.

done, is said to *have been contingent,* if it might or might not have been.

§ 10. *Cor.* 1. Contingency is opposed to *necessity*, not to *certainty:* for that is said to be certain, which will be, without considering whether it be necessary or not[a].

§ 11. 2. There are in fact various things, which are in their nature contingent; for such are all the actions of free creatures, considered as free[b]. See *Lect.* 18. and *Lect.* 19. and *Notes.*

§ 12. *Prop.* Future contingencies are known to God.

N. B. Though this be comprehended in *Lect.* 39. § 5. yet we shall here give a distinct demonstration of it, because it has been so much controverted, and so much of what follows depends upon it.

§ 13. *Dem.* 1. So much depends upon future contingencies, that if they be unknown to God, almost every thing relating to those of his creatures which are free agents must be unknown to him too; so that our ideas of the divine knowledge and perfection will by this means be very much diminished.

§ 14. 2. Wise and sagacious men are capable of making very probable conjectures of future events; and therefore it seems dishonourable to deny that God has a power of forming an unerring judgment concerning them.

§ 15. 3. If God does not foreknow future contingencies, he is daily growing more and more knowing, in a prodigious and incomparable degree beyond any of his creatures; which would be inconsistent with his immutability, and therefore contrary to *Lect.* 4. § 9[c]. *Valet propositio.*

§ 16. *Cor.* God always wills the same thing; for whatever appears to him eligible in any circumstances which actually are, must always have appeared eligible on the foresight of those circumstances, i. e. he must always have willed it; supposing, what we shall hereafter endeavour to prove, that his will is always agreeable to reason, and never changed without it.

a CLARKE at BOYLE'S Lect. p. 100.
b WATTS's Ontol. m. p. 331—333.
HUTCH. Metaph. part i. c. iv. § 2. p. 23—25.
c HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 102—104.
Rel. of Nat. p. 99—102.
TILLOTS. vol. ii. p. 605, 606.

FOST. on Nat. Rel. vol. i. p. 69—74.
SEARCH on Free Will, &c. § 23—31.
CLARKE's Post. Serm. vol. i. No. 11. p. 258—268.
ABERN. vol. i. Serm. ix. p. 313—322.

LECT. XLI.

Of Contingency, and Scientia Media.

§ 1. *Schol.* 1. IF it should hereafter be proved on the one hand, that God has foretold the evil actions of his creatures, and on the other, that he could not have made them necessary; then it will appear that this proposition is true in fact, whatever plausible objections may be raised against it.

§ 2. 2. The principal objection to the proposition is, that certainly to foreknow contingencies is a contradiction; since nothing can be the object of knowledge, but what exists in itself or in its necessary cause: and consequently to deny their being known to God is no more limiting his knowledge, than it limits his power to own he is not able to do what is self-contradictory.

§ 3. To this we answer, that the *certainty* of an event does not imply *necessity*; (*Lect.* 40. § 10.) and consequently, that there may be a foundation for certain foresight, where the event itself is contingent; or in other words, the thing will not be because God foresees it, but God foresees it because it will certainly be. It may be added, that not to be able to do a contradiction, is in effect no limitation of the power of God, because a power to effect a contradiction is indeed no power at all: (*Lect.* 35. § 4.) but not to know what the will of a free creature will determine, is indeed a limitation of knowledge, or in other words, a difficulty, with which the divine understanding (if the proposition be denied) is puzzled and confounded.

§ 4. It must be acknowledged, that the method, by which God foresees these contingencies, is unknown: for I think it not safe to say, as some do, that the mind is so constituted, that it does always in fact, though not necessarily, determine itself according to the preponderancy of the motive offered to it; which if it were granted, would not be a certain foundation of prescience; since if this scheme could be reconciled with the doctrine of liberty as stated *Lect.* 19, and 20. yet it would subject the divine being to a possibility of error in every particular, and in all the schemes depending upon each. We are sure (by *Lect.* 39. § 5.) that God knows all things that actually are, whereas our own knowledge is limited to a very narrow sphere; and therefore, since we are sure the divine understanding does in that instance entirely exceed our comprehension, why may we not as well allow that it may exceed it in the manner of fore-

knowing future contingencies; or where is it we may more reasonably suppose the human mind to be puzzled, than when it would attempt to explain the method of divine knowledge [a]?

§ 5. 3. To the second step it is answered, God may indeed form very probable conjectures, vastly beyond the reach of any human sagacity, though he cannot certainly foreknow the event.

§ 6. To this the principal reply is, that to suppose God always in doubt, and ever liable to be mistaken, seems inconsistent with the perfections of his nature, and is a less honourable way of conceiving of him; especially if we consider, that as an event lies more and more distant, the possibility of an error in each intermediate circumstance will so much affect the rest, that in a little time there may be upon complicated schemes almost a total darkness. But should it ever appear, that he has actually and positively without any hesitation foretold future contingent events, and that he has even put the evidence of his true divinity upon such predictions, that would abundantly confirm the second argument: nor would the hypothesis of a constant though not necessary determination of the will according to motives, (§ 1.) be sufficient to vindicate such a conduct; since still there was in every instance at least a possibility of mistake.

§ 7. 4. To step the third it is objected, that such a change as is there supposed is not inconsistent with the immutability of the divine being; seeing his nature and attributes are still the same, though his ideas are supposed to be different at different times. But it is answered, this is only a partial immutability: whereas the arguments that prove the immutability of God in general will not admit of such a change in the divine views and purposes, as must be involved in the ignorance of future contingent events [b].

a CRELLIUS de Deo, p. 67, 68. ap. Op. vol. iv.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 51. Ed 2. p. 106—109.
CLARKE at BOYLE'S Lect. p. 100—104.
Rel. of Nat. p. 102, 103.
WEST'S Serm. iii.
RAMS. Princip. xxii.
TILLOTS. vol. ii. p. 606—608.
HOWE'S Works, vol. i. p. 104—106. vol. ii. p. 50*, 50 b.
MORE'S Enchir. l. iii. c. ii. § 2.
Lettres Pers. vol. i. No. 50.
JACKSON on Liberty, p. 50—76.
BOETH. de Consol. Philos. l. v.
LAW on King's Orig. of Evil, Note L. Rem. c.
HARTLEY on Man, vol. ii. pt. 1o.

b COLLIB. Inq. p. 56, 57. Ed. 2. 66, 67.
RIDGLEY'S Div. vol. i. p. 62*.

* The question, whether future contingencies are known to God, unavoidably enters into the grand controversy concerning the liberty or necessity of the human will. Accordingly, it will be found to have been more or less discussed in the authors to whom we have referred under the sixteenth proposition. K. *Lect.* XX. *ad fin.*

Respecting God's foreknowledge of *continent events* it may be observed, that all contingent objects or events are either *good* or *evil*; for, strictly speaking, all, however mixed and shaded, are reducible to these two.

PROPOSITION I.

God foreknows all *good*, For,

§ 8. 5. It seems strange, that many who grant the universal foreknowledge of what *will actually be*, should deny what they call *scientia media*, or hypothetical prescience, i. e. the knowledge of what would follow upon some certain suppositions, which are not fact; v. g. how king GEORGE would have acted, if he had been emperor of Germany, or the emperor, if he had been king of Great-Britain; or how any child who died in infancy would have behaved, if he had grown up to manhood. To object, that this would suppose the divine mind filled with a variety of vain speculations, is very inconclusive; for it is difficult to say, how God could in any instance select any scheme as best, if he had not a view of others with which it might be compared[a]*.

[a] LE BLANC's Thes. p. 454—458. LILIEN. Theod. 389—417. | JUVENAL's Sat. x. ver. 350—354.

1. No good object or event can exist without an efficient producing cause.

2. This efficient producing cause can be no other ultimately but God.

3. God, as a being of infinite knowledge and perfection, must know perfectly what he will effect to eternity. Therefore,

4. God foreknows all *good* with perfect, that is, infinite exactness.

PROPOSITION II.

God foreknows all *evil*. For,

1. Were there no good there could be no evil; for the very nature and degree of evil is *relative*, and consists in want of and contrariety to existing good.

2. As God foreknows all good, in every possible degree, and relation, he must know all evil as it stands *related* to the contrary good.

3. Beside, though every created nature, as it is the fruit of divine purpose and operation, is good, nevertheless every creature has a *tendency* to sink into its original *nihility*; or (if preserved to answer the purposes of a moral system and accountableness) it has an equal tendency to *defection*; and is preserved in either case only by a *sovereign favour*. This tendency alike to *nothing* and to *sin* is that PASSIVE POWER which constitutes the essential difference between an absolute and a contingent being, between *self-existence* and that which is *derived*.

4. Though in what is properly evil there is no divine impulse or positive causation, yet that the evil may be known by the omniscient with infinite accuracy, is evident from the consideration of every being, whether caused or uncaused, having an *hypothetical tendency* in its own nature. On this truth is founded every argument to prove divine *perfections* from divine *existence*; any effect from a cause, or any cause from an effect. Such as if there be a first cause, mere chance is excluded—If there be a supreme essence, it must be good—If there be a moral system it must be wisely governed—If God deal with a free agent in *strict equity*, (i. e. without any mixture of sovereign favour) such agent will be certain to abuse his liberty—if a sinful creature be made just, holy, and happy, it must be by sovereign grace, &c. Therefore

5. All evil is foreknown. Q. E. D. *Cor.* Not any thing can be so contingent as not to have an *assignable, infallible cause* of its existence, either positive or negative, efficient or deficient. W.

* The principal ground on which divines and metaphysicians have opposed the doctrine of *scientia media*, or hypothetical prescience, seems to have been a mistaken apprehension that good and evil have *uniform* rather than *opposite* causes. Those who are jealous for the honour of sovereign grace cannot allow *good* works to be *only foreseen*; and those who are jealous for the honour of moral government cannot en-

LECT. XLII.

Of the Wisdom of God.

§ 1. *Def.* THAT being is said to be SPECULATIVELY WISE, who is able rightly to determine and judge of the relation of means to their respective ends, and the value and importance of those ends with respect to the person by whom they are pursued: and that being is said to be PRACTICALLY WISE, who determines his own choice in a manner agreeable to such right views, so as that his own greatest happiness may be most effectually promoted, if it be not yet perfect, and maintained, if it be.

§ 2. *Cor.* 1. A being of great sagacity, who in some instances chuses excellent ends and right means, yet neglects the greatest of all, may be said to have a partial practical, as well as speculative wisdom, yet must on the whole be accounted foolish.

§ 3. 2. Speculative wisdom is a part of knowledge.

§ 4. *Prop.* God is possessed of the highest degree both of speculative and practical wisdom.

§ 5. *Dem.* 1. We can conceive no more exquisite degrees of wisdom, than are displayed in the formation and preservation of the world, where we evidently see a most astonishing subordination of means to ends, rising through numberless degrees, in which the most penetrating human understanding is soon swallowed up. See *Lect.* 30. § 2. *Lect.* 31. § 9—20.

§ 6. 2. We see nothing upon which we can with certainty pronounce that it is on the whole foolish, because we know not what its connection may be, and what end it may subserve[a].

§ 7. 3. So far as we can judge from fact, God is speculatively wise.

§ 8. 4. Speculative wisdom being included in knowledge, which was before proved to belong to God, another argument arises independent on the former. § 3. *Lect.* 39. § 5.

[a] POPE's Ess. on Man.

dure the thought of *sin* being *fore-appointed*. Each therefore seems to possess half the truth. The hypothetical tendency of *good* is known in its *all-sufficient cause*; but that of *evil* in its *deficient cause*, the liberty and passive power of the creature. The learned reader who wishes to enter at large into the manner in which the subject has been discussed by scholastic divines may consult Dr. Twisse's Dissertatio de *Scientia Media*, Fol. Arnhem. 1639. W.

§ 9. 5. God is possessed of the highest degree of speculative wisdom.

§ 10. 6. To chuse and act, with an utter disregard to his own felicity, when known, (as by the preceding step he must know the most certain methods of maintaining it) would be a character in a rational agent so unaccountable, and in so peculiar a manner unworthy of deity, that nothing could be more dishonourable than to ascribe it to him[a]. *Valet propositio.*

§ 11. *Cor.* Philosophical liberty belongs to God in the most perfect degree; for that is indeed no other than the practical wisdom here defined: *Vid. Lect.* 18. § 7. and that liberty of action belongs to him, appears from comparing *Lect.* 18. § 4. with *Lect.* 34. § 5.

§ 12. *Schol.* It may be objected, that it is dishonourable to the divine being, to suppose that one thing can be more congruous to his happiness than another. To this we reply, that we most readily acknowledge, that it would be very absurd (for reasons afterwards to be mentioned) to suppose, that the divine felicity depended on the existence of his creatures, or any actio of theirs. Nevertheless it is reasonable to believe, that the divine nature is such, that unspeakable delight must arise to himself from some methods of acting, which so perfect an understanding cannot but approve; and that on the other hand, different methods of acting must appear to him the objects of aversion, as being in themselves absurd, contemptible and mean; v. g. for him to do homage to any of his creatures, as more excellent than himself; or to make a creature merely to torment it. It is so far from being dishonourable to God, to suppose his happiness inseparably connected with certain methods of acting rather than others, that we could think of nothing more reproachful, than to represent him as so arbitrary a being, that of all possible methods of acting which might be proposed to him, it would be as congruous to his nature and happiness, to chuse one as the other[b].

a WILK. Nat. Rel. p. 128, 129.
CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 106, 107.
TILLOTS. vol. ii. p. 617, 618.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 65, 66. Ed. 3. p. 77, 78.

ABERN. vol. i. Serm. v.
b FOST. Serm. vol. i. No. 5.
GROVE on Wisd. p. 21—23.

LECT. XLIII.

Of God's Liberty and Happiness.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO enquire how far natural liberty belongs to God. *Vid. Lect.* 17. § 12.

§ 2. *Sol. and Dem.* 1. Whenever any thing is more congruous to the divine felicity than another, God certainly chuses it, nor can we suppose him to do otherwise, for that were inconsistent with his wisdom, and therefore contrary to *Lect.* 42. § 4.

§ 3. 2. Nevertheless, when of many things which might be proposed any one is equally congruous to his felicity with the rest, in this he has a natural freedom of choice; and it seems that many things are indeed of such a nature. Now that this liberty is to be ascribed to him, appears from its being found in the human mind, and its being a perfection in its degree[a]. *Lect.* 20. § 2.

§ 4. *Schol.* It is objected, that it is a reflection upon infinite wisdom, to suppose that God does not always chuse that one scheme which is of all others the best, i. e. the most congruous to his felicity.

§ 5. It is replied, the objection goes upon the supposition that there is one fitter than the rest, which is begging the question. If it be enquired, whether God could not contrive such a scheme; it is answered, that we most readily allow, that he might form a scheme, fitter than the best which any created understanding could contrive; but to say, he could not form another equal to that, is speaking without proof: nor does it appear, that it would be any honour to divine wisdom to maintain it, more than to say, that having made one human face exceeding beautiful, it should be impossible for him to make another, whose beauty should on the whole be equal to it, even though some of the features were different: and when God chuses one of those many things than which nothing could be fitter and nothing better, he may agreeably to the common forms of speech be said to chuse the fittest and the best. Nevertheless we must acknowledge, that when we weak creatures speak of the divine wisdom, we speak of what is to us an unsearchable thing[b]*.

a WATTS on Lib. p. 41. 42, 44—48. HARTLEY on Man, prop. ix.

GROVE on Wisd. p. 21—26, 30—37.
b PRICE's Four Dissertations, 1st Ed. p. 121. Note.

* To the demonstration it may be objected, that it does not appear conclusive in Lect. 19. on which the reasoning is founded, that the human mind is pos-

§ 6. *Prop.* God is infinitely happy.

§ 7. *Dem.* 1. His wisdom always enables him to know, and engages him to chuse what is most conducive to his happiness. See *Lect.* 42. § 4.

§ 8. 2. Being omnipotent, he is always able to do whatever he chuses, and above the possibility of being disturbed or hurt by any being whatsoever. *Lect.* 34. § 5.

§ 9. 3. To suppose the divine happiness dependent on any creature, would be most absurd; for then, before that creature was produced, he must have been unhappy: and as he had eternally existed before the production of that creature, he must have been eternally unhappy, i. e. of all other beings the most unhappy, which it would be most dishonourable and groundless to imagine. Therefore God is infinitely happy [a]. Q. E. D.

a TILLOTS. vol. ii. p. 586—588. | COLLIB. Inq. p. 57—59. Ed. 3. p. 67—69.

sessed of natural liberty in the sense here taken. See *Lect.* 18. § 3. *Note*; and *Lect.* 19. § 5. *Note.*—And even were it applicable to the human mind in fact, it does not appear that it would be a perfection; and therefore not applicable to God.—As to the question, Whether there may not be a *perfect equality* in different objects? Let it be observed:

1. That there is a distinction to be made between the goodness or beauty of an object in the *abstract*, and the same *relatively* considered. Therefore, on supposition of an abstract equality, it would not be conclusive to reason from it to that which is relative. Again,

2. As relative equality is the thing in question, and if there be no relative difference in the objects, except what is supposed to exist in the mind exercising its volitions, by due consideration it will be found that the supposed objects are in reality *idem*. Moreover,

3. The argument seems to prove too much, and, if so, proves nothing to the purpose. If *two* things *may* be, in a relative sense, or as parts of a system, equally good, beautiful, useful, &c. *in all respects*, and this possibility must be supposed founded in the divine all-sufficiency, it follows that such objects and systems may be multiplied *ad infinitum*, as this all-sufficiency knows no limits. But will any one plead that countless millions of systems, *ad infinitum*, may be *in all respects perfectly equal*?—Beside,

4. Supposing two objects (and by parity of reason countless millions) were perfectly equal as to quantity and quality, they must needs differ either as to time or place. But such difference must exclude perfect relative equality.

5. The improbability of the sentiment which occasions this note will be rendered still greater by another consideration. Difference, it should seem, is essential to every creature as compared *with itself* in successive points of its existence. Perfect sameness, or identity, seems incompatible with absolute dependence; but absolute dependence is the condition of every created nature; therefore deity alone excludes *difference*, compared with itself in reference to successive periods. But if every object thus differ from *itself*, it is still more probable that it differs from every other.

It is useless to object, that two or more things or systems may be *specifically* the same but *identically* different; as, for instance, two pieces of money, two eggs, two blades of grass, two grains of sand, drops of water, or particles of light. For to whatever extent their equality may be carried, there must remain still some *relative* difference; a difference which *may* be of great importance in a system, but which it is not possible to prove of *no* importance. W.

§ 10. *Schol.* It may be asked, why does God act at all, if he be, as the proposition supposes, perfectly happy previous to action.

§ 11. To this we may answer, that the divine being may find some unknown delight in those volitions, by which he communicates being and happiness to his creatures; nor does this suppose any change in him, since it is reasonable to believe he always wills the same thing; (*Lect.* 40. § 16.) viz. that at such times and in such circumstances beings should exist; and being secure of the execution of his volitions, (*Lect.* 34. § 13.) whatever delight he can be supposed to have in the actual production and happiness of those beings, he must have had in the purpose of producing them: so that in this respect, things that are not, are to him as if they were. And if it be said, that there is a change in him, when in consequence of his volition those creatures are produced, he being now their creator, supporter, benefactor, &c. which he was not before, it is answered, this is no change in *him*; a change of relations necessarily arising from the very idea of a creator, and being perfectly consistent with the highest conceivable immutability; else God is changing in numberless instances every moment, as the relations of his creatures change.

§ 12. And if it were to be allowed, that we find some degree of *uneasiness* attending the desire necessary to produce action in *us*, which however seems not to be wholly the case, yet we could not thence argue, that it must be so with regard to *all* created beings; much less can we assert it of God, in whose volitions and motives of action, we must after all acknowledge there is something, which we cannot fully explain[a].

LECT. XLIV.

Of the Unity of God.

§ 1. *Prop.* THERE is no self-existent being besides that, whose existence and attributes we have demonstrated above.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. If there were any other self-existent being, besides that whose existence we have demonstrated, he must in all respects be equal to him; for otherwise it would be natural to

[a] HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 505. | GROVE on Wisd. p. 18—20.

suppose some derivation or dependency, inconsistent with self-existence, and consequently with the hypothesis.

§ 3. 2. To suppose such another being, is to limit the omnipotence of God; for (not to plead God's supposed incapacity to annihilate or change him; because it may be said, that admitting him to be self-existent, this would be a contradiction, and therefore an incapacity of effecting it no limitation of power; nor to insist upon his inability to controul him on account of the supposed omnipotence of this other being, to which the same thought may be applied) it seems he would be unable to act without his consent, at least tacitly implied. And if their volitions should in any respect contradict each other, which in things indifferent they might at least very possibly do, the one would be a restraint upon the other, and so neither would be omnipotent.

§ 4. 3. It would be impossible for God to conceal any of his counsels or purposes from the knowledge of such a being, which would in some degree derogate from his majesty: or if it were allowed, that he might conceal any thing from that other being, that other being might by a parity of reason conceal some things from him, and consequently he would not be omniscient; nay, supposing this being to be infinite, the number and variety of things so concealed might surpass any expression or imagination of ours.

§ 5. 4. It is a much greater glory to be the highest of all beings, than to be only one of a number of equals; now this supremacy of God would be destroyed by the supposition of an equal, especially when it is considered, that no one can say how many they might be, for we might allow two millions as well as two.

§ 6. 5. It would be much less honourable to God, to suppose any such other being as himself, than to suppose the contrary.

§ 7. 6. The unity of design, which seems to prevail in the works of nature, makes it reasonable to believe it had but one author, and that he operated in an uncontrouled manner.

§ 8. 7. There is no reason from the light of nature to conclude, that there are any more deities than one, or indeed to *imagine* there are any more; since one almighty and all-wise being can do as much as a thousand such beings can do; and if any revelation of it be pretended, it will be examined in its proper place.

§ 9. 8. It is reasonable to believe, there is no self-existent being, besides that one, whose existence and attributes we have already demonstrated[a]. *Vid. Lect.* 29. § 12.

LECT. XLV.

Of the Unity of God; continued.

§ 1. *Schol.* 1. IT is readily acknowledged, that these arguments, as well as many by which the foregoing proposition has been proved, do not arise to full demonstration; yet they carry a very strong degree of probability in which the mind must acquiesce, till further proof can be offered from other principles.

§ 2. 2. LIMBORCH objects, that this proof is built on the supposition, that God is a being of all possible perfections: we reply, it goes on the supposition, that we are to conceive of him in the most honourable manner that we can; and it seems enough, if we can prove that it is dishonourable to the deity to suppose a plurality[b].

§ 3. 3. To the argument *Lect.* 44. § 7. of the last it is objected, (1.) That we cannot see how far the unity of design is preserved, unless we knew the whole system.

§ 4. (2.) That so far as we can judge by the specimen we have, it seems that unity of design is not preserved, since there is a mixture of good and evil; which makes it probable, that there must be at least two self-existent beings, the one evil, and the other good.

§ 5. To the first of these we answer, that we must judge by analogy in this respect as in many others; and particularly that the unity of the divine being stands thus far on the same footing with his wisdom, which can only be proved from a comprehensive view of the whole scheme, and must be left an uncertain thing, by all created understandings, if the reasoning in the objection be admitted. As to the second, it will be more fully answered below: for the present it may be sufficient to observe, that the quantity of good, being so much greater than of evil, there is no reason to believe two equal beings, one entirely be-

a WILKIN's Nat. Rel. p. 113, 114.
BURN. on Art. p. 23, 24.
CLERICI Pneum. l. iii. c. x. § 2—4.
LOCKE's Fam. Lett. p. 412—415.
CLARKE's Posth. Serm. vol. i. p. 29.
GROVE's Posth. Works, vol. iv. p. 20—21.
HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 72, 73.
GROT. de Verit. l. i. c. iii.
LACTANT. Instit. l. i. c. iii.
ABERN. vol. i. Serm. v. præs. p. 164—177.
PRIEST. Instit. vol. i.
Lett. to Philos. Unbel. part i.

b LOCKE's Lett. p. 424—425.

nevolent, the other entirely malevolent; which yet must be the hypothesis, if the phænomena referred to could grow into an objection against the proposition[a].

§ 6. 4. Mr. GROVE argues the truth of the proposition, from our having no revelation of more deities than one; whereas if there were more, every one of them would be the reasonable object of veneration from all other beings, even though no benefits were conferred; and consequently any one wise self-existent being would reveal to all his creatures the general knowledge of his associates, that they might pay them all due veneration. But we do not chuse to insist upon this, because it depends upon those moral perfections of the deity, which we have not yet demonstrated; and might be liable to some objection, even if those moral perfections were granted[b].

§ 7. 5. It seems not improper here to mention some other arguments, which have been urged by writers of considerable note, which yet appear not to carry along with them equal conviction with the former.

§ 8. (1.) CLARKE and COLLIBER argue from the nature of *self-existence*, which is *simple*, *uniform*, and *universal*; whereas all *variety* must arise from some external cause, be dependent on it, and proportionable to the efficacy of it. But to this it is objected, that if it were allowed that extension and duration were not, (as Dr. CLARKE supposes,) properties of God, (which if they are, they are undoubtedly *distinct* properties,) yet *intelligence* and *volition*, which all allow in the deity, may be considered as various things; how then shall we account for this variety in him? or if we say he is, what the schoolmen called, *purus putus Actus*, what idea shall we fix to those hard words[c]?

§ 9. (2.) TILLOTSON and CLARKE both argue, that if there were another self-existent being, then the existence of God would not be necessary, nay, that this would introduce atheism; for no one of the supposed number would be necessary, i. e. there would be no God: for you might suppose any one of them not to exist, if the other would suffice to account for all the phænomena of nature. But I confess this argument seems to me to arise from the ambiguity of the word *necessary*: in one place, it

a Hist. of Works of the Learned, Sept. and Dec. 1739. Art. 13 and 30.
POST. on Nat. Relig. vol. i. p. 42—45.
CLERICI Pneum. 3. x. 4—6.

b GROVE's Post. Works, vol. iv. p. 27—29.
NYE on Nat. and Rev. Relig. p. 40—42.

c CLARKE at Boyle's Lect. p. 46.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 26, 27. Ed. 3. p. 30—32.

signifies what is *hypothetically* necessary, i. e. necessary in order to solve some apparent phænomena; in the other, it signifies *underived*[a] *.

§ 10 (3.) WOLLASTON argues, (as Mr. LOCKE has done in the preceding references) that if two or more such beings as we have described be supposed, their natures must be supposed either the same or different; if different, they must be contrary, or various; if contrary, each must destroy the operations of the other; if various, one must have what the other wants; both therefore cannot be perfect: but if their nature be perfectly the same, then they would coincide, and indeed be but one, though called two. But this latter branch of the argument seems not to be self-evident: for aught appears, they might be *specifically* though not *identically* the same: and if it be self-evident, it supersedes all the former part of the argumentation, amounting indeed to nothing less than an assertion, that the existence of two all-perfect beings is a contradiction in terms[b].

§ 11. All these arguments, with those mentioned in the proposition, are stated and urged in CAMB. of Exist. p. 236—246. § 61, 71.

§ 12. 6. If upon the whole that God, whose existence and attributes have been the subject of our former enquiries, were only a co-ordinate deity, and the God of our own system, he would nevertheless be the supreme object of our reverence, gratitude and obedience[c] †.

§ 13. 7. That several of the wiser heathens, notwithstanding the tales of their priests and their poets, believed the existence of one supreme deity, appears from many passages in their

a CLARKE at Boyle's Lect. p. 46, 47, 459—461, 463, 464, 466, 467, 470. TILLOTS. vol. i. p. 491, 492.

b Rel. of Nat. p. 70, 71.

c HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 100, 101. Liv. Temp. part i. c. vi. § 6.

* This argument for the divine unity should not be so readily given up. The distinction here made on the word "*necessary*" does not affect it. For if there were two or more self-existent beings, this absurdity would follow, that there would be number without unity, or difference without identity. *Two* beings include both number and difference, but number and difference are *contingent* ideas, and are totally distinct from absolute *necessity*, and therefore self-existence. Yet all contingent ideas imply absolute necessity of existence. Therefore, two self-existent beings involve a contradiction. W.

† To this it may be objected, that *supreme* adoration to a *co-ordinate* deity would be at least absurd, if not impious. Two beings *co-ordinate* must needs be *contingent*, whatever they are called; but to give supreme reverence, gratitude and obedience to a contingent being, though comprehending the excellencies of all contingent beings, is no better than a plausible species of idolatry. W.

writings: and if the word God, wherever we find it used, were always to be considered, as signifying a being of all possible perfections, it would be difficult to prove, that there ever was such a thing as polytheism in the heathen world. It is the opinion of the learned and ingenious Dr. WARBURTON, that the mysteries of the *greater initiation*, among the heathens, was the discovery of the doctrine of the divine unity to the wiser part of the people: agreeable to which he supposes, that the song ascribed to ORPHEUS, preserved by CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS and EUSEBIUS, was the very hymn used upon that occasion. That of CLEANTHES (See CUDWORTH's Int. Syst. p. 432, 433, and WEST's Pindar) must be allowed in the strongest sense to speak this language; and is perhaps the finest piece of pure and unadulterated natural religion, to be found in the whole heathen world [a] *.

LECT. XLVI.

Of Space, Place and Time.

§ 1. *Ax.* OUR idea of SPACE is a simple idea, which we get by observing the distance of one body from another [b].

§ 2. *Def.* The PLACE of a body, is its situation with respect to some other body, with which it is compared [c].

§ 3. *Cor.* 1. According to the different surrounding bodies brought into comparison, any body under consideration, may be said to continue in the same place, or be removed from it [d].

§ 4. 2. The universe has no place [e].

§ 5. *Prop.* Space is a mere abstract idea; and does not signify any thing which has a real and positive existence without us.

§ 6. *Dem.* 1. Space is either something real and existing without us, or a mere abstract idea.

a WARB. Div. Leg. vol. i. l. ii. § 4. p. 131—160. Ed. 1.
TILLARD's Reply to Warb. c. iv. p. 248—272.
AB. TAYLOR of Faith, Not. p. 12—17.
LELAND on Rev. vol. i. c. 8, 9.
SYKES's Connect. c. xiv. p. 364—383. prax. 364, 365.
CUD. Int. Syst. c. iv. § 10—31, prax. § 19—28. p. 194—186.
LACT. Inst. l. i. § 5.
b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xiii. § 2—4.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 213. Ed. 3. p. 256, 257.
c WATTS's Ontol. p. 380. Ed. 3.
d LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xiii. § 7—9.
e LOCKE ib. § 10.

* DR. WARBURTON's opinion is disputed by DR. JOHN LELAND, in his great work on the Christian Revelation, vol. i. c. 8, 9.—For the sentiments of the several sects of the ancient philosophers concerning the Deity, recourse may be had to BRUCKER and ENFIELD. K.

§ 7. 2. If space be something really existing without us, it is either a mode or a substance.

§ 8. 3. If space be a mode, it must be a mode of some substance, and this substance must be co-extended with space; and the great question will be, how space differs from the substance whose mode it is said to be, or how that can be said to be a mode which, if it exists at all, exists necessarily, and is so far from depending upon any support, that it is itself the support of accidents, such as length, breadth, capacity, &c. Therefore,

§ 9. 4. Space is not a mode.

§ 10. 5. If space be a substance, it must be God: for those who assert its reality maintain, (as they needs must do) that it is self-existent, infinite and immutable; and we have already proved (*Lect.* 44.) God to be the only self-existent, infinite and immutable being.

§ 11. 6. Space cannot be God; since mere space has neither wisdom nor power, and we have already proved God to be both omniscient and omnipotent. *Prop.* 31, 33.

§ 12. 7. Space is not a substance. Therefore,

§ 13. 8. Space is a mere abstract idea, and does not signify any thing real and positive existing without us[a]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 14. *Schol.* 1. By what operation of the mind, Dr. WATERLAND apprehends the idea of space to be formed; and what he thinks the foundation of our mistaking it for something real, see in WATERLAND ap. LAW's Inq. p. 14—16. JACKS. Exist. p. 75, 76. LAW ib. p. 26, 27, 30—33.

§ 15. 2. To the proposition it is objected, that space is a simple idea, and therefore must have an *objective* reality.

§ 16. To this some have answered, by denying that the idea of space is simple; since we necessarily conceive of it, as having *partes extra partes*: but it is more justly replied, that bare *privation* is sufficient to suggest positive ideas, as darkness and silence, though they have nothing of an objective reality[b].

§ 17. 3. It is said, that space forces its actual existence upon us.

Ans. If its idea forces itself upon us, it is only as mere emptiness: nor can we certainly argue the real existence of a

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xiii. § 17, 18.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 218. Ed. 3. p. 261—263.
CLARKE at Boyle's Lect. p. 39, 40.
WATTS's Ess. l. i. § 2—5. p. 4—18. § 7. p. 23—25.
Rel. of Nat. p. 74, 75.

b JACKS. on Exist. and Unity, p. 63—69.
LAW's Inq. p. 33, 34.

thing, merely from our not being able to avoid the idea of it, or to suppose it not to be[a].

§ 18. 4. It is further objected, that *nothing* has no properties; whereas we talk of the properties of space, and settle its dimensions as well as those of body.

We reply, (as above, § 15.) that we sometimes talk of mere abstract ideas, as if they were real beings; and though a shadow be only a privation of light, yet we often speak of it as a positive thing[b].

§ 19. 5. It is further argued, that space is necessarily infinite, and therefore real.

Ans. This takes the question for granted: for this infinity supposes its reality; else, wherever body is, space is excluded: nor do we allow that our idea of space is *infinite*, though it may be *ever growing*: the same argument would prove number to be infinite, which seems a great absurdity at first view[c].

§ 20. 6. If space were not real, it is said there could be no *motion*, because no space to move in.

Ans. A body might move on to infinity; for there would be nothing to stop it; and since motion is only a change of place, i. e. in the situation of bodies with respect to each other, (§ 2.) there needs no such medium through which the change should be made[d].

§ 21. To this Mr. JACKSON answers, that according to this account of motion, God could not move the whole material creation in a strait line. To which Mr. LAW replies, with LEIBNITZ, that this would not be real motion, since it is neither going to nor from any thing, but is still in the centre of infinite space. If it be said, it relates to the various parts of the real space, the body going from one point of it to another; it is answered, that this is evidently taking the whole question for granted; and that a motion in a mere void is as conceivable, as a motion in a void space supposed ever so real. After all, the whole seems to amount to little more than a controversy about the definition of *motion*[e].

§ 22. 7. It is further objected, that supposing two bodies a

a JACKSON ib. p. 69—73.
LAW ib. p. 44—46. and p. 8—12.
b CLARKE at Boyle's Lect. p. 16, 17.
WATTS's Ess. I. i. § 8. p. 25—28. and § 10. p. 31—39.
JACKS. ib. p. 77—81.
LAW's Inq. p. 48—50.

c JACKS. ib. p. 81—88.
LAW's Inq. p. 54—65.
d JACKS. ib. p. 88—92.
LAW ib. p. 65—88.
e JACKSON ib. p. 93—95.
LAW ib. p. 68—70.
CLARKE and LEIBNITZ, p. 57. § 5. p. 79. § 4. p. 99. § 13. p. 133. § 13. p. 307. § 52, 53.

yard asunder, and all intervening bodies annihilated, if space be nothing, they would be contiguous, since in that case there would be nothing between them.

Ans. To be *contiguous*, and to have *nothing between them*, are not synonomous terms. To be *contiguous*, signifies to *touch* one another; which is not a necessary consequence of their having nothing between them [a].

§ 23. *Cor.* It is matter of humiliation, to think that there should be such weakness and darkness in the mind of man, that some of the greatest geniuses should dispute whether space be *God*, or whether it be *nothing* [b].

§ 24. 8. It seems that *time* is an abstract idea, as well as space: having gotten the idea of it from some things in a constant succession, we conceive it to flow uniformly on, and to take in all existences; thus it becomes a kind of common receptacle, as well as space. But many of the same arguments brought for and against the reality of space, may also be applied to that of time [c]. *Vid. Lect.* 10. § 1, 13.

LECT. XLVII.

Of God as Incorporeal.

§ 1. *Ax.* IT is impossible for two bodies to be in the same place at the same time. *Vid. Def.* 3.

§ 2. *Prop.* God is incorporeal or immaterial.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. Materiality has already been proved incompatible with self-existence, therefore God being self-existent must be incorporeal.

§ 4. 2. If God were corporeal, he could not be present in any part of the world where body is: yet we have proved his presence to be continually necessary for the support and motion of body. Therefore,

§ 5. 3. God is incorporeal [d]. Q. E. D.

§ 6. *Cor.* God is invisible [e].

§ 7. *Schol.* 1. The chief objection which has been urged

a WATTS's Fss. No. 1. § 11. p. 39—43.
JACKS. ib. p. 92.
LAW ib. p. 50—53.
b WATTS ib. No. 1. § 6. p. 20—23.
RAMS. Phil. Princ. Prop. 24. Schol. 2.
c LAW'S Inq. p. 79, 80.
JACKS. ib. p. 79.
WATTS's Ontol. c. iv. and xii.
SOAME JENYNS'S Disqus. Dissert. iv.
d CLARKE'S Serm. vol. i. p. 98. Oct.
FOSTER on Nat. Rel. p. 50, 51.
TAYLOR of Deism, p. 280, 360.
e ABERN. Serm. vol. i. No. iv.

against the proposition is, that unless God were corporeal, we could not imagine that he should produce body, since nothing can give what it has not. It is answered, that we grant nothing can produce an effect more excellent than itself; (*Lect.* 28. § 1.) but to be corporeal is not a greater excellency and perfection than to be incorporeal, but rather the contrary: nor would our conceptions of God's producing matter be at all helped by conceiving of him as material; unless that production were only making some alteration in the form and situation of some parts of himself, which is far from being the idea of creation: and indeed on the whole, creation is a thing of which we can form no distinct idea, whether we suppose the creator on the one hand, or the creature on the other, corporeal, or incorporeal[a].

§ 8. 2. Some who allow the immateriality of the divine being contend, that though it is impossible one body should penetrate another, yet it is not impossible that an immaterial being should penetrate body, for their natures will still be distinct; and the pre-eminence of the divine nature above all corporeal or derived natures is such, that there is not an equal reality in both, as there is in two particles of matter, which hinder them from coming into the same place.

§ 9. *Ans.* Though we easily perceive what it is for a subtil fluid to penetrate a body rarer than itself, v. g. for water to fill the pores of a sponge, yet this does not help our ideas, when we apply penetration to an incorporeal substance; and it seems altogether as reasonable to suppose that an immaterial being moves bodies by contact, as that it does in a proper sense penetrate them. If that penetration mean no more, than that God can act in and upon every particle of matter where or however situated, this will be readily granted, but this seems not to be what is contended for by Mr. COLLIBER. On the whole, considering the immateriality of God, if any thing be asserted concerning his omnipresence, beyond what is expressed, *Def.* 32, it is to us mysterious and incomprehensible[b].

§ 10. 3. Notwithstanding what has been asserted in the former corollary, it may be allowed possible for God to manifest himself to his creatures, by presenting some material phænomenon to their senses, and thereby communicating ideas to them: yet in this case, it is only in a secondary and less proper sense, that we may be said to see God, or hear his voice[c].

a LOCKE's Ess. l. iv. c. x. § 18, 19.
b COLLIB. Inq. p. 218—221. Ed. 3. p. 263—265. Fool of Quality, Vol. i. p. 82.
WATTS's Ontol. c. xii. p. 377—379.
c BURNET on Art. p. 25.

§ 11. 4. Some who have maintained that God is so present as actually to fill space, have differed in explaining the extent of that presence. Sir ISAAC NEWTON and Dr. CLARKE argue, that infinite space is possessed by him; but COLLIBER denies it: and though he maintains that the divine being penetrates all space, yet, as he denies the infinity of real space, he also denies the infinite extension of the divine being, and by a parity of reason, the infinity of the other properties of his nature: and as many of his thoughts are uncommon, it will not be amiss to subjoin some account of the arguments on both sides[a]*.

§ 12. 5. It appears, by the forementioned references to COLLIBER, that he denies God to be *infinite*, in our sense of infinity; for to have no bounds, is to be in its own nature incapable of end, which is the explication he gives of *positive* and *absolute infinity*. (Vid. *Lect.* 23. § 11.) How far he is consistent with himself, in denying this, while he grants what he calls a *negative* infinity, may be afterwards considered. It is however apparent, that if he keeps to his own idea, in denying the infinity of God he in effect asserts, that there are certain bounds, beyond which the extension, power, knowledge, &c. of the divine being do not exist: and indeed in his late treatise, which he calls, The Knowledge of God, he very evidently avows it, when he confesses that the deity must have some figure, and intimates it may probably be spherical[b].

a NEWTON's Princ. p. 483.
CLARKE, Inq. p. 141, 142. Ed. 3. p. 170, 171.
COCKBURNE's Works, vol. i. p. 400—402.
b COLLIB. Known God, p. 22—24.

* COLLIBER in his denial of God's Immensity, is not new. It was denied by SOCINUS and his followers, (see SOCINI Opera, tom. i. p. 685.) and by VAORTUS, though not a Socinian. Compare TURRETINI Institutiones, Locus iii. quæst. 8, 9. vol. i. p. 215, 221. Geneva Edition. COLLIBER seems to want clear notions of his subject, and was by no means a close judicious writer, nor deserving of so much attention as our author has paid him. S.

The fact is, that when Dr. DODDRIDGE drew up his Lectures, COLLIBER's Inquiry had excited considerable notice, as is apparent from its passing through three editions. The book is now nearly sunk into oblivion. It was formerly read by the present editor, who, in his opinion concerning it, entirely agrees with Dr. SAVAGE. K.

LECT. XLVIII.

Of the Infinity of God—Something infinite.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO propose and examine some of the most considerable arguments, brought to prove the absolute infinity of the divine being.

§ 2. *Lem.* The solution will consist of two parts: in the first, we shall produce the arguments brought to prove that *something* is actually infinite: and in the second, shall consider the arguments to prove that infinity belongs to the *divine being*.

§ 3. *Sol.* Arguments to prove that *something* is actually infinite.

1. Some have argued from the nature of space, which (supposing it to be, as Mr. COLLIBER does, a real thing) is certainly infinite, and cannot be bounded so much as in thought. COLLIBER grants we can have no idea of the end of it; yet maintains there may be an end of universal space, as we know there is of particular: and if it be asked, what bounds it? he answers, *nothing;* but will not allow that it is therefore infinite. But it is plain he conceives of space only as the interstice betwixt bodies; and how this is more real than the void which lies on the other side the remotest body, I cannot imagine. But if *Prop.* 40. be true, this can be no solid argument: for nothing would be more absurd, than to ascribe infinity to *nothing*, or to a mere abstract idea [a].

§ 4. 2. It is pleaded that the divine being is allowed to be eternal: now eternity, i. e. infinite duration, is as incomprehensible as any other kind of infinity.

COLLIBER answers, eternity is not and cannot be an infinite duration, being limited on the one side by the present moment; and he adds, that *duration* does not belong to God. Yet still, if we consider him as a being without a beginning, (which surely we must confess him, or something to be) I see not how it is possible to separate duration from our idea of him: and if we cannot, surely here is an infinite in one respect, indeed in that respect in which it is most difficult to conceive of it [b].

§ 5. 3. Another argument is taken from the infinite divi-

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 4, 21. COLLIB. Inq. p. 150—153. Ed. 3. p. 185—193.

b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 5, 20. COLLIB. Inq. p. 149, 152, 153, 154. Ed. 3. p. 180—187.

sibility of matter, since it is certain division can never annihilate.

§ 6. This Mr. COLLIBER is obliged to admit But he pleads, that this infinite divisibility does not imply an infinite number of parts in every particle of matter, but rather the contrary; for else the subject must be of an infinite bulk. Some have replied, these parts may be infinitely small; but he denies that any thing can be so; and if they were, matter could not be infinitely divisible. If it be said, that this infinite divisibility proves that there is an infinite distance between the smallest beings and nothing, he says, that creation proves the contrary. Nevertheless it may be answered, that we maintain the creator to be omnipotent, and that an almighty power may overcome that infinite distance; or rather, that when we talk of an infinite distance in this sense, we only mean a very great distance; so that nothing certain can be concluded from this argument[a].

§ 7. 3. Others have pleaded that no limits can be set by our thoughts to the number and extent of *possibilities*, but more may be conceived to be produced, and still more without bounds; there must therefore be an actual infinity, in proportion to this possible one.

COLLIBER answers, this only proves that our imaginations may be perpetually going on in their operations; but that there is no reasoning from imagination to fact, without confounding possibilities and realities: and indeed it must be confessed, that all the utmost efforts of imagination will always be finite, though they be ever growing[b].

LECT. XLIX.

Of the Infinity of the divine Being.

§ 1. *Sol.* ARGUMENTS to prove the infinity of *the divine being*.

1. Some have argued, that if God be limited, it must either be by himself, or by another; but no wise being would abridge himself, and there could be no other being to limit God.

a LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 12. COLLIB. Inq. p. 161—165. Ed. 3. p. 194—200.

b HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 63, 64, 67. Liv. Temp. part i. c. iv. § 4. COLLIB. Inq. p. 170—179. Ed. 3. p. 213—216.

§ 2. COLLIBER answers, that no cause can bestow absolute infinity upon its effect; and therefore there needs no cause of the finiteness of any created, why then of an uncreated being? And further, the argument supposes it to be matter of choice with God, whether he would be finite or infinite, which it is unreasonable to suppose; and would indeed imply (what PLATO and CARTESIUS are said to have maintained) that the deity produced himself by a proper causality; whereas not to abridge itself, can never make any being infinite. Thus it may be said, that as God did not make himself wise, nor did another being make him wise, yet he is wise; so he may not limit himself, nor be limited by another, and yet he may be limited. If in answer to this it be urged, that as he is wise, so he is also unlimited by the necessity of his nature, which is all that can be replied, this argument thus founded will coincide with the next[a].

§ 3. 2. Others plead that infinity follows from self-existence; for a necessity that is not universal, must depend on some external cause, (*Vid. Lect.* 23. § 12.) which a self-existent being does not.—To this Mr. COLLIBER replies,

§ 4. (1.) That though necessary existence has no relation either to place or limit, any more than to variety, yet as there is some sort of variety in God, (*Lect.* 45. § 7.) so there may be limits.

§ 5. (2.) That to be finite is not properly the effect of any cause, and therefore may consist with necessary existence.

§ 6. (3.) That finiteness is in itself necessary; because every being has a complete and positive nature, whereas our idea of infinite is negative.

§ 7. (4.) That how absolute soever the necessity of a supposed infinite being can be, that of a finite may be equally so. He adds, we must not argue too much from abstract ideas to things: that may be necessary in its own nature, which we may conceive as not existing, v. g. perfect wisdom; and that may not be necessary in its own nature which we may not be able to conceive not to exist, v. g. space.

§ 8. It seems that the third of these answers is inconsistent with the first: that any being should be the less complete, and the less positive, because it is infinite, I own I cannot conceive; though our idea of infinite should be allowed to be a negative idea[b].

a SCOTT's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 193, 194. COLLIB. Inq. p. 145—147. Ed. 3. p. 175—178.
b CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 43. COLLIB. Inq. p. 168—174. Ed. 3. p. 203—211. Berry-Street Serm. vol. i. p. 107. Ed. 2. LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 12—14.

§ 9. 3. It is urged that creation is so great an act of power, that we can imagine nothing impossible to that being who has performed it, but must therefore ascribe to him infinite power.

§ 10. COLLIBER answers, the distance between being and not being may be said to be finite, because it has been passed over; and is indeed no other than between thinking and not thinking, moving and not moving: though they are irreconcileable with each other, there may be a possibility of passing from one to the other, without an infinite degree of power. Yet he adds, nothing on this side a contradiction can be imagined less possible than a production from nothing, and therefore allows a proper omnipotence in God, which he takes to be infinite power: so that this argument seems to be given up[a]. *Lect.* 35. § 4.

§ 11. 4. It is more honourable to the divine being to conceive of him as infinite than finite.

§ 12. To this COLLIBER answers, by endeavouring to prove, that to conceive of him as infinite leads us into many absurd and dishonourable notions of him, which will be surveyed in the next proposition: yet he is forced after all to acknowledge a negative infinity, i. e. that there is nothing too great for the power of God, that nothing which can be the object of knowledge is unknown to him, and that no being can bound God, or even human imagination itself[b]. *Vid. Lect.* 47. § 7.

§ 13. *Schol.* 1. I have not here mentioned the argument taken from the supposed innate idea of infinity, nor from the immensity of matter; both which appear to me so evidently inconclusive, as not to deserve so large a survey as the former[c].

§ 14. 2. The argument from the fulness of being supposed in God, if it imports any thing at all, must coincide with some of the former arguments, especially the fourth[d].

LECT. L.

Objections to the divine Infinity answered.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO review and consider the arguments which Mr. COLLIBER has urged against the divine infinity, and by which he has endeavoured to prove it a pernicious doctrine.

a COLLIB. Inq. p. 147—149. Ed. 3. p. 178—180.
b COLLIB. Inq. p. 180—183. Ed. 3. p. 217—221.
c COLLIB. ib. p. 144, 145, 154—161. Ed. 3. p. 174, 175, 200—203. CAMB. sur l'Exist. p. 191—197. Or BOYCE's Transl. p. 135—137.
d COLLIB. ib. p. 175, 176. Ed. 3. p. 212, 213. HOWE's Liv. Temp. part i. c. iv. § 2. SCOTT's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 344, 345.

§ 2. *Sol.* He asserts it to be attended with pernicious consequences, whether we consider the deity *in himself*, or *with respect to us.*

§ 3. With respect to the *deity itself*, he maintains that it leads us into the following absurdities.

§ 4. 1. To assert his inextension; for all extension naturally implies bounds, therefore the *Platonists*, asserting the infinity of God, said he was *a mathematical point*, thereby making him infinitely less than the least grain of sand; yet at the same time they asserted him to be *all in all*, and *all in every part:* than which nothing can be more absurd.

§ 5. To this it is answered, (1.) That many maintain extension does not imply limits. (2.) That a mathematical point being only an abstract idea, God cannot properly be represented by it. (3.) That when it is said he is *all in all*, and *all in every part*, nothing more may be meant than this, that his almighty power can operate in every place, and is the support of all other beings; which COLLIBER himself allows.

§ 6. But he replies, if we do not allow this way of speaking, we must go into the scheme of the *Nullibists*, and affirm that God is no where.—And what if it should be asserted, that it is not his property to be present in any place, by a diffusive presence?—It will be said that therefore he is not at all.—But this pretended axiom will require proof[a]. *Lect.* 47. § 8, 9.

§ 7. 2. From the doctrine of God's infinity arises that of *absolute simplicity;* else each attribute would be infinite, whereas it is said there can be but one infinite.

Ans. This objection arises from an absurd confounding the idea of attribute with that of being[b]. *Lect.* 1. 6.

§ 8. 3. From infinity is inferred absolute omnipotence, which includes a power of working contradictions.—But it is sufficient to answer that this is not properly a power, as has been observed above[c]. *Lect.* 35. § 4.

§ 9. 4. From infinity follows absolute omniscience, which would establish the doctrine of decrees, inconsistent with liberty and therefore with virtue.

Ans. We have endeavoured to shew that the foreknowledge of God is not inconsistent with liberty[d]. *Lect.* 41. § 2, &c.

§ 10. 5. Hence some have inferred, that God not only *does*,

a COLLIB. Inq. p. 184—187. Ed. 3. p. 222—229.
b COLLIB. ib. p. 190, 191. Ed. 3. p. 229—231.
c COLLIB. ib. p. 192. Ed. 3. p. 231, 232.
d COLLIB. ib. p. 193, 194. Ed. 3. p. 232—235.

but *is* all things. This is SPINOZA's scheme; who argues that an infinite being must comprehend all particular finite beings.—But it may be replied, that this argument arises from mistaking the word *infinite*, which implies, that the being to whom it is ascribed, has no bounds: now God is not at all bounded by the existence of creatures, whose natures are entirely different from his own. And how, on COLLIBER's own scheme, can God be where the creatures are, without a confusion of his being with theirs, if the foundation of SPINOZA's argument, even on his own principles, be just [a].

LECT. LI.

Objections to the divine Infinity further answered.

§ 1. *Sol.* WITH respect to *ourselves*, Mr. COLLIBER asserts,

1. That the doctrine of the divine infinity discourages our enquiries into the nature of God; because we must for ever despair of attaining to the knowledge of him.

§ 2. *Ans.* On COLLIBER's own principles, we must acknowledge it to be impossible perfectly to know him; nor is it any wonder that it should be so. (*Vid. Lect.* 22. § 12, &c.) But supposing him to be infinite, we may know as much of him as if he were finite, though more will continue unknown [b].

§ 3. 2. It is said this doctrine raises prejudices against his existence, because it makes it impossible to conceive clearly of him.—To this we may reply,

§ 4. (1.) There can be no scheme, on which there will not be some difficulties: those of atheism will be still greater than would follow from supposing an infinite deity [c].

§ 5. (2.) If *one* finite being could be supposed necessary, why may not *any other*? i. e. Why may not the doctrine of the finiteness of God, be a shelter for atheism in one view, as well as that of his infinity in another [d]?

§ 6. *Schol.* 1. Mr. COLLIBER seems chiefly to have opposed the doctrine of the infinity of God, in order to establish his scheme of denying the divine decrees and foreknowledge, which must indeed suppose him a limited being.

a COLLIB. ib. p. 198—240. Ed. 3. p. 238—241. HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 69—72. Or, Liv. Temp. part i. c. iv. § 9. Works of the Learned, for 1728. Jan. Art. iv.

b COLLIB. Inq. p. 209. Ed. 3. p. 241—245.

c GURDON at BOYLE's Lect. pass. præs. p. 79, 80. ARMRR. Verit. de Incarn. part i. c. xvi. xvii. vol. i. p. 117—122.

d COLLIB. [illegible] p. [illegible] Ed. 3. p. 243

§ 7. 2. On the most accurate survey and examination of these two last propositions, we may perhaps see reason to remark,

§ 8. (1.) That many arguments which have been brought to prove the infinity of God are inconclusive.

§ 9. (2.) That to suppose him finite, would not free the mind from all difficulties in conceiving of him, especially those which are the consequences of his eternity; but would plunge us into some new difficulties.

§ 10. (3.) That though it be most honourable to the divine being, to suppose him infinite, yet if we conceive of him only as superior to all other beings, and possessed of perfections beyond the investigation of our minds, there will be a foundation laid for religion and virtue, in the several branches in which we shall afterwards endeavour to open it.

APPENDIX

Concerning Dr. Berkley's Scheme, That there is no material World.

§ 1. IN considering the scheme, we shall

I. Propose the scheme itself, and the arguments by which it is supported.

II. Examine the objections brought against it.

III. Consider how far our enquiries into natural philosophy are affected by it.

§ 2. I. The scheme itself is not, that sensible objects have *no real existence;* or that all is but a waking dream: he disclaims both these, his principle is, that no sensible object exists *unperceived;* or more plainly, that *there is no material world,* and that *primary*, as well as secondary qualities, do only exist in the mind perceiving them; so that if all minds were annihilated, all bodies would be annihilated too; and the difference between dreaming and perceiving, is only that the latter is more active, regular and vivid than the former.

§ 3. The arguments by which the Doctor supports this system are these.

1. The existence of a material world cannot be demonstrated; because an almighty power can always produce such sensations without any archetype, and it is plain in dreams he does so.

§ 4. *Ans.* This will not prove that he *has* done it. We assert not that matter is a necessary being; but its actual existence may nevertheless be proved, as well as that of a created mind.

§ 5. 2. It is an useless incumbrance; because a divine influence is necessary to produce ideas from material archetypes.

§ 6. *Ans.* The divine power may be illustrated in such a harmony; and the actual support of bodies seems an act of great power, as well as the union of the soul and body, of great wisdom.

§ 7. 3. The supposition of it is very inconvenient, as it introduces disputes about the production and subsistence of bodies, the infinite divisibility of matter, the union of body and mind, &c.

§ 8. But it may be replied, that if giving occasion to dis-

putes could disprove the thing disputed about, we must also give up the existence of spiritual and immaterial beings.

§ 9. 4. It implies a contradiction. Sensible objects are the things we perceive by our senses; but we can perceive only our own ideas and sensations: now it is plainly repugnant, that any of our own sensations should exist unperceived, and therefore that sensible objects should so exist.

§ 10. *Ans.* This is plainly taking the question for granted; yet he triumphs greatly in this argument, and says, the bare possibility of the existence of any extended moveable substance, or in general any idea, or any thing like an idea, but in a thinking mind, is absurd. But this triumph is extremely ill grounded; because if it were granted him, that sensible objects are in fact only the things which our senses immediately perceive, i. e. that they are our own ideas, (which is, as we observed above, begging the question) it will not follow from thence, that it is impossible there should be, or should have been, any external archetypes of them[a].

§ 11. 5. The various appearances of the same object to different persons at the same time, prove that it exists only in a perceiving mind; else the same thing must have different magnitudes, colours, &c.

§ 12. *Ans.* The various circumstances in which it is, seems to account for its different appearance; and if the object were material, it must be so.

§ 13. 6. The best philosophers have granted it as to *secondary* qualities, but the case is the same as to *primary*.—This is denied.

§ 14. II. The objections against it are these.

§ 15. 1. To deny the possibility of matter, is plainly limiting the power of God.

§ 16. 2. This hypothesis which supposes us under a continual deception, reflects upon the divine veracity. He answers, the same objection will lie against supposing the earth to move about the sun.

§ 17. 3. The senses give us such an evidence, that if it is possible they may be true notices of what passes without us, we must certainly believe they are so.

§ 18. 4. Our ideas can have no parts; but the objects of them have parts: therefore the objects are something different from the ideas themselves.

a BERKLEY's Princ. § 22.

§ 19. 5. Every thing real is banished out of the world.—This BERKLEY expressly denies.

§ 20. 6. Things on this supposition are continually annihilated and created anew.—He answers, the school-men allow a continual creation. But that is a weak reply. If *Adam* and *Eve* both slept, the sun for that time was annihilated: if it be said, it existed in the divine mind; it may be answered, so it did from all eternity, and at that rate all creatures must be eternal.

§ 21. 7. It makes all the apparatus of nature in the organization of plants and animals vain.

§ 22. *Ans.* Not vainer than upon the supposition of a continued divine concurrence, asserted *Prop.* 32. they are rules which God has laid down, according to which he directs his own operations.

§ 23. 8. This doctrine destroys all the evidence of the existence of other created spirits; some also add, of the divine existence; but I think not: yet it certainly weakens some proofs of it, especially that taken from the *vis inertiæ* of matter.

§ 24. III. How far our inquiries into natural philosophy are affected by it.

§ 25. 1. It cuts off a great part of our present inquiries.

§ 26. 2. In a strict sense, it would change a great part of our language.

§ 27. 3. Nevertheless, it leaves room for the observation of the phænomena of nature, and the connection between causes and effects, in many instances. On the whole, it is a scheme destitute of proof; the most we can assert is, that it is *possible*; and we are led every moment, whether we will or no, into an apprehension of the contrary. If we believe it to be true, we ought to act in every instance, and on every occasion, just as if it were false.

§ 28. We conclude with observing, that as some have denied all *material*, and others all *immaterial* substances, each asserting one or the other *only* to be real, we may reasonably believe them *both* to be so[a].

a BERKLEY's Princ. and Dial. pass.
COLLIER's Inquest. World.
BAXTER on the Soul, vol. ii. § 2. Oct.
RAMS. Princip. prop. 54 and 57.
REID on the Hum. Mind, c. v. §87, 88.
KAIMS's Ess. on the Princ. of Morality and Nat. Rel. part ii. Ess. iii *.

* See Dr. REID's Inquiry into the Human Mind. See also his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay ii. ch. 10, 11, p. 156—185; and BEATTIE on the Immutability of Truth, part ii. ch. ii. § 2. p. 169—191.

PARTS III. AND IV.

ON ETHICS.

PART III.

OF THE NATURE OF MORAL VIRTUE IN GENERAL, AND THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. OF THE SEVERAL BRANCHES OF VIRTUE, AND THE NATURE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

LECT. LII.

Axioms and Definitions—Differences and Relations—Virtue and Vice—moral Beauty and Turpitude—Obligation—moral Rectitude.

§ 1. *Ax.* 1. FROM the *essences* of things (the ideas of which immutably exist in the divine mind) arise certain DIFFERENCES, and from the circumstances in which they are placed, certain RELATIONS, inseparable from those essences or circumstances.

§ 2. 2. The actions of an intelligent being may *agree* or *disagree* with the *nature*, *circumstances* and *relations* of things; or in other words, they may with respect to them be FIT or UNFIT: v. g. Evil is as unfit to be returned for good, as a cubical case is unfit exactly to contain a globe.

§ 3. *Def.* The *agreement* of the actions of any intelligent being with the nature, circumstances, and relation of things, is called the MORAL FITNESS, or the VIRTUE of that action; the *disagreement* is therefore the MORAL UNFITNESS, or VICE.

§ 4. *Cor.* There is really and necessarily a moral fitness in some actions, and a moral unfitness in others[a]. *Vid.* § 2.

a WISHART's Reform. Serm. p. 5, 6.
CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 174—179, 181.
FOST. Serm. vol. i. p. 5—8. ii. p. 105, 106.
PRICE on Mor. p. 59—70.
Lett. to Dr. CLARKE, p. 5—11.
CHAND. Ref. Serm. p. 5—7, 14—19.
BENSON's Serm. No. ii. p. 40—45.
Dr. ADAMS's Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue, p. 3—6*.

* For a most elaborate and ample vindication of the doctrine of moral fitnesses and unfitnesses, see Dr. PRICE's "Review of the principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals." K.

See also Dr. CUDWORTH on "Eternal and Immutable Morality," a work highly deserving of attention, and to which, on the present subject, Dr. PRICE was so much beholden. W.

§ 5. *Schol.* To this some have objected the various opinions of learned men, and the difference in the laws of various nations concerning right and wrong.

§ 6. We answer, that it does indeed from hence follow, that all the moral fitnesses of things are not self-evident; and we readily allow, that in some cases it may be very difficult to pronounce concerning them, and in others the judgments of men may be so prejudiced by corrupt affections as to err, though the cases themselves are very clear. Nevertheless, there are some things so plain, that they were never denied to be more fit than their opposites: nor was it ever commanded or allowed by any known law, that every man might plunder or murder his fellow-citizens as he pleased; that no faith should be kept, or compacts performed, &c[a].

§ 7. *Ax.* The actions of an intelligent being appear to have a BEAUTY or excellency, when they are morally fit, and a TURPITUDE and deformity, when they are morally unfit[b].

§ 8. *Schol.* 1. This answers the question, "What are moral fitnesses fit for?" Their mutual congruity and harmony is as fit to gain the approbation of an intelligent mind, as music to please an ear that is rightly formed[c].

§ 9. 2. The apprehension of that beauty or deformity, which arises in the mind by a kind of natural instinct, previous to any reasoning upon the remoter consequences of actions, has been with great propriety called by many elegant writers the *moral sense*: but what is peculiar in some of their notions will be afterwards stated and examined[d].

§ 10. *Def.* An intelligent agent is said to be OBLIGED IN REASON, to that which appears to him on an impartial enquiry most *honourable* and decent; and to be OBLIGED IN INTEREST, to that which on an impartial enquiry shall appear most conducive to his *happiness* on the whole[e].

§ 11. *Schol.* Though an obligation in reason and interest may seem distinct, yet they are, at least in a great measure, if not entirely, connected: for on the one hand, the obligations

a LOCKE's Ess. l. i. c. iii. § 9—12.
CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 181—183.
PASSER. Phil. Inq. pass*.
b PRICE on Mor. p. 90—99.
c GROVE's Wisd. of God, p. 29.
WISHART's Ref. Serm. p. 11—15.
CHAND. Ref. Serm. p. 27—31.
BENS. Serm. No. ii. p. 48—50.
d HUTCHESON on the Pass. p. 245—253.
PRICE on Mor. p. 99—103.
e BALG. Law of Truth, p. 4—12.
PRICE on Mor. p. 181—206.

* This objection is particularly considered and answered in Dr. BEATTIE's Essay on the Immutability of Truth. K.

of reason, honour and decency cannot be broken through, without some *uneasiness* to a mind conscious of the violation of them; and on the other, it is a reasonable, decent and honourable thing, to be influenced by a regard to our own happiness.

§ 12. *Def.* The MORAL RECTITUDE or VIRTUE of any being consists, in acting knowingly and designedly in a manner agreeable to the moral fitness of things; and VICE, in acting contrary to them, when they are or might have been known to him [a].

§ 13. *Cor.* 1. There is a beauty inseparable from virtue of character, and a deformity from vice [b]. *Comp.* § 7. and § 3.

§ 14. 2. Every intelligent being capable of discerning this beauty and deformity, is in reason obliged to the practice of virtue in every instance [c]. *Comp.* § 10.

§ 15. 3. The foundation of virtue and vice cannot depend upon the mere will of any being whatsoever [d]. *Vid.* § 1, 2.

LECT. LIII.

Of moral Fitness—and the Will of God.

§ 1. NEVERTHELESS, as the circumstances of things vary, the fitness of actions will proportionably vary; and therefore the will of a superior may make some things fit, which otherwise would not be so; (v. g. a general's command to a soldier to march any particular way, or a magistrate appointing an execution, &c.) but while the same circumstances continue, the moral fitness of things will always be the same [e].

§ 2. 2. To what is said *Lect.* 52. § 15. some have objected, that this is setting up something different from, and independent on the divine being, to be the rule of his actions.

§ 3. But it is replied, that as nothing can be prior to God, so nothing distinct from his nature is here asserted to be a law or rule of action to him. We cannot suppose the divine mind

a BALG. Inq. into the Nat. of Mor. Goodness, part i. p. 30, 31.
Elements of Crit. vol. i. p. 64—66.
b SHAFTESB. Char. vol. ii. p. 28—36.
c PRICE's Review, c. vi.
BURLAMAQUI's Elementa, par. i. c. v. vi. par. ii. c. vii.
d Lett. to Dr. CLARKE, p. 11—15.
GROVE of Wisd. p. 25—26.
MOLE's Serm. of Moral Virtue, p. 21—24, 27*.
e MOLE on Mor. Virtue, p. 27, 28.
PRICE on Mor. p. 77—85.

* The doctrine of the third corollary is strongly asserted and maintained in Dr. PRICE's work, before referred to. K.

Also by Dr. CUDWORTH in his Treatise of "Eternal and Immutable Morality. W.

ever to have been without ideas; (for then God would have been without knowledge, and without volitions, and consequently without action; all which are most inconsistent with what we have before proved concerning him:) now perfectly discerning every idea, (*Prop.* 33.) he must have perfectly discerned all their relations, and therefore among the rest the moral fitness of some, and unfitness of other actions, in such and such supposed circumstances: so that on the whole, it is no more injurious to the divine being to assert, that he cannot alter his own sense of some moral fitnesses, than that he cannot change his nature, or destroy his being[a].

§ 4. 3. Some have thought themselves, on the premises laid down above, authorised to say, that supposing God to change his mind concerning these things, the things themselves would nevertheless continue the same.

§ 5. But it may be observed with regard to such a manner of expression, that if we consider God as existing alone and prior to all creation, and by a change of *mind* mean only a change of *will;* then to say, the things themselves would nevertheless continue the same, is only saying, that God would still continue to discern what is right, though his own actions were contrary to his judgment; which is a trifling proposition, as well as a blasphemous hypothesis. But if the supposition be, that his *ideas* are likewise changed, this would suppose the former ideas totally destroyed, seeing there would be no other mind in which they could exist; and then all the *relations* and *fitnesses* would be destroyed with them. But if we were to consider other minds as existing, and to suppose God either to change his ideas, or to act contrary to rectitude, while any one of his creatures retained this sense of it; it is granted that virtue would still be the same: but if it be hereafter proved, that God is a being of perfect rectitude, (since we have already demonstrated his immutability,) it will follow, that all these suppositions are in effect no other, than that God should cease to be God; and are so unreasonable and indecent, that they ought not to be made[b].

§ 6. 4. If it should be hereafter proved to be the will of God, that all rational creatures should prosecute virtue; and also proved, that the will of God lays an obligation on his rational creatures; then from hence it will evidently appear, that no man, capable of knowing God, is obliged to any thing by the

a Limestr. Lect. vol. ii. p. 379—381 PRICE on Mor. p. 149—152.

b Lett. to Dr. CLARKE, p. 14, 15.

moral fitness of things, to which he is not also obliged by the will of God.

§ 7. 5. If it be further enquired, whether our obligations arising from the fitness of things, be *antecedent* to those arising from the will of God, we answer,

(1.) If God will the universal virtue of all his rational creatures, he must will it from the first moment of their existence; and taking the matter in a general view, no obligation in order of time can be prior to that arising from his will, nor reach further, since universal virtue comprehends all moral fitnesses.

§ 8. (2.) It must be acknowledged, that our sense of the fitness of some things may be prior to our discovery of the existence and nature of God; and that in proportion to the degree in which that sense is more or less strong, there will be a correspondent degree of obligation: nay it is hard to say, how any one could know that he *ought* to do a thing, which he knew to be the will of God, unless he had some previous sense of obligation in reason or interest, on which such a conviction should be founded.

§ 9. (3.) Nevertheless, as children apprehend the ideas of *things*, sooner than they learn the names of *complex*, *moral modes*, the easiest and best way of forming them to a sense of virtue will be, to give them an early sense of the being and perfections of God, according to their feeble capacities of apprehending them; representing it as his command, that they should do every thing they know to be good, and forbear every thing they know to be evil. But

§ 10. (4.) As to the order of our conception of things, when we come to examine them in riper years, if the rectitude of God should hereafter be proved to us on the one hand, and our obligation to obey him on the other; then when we know any thing to be *fit*, we know it to be the will of God; and when we know it to be the will of God, we know it to be fit for us to do in present circumstances: and therefore we need not be very nice in adjusting, on which of these things the greatest stress is to be laid; since we should then consider the will of God not merely as an arbitrary thing, but as the will of a wise and a righteous being. And it is certain, that whatever might be conceived as fit from other abstract considerations, will appear yet more fit, when considered as the will of such a being: so that a regard to the divine authority, in doing a thing, can never di-

minish the degree of virtue in an action, but will always increase the sense of obligation to it[a]*.

§ 11. 6. On the whole it is proper to observe, that great care should be taken, especially in popular discourses, that we do not make any false suppositions of God's being changed from what we know him immutably to be, that we do not represent him as under the restraint of something superior to himself, nor ourselves as under greater obligations to something else than we are under to God. It is much more proper to say, (if the rectitude of the divine being be proved) that his unerring judgment is the rule of *his* actions, and his will as directed by it, (however that will may be known,) the rule of *ours*; and the foundation of moral good and evil should be asserted, not to be *previous* to, or merely consequent upon, but inseparably *connected with* the immutable will of God[b].

LECT. LIV.

Of God's moral Rectitude.

§ 1. *Def.* MORAL rectitude is generally called HOLINESS, when applied to God, VIRTUE, when applied to the creature[c].

§ 2. *Schol. Virtue* is sometimes taken in a more limited sense, for the duties we owe to *ourselves* and our *fellow-creatures:* and then *religion* is put to signify the duties we owe more immediately to *God.*

§ 3. *Ax.* Where there is any moral turpitude in the actions of a rational being, it is *(cæteris paribus)* proportionable to the

a WRIGHT against MOLE, p. 41—43.
b WRIGHT against MOLE, p. 27—29, 41—51.
LOCKE's Ess. I. ii. c. xxviii.
CONYB. against TYND. p. 55—72.
ADAMSON's Nat. and Oblig. of moral Virtue.
TAYLOR's Sketch.
BALGUY on Moral Goodn. p. 41, 42.
WARB. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 36—53.
BOLTS's Answer to WARB. p. 228, ad fin. præs. [illegible]—289.
c [illegible]S, N. Dr's Works, p. 8, 94.
GROVE on Wisdom, p. 59.

* As a brief answer to the question, (§ 7.) it may be observed, that a constitution of created things being supposed; moral obligation results from the constituted relations; yet the mere will of God gave birth to that constitution. The *ultimate* standard, therefore, of moral rectitude is God himself, in his infinite being and necessary perfections; the *intermediate*, his sovereign pleasure, ever conformable to himself; and the *proximate*, our appointed relation to him and other beings. Vid. "Influence of Religious Practice on our Enquiries after Truth," p. 31. W.

† JOSEPH MEDE, in the passage referred to, did not mean philosophically to define the moral rectitude of God, but to describe, in general, his singular greatness and holiness. K.

degree, in which such a being understands the relations of things, and is free from temptation to act contrary to them.

§ 4. *Prop.* God is a being of perfect HOLINESS, i. e. of the highest moral rectitude.

§ 5. *Dem.* 1. His infinite understanding must enable him to discern all the relations of things as they really are. *Lect.* 39. § 5.

§ 6. 2. He is almighty, and therefore has nothing to fear. *Lect.* 34. § 5.

§ 7. 3. He is perfectly happy, and therefore has nothing to hope. *Lect.* 43. § 6.

§ 8. 4. He is infinitely removed from all temptation to act contrary to moral rectitude.

§ 9. 5. It would be highly dishonourable to the divine being, to suppose him in any respect to deviate from the exactest rectitude in his actions. § 3.

§ 10. 6. Without any temptation or advantage to deviate from moral rectitude, must fill the mind of being with uneasy reflections upon it. *Lect.* 52. § 10.

§ 11. 7. It would be inconsistent with the divine felicity[a]. *Valet propositio.*

§ 12. *Cor.* 1. It is reasonable to believe that it is the will of God, that all created beings, that are capable of virtue, should make it the great object of pursuit[b].

§ 13. 2. Since God is a being of almighty power, and has the final happiness or misery of all creatures in his hands, every creature capable of virtue must be obliged in interest, as well as reason to cultivate the practice of it: (*Vid.* § 12.) and thus it appears, that virtue and self-love can only be perfectly reconciled by *religion*. See Dr. WATTS's pamphlet on the subject.

§ 14. 3. Whatsoever shall hereafter be proved a branch of virtue, and does not imply some degree of weakness and dependence in the being by whom it is to be practised, is undoubtedly to be found in God[c].

§ 15. 4. If we see God in fact doing any thing, we may assure ourselves that it is agreeable to the reason of things that it should be done, though we cannot shew how it agrees; and

a Lett. to Dr. CLARKE, p. 15—28.
SCOTT's Christ. Life, vol. ii. p. 361—364.
TILLOTS. Works, vol. ii. p. 662.
PRICE on Mor. p. 427. 459.
b PRICE, ib. p. 443—447.
c CONYB. on Rev. Relig. p. 55—72.
WATTS on Self-Love and Virtue, pass.
PRICE, ib. 274—298.
Prot. Syst. vol. ii. p. 454—465.

though there may be some objections to it, which, in consequence of the imperfection of our views, we are not able to answer[a].

§ 16. *Schol.* It may perhaps be queried, whether this rectitude of the divine being be *necessary*, i. e. whether God can do what is morally unfit.

Ans. God has a natural power to do what is most unfit for him to do, if we consider merely the action itself; v. g. to put a period to the existence of the most excellent creature, &c. but considering all the circumstances of an evil action, which cannot but be known to him, he cannot so oppose and contradict himself as to do it: for it is as impossible for a free agent, of perfect immutable rectitude, to act contrary to reason, i. e. to destroy its own rectitude, as for necessary existence to destroy its own being; and if the rectitude of God were not immutable, then he might be changed from a most benevolent to a most malevolent being, from a most faithful to a most perfidious being; which surely is as inconsistent with self-existence, as a change from knowledge to ignorance, or from power to weakness. Nevertheless God may freely chuse this or that action, out of many others equally good and fit[b].

LECT. LV.

Of God's Goodness.

§ 1. *Def.* THAT being may be said to be perfectly GOOD or BENEVOLENT, who promotes the happiness of others so far as it is fit to be promoted[c].

§ 2. God is perfectly good.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. We see a great deal of happiness in the creation, of which God is the author; and generally speaking, those things which contain displays of art and wisdom, are calculated to promote the happiness of his creatures: under which head we are to rank the benevolent instincts, which he has implanted in the human mind.

§ 4. 2. We see no mixture of evil, from whence good may

a BUTL. Anal. parti. c. vii.
b CLARKE at BOYLE'S Lect. p. 115—119. GROVE on Wisdom, p. 30—33. PRICE on Mor.
MOLE's Found. of Virt. p. 24. WRIGHT against MOLE, p. 8, 9, 22—25.
c HARTLEY on Man, vol. ii. p. 23—26.

not proceed; and are sure that in many instances good does actually proceed from those things which have the appearance of evil.

§ 5. 3. The greatest part of those evils which we here observe arise from the abuse of human liberty, and therefore are not directly to be charged upon God. *Prop.* 16.

§ 6. 4. If we judge by the phænomena of nature, i. e. by the divine works of creation and providence obvious to us, it seems that God is a good being.

§ 7. 5. God is so great, as to have no need of seeking his own happiness in the causeless misery of his creatures; nor is it a conceivable thing how he should take any pleasure in it, or how he could be happy with a supposed malignant disposition.

§ 8. 6. Benevolence is the great glory of a rational being, and without it, no other perfection can appear amiable and honourable.

§ 9. 7. We have reason to believe that God is perfectly good[a]. Q. E. D. *Lect.* 43. § 6. *Lect.* 29. § 12.

§ 10. *Schol.* 1. The great objection to this, is the mixture of evil in the world, natural evil, i. e. pain, and moral evil, i. e. vice: (*Vid. Lect.* 52. § 12.) and it is questioned, how far the existence and prevalence of it in so great a degree can be reconcileable with what has been said of the divine goodness, since God has already been proved an almighty being.

§ 11. *Ans.* 1. We cannot possibly judge as to the proportion there is between the quantity of happiness and misery in the creation, merely from what we observe in this part of it, which is our own abode. There may perhaps be regions incomparably more extensive and populous, in which neither natural nor moral evil are known, at least by experience.

§ 12. 2. It is possible there is no evil of any kind, from which a degree of good may not proceed, more than sufficient to counterbalance it.

§ 13. 3. When moral evil has been introduced, (which, as was observed above, gr. 3.) might be by the abuse of liberty in

a WILK. Nat. Rel. p. 135—139.
CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 113.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 68—71. Ed. 3. p. 81—84.
HARTLEY on Man, vol. ii. prop. iv.
RAMS. Princ. vol. i. Prop. 24, 25.
HUTCH. Syst. vol. i. c. ix. 5—14.
CLARKE'S Posth. Works, vol. i. p. 321—327, 337—341. Oct.
BAYES on Div. Benev. p. 20—29.
ABERN. Serm. vol. ii. No. 2*.

* For a curious and valuable tract on this subject, see Dr. THOMAS BALGUY'S Divine Benevolence asserted and vindicated. K.

free creatures, then penal evil is on the whole, good, and well suited to a state of discipline, which may possibly in those circumstances be intended as a proper introduction to a state of enjoyment.

§ 14. 4. The scheme of things which we now see may perhaps be continually growing better and better; not to say, that for aught certainly appears by the light of nature, the time may come, when all natural and moral evil may cease[a].

LECT. LVI.

Of the Permission of Moral Evil.

§ 1. *Schol.* 2. IT will still be demanded, why was moral evil permitted? To this it is generally answered, that it was the result of natural liberty; and it was fit, that among all the other classes and orders of being, some should be formed possessed of this, as it conduces to the harmony of the universe, and to the beautiful variety of beings in it.

§ 2. Yet still it is replied, why did not God prevent this abuse of liberty*? One would not willingly say, that he is not able to do it, without violating the nature of his creatures; nor is it possible that any should prove this. It is commonly said, that he permitted it, in order to extract from thence greater

a Rel. of Nat. p. 71, 72.
BAXT. Works, vol. ii. p. 37—39, 90, 91.
SCOTT's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 245—249.
BALG. on Div. Rect. p. 31—33, 38—40.
LEIBNITZ Theod. vol. i p. 83—85.
MANDEV. Free Thoughts, p. 99—102.
MAIM. More Nevoch. part iii. c. xii.
Travels of Cyrus, p. 248—258. 12mo.
HALLET on Script. vol. ii. p. 310—318.
ABERN. Serm. vol. ii. No. 3.
CLARKE on the Orig. of Nat. Evil, præs. p. 60—77 & p. 160, ad fin.
BONET's Contemplation of Nature.

* The continued perfection of any creature must be owing to such continued acts of God as cannot be claimed in equity. For though no creature be *impelled* to sin, he is not sufficient of himself, without God's immediate and *gratuitous assistance*, to preserve his happy state one moment. The question, in fact, returns to this, Are the attributes of *strict equity* and *sovereign mercy* to be MANIFESTED, or are they not? The *latter* cannot be displayed but to a creature who is brought, through the "abuse of liberty," into a state of sin; nor could sin take place but by the exercise of the *former*; not as the *cause*, but the innocent *occasion*. The true cause is the creature's *passive power*, a term which I am constrained to use for want of a better, notwithstanding Dr. REID's objection to it. This tendency to defection, inseparable from the essence of a created nature, becomes the actual cause of sin only when employed by *liberty*, and *that* employed by *equity*. But sovereign favour alone, or direct supernatural influence, can counteract passive power, and thereby prevent the abuse of liberty, and produce moral good. W.

good. But it may be further queried, could he not have produced that greater good without such a means? Could he not have secured among all his creatures universal good and universal happiness, in full consistency with the liberty he had given them? I acknowledge I see no way of answering this question, but by saying, he had indeed a natural power of doing it, but that he saw it better not to do it, though the reasons upon which it appeared preferable to him are entirely unknown to us[a].

§ 3. 3. Some have thought it more for the honour of the divine being to say, that the nature of things is such, that the happiness of the whole system will be more effectually promoted by the misery of some part of it; and therefore, that perfect benevolence would induce the creator to chuse such a mixed scheme, rather than another in which there should have been unmixed virtue and happiness.—But granting that there is no evil, from which an equal or greater degree of good may not proceed, (*Schol.* 1. *gr.* 2.) yet it may justly be asked, what is here meant by *the nature of things*, or how can it possibly be imagined or believed, that a greater sum of happiness should arise from the mixture of evil, than omnipotence could have produced some other way; or how can the view or experience of misery be necessary to give a virtuous being a more exquisite relish of happiness[b] †?

§ 4. 4. If we still remain dissatisfied with the reply given to the objection, *Lect.* 55. § 10. it seems that the chief reason is, that we are apt to go on the mistaken principle, that God must needs raise the happiness of the universe to the highest possible

a POPE's Ethic Epist. No. i. ver. 43—60. & 123—172.
FOST. Serm. vol ii. No. 2.
CLARKE on the Orig. of Mor. Evil, præs. p. 122—140. & p. 182—198*.
KING's Orig. of Evil, p. 411—414. No. 80, &c.

b JENYNS's Let. on Orig. of Evil, No. 1—4.
KING's Orig. of Evil, p. 110—115.

* To the writers here referred to may be added BONET's "Contemplation of Nature." Among the works which exaggerate the evils of mankind in order to promote atheistical purposes, may be reckoned the "Systeme de la Nature," ascribed to MIRABEAU the Father. On the question, Why God did not prevent the abuse of liberty? no one is more sceptically copious than BAYLE in several articles of his Historical Dictionary, and particularly under the heads of Manichæans and Paulicians. K.

The inquisitive reader is referred further, on this profound subject, to Dr. BELLAMY on "The Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin;" and Mr. JOHN PYE SMITH on "The divine Glory displayed by the Permission of Sin," lately published. Dr. HOPKINS's Theory on the Causation of Sin, seems highly exceptionable. See his "System of Doctrines contained in Divine Revelation," explained and defended, vol. I. p. 156—217. W.

† For the writers who maintain that both the natural and moral evil existing in the world are essential parts of the best possible system, recourse may be had to HARTLEY, &c. K.

degree. But we are to remember, on the one hand, that God is a being of infinite power, (*Lect.* 34. § 5.) and on the other, that to be *created* implies to be *limited* in point of *happiness*, as well as of *power*; and to be possessed of some limited degree of happiness, necessarily implies a possibility of receiving some higher degrees of it from an almighty power; so that it can never be said, that God has done his utmost for the happiness of any particular creature, or of the universe in general: and this is so far from being a reflection on him, that it is indeed his glory. Whatever the number of creatures be, it might have been multiplied to and beyond any given degree; there might have been as many beings of the highest order of all, as there are of them and all the subordinate classes; and whatever were supposed to have been done, there would still have been room for the inquiry, why was not more done: and if the answer is not to be resolved into mere sovereign pleasure, as perhaps it may, then it must be referred into some reason unknown to us; for the reason cannot be, that the happiness of the whole would have been less, which in this case it is a contradiction to assert [a].

§ 5. 5. To this way of stating the divine goodness, as pursuing the happiness of the creation so far as it is fit to be pursued, it is objected, that nothing can be fit, but what tends to produce happiness; and that no being can be perfectly good, unless he does all the good he can possibly do. But this last principle cannot for the reason above-mentioned be allowed, when we speak of an almighty agent.

§ 6. On the whole, it must be owned a considerable difficulty. Nevertheless, we are sure there is a mixture of evil in the world; and it becomes us seriously to consider, whether it be more honourable to God, or decent in us to say, that he could have prevented it, though for some wise but unknown reason he did not chuse to do it; or to say, he could not have prevented it, without chusing a scheme, in consequence of which his creation might have been less happy than it now is [b].

LECT. LVII.

Of the Spring of Action in the Deity.

§ 1. *Schol.* 6. IT may not be improper here to take some notice of the celebrated controversy, between Mr. BALGUY, Mr. BAYES,

a BOYLE on Venerat. p. 88, 89.
BAYES on Div. Benev. p. 65—70.
FENELON's Phil. Works, vol. ii. p. 70—82.
Ibid. § 9, 10. p. 72—76.
LEIBNITZ Theod. vol. ii. p. 251, &c.
KING ib. 107—110, 396, &c.

b BALG. on Div. Rect. p. 23—30.
BAYES on Div. Benev. p. 99—103.
GROVE on Wisd. p. 59—80.
KING ib. p. 403—427.

and Mr. GROVE, concerning the *Spring of the divine actions.* BALGUY refers them all to *Rectitude*, BAYES to *Benevolence*, and GROVE to *Wisdom.* There is something which well deserves an attentive perusal in their writings on this subject, of which we shall give a short abstract in the following scholia, so far as they relate to the present question.

§ 2. BALGUY maintains, that God always does that which is right and fit, and that all his moral attributes, viz. justice, truth, faithfulness, mercy, patience, &c. are but so many different modifications of *rectitude.* He thinks it most agreeable to the divine simplicity, and most honourable to God, to conceive of him as always influenced by this uniform principle; and that this manner of conceiving of him would prevent much confusion in our ideas, which arises from considering his different attributes as having different interests and claims[a].

§ 3. He grants that the *communication of good* is *one* great and right end of the creator; but maintains that it is not the *only* end: he ultimately aims at *his own glory*, i. e. the complacential approbation of his own actions, arising from a consciousness of having inviolably preserved a due decorum, order and beauty in his works: and if ever the happiness of any particular creature, or of the whole system interfere with this, (as he thinks it sometimes may) it must so far give way to it[b].

§ 4. This leads him into some reflections on the nature of *beauty* and *order*, in which he maintains that they are real and absolute in themselves, and are not merely relative to our faculties; otherwise, why this wonderful apparatus, this profusion of art and skill in the universe? He contends that Dr. HUTCHESON grants this, when he places all beauty in *uniformity amidst variety.* Now whatever is beautiful in the universe, the creator must see it, and have a perfect view of all that is amiable and delightful in it. He concludes this part of his discourse with observing, that to suppose all the beauty, order and harmony of the universe subservient to the happiness of living creatures, is hardly to be reconciled with the appearance of things: so that on the whole, the increase of *happiness*, and love of *order*, being both agreeable to the rectitude and perfection of the divine nature, are joint ends, blended together both in the works of creation and providence[c].

§ 5. 7. To this Mr. BAYES objects, that to consider God first in general as doing all that is right, and then to deduce his par-

a Div. Rect. p. 3—8.
PRICE on Mor. p. 104—109.
b Div. Rect. p. 10—15.
c Div. Rect. p. 16—29.

ticular moral attributes, as branches of this universal rectitude of his nature, is going further about than is necessary, and leaves particular attributes entangled in just the same difficulty as before. But if it were otherwise, he says, that as nothing can be *fit* but what tends to promote happiness, the best idea we can entertain of the rectitude of God, is a disposition in him to promote the general happiness of the universe; and that we may as well consider all the other moral attributes as comprehended in this, and different modifications of it, as to consider them united in BALGUY's view of rectitude; but with this advantage, that here we shall have something certain to depend upon; whereas it must throw the mind into perpetual perplexity, if (for aught we know) God may have some ends in his actions and dispensations, entirely different from and perhaps opposite to the happiness of his creatures [a].

§ 6. As for the ideas of *order* and *beauty*, he seems to query whether those objects which appear beautiful to us may appear so to the divine mind. He thinks that the only glory, which God can propose as the end of his actions, is the approbation of his own benevolent mind, as acting always in such a manner as shall be most for the happiness of the creation. He urges several objections against BALGUY's notion of beauty, which it is not necessary to contract here, lest we deviate too much from the principal question [b].

§ 7. On the whole, he concludes that the divine benevolence is not to be stated, as "an unbounded inclination to communicate the highest degree of happiness," which is a contradiction, as it would be to suppose the greatest possible triangle actually described; (*Comp. Lect.* 56. § 4.) but "as a kind affection towards his creatures, inclining him to confer upon that universe which he has made (and which he might have created or not, or have created with inferior or superior capacities for happiness) the greatest happiness of which it is capable." But if it be asked, why it was not made capable of more, he supposes that must be referred into the will and pleasure of God [c].

LECT. LVIII.

Of the Spring of Action in Deity; continued.

§ 1. *Schol.* 8. MR. GROVE refers all into the *wisdom* of God, which he says is "the knowledge that God has of what is

a BAYES on Div. Benev. p. 7—19. | Relig. of Nat. p. 116—119.
b BAYES ib. p. 33—44. | c BAYES ib. p. 70, 71.

fitting or unfit to be chosen in every imaginable circumstance;" and taking it for granted that he is under no wrong bias, concludes that he always chuses according to this fitness. He adds, that nothing can be fit to be chosen by any being, but what has some reference to *happiness*, either that of the agent or some other; and that *beauty* and *order* are nothing any further than as they tend to communicate pleasure to percipient beings: therefore the end of God in the creation must be *happiness*; as to the degree and manner of attaining it, suited to the faculties, dependencies and freedom of his rational creatures. On the whole, he supposes it must be apparently fit, that no reasonable creature should be made miserable, before he deserves it. He farther adds, that he should be made for happiness; but that he should be obliged as reasonable and free to chuse reason as his guide to it: and if he will not be persuaded to take the right way, it is fit he should be left to the ill consequences of his own wrong choice. All this therefore he supposes God must will[a].

§ 2. As BAYES and others have maintained, that benevolence is a *kind inclination* or affection in God, GROVE endeavours to prove, that properly speaking, there is no inclination in him; and maintains, that to suppose such an inclination as depends not on the previous act of the divine understanding, will be in effect imputing to him a blind and irrational propensity; and that nothing could be more dishonourable to the divine being, than universally to assign this reason for his conduct in any instance, "that he was inclined, or had a mind to do it." But he further maintains it, as probable at least, that there are no inclinations in God at all distinct from his actual volitions, but that the actings of the divine will are immediately and inseparably connected with those of his understanding: to suppose the contrary, he thinks would in effect be supposing, that reason would not be sufficient to determine the divine mind. If any determination be said to have proceeded from such inclination, that coincides entirely with the former exploded hypothesis of blind inclination: but if it be said, the action proceeded partly from reason and partly from inclination, he asserts, that it may as well be supposed to proceed entirely from reason[b].

§ 3. From hence Mr. GROVE infers in the process of his discourse several things, relating to the divine liberty, the origin of evil, the divine happiness, and the duties of natural religion,

a GROVE on Wisd. p. 1—7. Rel. of Nat. p. 116.

b GROVE ib. p. 14—23. BALG. Div. Rect. p. 9, 10.

which have been or will be referred to, so far as there appears any thing peculiarly remarkable in them.

§ 4. 9. From the survey we have taken of this controversy, it may be natural to make the following remarks.

§ 5. 1. That each of these ingenious writers discover a pious temper, a concern for the honour of the divine being, and the advancement of virtue in the world.

§ 6. 2. That they all acknowledge that God does always what is right and good: nay, that when one thing is on the whole more fit than another, he invariably chuses it.

§ 7. 3. That both Mr. GROVE and Mr. BALGUY acknowledge the *communication of happiness*, a noble and excellent end, which the deity in some measure has always in view; and which he prosecutes, so far as to bring happiness at least within the reach of all his rational creatures; never inflicting any evil upon them out of caprice, or without some just and important reason.

§ 8. 4. That there is very little difference between the foundation of GROVE's discourse, and that of BALGUY's; *wisdom* in the former being so stated, that to be always governed by it coincides with the notion of *rectitude*, maintained by the latter[a].

§ 9. 5. That Mr. BAYES himself does not assert, that it would have been impossible for God to have produced a greater sum of happiness; and by granting the contrary seems to overturn the foundation of those arguments, by which he attempts to prove, that God has made the creation as happy as its present capacity would admit.

§ 10. 6. It seems that a virtuous mind may be as easy, in considering God as a being of universal *rectitude*, as if we were to consider him as a being of unbounded *benevolence*: nay it seems, that in some respects the former will have the advantage; as it is impossible for us confidently to say, what will be for the greatest happiness of the whole; but on the other hand, we may naturally conclude, that rectitude will on the whole incline God to treat the virtuous man in a more favourable manner than the wicked.

§ 11. 7. That the scheme of universal benevolence in the highest sense seems evidently to imply *fatality*: for if all the sin and misery of the creatures were necessary to produce the greatest possible sum of happiness, and if the perfection of the

a BALGUY's Law of Truth, Suppl. | PRICE, ib. p. 435, &c.

divine nature determined him to produce this greatest sum, then sin and misery would be necessary; whereby the doctrine of liberty is destroyed, and such a seeming reflection thrown on the divine character, as few would be able to digest.

§ 12. 8. It seems therefore on the whole best to keep to that in which we all agree, and freely acknowledge, there are depths in the divine counsels unfathomable to us; so that though we may justly believe God has his reasons for suffering evil to be produced, we cannot certainly determine what those reasons are; and when we go about particularly to explain them, we find it difficult, according to the different schemes we embrace, on the one hand to vindicate his goodness, or on the other his omnipotence.

LECT. LIX.

God is Incomprehensible—not the Subject of human Passions and Affections—Of divine Analogy.

§ 1. *Prop.* GOD IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. This would follow merely from his being a spirit, endued with perfections vastly superior to our own. *Vid. Lect.* 29. § 11. *Lect.* 22. § 12.

§ 3. 2. There may be (for any thing we certainly know) attributes and perfections in God, of which we have not the least idea.

§ 4. 3. In those perfections of the divine nature, of which we have some idea, there are many things to us inexplicable, and with which, the more deeply and attentively we think of them, the more we find our thoughts swallowed up; v. g. his self-existence, his eternity, his omnipresence, whether it be conceived of as diffusive or not diffusive; his producing effects by mere volition, the creation of matter or even of spirit; his omniscience, where his knowledge of what is past from the creation of the world (how long soever you suppose it to have been) bears no given proportion to the knowledge of what is yet to come, if any creature be supposed immortal; especially his knowledge of future contingencies; how being perfectly happy, and consequently having nothing to wish or desire, he was excited to act: how being perfectly good and omnipotent, he permitted evil to enter into the world; besides many other particulars touched upon in the preceding lectures.

§ 5. 4. God is incomprehensible[a]. *2. E. D.*

§ 6. *Cor.* 1. We have reason to believe, that as the perfections of God are infinite, if there be any orders of intelligent creatures superior to us, these perfections must also be incomprehensible to them[b].

§ 7. 2. It certainly becomes us to use great modesty and caution, when we are speaking of the divine perfections[c].

§ 8. *Schol.* It ought to be remembered, that the incomprehensible nature of the divine being is no sufficient reason for our allowing ourselves in self-contradictory language, when we are speaking of him; as some of the antients did, when they spoke of him as *more than unknown*, *without existence*, *without substance*, *a super-divine divinity*, and as *terminating infinity* itself, so that infinite space is but a small corner of his productions, and *beyond perfection*; which, though probably designed only as strong hyperboles, tend to expose the persons that use them to ridicule, rather than to exalt our ideas of the divine glory[d].

§ 9. *Prop.* The passions and affections of human nature are not in any degree to be ascribed to God: *Comp. Prop.* 1. *Gr.* 3. and *Prop.* 13.

§ 10. *Dem.* 1. Many of those passions are grievous and troublesome, as anger, envy, fear, shame, &c. and consequently there can be no room for them in a being perfectly happy, as God is. *Lect.* 43. § 6.

§ 11. 2. Others of them, which afford more pleasing sensations, are founded on some degree of weakness, and plainly imply a defect of happiness, as desire, and hope, &c. and consequently are inconsistent with the omnipotence, as well as the felicity of God.

§ 12. 3. The workings of the passions in us are always attended with some commotions in animal nature, and therefore imply corporeity; but God being incorporeal, such passions can have no place in him. *Lect.* 48. § 2.

§ 13. 4. God is free from human passions. *2. E. D.*

§ 14. *Schol.* 1. Nevertheless in a *figurative* sense, love and joy, anger and pity, &c. may be ascribed to God; when we

a ABERN. Serm. vol. ii. No. 6, 7.
GROVE's Posth. Works, vol. i. p. 141—156.
b FILLOTS. Serm. vol. ii. p. 7—8.
Rel. of Nat. p. 93, 94.
c KING of Predest. § 30, 31.
GROVE, ib. 157—160.
d BUTLER Analogy, p. 65, 66.
FRASER's Life of Nadir Schah, p. 12—18.

mean no more, than that God does such acts, as in us would be at least probable indications of such passions in our mind, v. g. supplying the necessitous, relieving the sorrowful, punishing the vicious, &c. Yet strictly speaking, we are to conceive of all these, as performed by him with the utmost calmness and serenity; and even that complacency, with which God contemplates his own perfections, and the actions and characters of the best of his creatures, is of a nature very different from, and vastly superior to, those sallies of joy, which we perceive in ourselves, in the most agreeable situations in life, and when our enjoyments are most refined [a].

§ 15. 2. It may be proper here to mention the scheme, which Mr. BROWN advances in his *Divine Analogy* as of so great importance, and which is built upon a hint in Archbishop KING.

He pretends, that all we know of God is merely by *analogy*; i. e. from what we see in ourselves and observe in others, compared with events produced by the divine being, we conclude, that there is something in God, in some degree *answerable* to those phænomena, though indeed very *different* from them. This analogy, as he maintains, differs much from *metaphor*, which is a mere figure, v. g. when we speak of the eye of God, the hand of God, it is a metaphor, God being entirely incorporeal; but when we speak of the knowledge and power of God, it is by analogy.

§ 16. If he means by this, that the divine manner of knowing and acting is different from ours, or whatever degree of knowledge and power we possess, bears no proportion to that of the supreme being, it is what every one will very readily allow, and has generally been asserted by all who believe the existence and infinite perfections of God: but if he intends any thing else, his meaning seems either very unintelligible, or very absurd; so that the scheme, in either of these views, seems utterly unworthy of that vast parade, with which he introduces it, as if the whole of natural and revealed religion depended upon such an explication of the matter [b].

a LIMB. Theol. l. ii. c. x. § 3.
BURNET on the Art. p. 24—27.
Mrs. COCKBURN's Works, vol. ii. p. 288.
b KING of Predest. § 3—6, 8, 9, 37.
GROVE on Wisd. p. 42, 43.
Proced. of Understanding, p. 3—6, and 132—143.
COLLINS's Vindic. of Div. Attrib. in ans. to King.
Divine Analogy, c. i.
LAW's Notes on King, on the Orig. of Evil, p. 67—70.

LECT. LX.

Definitions of Virtue considered.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO consider some of the most celebrated definitions of virtue, and accounts of the foundation of it, and to compare them with that given, *Lect.* 52. § 12.

§ 2. *Sol. and Dem.* 1. Dr. CLARKE and Mr. BALGUY have the same notion with that stated above; as evidently appears from the references to them, *Lect.* 52. § 12. and § 4. And those of the *ancients*, who defined virtue, to be *living according to nature*, seem to have meant much the same.

§ 3. 2. Mr. WOLLASTON has placed it in a reward to *truth*: i. e. he supposes that not only our words, but our *actions* have a language; when this language is agreeable to the nature of things, then the action is virtuous, but when it implies a false assertion, then it is vicious. This account, though it differs in words, seems entirely to coincide with the former, or evidently to depend upon it[a].

§ 4. 3. Dr. HUTCHESON defines *moral goodness*, "to be a quality apprehended in some actions, which produces approbation and love towards the actor, from those who receive no benefit from the action;" and supposes what he calls a *moral sense*, implanted in our natures, or an instinct, like that of self-preservation, which, independent on any arguments taken from the reasonableness and advantage of any action, leads us to perform it ourselves, or to approve it when performed by others[b].

That there is indeed such a sense, as to some branches of virtue, though in many persons and instances much impaired, is not to be denied, and is well illustrated and proved in HUTCHES. Inq. p. 107—124. Spect. vol. viii. No. 588.

Nor does it imply any innate idea, as some have supposed; any more than the intuitive discerning of self-evident propositions, implies the ideas connected with them to have been innate[c].

§ 5. But Dr. HUTCHESON has made this instinct to be the very *foundation* of virtue; and expressly says, that "every good action is supposed to follow from affection to some rational agent;" and that "the true spring of virtue is some instinct,

a Rel. of Nat. p. 8—13. and 20—24.
HUTCHES. on the Pass. p. 250—274.
GROVE's Works, vol. iv. p. 50—54.

PRICE on Mor. p. 179—181. 215—226.
b HUTCHES. Inq. Pref. p. 6—8. and p. 101—106.
c WATTS's Ess. No. iv. § 5. p. 108—115.

which influences to the love of others, as the moral sense determines us to approve actions flowing from this principle[a]."

§ 6. But Mr. BALGUY pleads that this makes virtue an *arbitrary* thing, which might have been contrary to what it is, had the instinct been contrary: that it implies that a creature with intelligence, reason and liberty could not have performed one good action, without this affection: that it makes brutes capable of virtue, since they are capable of affections: that it estimates the excellency of characters by the strength of passions, by no means in our own power; and on the whole, gives us a much less honourable idea of virtue, than the method of stating it, which is taken above: to which we may add, that if we do not conceive of God as an *affectionate* being, such an idea of moral goodness as this, would be inconsistent with that of the divine rectitude.

§ 7. It may be observed by the way, that though Lord SHAFTESBURY uses many expressions, which Dr. HUTCHESON has adopted, yet it seems that he in the main falls in with the account given above; since he considers virtue as founded on "the *eternal measure* and immutable *relation of things*," or in other words as consisting "in a certain just disposition of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrong[b]."

§ 8. We conclude this head with observing, that Dr. HUTCHESON's definition is liable to some exception; as there may be room to question, what he means by the expression, "those who receive no advantage from the action:" if it be only *the generality of mankind*, it is evidently a vague, uncertain manner of speaking, and for that reason to be declined in so important a definition; but if he means *all rational beings*, then it will remain to be proved, that all these, or even the human species, do necessarily approve and love virtue in all its branches, and all that practise it[c].

LECT. LXI.

Definitions of Virtue; continued.

§ 1. *Sol. and Dem.* 4. MANY writers, both ancient and modern, have placed virtue in *the imitation of God:* and it must be

a HUTCHES. Inq. p. 143, 153.
b SHAFTESB. Char. vol. ii. p. 36, 40.
c BALG. Found. of Goodn. part i. p. 7—15, 20—22. TAYL. Exam. of Hutch. pass. PRICE, ib. p. 116—122.

allowed to be a very noble view of it. Now as it has already been proved. *Prop.* 44. that God is a being of perfect rectitude, it follows, that taking virtue on our definition, it will also be an imitation of God.—But on the whole, this definition did not seem preferable, for two reasons,

§ 2. (1.) Because it is difficult to prove the moral perfections of the divine being, otherwise than by the medium of an immutable difference in actions, the conformity to which shall be honourable, and the contrary dishonourable.

§ 3. (2.) Because, when virtue is said to be an imitation of God, great allowance must be made for the different nature and relations of that blessed being and ourselves: since there are some things, in which it would be impossible or impious for us to attempt to imitate him; and others, in which it is impossible that he should be an example to us; i. e. in all those branches of duty, which suppose either dependence, corporeity, or guilt. There is indeed in these branches of virtue, a *correspondence* between the nature of God and our temper and conduct, but that cannot in strict propriety be called a *resemblance*[a].

§ 4. 5. Others, and particularly Dr. CUMBERLAND, in his Law of Nature, have placed the whole of virtue, as in men, in the *love of God*, and *our fellow-creatures;* or to express it in his own words, "The foundation of all natural law is this, the greatest benevolence of every rational agent towards all, forms the happiest state of every and of all the benevolent, so far as it is in their power; and is necessarily requisite to the happiest state which they can attain, and therefore the common good is the supreme law."

§ 5. This is an amiable view of it, and well expresses that principle of gratitude and benevolence, from whence all true virtue in us must flow: but it nearly coincides with Dr. HUTCHESON's notion *Lect.* 60. § 4. and in a great measure with § 1. for to love God, is to regard him as the centre of happiness, whom therefore we must in all things study to resemble and to please: and thus it is an universal principle, of which the love of our neighbour is a very important branch: and when we are required to do to others, as we would have them do to us, the meaning is, that we must treat them as we could reasonably desire they should treat us, were they in our circumstances and we in theirs. So that here is a reference to the fitness of things according to present circumstances; which plainly shews that

a PLATO ap. HOWE's Blessedn. &c. Tit. Page. TILLOTS. vol. ii. p. 581. CONYB. against TYNDAL. p. 142—144. HOWE ib. p. 69—79. Ap. Op. vol. i. p. 471—475. EVANS's Christian Temp. vol. i. p. 29—66.

precept to be founded on the definition of virtue which we have advanced [a].

§ 6. 6. ARISTOTLE, and other ancient moralists have placed virtue in a *mediocrity;* supposing vice to consist in extremes. But it is evident, that merely from this definition none could know what virtue is; nor can it be determined what is an extreme, till we know what is agreeable to the nature of things: besides there are some branches of virtue, which cannot be carried to an extreme, v. g. resignation to the will of God, belief of his promises, &c [b].

§ 7. 7. Some have placed all virtue in a *wise regard to our own interest;* which seems to have been the opinion of Dr. WATERLAND, Mr. CLARKE of Hull, and Dr. RUTHERFORD. Concerning which it may be observed, that the question is not, whether virtue be always most for our interest; (*Vid. Lect.* 54. § 13.) nor whether there be any such thing in nature as disinterested benevolence; (which we shall afterwards examine, *Lect.* 65.) or whether, supposing there is, all virtue consists in it, so that our own interest should be disregarded; but whether a wise regard to it is the clearest, the most rational and amiable view of virtue in general; which, from what has been said above, evidently appears not to be the case [c]*.

§ 8. *Cor.* From a survey of all these it may appear, that the most considerable writers, whose notions we have examined in the five first steps, have differed from each other, more in expression, than in meaning, in the different views they have given of moral virtue.

a CUMBERL. Law of Nat. c. i. § 4.
HOBBES's Leviath. p. 140, sub fin.
EVANS's Christian Temper, vol. ii. p. 186—194.
b ARISTOT. Ethic. l. ii. c. vi.
GROT. de Jure Belli & Pacis. Prol. § 43—45.
Relig. of Nat. p. 24, 25.
c WATERL. Posth. Serm. vol. i. No. 3.
RUTHERF. Ess. on Mor. Virt. p. 153—167.
Mrs. COCKBURN's Works, vol. ii. p. 7—12.

* Other definitions of virtue, and accounts of the foundation of it, have been given since the lecture was written; Mr. HUME includes under his description of virture whatever is *agreeable* to ourselves and others, and whatever is *useful* to ourselves and others. Dr. ADAM SMITH refers it to the principle of *sympathy*. Mr. Archdeacon PALEY defines virtue to be, "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." About fifty years ago, Mr. JAMESON, a Scotch clergyman, published a treatise to shew, that the obligation of virtue is unitedly founded upon reason and fitness of things, the moral sense, and the will of God. K.

But the most elaborate, acute, and rational account of this interesting subject, is a Treatise by President EDWARDS, of New England, "On the Nature of True Virtue." W.

LECT. LXII.

Of the Degree of Virtue in any Action.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO estimate the degree of virtue in any given action.

§ 2. *Sol. and Dem.* 1. There can be no virtue at all in any action, if the agent by whom it is performed has not some idea of the moral fitness of things. *Vid. Lect.* 52. § 12.

§ 3. 2. There can be no virtue at all in it, if there be not an ultimate purpose of acting agreeably to that fitness, or from an end, which it is upon the whole virtuous to propose: for if the action be designed merely as a means of obtaining an end which it is vicious to desire and pursue, in that connection it participates of the meanness of the end, how excellent soever it might otherwise have been; and the nobler the motive is, *cæt. par.* the more virtuous is the action[a].

§ 4. 3. The action must on the whole be *chosen* by the agent, in order to its being virtue in him; otherwise it is not so properly his action, as the action of some other being, whose instrument or organ he at that time is. *Vid. Lect.* 2. § 7.

§ 5. 4. It is much debated, whether it be necessary that the being acting should have a *liberty of choice*, (*Lect.* 18. § 1.) i. e. be able to chuse otherwise. It must be owned, this does not follow from our definition of virtue: nevertheless it may be allowed, that the virtue of a being in a *state of probation* must be founded in a liberty of choice[b].

§ 6. 5. It cannot be necessary, that there should be in the general some degree of *affection* in every agent, to render his actions virtuous; for then the divine being, if he be free from affections and passions, would be incapable of virtue, contrary to *Lect.* 50. § 1. But when passions are wrought into the constitution of any being, as in us, it is indeed very desirable that they should concur with the volition; but if they do not, and a fit action is performed, without any passionate impressions at all, from a rational principle of gratitude to God and regard to the happiness of man, it is still a virtuous action[c]. *Vid. Lect.* 60. § 4.

a SCOTT's Christian Life, vol. i. c. iv. p. 251—258. PRICE on Mor. p. 320—332. Spect. vol. iii. No 215.

b BAIG. Dis. Rect. p. 26—28. HARTLEY on Man, prop. 14, 15. GROVE Div. Wisd. p. 61—63. PRICE, ib. p. 315—319.

c BAIG. Inq. part i. p. 57—60. PRICE, ib. p. 332—336.

§ 7. 6. Though the degree of virtue in any action is lessened by the degree in which it proceeds from a regard to any private advantage, distinct from virtue itself, (*Vid.* § 3.) yet if any be excited to virtuous actions, in hopes thereby of attaining to a state of complete virtue, the degree of virtue in such actions is not thereby lessened; but this is properly loving virtue for virtue's sake[a].

§ 8. 7. When the passions work in a powerful manner on the side of virtue, the force of virtue is in that case less seen, than when they work strongly against it, and a regard to the fitness of things surmounts them. Nevertheless, there may be as great virtue in a being, where there is no struggle at all, as where virtue triumphs over the most violent opposition; otherwise the deity would be incapable of virtue: nay there may be virtue, where the passions plead strongly on its side; otherwise a man would daily grow less capable of exalted degrees of virtue, as he gained a conquest over the irregularities of his passions, which is all most evidently absurd[b].

LECT. LXIII.

Of the Degree of Virtue in any Action; continued.

§ 1. *Cor.* 1. ON nearly the like principles, *(mutat. mutand.)* the degree of *vice* in any given action may be estimated. The matter is largely stated on both sides in HUTCHES. Inq. p. 150—168. HUTCHES. Syst. of Mor. Phil. l. ii. c. 1, 2. PRICE on Mor. p. 341—345.

§ 2. 2. It is impossible certainly to pronounce on the degree of moral good in any action, unless we exactly knew the heart of the agent, and also knew the whole of his circumstances and relations, so as to be able confidently to determine, what he could, and what he could not have known concerning the moral fitness, or unfitness of the thing in question. *Vid. Lect.* 52. § 12.

§ 3. 3. God alone can certainly and infallibly judge of the degree of virtue or vice in any given action: much more may this be affirmed concerning the whole of any *character*.

§ 4. *Schol.* 1. Dr. HUTCHESON has attempted to introduce mathematical calculations into these subjects of morality; of

a SHAFTESB. Char. vol. ii. p. 58—66.
BALG. Lett. to a Deist, No. i. p. 33—36.
BALG. Moral Goodn. part ii. p. 35—38.
FITZOSBORNE's Lett. No. 15.
PRICE, ib. p. 326—341.
b SHAFTESB. Char. vol. ii. p. 36—38.
NORRIS's Miscell. p. 49—51.
BALG. of Moral Goodn. part ii. p. 88, 89.

which it may not be improper to give a little specimen. It is to be observed, that he undertakes to shew the method of stating the importance of *a character*, rather than the degree of virtue in any *particular action*; and his rules are these. Let M signify the *moment*, or degree of *good* produced by the person, whose character is under consideration; B the *benevolence* of his temper, and A his *ability*: then $M=B\times A$, i. e. in a compound ratio of his benevolence and ability: when in any two beings their abilities are the same, M=B: when their benevolence is equal, M=A. On the other hand, it appears from the former view, that $B=\frac{M}{A}$ i. e. *directly* as the moment of good, and *inversly* as the ability.

When present *interest* lies *on the side* of virtue, if I express it, then $B=\frac{M-I}{A}$; but if it lies *against* virtue, then $B=\frac{M\times I.}{A}$ He adds, that it is the perfection of goodness, when M=A, for then the virtue of any two beings compared will be equal, i. e. : : 1 : 1 whatever their abilities are. This he supposes the *Stoics* meant, when they said, the virtue of a wise man was equal to that of the gods. Yet here by the way, they took it for granted, that a wise man had no regard at all to his own interest, otherwise the assertion on these principles would be false: and if the reasoning *Lect.* 56. § 4. be allowed, this canon cannot be applied to the divine being; since A expresses an infinite quantity, and M can only express a finite.

§ 5. To express the degree of *moral evil* in any character, let μ signify the *degree of evil* produced, and H *hatred* or ill-will; and the former canon *(mut. mutand.)* may be applied [a].

§ 6. 2. How right soever this may be in the general, yet when particular circumstances and characters come to be examined by it, it will be found of little use; since it is hardly possible to express by proportional numbers, the degree of benevolence, the degree of ability for virtuous actions, and the degree in which interest is apprehended and considered for or against them; which must all be exactly adjusted before the preceding canons can be applied [b].

a HUTCH. ib. p. 169—174, 177, 178.

b PRICE, ib. p. 349—368.

LECT. LXIV.

Of the Divine Virtues.

§ 1. *Def.* THOSE branches of virtue which more immediately respect God, are called DIVINE, those which respect our fellow-creatures, are called SOCIAL, and those which respect ourselves, HUMAN or PERSONAL VIRTUES.

§ 2. *Prop.* To inquire into the principal branches of divine virtue.

§ 3. *Sol. and Dem.* 1. It is fit we should often contemplate the divine being; since he appears by the foregoing propositions possessed of such illustrious perfections, as well deserve our most attentive thoughts; and since the knowledge of his nature must be of great use, to direct us in the methods of pleasing him, and securing our own happiness [a].

§ 4. 2. On account of those perfections, it is fit we should humbly adore him, as infinitely superior to all other beings; and that both our souls and bodies should concur in the expression of such adoration [b].

§ 5. 3. Forasmuch as God is the most amiable being, it is fit we should love him with all our heart; i. e. should think of him with the highest complacency and delight; and as he is our great benefactor, that we should cherish the most lively sentiments of gratitude towards him; and that, seeing he is the source of being and happiness, we should consider our own happiness as centred in him [c].

§ 6. 4. Forasmuch as God is the author and disposer of all events, it is fit we should observe, acknowledge, and consider his providential interposition in all the various occurrences of life [d].

§ 7. 5. In consequence of this his universal providence, in conjunction with his wisdom and goodness, it is fit, we should acquiesce in the determinations of his will, when most contrary to our present interest, or natural inclinations [e].

§ 8. 6. Considering on the one hand his power, and on the other his evident and experienced wisdom and goodness, it is fit,

a WRIGHT's Great Concern, p. 158—163. Ed. 1. p. 151—157.
SCOTT's Christian Life, vol. i. p. 85—90.
b WRIGHT ib. p. 182—185. Ed. 1. p. 174—177.
SCOTT ib. p. 91—96.
c WRIGHT ib. p. 200—205. Ed. 1. p. 194—198.
SCOTT ib. p. 96—105.
COLLIB. Inq. p. 11—17.
EVANS's Serm. vol. i. No. viii. p. 167—173.
ABERN. Serm. vol. ii. No. x.
d WRIGHT ib. p. 163—169. Ed. 1. p. 157—163
e WRIGHT ib. p. 196—199. Ed. 1. p. 189—194.
SCOTT ib. p. 115—126.

we should trust ourselves to his providential care, as to what is still before us[a].

§ 9. 7. Seeing all our happiness does entirely depend upon his favour, it is fit we should make it our highest care to please him, by complying with all the intimations of his will, and by imitating the moral perfections of his nature, so far as we are capable of such imitation; which, as was before observed, implies a regard to all the known branches of virtue: (*Lect.* 61. § 4.) nevertheless, when considered in this particular view, it is a branch of that duty which we immediately owe to God, and a regard to it should run through the whole of our lives; that even our minutest actions may as far as possible be dignified and sanctified by it[b].

§ 10. *Schol.* 1. See also on this subject the following writers, AMORY's Dial. on Devotion. FORDYCE's Mor Phil. l. ii. § 4. GROVE's Ethics, part ii. c. xix. PRICE ib. p. 240—249. HUTCHES. Syst. of Mor. Philos. l. i. c. 10. BUTLER's Serm. No. xiii, xiv. XENOPH. Mem. l. i. c. 4. l. iv. c. 3. BEATTIE's Elements of Moral Science, vol. ii. p. 78—95. PALEY's Principles of moral and political Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 29—109.

§ 11. 2. Faith in the divine declarations is also a branch of divine virtue; but cannot so properly be considered here, as we have not yet examined the evidence of the divine veracity: and we may add, that a diligent inquiry into whatever bears any striking and probable marks of a declaration from heaven, will be a natural consequence of that veneration for God, that love to him, and that care to please him, which were specified in § 4, 5, 9. as branches of divine virtue.

§ 12. *Cor.* 1. It is vicious to ascribe supreme divine honour to any other than God alone. *Vid. Lect.* 44. § 1.

§ 13. 2 It is also vicious to worship God by images, since it tends to sink our conceptions of him, § 4, 5[c].

§ 14. 3. The desire of foreknowing future contingencies, and all such astrological and magical arts, as some pursue in order to the discovery of them, are to be avoided; as not only tending to vex and disquiet the mind, but also, as in a degree inconsistent with the reverence, submission, and dependence, which we owe to the divine being[d].

a WRIGHT ib. p. 206—208. Ed. 1 p. 200, 201.
SCOTT ib. p. 126.—135.
ABERN. vol. ii. No. xi.
b WRIGHT ib. p. 192—195. Ed. 1 p. 185—189.
SCOTT ib. p. 105—115.
BURN. Serm. vol. ii. No. 13.
c LIMB. Theol. l. v. c. 33—36.
CRELLII Ethic. l. iii. c. 6. p. 329—330.
d HOWE's Works, vol. ii. p. 137—144.
TURRET. loc. v. quæst. 7. § 18.
FRID. Connect. vol. ii. p. 329—331.
MORE's Theol. Works, p. 240—255.
WELWOOD's Memoirs, p. 105—107.
HORACE, B. i Ode xi.
JENNING's Antiquities, vol i. p. 384.
LIMB. Theol. B. v. c. XXXV.

§ 15. 4. Great care should be taken, that our inquiries into the nature of the blessed God be made with a becoming reverence, and not in as loose and indifferent a manner, as if we were examining the properties of a mathematical figure, or a mechanical engine [a].

§ 16. 5. To blaspheme the name of God, i. e. to speak of him in a manner signifying contempt, or hatred, must be a most horrible degree of wickedness [b].

§ 17. 6. Forasmuch as our obligation to these branches of *divine virtue* is plainly founded on the nature of things, it is evident they give a very defective account of virtue, who confine it, (as the ancients generally did, and those who reject revelation often do,) to *sobriety*, and *benevolence:* and there is great reason to believe, that God as indispensably requires those regards to *himself* before described, as he does *social* virtue: for though on account of the infinite perfections of his nature he cannot require them for his own sake, i. e. to advance his own happiness, yet his love to rectitude and order on the one hand, and his regard to the truest happiness of his rational creatures on the other, must engage him absolutely to insist upon them [c].

LECT. LXV.

Of social Virtue—Benevolence.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO take a general survey of social virtue. *Lect.* 64. § 1.

§ 2. *Sol.* The universal rule here is, that virtue obliges us to avoid whatever would be grievous to any of our fellow-creatures, if it be not necessary to procure some greater good; and that we labour to promote the happiness of all about us to the utmost of our power.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. Our natures are so constituted, that we cannot but approve of kind and benevolent actions, and abhor those which are malevolent and cruel.

§ 4. 2. Every man, by an ill-natured conduct, must expose himself to the hatred and contempt of others.

a NIEUWENT. Rel. Phil. vol. i. Pref. § 24. BOYLE on Venerat. p. 1, 2.
b WITS. Ægyp. l. i. c. v. § 4. l. ii. c. xvi. § 1. BARROW'S Works, vol. i. p. 133—137.
c LELAND against Tind. vol. i. p. 236—243. Night Thoughts, No. 8. LEECHM. Serm. on the Duty of a Min. p. 36.—39. Glasg. Ed. PRICE on Mor. p. 249—254.

§ 5. 3. By an ill-natured conduct, a man would be exposed to the upbraidings of his own mind.

§ 6. 4. Mutual ill-offices naturally circulate; and it is exceeding probable, that they will at last come home to the man who allows himself in them [a].

§ 7. 5. God is good, and therefore a benevolent conduct is an imitation of him, and consequently a branch of virtue. *Lect.* 55. § 2. 64. § 9.

§ 8. 6. It is reasonable therefore, and consequently virtuous, to avoid doing what is grievous to others, and to do them all the good that we can, i. e. to be as benevolent as possible [b]. *2. E. D.*

§ 9. *Cor.* 1. Hence it appears, that the rule of loving our neighbour as ourselves, is a summary view of social virtue; which, at the same time that it gives the *rule*, suggests the *reason*, as it is most apparent, that our conduct is to be determined, not by considering who the person is, with regard to whom we act, but what the circumstances of his case are [c].

§ 10. 2. Since life is the foundation of happiness, virtue requires that we should not only forbear taking away the lives of our fellow-creatures, (unless when the good of the whole requires it,) but that we should be ready to preserve their lives, when we can do it without exposing our own, and in our own exposing the whole to damage, at least to the advantage that would arise from the preservation of the life or lives supposed to be secured at the expence of ours [d].

§ 11. 3. The law of universal benevolence extends also to *ourselves*; and consequently obliges us to take care to secure our own lives, and to furnish ourselves with the necessary supports of them, if it lie in our power, that we may not be burthensome to others. It also obliges us to act in such a manner, as to preserve our characters fair and untainted; for if they be damaged, our capacity of being useful to others will be proportionably impaired.

§ 12. 4. This law of universal benevolence extends itself even to the *brutes*, supposing them capable of sensation, and consequently of pleasure and pain. And though there should

a Lettres Persannes, vol. i. No. viii—xi.
b HUTCHES. Inq. Ess. ii. § 5. p. 195—222.
BEATTIE's Elem. vol. ii. p. 95—105.
PALEY's Princip. of Mor. and pol. Philos. p. 231—236. 241—259.
FOSTER's Disc. vol. ii. p. 8—12.
PRICE on Mor. p. 263—265.
Rel. of Nat. p. 128, 129.
PUFFEND. de Off. l. i. c. viii. § 1—6.
GROVE's Mor. Phil. vol. ii. § 3. c. 18.
POPE's Ess. on Man, No. 3.
c Rel. of Nat. p. 41.
EVANS's Christian Temper, vol. ii. p. 168—176.
BUTL. Serm. No. xi, xii.
d CIC. de Offic. l. iii. c. xxiii. p. 167. Tooi. Ed.

be reason to suspect, that the arguments, *Lect.* 3. are not conclusive, yet since it is difficult, if not impossible, certainly to prove, that they are mere machines, a virtuous man would be cautious how he abuses them, (especially since they are generally supposed to have sensation,) lest by any degree of cruelty towards them, an habit of cruelty might be contracted or encouraged: nevertheless, as they are capable of but small degrees of happiness in comparison with man, it is fit that their interests should give way to that of the human species, whenever in any considerable article they come in competition with each other[a].

§ 13. *Schol.* As we here dismiss the consideration of benevolence in general, and proceed to particular branches and effects of it; this seems to be the proper place to touch upon the celebrated question, whether, and how far benevolence is to be conceived as *disinterested**. With respect to which, the following remarks seem just and rational.

§ 14. 1. That every man cannot but desire his own happiness, whenever he thinks of it.

§ 15. 2. That this happiness will be more effectually obtained, by a due regard to the public, than by seeking a separate interest; as appears by principles laid down above.

§ 16. 3. That when the connection of self-advantage with benevolent actions is thought of, it seems impossible that it should not also be intended and considered: § 14. and the principle of universal benevolence, instead of forbidding, will require that some regard should be paid to it, in such a circumstance.

§ 17. 4. That it would be very mean and ungenerous, if it were possible, to seek the happiness of the public, without any affection to it, but merely as an instrument of private good.

a PUFF. Law of Nat. i. iv. c. iii. § 6.
HALE's Contemp. vol. i. p. 293—295.
Guard. vol. i. No. 61.
FOST. Serm. vol. i. No. iii 4.

* The true character of benevolence, as of real virtue, is to be estimated according to its *object*; and the proper object of both is *universal being*; but the exercise of benevolence without *any* consideration of *self*, is impossible, because ourselves are a part of that whole which constitutes the universality of being. Therefore benevolence cannot be absolutely *disinterested*. It should be observed, however, that in the scale of universal being GOD is *almost* the sum total. Hence another question, nearly allied to the last, is more easily answered: Whether God or ourselves should be *most* loved? Every good man, as he ought, loves God more, much more, than himself; every bad man loves himself more than God, *habitually*: Here lies the great apostacy. W.

† The obligation of mercy to brute animals has been elaborately considered by Dr. HUMPHREY PRIMATT, in an express treatise on the subject. K.

§ 18. 5. That when a man feels the highest pleasure in doing good to the public, and even sacrificing his own separate interest to it, he must certainly have a real love for it, which may with some considerable propriety be called disinterested, if it be not so in the highest possible sense.

§ 19. 6. That as the happiness of *one* is of little importance, when compared with the happiness of *all*, it seems reasonable, that so far as it is regarded, it should not be made the chief end of actions profitable to the public, nor considered in any other view, than as subordinate to the good of the community, of which each is but one.

§ 20. 7. That the benevolent affections may be so strong, as to prevent any reflection upon the present pleasure, and much more the future advantage of a benevolent action to ourselves.

§ 21. 8. That the mind is so formed, as to reflect with great pleasure and delight on characters and actions, the consideration of which does not immediately affect our own personal interest; and to say, that our complacency in them arises from an apprehension, that the prevalency of such a temper in us would be advantageous to ourselves, seems asserting an evident falshood [a].

LECT. LXVI.

Whether Brutes may be slain for Food.

§ 1. IT is consistent with benevolence, and therefore with virtue, that brute animals should be slain for the food of men.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. If animal food be used with moderation, it seems that hereby the happiness of mankind is promoted: this more generous kind of food may afford brisker spirits than a vegetable diet used alone; at least, it seems that those who have from their infancy been accustomed to eat flesh, would be exposed to considerable trouble and inconvenience if not to distempers, by entirely leaving it off.

§ 3. 2. The happiness of the brutes is not on the whole diminished but rather promoted by this means: for a violent

a HUTCHES on Pass. p. 13—26. Inq. p. 160—162. Elem. of Crit. vol. i. p. 44—48. HUTCHES. Syst. i. 3. pass. | PRICE ib. p. 126—129. WESLEY's Lett. to the Bishop of Glo. p. 37.

death does not seem to be near so painful as a natural death, coming upon them by the slow advances of a disease: their life, though it be shortened, yet is not embittered with fear and expectation of death, of which they seem not capable: to which we may add, that out of regard to our own advantage, we take care to feed and defend them, which renders their lives much happier than they would otherwise be; whereas, were they not to be used for food, we must either destroy them without eating their carcases, to prevent their multiplying too fast upon us, or they would destroy each other, consume the vegetable creation, and perhaps grow dangerous to us for want of sufficient food.

§ 4. 3. It is also to be remembered, that where the custom of eating flesh has long prevailed, it ought not to be laid aside without great and important reasons; considering what great numbers of mankind are subsisted by keeping cattle, and trafficing in them alive or dead.

§ 5. *Schol.* 1. Whereas some have objected, that it is an invasion of the rights of God, as the great Lord of life, to make such havoc of the lives of brute-animals, it may be answered.

§ 6. (1.) That by appointing it in the course of his providence, that they should multiply so fast, God has made it necessary that many of them should be slain, from whence we may reasonably argue, that he allows us to kill them for food.

§ 7. (2.) That in the various classes of animals, it seems that the greater are generally supported by eating the less: not to say, (what yet some have urged,) that the teeth and stomachs of men are so formed, as to intimate that they were intended to feed upon flesh.

§ 8. (3.) The agreeable variety of tastes, which God has given to the flesh of many birds, beasts and fishes, is a further presumption that he designed them for our food, and consequently meant to give us a liberty of taking away their lives.

§ 9. (4.) Most vegetables, when they come to be examined by microscopes, swarm with multitudes of small animals, which live in and upon them; so that a man, who should scruple destroying animals, would hardly be able to find a subsistence, at least not without resigning some of the finest vegetables, and so frustrating the kind purpose of Providence in creating them[a].

a REYNOLDS's Lett. to a Deist, No. i. præs. p. 4—61.
THOMSON's Spring, ver. 336—378.
——— Autumn, ver. 1089—1124.
OVID's Met. l. xv. ver. 50—152.
HUTCHES. 2. vi. 4.
CHEYNE on Regim. p. 53—63. Disc. i.
PUFF. Law of Nat. l. iv. c. iii. § 4, 5.
Nat. Disp. part i. p. 44—49.
FITZOSBORNE's Lett. No. viii.
CLARKE's Orig. of Evil, p. 266—295.
GROVE's Mor. Phil. vol. ii. p. 385—387.

§ 10. 2. Nevertheless care should be taken, not to add any unnecessary circumstances of terror and pain to their death, nor should we accustom ourselves to sport with their lives[a].

§ 11. 3. Some have objected, that several of the arguments used in the proposition extend not to *fish*. But it is answered, that if a right of killing terrestial animals for food be established, there seems little reason for scrupling to use fish in the like manner; it seems a part of the scheme agreeable to the rest: and the instinct, which brings them in shoals at certain times to the shore, seems an intimation that they are intended for human use.

§ 12. 4. It seems an instance of the goodness of the divine being, that he has in the course of his providence appointed the greater part of animals to die by some sudden violence, rather than by a lingering decay, in which on the whole they would suffer a great deal more, than they can do in the few painful moments which generally attend their death, when slain by men, or when devoured by each other, in which perhaps surprise and astonishment take off much of the sense of pain *.

LECT. LXVII.

Concerning Things in a State of Nature—the division of Property.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO enquire how the parts and fruits of the earth ought to be distributed for the use of its inhabitants, before any mutual agreement is made between them, i. e. considering things in a *state of nature.*

§ 2. *Sol.* 1. If there be enough of each, every one may take what he first lights on.

§ 3. 2. When he has thus taken it, another person ought not to seize upon it without his leave, but should rather take some other part not so occupied.

§ 4. 3. Nevertheless, if there be not enough for each, he who has possessed himself of more than is necessary for his own

a DODD. on Educ. p. 22, 23. Adventurer, No. 5, 37. | DELANY on Rel. Dut. p. 92. THOMSON's Autumn, line 360—482.

* Mr. HOLWELL and Mr. OSWALD, both of whom have resided in the East Indies, have embraced the principles of the Hindoos, and written against the use of animal food; Mr. OSWALD in a distinct treatise, very lately published. K.

subsistence, ought to impart some of it to him who is not capable of thus providing for himself. *Vid. Lect.* 65.

§ 5. 4. If necessary supplies be denied to a person incapable of providing otherwise for himself, he may seize on the possessions of another; nevertheless with this proviso, that no one shall be destroyed by such a seizure, whose life is of more importance to the whole community than that of the person who makes the seizure. *Vid. Lect.* 65. § 10.

§ 6. 5. Nevertheless, it is not requisite that an equal distribution should be made; since on the one hand, each has in common cases a right to the fruits of his own industry, on the principles laid down above, § 2, 3. and on the other, it is for the good of society in general, that some should be richer than the rest, seeing there are many civil offices to be performed in life, which might become matter of dangerous debate, if some persons were not by the straitness of their circumstances induced voluntarily to perform them.

§ 7. *Dem.* The demonstration appears from *Lect.* 65. § 2, 10. for it is evident, that these rules will promote the happiness of mankind in general[a].

§ 8. *Schol.* 1. It seems that *usury* is not in general to be condemned, provided it be no more than is proportionable to that gain which the person borrowing receives from the loan; especially among men, who subsist not merely by agriculture and grazing and manual arts, but by trade or merchandize; since it is evident that among such, the money might turn to better account to the owners, than in the former case; and consequently the owners would have a just claim to some equivalent, for the advantage they forego in favour of the borrower. Nevertheless, in exacting this, virtue requires a compassionate regard to any calamitous circumstances, which may render the borrower incapable of paying interest, or perhaps the principle[b].

§ 9. 2. Many things continue yet common, and are not become the property of any, there being enough to suffice all; some of them not being capable of occupation by one person alone, and others such that the property of them would not

a LOCKE on Gov. l. ii. c. v.
GROT. de Jure Belli & Pac. l. ii. c. ii. § 2.
MORE's Utopia, p. 78—98.
GROVE's Mor. Phil. vol. ii. p. 88—92.

b PUFF. Law of Nat. l. v. c. vii. § 8—12.
GROVE's Eth. vol. ii. p. 407. 408.
GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. xii. § 21*.

* Mr. BENTHAM has lately published a curious Essay on Usury, in which the English laws upon this subject are examined, and the wisdom and propriety of them freely discussed. K.

be useful to any, v. g. wild beasts and birds, air, insects, sea-water. Whether the *sea* can come into property, has been warmly disputed: GROTIUS denies it in his Mare Liberum, and SELDEN asserts it in his Mare Clausum: but it would be tedious and unnecessary to give a view of their arguments here[a].

§ 10. 3. Property in any degree ceases, when the thing is abandoned by the former possessor: and the security of mankind seems to require, that when any thing has been long in the possession of a person, family, or nation, it should continue with them, if for a considerable time the original possessor has entered no claim upon it. Perhaps hereby that former possessor may suffer some damage; yet there would be so much room for fraud and litigation, were antiquated claims often to be revived, that on the whole, they would undoubtedly occasion greater trouble than advantage to mankind; and it is impossible to lay down any general rules, which would not in some instances bear hard on the innocent and virtuous[b].

§ 11. 4. Perhaps upon these principles, that kind of theft, which was permitted by the *Spartan* law, might be justified; as by making such a law, the proprietors seemed voluntarily to have relinquished their property to those who could seize it in such circumstances: but how far it was on the whole prudent to do it, is difficult to determine, without stating the matter more largely than would be convenient here[c].

LECT. LXVIII.

Of Logical and Ethical Truth.

§ 1. *Def.* THAT verbal proposition is said to be ETHICALLY TRUE, in which we join those relations, attributes, or properties, which *seem to us* to belong to any idea, and separate those, which *seem to us* not to belong to it; but it is then LOGICALLY TRUE, when we join those that *do really* agree, and separate those which *do not*.

a GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. ii. § 3—5.
HUTCHES. Syst. 2. vii. 5.
PUFF. ib. l. iv. c. v. § 5—10.

b GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. iv. § 3—9.
PUFF. ib. l. iv. c. xii. § 8.
c ROLLIN's Man. vol. iii. p. 340—347*.

* The doctrine of property is particularly considered by Archdeacon PALEY in his "Moral and Political Philosophy," book iii. chap. i. vol. i. p. 105—122. Seventh Edition. K.

§ 2. 1. A proposition *logically* true, may be *ethically* false, and *vice versâ*.

§ 3. 2. Propositions directly contrary to each other, in the mouths of different persons, may both be ethically, though not logically true.

§ 4. *Schol.* Ethical truth is sometimes divided into *veracity*, i. e. a conformity of our words to our thoughts, and *faithfulness*, i. e. a conformity of our actions to our words: the last seems to be limited to words expressing a purpose of doing *good* to another.

§ 5. *Def.* That proposition, in which we culpably violate ethical truth, is said to be A LIE [a].

§ 6. *Prop.* Virtue requires that ethical truth should be preserved among men in their discourses with each other.

§ 7. *Dem.* 1. Speech may be useful in spreading the knowledge of those things, which may advance the happiness of mankind.

§ 8 2. In order to render it thus useful, it is necessary that a person should be believed.

§ 9. 3. If ethical truth be not regarded, the person speaking cannot be believed.

§ 10. 4. The violation of ethical truth has generally been regarded as infamous, and persons who allow themselves in it, do thereby necessarily subject themselves to great contempt, and so greatly impair both their comfort and usefulness [b]. *Valet propositio.*

§ 11. *Cor.* 1. It is injurious to virtue, to allow ourselves to abuse the ambiguity of words, in such a manner as thereby to lead others into a mistake, since most of the ill consequences which follow from direct lying, do also follow from such equivocations and mental reservations [c].

§ 12. 2. Virtue forbids our deceiving others by *actions*, as well as by words; since the reasoning of the proposition does not depend upon making use of articulate sounds, or written characters, but upon any method taken to communicate our ideas to each other [d].

§ 13. *Schol.* 1. To this some have added a further argu-

a PUFF. ib. l. iv. c. i. § 8.
b PUFF. ib. § 7, 10.
WATTS's Serm. vol. ii. p. 168—170.
PALEY's Princip. vol. i. p. 184—189. Ed. 7.
PRICE on Mor. p. 266—270.
HIGHMORE's Ess. vol. i. p. 1—10.
GROT. de Jure, l. iii. c. i. § 11.
GROVE's Eth. vol. ii. part ii. c. xi.
c PUFF. ib. § 13, 14.
GROT. ib. § 10.
BURNET's Ess. on Queen MARY, p. 63, 64.
HUTCHES. Syst. 2. x. 4.
d PUFF. ib. § 2.

ment, taken from the *nature* of ethical truth, which, separate from all its *effects*, seems to imply something in it so sacred, that a violation of it is dishonourable and contemptible, and therefore vicious, though no damage should arise to ourselves or others from such a violation; especially considering, that God is the witness of every falshood, and consequently it is a kind of indignity offered to him, to utter any thing in his presence which he knows to be contrary to our own knowledge. This some have expressed by saying, God has given us *a sense*, by which we unavoidably delight in the truth, nor is it in our own power so far to reconcile ourselves to falshood, as to approve of a scheme, in which any given degree of happiness should be produced by falshood, so well as one, in which it should be produced by truth[a].

§ 14. 2. From hence arises a question of considerable difficulty and importance; whether it may be in any case lawful to speak what is ethically false.

Those who maintain the principles of the former scholium must deny it: but those who place the obligation to ethical truth merely on the principles laid down in the proposition, affirm, that if in any case, the happiness of mankind may be more effectually promoted by falshood than truth, in that case, falshood ceases to be a vice and becomes a virtue; and they suppose that many such cases actually occur; and that on these principles, it is lawful to use falshood in our discourses with persons that are distracted, with infants and sick men, with a melancholy man, and those who enquire after the truth, with a design of doing that injury by the knowledge of it, which without it they would not have been able to effect.

§ 15. This must be acknowledged a controversy of very great difficulty. Perhaps it is not possible for any human or finite understanding to determine, whether the universal observation of truth would be more for the advantage of the rational creation, than the violation of it in some imaginable particulars: but as it is certain that the generality of mankind are too prone to artifice and deceit, and would be ready to abuse the doctrine of the innocence of falshood in any case, we should be very cautious of maintaining it; and an honest, generous, and religious man, if he errs at all, would rather chuse to err on the side of truth *. And perhaps a regard expressed to it, even in

a BALG. Law of Truth, p. 4—12. | BUTLER's Anal. p. 316—318. 4to Ed.

* Our author seems to make "the advantage of the rational creation" too

circumstances, where it could not be maintained, without great danger and seeming ill consequences to ourselves, might make such impressions on the minds of very bad men, as might prove of service to the cause of virtue and the happiness of mankind; especially considering the unlimited power which God has over all the thoughts of men's hearts, and all the circumstances and occurrences of their lives: and it will be seen, when we come to enquire into the evidence of the divine veracity, that this attribute of the deity is incapable of being proved, if the opinion which we are here opposing be admitted. To all which we may add, that the supposed lawfulness of speaking falsely in great emergencies for the preservation of life, might also be extremely mischievous to mankind, by depriving them of all instances of martyrdom for religion; and is indeed a maxim so dangerous to human society, that it seems, that a wise and benevolent man, who firmly believes it, would on his own principles teach the contrary. And after all, if the principle itself were granted, yet many of the instances mentioned above, seem of too trivial a nature, to justify having recourse to a falsehood; and in particular, nothing can be more dangerous to children, than to be taught to lie, by the example of their parents and governors [a].

§ 16. 3. Nevertheless, allowance is to be made for the change which custom may have introduced into the signification of words, which has brought some expressions of complaisance and kindness, in most civilized nations, to so loose an import, that a man has no room to imagine, they will be interpreted rigorously, according to their utmost literal extent, and therefore need not be scrupulous about the use of them; v. g. as if he could not say, "he was at a friend's service," unless he intended thereby to make himself *a slave* [b].

a PUFF. ib. § 9, 10, 15, 16, 18.
BARBEYRAC's Notes, ib. l. iv. c. i. § 7.
GROT. ib. l. iii. c. i. § 12—14.
SAURIN's Disc. vol. i. p. 306—308. vol. iv. p. 322—346.
WATTS's Serm. vol. ii. App. p. 207—219.
Rel. of Nat. p. 29, 30.
CAMBR. Telemach. l. iii. p. 57—59.
HIGHMORE's Ess. vol. i. p. 10—36.
GROVE's Eth. vol. ii. par. ii. c. ii. § 5—11.
HUTCHES. Syst. 2. xvii. 5—9.

b PUFF. de Jure, l. iv. c. i. § 6.
Spect. vol. viii. No. 557.
HUTCHES. 2. x. 4.
COLLIER's Ess. vol. iv. No. 4.
TILLOTS. vol. ii. p. 5, 6.
HIGHMORE's ib. p. 37—68.

much the standard of right and wrong, instead of universal justice, irrespective of consequences. W.

LECT. LXIX.

Of Promises and Covenants.

§ 1. *Def.* A PROMISE is any speech, or other sign, by which we signify to another person a present determinate purpose of transferring to him a part of our property or liberty, which nevertheless he is not actually to possess, till after some time.

§ 2. *Def. A mutual promise*, or agreement of two or more persons with each other, may be called A COVENANT, whether the performance of one of the parties be, or be not the condition of obliging the other: but it is in the former case, called a *conditional covenant.*

§ 3. *Cor.* There is some foundation for distinguishing between *conditional promises*, and *pacts* or *covenants*; not only, as each party in a covenant may be absolutely bound to the performance of his part, without waiting to see whether the other will perform his, but also, as there may be a *conditional* promise, which is not *mutual*, whereas every covenant must necessarily be mutual[a].

§ 4. *Prop.* Virtue requires that promises be fulfilled.

§ 5. *Dem.* 1. Ethical truth, and therefore virtue requires, that when I declare a fixed purpose of giving or doing any thing, I should really intend it. *Lect.* 68. § 6.

§ 6. 2. The promisee, i. e. the person to whom the promise is made, acquires a property in virtue of the promise. § 1.

§ 7. 3. The uncertainty of property would evidently be attended with great inconvenience.

§ 8. 4. By failing to fulfil my promise, I either shew, that I was not sincere in making it, or that I have little constancy or resolution, and either way injure my character, and consequently my usefulness in life. Therefore,

§ 9. 5. Virtue requires that promises should be fulfilled[b].

§ 10. *Schol.* 1. A man is not bound by a naked *assertion*, as he is by a promise; nevertheless, when he makes such an assertion, he ought to intend to act according to it, (*Lect.* 68. § 6.) and when publicly made he should not lightly change it,

a PUFF. de Jure, l. iii. c. viii. § 8. | PRICE on Mor. p. 270—273.
b WATTS's Serm. vol. ii. p. 146. | GROVE's Ethics, vol. ii. part ii. c. xii.

lest his character for wisdom and resolution should thereby suffer[a].

§ 11. 2. Nevertheless there are some excepted cases, in which virtue does not oblige us to fulfil our promises, because the reasons mentioned in the proposition do not extend to them, v. g.

(1.) If a promise was made by us, before we came to such exercise of reason, as to be fit to transact affairs of moment; or if by any distemper, or sudden surprise, we are deprived of the exercise of our reason, at the time when the promise is made[b].

§ 12. (2.) If the promise made was on a false presumption, in which the promiser, after the most diligent enquiry, was imposed upon, especially if he were deceived by the fraud of the promisee[c].

§ 13. (3.) If the thing itself be vicious; for virtue cannot require that vice should be committed.—Under this head, we may rank the giving a reward for an evil action[d].

§ 14. (4.) If the accomplishment of the promise be so hard and intolerable, that there is reason to believe, that had it been foreseen, it would have been an excepted case[e].

§ 15. If the promise be not accepted, or if it depend on conditions not performed, the non-performance of the promise is so evidently justifiable, that it seems hardly worth while to insert this among the catalogue of excepted cases[f] *.

LECT. LXX.

Of Oaths, Vows, Perjury, and Subscriptions to Articles of Religion.

§ 1. *Def.* AN OATH is a solemn appeal to God, as the witness of the truth of some facts asserted, or of our sincere resolution to perform some promise made, renouncing our claim

a GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. xi. § 2—4.
PUFF. ib. l. iii. c. v. § 5—7.
b LOCKE of Educ. p. 192—195.
PUFF. ib. l. iii. c. vi. § 5.
GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. xi. § 5—7.
c GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. xi. § 6. l. iii. c. xiii. § 4.
PUFF. ib. l. iii. c. vi. § 6—8.
d PUFF. ib. l. iii. c. vii. § 6, 7.
GROT. ib. l. ii. c. xi. § 8.
PUFF. ib. l. iii. c. vii. § 8.
e GROT. ib. l. ii. c. xvi. § 27.
CICERO de Offic. l. i. c. x.
f GROT. ib. l. ii. c. xi. § 14, 15. ib. l. iii. c. xix. § 14.
HUTCHES. Syst. 2. ix.

* The whole subject of *promises*; from whence the obligation to perform them arises; in what sense they are to be interpreted; and in what case they are not binding, is considered by Mr. PALEY. Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, vol. i. p. 123—141. Seventh Edition. K.

to the divine favour, or imprecating his displeasure upon ourselves either implicitly or explicitly, in case of falshood.

§ 2. *Cor.* It is vicious to swear by any creature, since that is in effect ascribing to such a creature a degree of knowledge and power, which seems peculiar to God. Nevertheless, if without the express mention of the name of God, there be a secret appeal to him, in that case we swear by him ultimately, and not so much by the creature we mention, v. g. if I swear by my head, or my child, meaning thereby, "may the divine vengeance fall on my head or my child, if I swear falsely[a]."

§ 3. *Schol. A vow* is a promise made to God: if any express or implicit imprecation attend it, it is evidently *an oath:* but as vows are made with different degrees of solemnity, some of them may, and some of them may not be oaths. Yet as an address to God is made by them, they necessarily approach nearer to an oath than a promise made to our fellow-creatures[b]*.

§ 4. *Def.* PERJURY is the use of an oath in confirmation of an assertion, known, apprehended, or suspected to be false; or the wilful violation of a promise, which by an oath we had bound to ourselves to perform.

§ 5. *Cor.* As when a person swears that a thing is so and so, he is in all reason to be understood to assert, that he certainly knows that it is so: the guilt of perjury may be contracted, even where a man believes a thing is as he asserts, if he has not a competent and determinate knowledge of the thing.

§ 6. *Prop.* Perjury is a very heinous crime.

§ 7. *Dem.* 1. It is plainly inconsistent with the reverence due to the divine being; as it implies, either that we do not believe his omniscience, or fear his displeasure, either of which is contrary to *Lect.* 65. § 1, &c.

§ 8. 2. Mankind have in all ages professed some peculiar reverence for an oath, so that it has been used to determine controversies, and seal the most solemn mutual engagements.

§ 9. 3. Faith among men would be still more injured by perjury, than by a false assertion, or promise uttered without an

[a] PUFF. de Jure, l. iv. c. xii. § 11.
PUFF. de Offic. Hom. l. i. c. xi. § 3.
HUTCHES. Syst. 2. xi. 2.

PUFF. de Jure, l. iv. c. ii. § 3.
PALEY'S Philos. vol. i. p. 190—197.
[b] PALEY'S Philos. vol. i. p. 141.

* On the subject of this lecture and the preceding one, see Bishop SANDERSON "*De Juramenti Promissorii Obligatione*"—And his "Casus de Voto Temerario."

oath; since therefore these have been shewn to be detrimental to mankind, (*Lect.* 68. § 6. *Lect.* 69. § 4.) this must be yet more so.

§ 10. 4. Perjury has always been esteemed a very detestable thing, and those who have been proved guilty of it have been looked upon as the pests of society.

§ 11. 5. Perjury, being thus dishonourable to God, injurious to others, and to ourselves, is a great crime[a]. *2. E. D.*

§ 12. *Cor.* 1. Care should be taken, that we do not impair the reverence due to an oath, by using or imposing oaths upon trifling occasions, or administering them in a careless manner[b].

§ 13. 2. The reverence of an oath requires, that we take peculiar care to avoid ambiguous expressions in it, and all equivocation and mental reservation[c]. *Vid. Prop.* 54. *Cor.* 1.

§ 14. *Schol.* 1. Something of this kind may be said of *subscription to articles of religion*, these being looked upon as solemn actions, and nearly approaching to an oath. Great care ought to be taken, that we subscribe nothing that we do not firmly believe. If the signification of the words be dubious, and we believe either sense, and that sense in which we do believe them is as natural as the other, we may consistently with integrity subscribe them: or if the sense in which we believe them be less natural, and we explain that sense, and that explication be admitted by the person requiring the subscription in his own right, there can be no just foundation for a scruple. Some have added, that if we have reason to believe (though it is not expressly declared) that he who imposes the subscription, does not intend that we should hereby declare our *assent* to those articles, but only that we should pay a compliment to his authority, and engage ourselves not openly to contradict them, we may in this case subscribe what is most directly contrary to our belief: or that if we declare our belief in any book, as for instance, the bible, it is to be supposed that we subscribe other articles, only so far as they are consistent with that; because we cannot imagine, that the law would require us to profess our belief of contrary propositions at the same time. But subscription upon these principles seems a very dangerous attack upon sincerity

a Occas. Paper. vol. i. No. vii. p. 5—12.
PUFF. de Jure, l. iv. c. ii. § 2.
BARROW's Works, vol. i. Serm. xv.
PALEY's Philos. vol. 1, p. 197, 199.
b Occas. Paper, ib. p. 22—24.
WHISTON's Memoirs, vol. i, p. 411—413.
HUTCHES. ib. 2, xi. 1.
c GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. xiii. § 3.
PUFF. de Jure, l. iv. c. ii. § 12—15.
TULLY de Offic. l. i. § 13.

and public virtue, especially in those designed for public offices[a] *.

§ 15. 2. If we have bound ourselves by an oath to do a thing detrimental to our interest, we ought to submit to great inconveniences rather than violate it: but if the nature of the oath be absolutely and evidently unlawful, we are not bound by it: and it is certain, that in some of the cases mentioned above, in which virtue allows the violation of promises, it may also permit our acting contrary to our oaths; with this proviso, that in proportion to the greater solemnity of the latter, the case should be more weighty and urgent[b].

§ 16. 3. If a conditional covenant, (*Lect.* 69, § 1.) be mutually confirmed by an oath, the breach of the condition on one side evidently dissolves the other party from his obligation; which by the way justifies the *revolution* in *England* in 1688, though many of the persons principally concerned had sworn allegiance to King *James*[c].

§ 17. 4. GROTIUS is mistaken, if he maintains, (as some have asserted he does,) that by an oath we always promise something to God, and that for this reason an oath must in no case be violated. It appears from the definition of an oath, that the former of these propositions is false, and from the second scholium, that if it were true, the inference drawn from it would be inconclusive: but the following passage, which some have quoted to prove this to be his opinion, is far from containing it[d].

LECT. LXXI.

Of Marriage.

§ 1. *Def.* MARRIAGE is a covenant between man and woman, in which they mutually promise cohabitation, and a continual care to promote the comfort and happiness of each other.

a BURN. on the Art. p. 6—9.
CLARKE on the Trinity, Introd. Ed. 1. p. 20—26. Ed. 4. p. 25—29.
COLLECTOR'S Serm. on Subscript. p. 24—31.
Confessional, passim.

b GROT. ib. l. ii. c. xiii. § 4.
BAXT. Works, vol. i. p. 572.
PUFF. de Jure, l. iv. c. ii. § 9. 10.
HUTCHES. Syst. 2. xi. 3, 4.
c Occas. Paper, vol. i. No. vii. p. 12—16.
d GROT. de Jure, l. ii, c. xiii. § 14, 15.

* The question concerning *subscription* to articles of religion has of late years received the most ample discussion. It would be almost endless to enumerate the various tracts that have appeared on the subject. The controversy was revived by the publication of the "Confessional," and carried on to still greater extent, by the distinct applications of a body of the clergy, and of the protestant dissenting ministers, for relief in the matter of subscription. K.

§ 2. *Prop.* Virtue requires that mankind should only be propagated by marriage.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. A more endearing friendship, and consequently a greater pleasure arises from continued cohabitation, than could arise from the promiscuous use of women; where there could be little room for a tender, generous and faithful friendship between the sexes.

§ 4. 2. The promiscuous use of women would naturally produce a great deal of jealousy, bitter mutual contentions, and a variety of other passions, from which marriage when preserved inviolate, very much secures.

§ 5. 3. Experience teaches that a promiscuous commerce between the sexes is very unfavourable to propagation, at least for producing a healthful offspring; and would prove the means of spreading to a fatal degree the venereal infection.

§ 6. 4. The weakness and disorders, to which women are subject during pregnancy, require, that both out of regard to them and the future race of mankind, they should be tenderly taken care of; and that during their confinement they should be comfortably maintained: now there is none, from whom these offices of friendship can be so reasonably expected, as from the person who apprehends himself the father of the child; but without marriage, no man could ordinarily have the security of being so.

§ 7. 5. The education of children is much better provided for by this means, both with respect to maintenance, instruction and government, while each knows his own, and the care and authority of both parents concur in the work; to which that of the father is generally on the whole of the greatest importance.

§ 8. 6. The regular descent of patrimony, being the consequence of fathers knowing their children, is better provided for by marriage, than it could be without it; which by the way is a great encouragement to industry and frugality.

§ 9. 7. The happiness both of men and women, and of the rising generation, is on the whole more effectually secured by marriage, than it would be by the promiscuous use of women; therefore mankind ought only to be propagated this way[a]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 10. *Cor.* 1. Those unnatural lusts, commonly known by

[a] PUFF. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 5.
WITS. Ægypt. l. ii. c. vi. § 13—15.
BAXT. Works, vol. i. p. 314. A. vol. ii. p. 31. B.
OSTERVALD of Circumcis. § 1. c. i. p. 1—10.
FORDYCE's Moral Phil. l. ii. § 3. c. ii.
MILT. Parad. Lost, l. iv. ver. 750—770.
GROVE's Eth. vol. ii. p. 470—472.
HUTCHES. Syst. § 1, 2, 3. v. 2, p. 150—155.

the name of bestiality and sodomy, are to be greatly detested, not only as actions, whereby the dignity of human nature is in the most infamous degree debased, but also as alienating the mind from marriage, which is so important a band of society[a].

§ 11. 2. Those who seduce single women to violate their chastity, are guilty of a very great crime; as thereby they discountenance marriage, and bring on persons so debauched, and the families to whom they are related, great calamity and indelible infamy[b].

§ 12. 3. All those things, which tend to cherish wandering lusts, are for that reason to be avoided, as lascivious actions, and unclean words, which generally lead on by a strong impulse to greater irregularities[c].

§ 13. 4. Since marriage is of so great importance to the happiness of mankind, it is plain that it ought not to be dissolved upon any trifling consideration; since uncertain marriages would be attended with many of the same inconveniences, as the promiscuous use of women, and would differ from it little more than in name[d].

LECT. LXXII.

Of the Duties of the Married State.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO enumerate the principal duties of the married state.

§ 2. *Sol.* 1. Virtue requires that both parties preserve their fidelity to each other inviolate.

§ 3. 2. They should study in every instance to promote each other's comfort and happiness.

§ 4. 3. They are to contribute their respective parts towards the maintenance and education of their children[e].

§ 5. *Dem.* The obligation to perform these several duties arises from the nature of the engagements into which the parties have entered; (*Def.* 48.) and from the tendency which such a

a Hutches. ib. p. 175.
b Guardian, vol. ii. No. 123.
Grove, ib. p. 480—482.
Hutches. ib. § 5.
Guardian, vol. i. No 17.
c Spect. vol. iv. No. 286.
Ostery. of Unclean. Pref. p. 16. ib. § 1. c. vii. p. 60—74.
Hutches. vol. ii. p. 42, 43.
Evans's Serm. vol. ii.
d Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. 1. § 20.
Hutches. ib. § 6.
e Delany on Relat. Dut. No. ii, iii.
Paley's Philos. vol. i. p. 339—344.
Beattie's Elem. vol. ii. p. 124—140

conduct will have to secure their mutual happiness and that of their families[a].

§ 6. *Prop.* Virtue requires that no man should at the same time have more than one wife, and no woman more than one husband.

§ 7. *Part* I. No man should have more than one wife at a time.

§ 8. *Dem.* 1. The number of females, so far as we can judge by the best computation, is not entirely equal to the number of males, in the human species[b]. *Vid. Lect.* 31. § 15.

§ 9. 2. Should polygamy prevail, there would not be females enow to supply all the males, consequently many of them must be deprived of the advantage of marriage: not to mention, how far it might be the occasion of those hateful and destructive practices, of sodomy and eviration[c].

§ 10. 3. Quarrels would probably arise between those men, who endeavoured to possess themselves of more women than one, and those who were by this means deprived of partners in life; which might be attended with fatal consequences on both sides, should polygamy very much prevail.

§ 11. 4. The jealousy of the wives would probably make them very unhappy, were several women to share among them the affection and care of the same man; and it would occasion many caballings, and mutual endeavours to supplant each other in his affections, by which the peace of families would be greatly disturbed; not to mention the frequent adulteries that might be expected, if there was not a strict guard. *Vid. Gen.* xxix, xxx.

§ 12. 5. The discords of the mothers might be communicated to the children; and so not only alienate their hearts from the father, and thereby prevent the efficacy of his care for their education, but also prevent a due harmony between them in riper years, and lay a foundation for quarrels to be transmitted to the next generation.

§ 13. 6. The master of the family would have his part in all this uneasiness; and would find it hardly possible to preserve his own quiet in any tolerable degree, without sacrificing the peculiar pleasure of having one intimate and best beloved friend, with whom to converse with the highest endearment: and if he had any true taste of the sublimest pleasures of friendship, the

a GROVE's Fth. vol. ii. p. 482—484. HUTCHES. Syst. 3, i. 7.
b DERHAM's Phys. Theol. p. 175, 176. Reflect. on Polyg. p. 4—7. HIPPISLEY's Ess. on Popul. of Africa.
c Reflect. on Polyg. p. 34—36.

gratification of appetite with a variety of women must appear but a poor equivalent for such a sacrifice.

§ 14. 7. The practice of polygamy may leave room to a married man to be continually entering upon new amours, and treaties with respect to other women; which would keep the mind in an uneasy agitation, and greatly divert him from applying to cares of the greatest importance to the happiness of his family and of the public, and expose him thereby to many obvious inconveniences.

§ 15. 8. Since polygamy is thus pernicious to the interest of the husband, wife and children, and, if it commonly prevailed, to that of so many single persons, virtue requires that one man should have but one wife at a time[a]. *Q. E. D**.

§ 16. *Cor.* It is yet more evidently unlawful for him who has married one wife, with a promise of confinement to her, afterwards to take a second. *Vid. Lect.* 69. § 4.

§ 17. *Schol.* 1. Some have argued in favour of the proposition, that it would prevent the over-stocking the world with inhabitants, which would be the consequence of polygamy. But we have waved that argument,

§ 18. (1.) Because it seems that the contrary is true, i. e. that the number of mankind is lessened rather than increased by polygamy, which is a direct consequence from § 8. for it is plain, that ten women for instance would be like to have more children by ten men, than by one, especially in some length of

a BURN. Life of Rochest. p. 112, 113.
PUFF. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 16—19.
SALM. State of Turkey, p. 411—416.
Reflect. on Polyg. p. 13—19.
L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. l. xvi. c. ii—viii.
HUTCHES. Syst. vol. ii. p. 160, 161.

* The question concerning *polygamy* has recently been revived, in consequence of an elaborate treatise in defence of it, written by the late Mr. MARTIN MADAN, and intitled "Thelyphthora." To this work many answers appeared, among which may be reckoned, "Polygamy Unscriptural," by JOHN TOWERS; "Remarks on Polygamy," by THOMAS WILLS; "Polygamy Indefensible," by JOHN SMITH; "Remarks on Thelyphthora," by JAMES PEN; "Blessings of Polygamy displayed," by R. HILL; "Examination of Thelyphthora," by JOHN PALMER; and "Refutation of Polygamy," by T. HAWEIS. There were, also, several anonymous publications on the subject, of which it may be sufficient to mention "Anti-Thelyphthora;" "Marriage and its Vows defended," by a female; "The Unlawfulness of Polygamy evinced;" and the "Cobler's Letter to the Author of Thelyphthora." But the most decisive blow that was given to the "Thelyphthora," was in two articles which occur in the sixty-third volume of the Monthly Review. These articles were written by the late Rev. SAMUEL BADCOCK. Some general reflections on Polygamy may be seen in PALEY's "Principles of moral and political Philosophy," vol. i. p. 319—325. and in BEATTIE's "Elements of moral Science," vol. ii. p. 127—129. K.

years, considering how much the body might be weakened by that luxury with which seraglios are generally attended: and accordingly it is found in fact, that there is the greatest increase of men, where polygamy is not used, as the author of the reflections on that subject has proved, in an accurate and convincing manner. But,

§ 19. (2.) If it were fact, that polygamy would increase the number of mankind, it would be an argument *for* it, rather than *against* it: for it is certain, the earth with proper cultivation would be capable of maintaining a much greater number of inhabitants than at present subsist upon it; and so many general calamities have from age to age interposed to thin their numbers, that it is hardly to be imagined, they will ever grow insupportably great. In the mean time, that polygamy lessens the number, is an additional argument that it is contrary to the happiness of the species, and therefore to virtue [a].

§ 20. *Part* II. One woman should have but one husband at a time.

§ 21. *Dem.* 1. Several of the arguments urged in the preceding demonstration will *(mutatis mutandis)* prevail here; especially those taken from the proportion of the sexes, mutual jealousy, and the want of peculiar endearments arising from one most intimate friend.

§ 22. 2. The offspring would be thereby rendered uncertain, and healthful propagation prevented, by which the main purposes of marriage would be evidently defeated [b]. *Valet propositio. Lect.* 71. § 2.

§ 23. *Schol.* This has appeared so intolerable a thing, that it has hardly been practised by any nation on earth, unless some very barbarous people are to be excepted. On the contrary, it has almost universally been made a main branch of the marriage covenant, that with regard to matrimonial converse, a wife should be the property of one husband alone, and those women have been accounted infamous, who have violated this engagement [c].

LECT. LXXIII.

Of Marriage and Divorce.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO enquire to whom virtue prohibits marriage.

§ 2. *Sol.* 1. In general, it is not advisable that marriage

a Reflect. on Polyg. Diss. vi, vii.
b PUFF. lib. I. vi. c. i. § 15. GROVE'S Edit. vol. ii. p. 472—477.
c L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. l. xvi. c. v. TEMPLE'S Hist. of Engl. p. 14—16.

should be contracted by those, who, by reason of their unripe age, or some natural or accidental defect in their understanding, are destitute of reason, and so incapable of making a proper choice, or behaving themselves aright in the conjugal state[a].

§ 3. 2. It is prohibited to those who are evidently incapable of propagation, unless they marry with others in the like condition with themselves: otherwise by their incapacity, the great end of marriage would be frustrated, and a foundation laid for a perpetual jealousy, and many other irregular passions[b].

§ 4. 3. To those who labour under any distemper of body, or distraction of mind, which would probably be conveyed to their offspring.

§ 5. 4. To those who are already married, and whose consorts are yet living, virtue forbids marriage, upon the principles of the preceding proposition, while the former marriage continues undissolved: and whereas among us, one man and one woman have been mutually appropriated to each other, it is yet more evidently and universally unlawful for either to marry a third person, without the consent of the other, as it is a breach of the marriage covenant: whether it may be lawful when such consent is gained, even supposing the preceding proposition to hold good, i. e. whether marriage may be dissolved by mutual consent, will be enquired in the next proposition[c].

§ 6. 5. It has generally been said, that marriage is unlawful to those who are nearly allied by blood or affinity. The chief reasons assigned against such marriages are,

§ 7. 1.) That in some cases, the duties of other relations would be plainly confounded by them, as in case of a mother's marrying her son.

§ 8. 2.) Friendship by this means would be less widely diffused; and covetous parents would hinder their wealth from being communicated, perhaps on these principles even forcing the elder brethren to marry their sisters, however contrary to their inclination; which must be the source of great calamity to them, as well as detriment to others.

§ 9. 3.) By prohibiting these marriages, provision is made against some temptations to unchastity, arising from the more frequent converse of near relations.

a PUFF. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 26
b PUFF. [illegible]
RICAUT's Ott. Court. p. 192.
Lettres Persannes, No. 41.
c GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 14.

§ 10. 4.) There seems to be something generally in the constitution of our natures abhorring such marriages, if the relations are near, which has rendered them infamous among most civilized nations: though it must be owned the *Egyptians* and *Persians* were an exception to this rule; however among the *European* nations, it prevails in full force [a].

§ 11. *Schol.* 1. Notwithstanding what has been said, it must be owned very difficult to fix the degrees of affinity, or consanguinity, within which marriage is unlawful, and if mankind ever have been or should be in such circumstances, that a brother could have no wife but his own sister, most of the arguments urged above would cease, and the rest must give way to such a necessity *.

§ 12. 2. The argument urged § 6—10. concludes much more strongly against marrying with those nearly related by *blood*, than by affinity [b].

§ 13. *Prop.* To enquire in what cases marriage may be rightly dissolved.

§ 14. *Sol.* 1. It is no doubt dissolved by the adultery of either party, which is an apparent breach of the most fundamental article of the covenant. *Lect.* 71. § 1. and *Lect.* 69. § 4.

§ 15. 2. For the same reason, it is dissolved upon the obstinate desertion of one of the parties, since thereby the covenant is also broken [c].

§ 16. 3. It is questioned whether marriage may be dissolved, on account of the unkind behaviour of one of the married persons. In one view, it may appear reasonable that it should, since consulting their mutual happiness and comfort is a branch of the marriage covenant: yet when we consider what damage might arise to the innocent offspring, how frequently complaints of this kind occur among married people, how generally in this case both parties are to blame, and on these accounts how uncertain marriage would be rendered, if the dissolution of it in this case should be allowed, it seems on the whole more for the

a PUFF. ib. § 28, 32, 34.
HUTCHES. Syst. 3. i. 8—10.
L'ESPRIT des Loix, vol. ii. l. xxvi. c. xiv.
GROVE's Eth. vol. ii. p. 487—489.

FRY's Case of Marriages.
b PUFF. ib. § 35.
c Life of Galeacius Caracciolus †.

* This subject has been particularly treated of by a Mr. JOHN FRY, in his "Case of Marriages between kindred." See, also, "The Legal Degrees of Marriage stated and considered," by JOHN ALLEYNE, Esq. K.

† GALEACIUS CARACCIOLUS is referred to, because his wife refused to cohabit with him on account of his religious principles. S.

happiness of mankind, that some who are in these unhappy circumstances should bear their calamity, than that they should be eased of it on terms so hazardous to the security and happiness of many more. To which we may also add, that the consideration of marriage as an indissoluble bond may engage both husband and wife, out of regard to their own peace, to be careful to govern their passions, so as not to make it mutually intolerable; in which exercise of wisdom and virtue, each party may find a very great account.

§ 17. 4. Marriage may not be dissolved, as many other covenants may, by the consent of the parties; if it might, marriages might frequently be contracted almost in jest, or merely in some views of present indulgence: and when one party was weary of the bond, very indirect measures might be used to procure the consent of the other to dissolve it; and thus a state of things would probably be introduced into the world, little different from that which marriage was intended to prevent.

§ 18. 5. Neither ought marriage to be dissolved, merely on account of barrenness, unless one of the parties evidently appears to have been under some natural incapacity before the contract; otherwise it would be difficult to fix the time when such a dissolution should take place, and great room would be left for fraudulent separations.

§ 19. 6. Neither are marriages to be dissolved, on account of any concealed deformity of body, or flaw in estate; though it be allowed very criminal and foolish, for any to impose upon another in a matter of so great importance[a].

§ 20. *Cor.* Since the marriage bond is of so strict a nature, it ought never to be formed without the most mature consideration; nor should any be forced into it by the authority of superiors, contrary to their own inclinations[b].

LECT. LXXIV.

Of Concubinage, and Care of Children.

§ 1. *Def.* CONCUBINAGE is a sort of marriage, in which the woman by agreement of both parties is to be considered as a servant in the family, and express provision is made, that her

a MILTON'S Prose Works, p. 5—12. PUFF. L. vi. c. i. § 20—22, 24. Lettres Persannes, vol. ii. No. 102. MONTESQ. Sp. of Laws, l. xvi. 15, 16. GROVE'S Eth. vol. ii. p. 477—480. HUTCHES. Syst. 3. i. 11, 12.

LOCKE on Government, part ii. § 78—81. REEVES'S Apol. vol. i. p. 187, 188. MORE'S Utopia, p. 141—144.

b GROVE'S Eth. vol. ii. p. 485—487. HUTCHES. Syst. 3. i. 13.

children shall not have such a right of possession and inheritance, as the children of the primary wife.

§ 2. *Schol.* It appears by *Lect.* 72. § 7, &c. that the taking a concubine during the life of another wife is generally at least to be avoided: and it seems, that he who never marries any woman but as a concubine, neither pays due respect to the female sex, nor sufficiently consults his own happiness, in a free and ingenuous friendship: yet perhaps, in case of a second marriage, where the children by a former wife are living, concubinage is not altogether to be condemned, if the constitution of the country permit it[a]*.

§ 3. *Prop.* Virtue requires that parents should take peculiar care of their own children.

§ 4. *Dem.* 1. The state of infancy is so feeble, that if tender care were not taken of young children, they would die quickly after their birth.

§ 5. 2. In childhood, on account of the weakness of reason, they are incapable of providing for themselves.

§ 6. 3. It is evidently of importance to themselves and the public, not only that their lives be taken care of, but that their minds be formed to virtuous and pious sentiments, of which they are at first void, not to say that many at least seem strongly inclined to the contrary.

§ 7. 4. Virtue requires that some provision should be made for the education of children. *Lect.* 65. § 1, &c.

§ 8. 5. Those who have produced them ought not in reason to throw them as a burden upon others, when they are capable of taking care of them themselves.

§ 9. 6. That στοργη, or natural affection, which parents feel towards the children, will render this task more easy and delightful to them, than it would be to others.

§ 10. 7. It is probable *cæt. par.* that children will be better taken care of by their parents than others.

§ 11. 8. Virtue requires that parents should take peculiar care of their own children[b]. *2. E. D.*

a PUFF. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 36. l. iv. c. xi. § 9.
GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 15.
b Rel. of Nat. p. 159, 160.
DEFANY on Rel. Duties, Serm. iv.—vii.
HUTCHES. Syst. vol. ii. 5. ii. 1.
GROVE's Mor. Phil. l. ii. p. 491—498.
FORDYCE's Mor. Phil. § 3. c. iii.
PALEY's Philos. vol. i. p. 345—367.
BEATTIE's Elem. vol. ii. p. 139—148.

* This language seems harsh alike to christian and to English ears. We have reason to be thankful that the law of marriage in our country is so conformable to divine law, given us in the New Testament, as not to favour concubinage. W.

§ 12. *Cor.* 1. Virtue generally requires that those who have children should make them their principal heirs[a].

§ 13. 2. Virtue requires that remoter ancestors should be careful of grand-children, or other descendants; especially if the immediate parents be either taken away by death, or any other way rendered incapable of affording them assistance[b].

§ 14. *Schol.* 1. It does not appear necessary, that an equal distribution of goods be made among all the children: some proper regard should be had to the merit of each: yet great care should be taken, that the parent does not by an imprudent distinction sow such seeds of discord, as may counterbalance the advantage accruing to the most deserving child from a larger share[c].

§ 15. 2. It seems reasonable, that the eldest son should generally have a larger share of his father's possessions than the rest; that so the honour of the family may be supported, and that he may be a refuge to younger children, if they should fall into poverty; especially since *(cæt. par.)* it may reasonably be expected, that he will be more capable of managing what he has for the common good, and the distinction made in his favour will generally be less provoking to the rest, than if it were made in favour of any other child[d].

§ 16. 3. Nevertheless, an elder son, or any other may be disinherited, or deprived of a part of what he would otherwise have had, upon account of his vicious disposition, if there be reason to believe that he will abuse it to the detriment of others: this the reason of things requires, and the laws of most nations admit of it, though PLATO only allows it with the consent of near relations. As for the argument brought against it from *Deut.* xxi. 15, &c. as a law of God to the Jews; it may be answered, that the Jews had not that power of alienating their estates in general, which all allow to others not under such a peculiar appointment, and therefore no valid argument can be drawn from hence: and it is plain, God often interposed to transfer the inheritance; as in a most memorable instance JACOB did, and that, (as all who believe scripture must suppose) by divine direction, *Gen* xlix. 3. 1 *Chron.* v. 1, 2. not to mention that power, which the law of God gave to Jewish parents to put a wicked child to death, which might render a particular licence to disinherit him needless. *Deut.* xxi. 18, &c[e].

a GROT. ib. l. ii. c. vii. § 5. No. ii.
L'Esprit des Loix, vol. ii. l. xxvi. c. vi.
b GROT. ib. § 6.
c GROVE, ib. p. 498—500.
d PUFF. de Jure, l. iv. c. xi. § 8.
FLEETW. Rel. Dom. p. 111—113.
PALEY's Philos. vol. i. 359, 360.
e PUFF. ib. § 11.
FLEETW. ib. p. 113—127.
BURN. Life of Sir M. HALE, p. 7, 8.
Judge HALE, p. 105.

LECT. LXXV.

Of Gratitude—Filial and Parental Duties.

§ 1. *Ax.* THERE is an evident fitness, that when one rational being has received a favour and kindness from another, he should have some sense of gratitude, and return good rather than evil[a].

§ 2. *Cor.* Virtue requires gratitude[b]. *Vid. Lect.* 52. § 10.

§ 3. *Prop.* To enquire into the duty of children towards their parents.

§ 4. *Sol. and Dem.* 1. Forasmuch as children have received important favours from their parents, gratitude, and therefore virtue requires that they should *love* them. § 1, 2.

§ 5. 2. Considering the superiority of age, and the probable superiority of wisdom, which there is on the side of parents, and also how much the satisfaction and comfort of a parent depends on the respect shewn him by his children, it is fit that children should *reverence* their parents.

§ 6. 3. It is fit that while the parents are living, and the use of their understanding continued, their children should not ordinarily undertake any matter of great importance without *advising* with them, or without very cogent reasons pursue it contrary to their consent.

§ 7. 4. As young people need some guidance and government in their minority, and as there is *(cæt. par.)* some peculiar reason to trust the prudence, care, and affection of a parent, preferable to any other person, it is reasonable that children, especially while in their minority, should *obey* their parents; without which, neither the order of families nor the happiness of the rising generation could be secured: nevertheless, still supposing that the commands of the parents are not inconsistent with the will of God.

§ 8. 5. Virtue requires, that if parents come to want, children should take care to furnish them with the necessaries of life, and so far as their ability will permit, with the conveniences of it[c].

§ 9. *Cor.* 1. The like regards are in some degree due to

a PUFF. de Off. l. i. c. viii. § 7, 8.
b HUTCHES. Sys.. 2. v. 6.
PRICE on Mor. p. 265.
c PUFF. de Jure, l. vi. c. ii. § 4, 7, 11.
FLEETW. on Rel. Duties, p. 1—24, 51, 52.
HUTCHES. Syst. vol. ii. p. 189. 194—196.
GROVE'S Mor. Phil. vol. ii. p. 500, 503.
DELANY, ib. No. viii, ix.
PUFF. de Off. l. ii. c. iii. § 12.
Rel. of Nat. p. 161, 162.
PALEY'S Philos. vol. i. p. 368—378.
BEATTIE'S Elem. vol. ii. p. 148—150.

remoter ancestors, if yet living; though if they come to want, they fall most properly under the care of their more immediate surviving descendants.

§ 10. 2. If any generous and compassionate friend act the part of a parent, in taking care of an helpless child, he may justly expect from him the returns of filial duty.

§ 11. 3. Where the parent has delegated his authority to some other person, reverence and some degree of obedience are on that account to be paid to him, beyond what might otherwise be his due.

§ 12. 4. Different degrees of obedience will be due to parents according to the different age and circumstances of the child, and in some degree according to the capacity and character of the parent[a].

§ 13. 5. It is the duty of parents, or of those who sustain their character and place, to behave to the children under their care in such a manner, as may most effectually conciliate their reverence and love, and make the yoke of obedience as light as possible; and for this reason all unnecessary severities are to be forborne[b].

§ 14. *Schol.* 1. Many have chosen to build the right of parents to the obedience of the child, wholly or chiefly on their having been the instruments of bringing it into existence, and have inferred from hence a sovereign right in the parent to dispose of the life, liberty, and fortune of the child; but it appears from the preceding propositions, that parental authority within moderate bounds may be fixed on a basis less liable to exception[c].

§ 15. 2. It appears from the reasoning of the proposition, that *both* the parents have a right to the duties there mentioned: nevertheless, *(cæt. par.)* the authority of the *father* is chiefly to be regarded; though HOBBES is of a contrary opinion, and maintains, that a sovereign and unlimited power over the children resides in the *mother*, and that the authority of others over them is derived from her[d].

§ 16. 3. Though it appears from § 6. that it is an irregular

a PUFF. de Off. l. ii. c. iii. § 5—8.
b TILLETW. of Relat. Duf. p. 78—81.
FOST. Disc. vol. ii. p. 97—102.
c GROT. l. ii. c. v. § 7.
FILMER of Patr. Government, c. i. § 4—8.
LOCKE of Government, l. i. § 52—59.
HUTCHES. ib. vol. ii. 3. ii. 2.
PUFF. ib. § 1—6.

—— BARBERAC's Notes on ib. § 10. p. 606 607.
FOST. Disc. p. 95—97.
d HOBBES de Cive, c. ix.
PUFF. de Jure, l. vi. c. ii. § 2, 3.
PUFF. de Offic. l. ii. c. iii. § 3.
GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 1. Not.

thing for children, generally speaking, to contract marriages without the advice or consent of their parents, nevertheless it might be attended with still worse consequences, if marriages so contracted were to be deemed invalid [a].

§ 17. 4. The indigence of human infants seems to have been wisely designed by providence, on purpose to lay a foundation for those mutual offices of parental and filial duty, on which much of the happiness of life evidently depends [b].

§ 18. 5. It follows from hence, that when the health of the mother, and the convenience of the family will admit of it, it is fit that mothers nurse their own children, or take care that they be nourished at home [c].

LECT. LXXVI.

Of Civil Government—A Community—A State of Nature—Law—Kinds of Government.

§ 1. *Def.* A COMMUNITY is a company of men, which is so associated, that the whole body, either by themselves or their representatives, should judge concerning any disputed rights or properties of each member of it [d].

§ 2. *Def.* Those men are said to be in A STATE OF NATURE, who are not by any mutual engagements, implicit or express, entered into communities.

§ 3. *Prop.* It is for the happiness of mankind, that men in a state of nature should form themselves into societies.

§ 4. *Dem.* 1. The happiness of mankind requires, that controversies which arise among them should be determined.

§ 5. 2. The prejudices of self-love would lead men to lay down different rules for themselves and others; it is proper therefore that there should be some universal rule.

§ 6. 3. When these rules are admitted, prejudice would

a PUFF. ib. § 14.
GROVE's Mor. Phil. vol. ii. p. 503—505.
GROT. ib. § 10.
b CAMBRAY (RAMSAY) on Gov. p. 26, 27 *.
c TILLOTS. Serm. vol. i. p. 523—525.
DELANY of Rel. Dut. Serm. iv. p. 79—98.
Spect. vol. iii. No. 246 †.
d LOCKE of Gov. I. ii. § 87.

* The book intituled "CAMBRAY on Government," was not written by FENELON, Archbishop of Cambray, but by the Chevalier RAMSAY, upon the principles of that prelate.

† On this question, recourse may be had to Dr. CADOGAN's Essay on Nursing, and Mr. NELSON's Treatise on the Government of Children. K.

bias particular persons in the application of them: therefore it is fit that particular cases should be determined by some other person, rather than by either of the parties, whose interest is in question.

§ 7. 4. Such determinations would often be in vain, if there were not some power to enforce the execution of them.

§ 8. 5. Where men are formed into communities, rules may be laid down, judges appointed, and determinations enforced, by the joint power of the whole body. Therefore,

§ 9. 6. The happiness of mankind, and therefore virtue requires, that men should form themselves into communities[a]. *Lect.* 65. § 1, &c.

§ 10. *Schol.* It is queried, who is to be considered as *a member of a community*. There can be no doubt as to those who have given their express consent to it: as for those who live under the protection of any community, it is to be taken for granted that while they so continue, they consent to bear the burden, as some equivalent for sharing the happiness of it: but for aught that yet appears, such may withdraw themselves from it, when they shall judge it requisite[b].

§ 11. A LAW is a rule of action, prescribed by some superior, in such a manner, as at the same time to declare a purpose of favouring or punishing those under his power, as they shall act agreeably or disagreeably to it[c].

§ 12. *Cor.* If it shall appear to us hereafter, that God has given us intimations, not only of his own delight in virtue and aversion to vice, but also that he will reward the one and punish the other, then it may properly be said, that the *law of God* requires virtue.

§ 13. *Def.* They are said to have the SUPREME CIVIL GOVERNMENT in any state or community, who have the supreme power of *making laws* for that community, and *executing* them in their own persons, or by such officers as they shall appoint.

§ 14. *Def.* When the supreme civil government is entirely in the hands of *one person*, it is called A MONARCHY: if in a *select number*, AN OLIGARCHY; which some have divided into an ARISTOCRACY, which is the government of the *nobles*, and AN

a LOCKE of Gov. l. ii. § 124—126.
PUFF. de Jure, l. vii. c. i. § 8—11.
HUTCHES. Syst. 2. iv. and 3. iv.
RAMSAY of Gov. p. 56—58.
THOMPS. Seas. Autumn, ver. 45—144.
GROVE's Eth. vol. ii. p. 515—547.

b LOCKE of Gov. l. ii. § 119—122.
GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 24. No. ii.

c PUFF. de Jure, l. i. c. vi. § 1—4.
BAXT. Works, vol. ii. p. 25, 26.
GROT. de Jure, l. i. c. i. § 9.

OCHLOCRACY, which is the government of a few of the *meanest*, appointed and supported in a tumultuous manner; whereas A DEMOCRACY is the government of the *whole body* of the *people*: but a constitution of government compounded of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, like the *British* constitution, is called A MIXED MONARCHY [a].

§ 15. *Schol.* The composition in different governments is so various, that some have thought this distribution not sufficiently accurate, urging that neither *Poland* nor *Holland* fall under any of these [b].

§ 16. *Def.* Laws made by the supreme civil power of any community, to be observed by all their subjects, are called CIVIL LAWS, and so differ from MUNICIPAL, made for particular towns and corporations.

§ 17. *Schol.* The word *civil law* among us is generally used to signify the laws of *the Roman empire*, which on account of their equity have been generally received in other nations: whereas those which have been established by *act of parliament*, are commonly called *statute*, though they be in our sense *civil* laws [c].

LECT. LXXVII.

The Origin of Government.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO enquire into the probable original of civil government, or of communities.

§ 2. *Sol.* 1. Considering the natural dependence of children upon their parents, it is certain that government would at first be *parental*: and it is exceeding probable, that if, according

a HUTCHES. Syst. 3. vi. 1, 2.
Spirit of Laws, l. ii.
b TEMPLE'S Ess. vol. i. p. 47, 48.
VOLTAIRE'S Hist. of Charles XII. l. ii. p. 61—67.
Univ. Hist. vol. xxxiv. p. 6—30. ibid. vol. xxxi. p. 3—12.
TEMPLE on the Netherlands, c. ii.
———'s Works, vol. i. p. 30—43.
c PUFF. de Jure, l. viii. c. i. § 1*.

* Though the specific discussion of the Roman law does not constitute a part of these lectures, it may not be amiss to refer the student to a few general writers on a subject which may hereafter demand some attention. A foundation should be laid in JUSTINIAN'S "Institutes," which may be read in HARRIS'S edition, comprehending both the original and a translation. To this may be added SCHOMBERG'S "Historical and Chronological View of Roman Law;" Dr. TAYLOR'S "Elements of the Civil Law;" the same gentleman's "Summary of the Roman Law;" and Dr. BEVER "On the Study of Jurisprudence," and his "History of the Legal Policy of the Roman State, and of the rise, progress, and extent of the Roman Laws." K.

to many of the most credible traditions, the human race descended from one pair, so long as the first man lived, and continued in the exercise of reason, he had a considerable influence over the councils and actions of his descendants, and was regarded by them as their common head.

§ 3. 2. From the nature of things, it is not probable that the power he had over his family descended entirely to the eldest son: it is certain, that the reason for being governed by an *elder brother*, is by no means the same as for being governed by a *father*; though we may naturally suppose, that *(cæt. par.)* the age and experience of the elder brother, together with the larger share of the inheritance which he probably had, would have given him some superiority; yet not so great, as an elder brother would now generally have; partly, as the world being thinly peopled, each might have as much land as he pleased, and partly, as in proportion to the length of men's lives in those early ages, (if we credit tradition as before,) the difference between the ages of the several elder brethren of a family would be very inconsiderable [a].

§ 4. 3. Each family would probably on the death of the common parent become a kind of little sovereignty, whose governor would naturally be the father of it during his life; and such sovereignties as these would be greatly multiplied in the third, fourth, or following generations.

§ 5. 4. It is exceeding probable, that among these lesser communities disputes would arise, for the determination of which they might judge it proper, on the principles mentioned, *Lect.* 76. § 3. to form themselves into larger societies, including several of those domestic communities; and perhaps the form of these might be various, according to the various tempers, characters, and circumstances of the persons concerned.

§ 6. 5. As disputes arose between one and another of those larger societies, which no doubt they often did, it was necessary that on their forcibly opposing each other, the command of their respective armies should centre in one person; and if he were not only remarkable for his valour, but also wisdom, humanity, eloquence, piety and good success in affairs, any of these, but especially the conjunction of them all, would greatly tend to increase his authority in the community, and might engage them to acquiesce in his stated government [b].

§ 7. 6. It is not to be supposed, that persons, families, or

a SIDNEY on Gov. c. i. § 9. | b SIDNEY on Gov. c. i. § 16.

larger communities, before free and independent, would submit themselves to the government of any one person whatever; without some equivalent, which could probably be no other, than that of protecting them in their liberties and properties; so that there was no doubt some original *contract* between the prince and the people, in all those kingdoms where the prince gained his power by a peaceable election.

§ 8. 7. Some ambitious persons, partly by stratagem and partly by force, might possess themselves of power over others; yet even those conquests could not be settled without some agreement between the victor and the vanquished; for till such an agreement was made, there was evidently a state of hostility, and not a community [a].

§ 9. *Cor.* 1. From hence it will follow, that though there might be various kinds of governments prevailing, and in monarchies various degrees of liberty in the people and power in the prince, yet there must always have been some original *contract* between them, as the foundation of all government, except that of a father or his descendants [b].

§ 10. 2. From hence we may see, how far sovereignty may be said to have its original *from God.* We have reason to believe that it is the will of God, that we should do our utmost to promote the happiness of mankind: now *some* government appears necessary for this purpose; (*Vid. Lect.* 76. § 3.) and when governments are formed, attempts to destroy them might in many instances be pernicious to ourselves and to the public: we have reason therefore to believe, that God wills not only that government in general should be, but that the present form of government should continue in any place, so long as the happiness of the whole may be promoted thereby; but there appears as yet no reason to believe, that God wills it should continue immutable, however it is administered, or that a prince can justly claim a commission from God in attempting the ruin of the community, which it is his business to protect. God's being the author of government in the sense explained above, will be a great aggravation of the guilt of such a tyrannical sovereign; and any pretence to divine authority in such outrages will only be adding impiety to treachery and cruelty: but this will be examined hereafter [c].

a PUFF. de Jure, l. vii. c. iii. § 1, 5—9.
TEMPLE'S Misc. vol. i. p. 55—82.
RAMS. of Gov. c. vii. p. 49—54.
Ancient Univ. Hist. vol. i. 8vo. p. 230, 385—388.
HUTCHES. Syst. vol. ii. 3. v.
LOCKE of Gov. part ii. c. viii. § 95—112.
ROLL. Anc. Hist. vol. i. Introd.
LYTTLET. Pers. Let. p. 33, &c.
BAUMGARTEN'S Supplem. vol. i. p. 42—69.

b SIDNEY on Gov. c. i. § 20.

c RAMS. of Gov. c. vi.
PUFF. de Jure, l. vii. c. iii. § 2—4.
ROLL. Man. vol. i. p. 423, 424.
SIDNEY on Gov. c. i. § 6.
DELANY on Rel. Dut. Serm. xiv. p. 276—285.
PALEY'S Philos. vol. ii. p. 141—163. 7th Ed.

LECT. LXXVIII.

Civil Government illustrated—the Patriarchal.

§ 1. *Schol.* 1. THE account of the original of civil government here given is illustrated, and something confirmed, by the constitution of several of the most considerable nations which we find in ancient history; particularly by the power of the *ephori* and *general assembly* amongst the *Spartans* (a), the *amphictyones* of *Greece* (b), the *suffetes*, *senate*, and *popular assembly* of *Carthage* (c), the *senate*, *comitia*, and *tribunes* of *Rome* (d), the *saxon Wittenagemot* (e), which was the original of the *British* parliament, and the *Spanish cortes* (f); not to mention the constitution of many other and more modern governments *.

§ 2. 2. Some probable conjectures, why arbitrary monarchy prevailed more in the northern parts of *Asia*, and in *Africa*, than in *Europe*, may be seen in TEMPLE's Misc. vol. i. p. 50—53. L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. l. xvii. p. 377—385. Engl. Transl. p. 390—395.

§ 3. 3. The objection against this scheme, from our not having a right over our own lives, and much less over the lives of others, in a state of nature, goes upon a very false principle; for every man, previous to contract, has a right of using all his natural power for the public good, and when that seems to require it, even of taking away the life of another, or forbearing to defend his own: and all that any man promises in this respect, is submission to a sentence of death in certain cases; for no law ever condemns a man to execute himself (h).

a STANYAN's Gr. Hist. vol. i. l. iii. c. iv. p. 86—92.
Univ. Hist. vol. ii. p. 574.
b POTTER's Archæol. l. i. c. xvi. vol. i. p. 83—85.
STANYAN ib. p. 119, 120.
c ROLLIN's Anc. Hist. l. ii. § 3. vol. i.
d MOYLE's Works, vol. i. p. 8, 9, 103—108.
VERTOT's Rom. Rev. vol. i. p. 7—9.
KENNET's Rom. Ant. part ii. l. iii. c. ix, and xvi.
e RAPIN's Hist. of England vol. i. p. 132—136.
SQUIRE of the Anglo-Sax. Gov.
f GEDDES's Misc. vol. i. p. 317, &c *.
g SIDNEY on Gov. c. ii. § 16. p. 130, &c.
h BURN. iv. Disc. p. 10, 11.
LOCKE of Gov. part ii. c. xi. § 135.
PUFF. de Jure, l. viii. c. iii. § 1.
HOADLY on Gov. p. 105—188.

* For farther, and extensive information on these subjects, recourse may be had to Mr. MITFORD's and Dr. GILLIES's "History of Greece;" "The Travels of ANACHARSIS the younger;" SPELMAN's "Translation of DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSENSIS;" HOOKE's "Roman History;" FERGUSON's "History of the Roman Republic;" Dr. ADAM's "Roman Antiquities;" Dr. ROBERTSON's "History of Charles the Fifth," volume the first; HOTOMAN's "Franco-Gallia;" ACHERLY's "Britannic Constitution;" St. AMAND's "Essay on the British Legislative Constitution of England;" HEAD's "Dialogues," vol. ii. p. 89—331, third edition; Dr. GILBERT STUART's "Historical Essay on the English Constitution;" and Lord LYTTLETON's "History of Henry the Second," vol. iii. p. 216—281, ibid. p. 372—464. third edition. K.

§ 4. *Prop.* To propose and confute that other hypothesis of the original government, which is commonly called the *patriarchal scheme.*

§ 5. *Sol.* 1. The foundation of it is, that the *first man* was absolute sovereign of all his posterity, so as to dispose of their possessions and their lives, without being accountable to any but God.

§ 6. 2. That on his death, his eldest son *Cain* having been disinherited by God, the supreme power devolved upon *Seth*, the next eldest son, and passed from him by a lineal succession to *Noah.*

§ 7. 3. That he, according to the divine direction, divided the earth after the deluge among *seventy* of his descendants, heads of so many nations, who were each of them made independent and absolute sovereigns; in whose successors (when they can be discovered) the right of government still continues.

§ 8. 4. That it is to be presumed, that in every country the *reigning prince* is that successor, and consequently, that such unlimited obedience is to be paid to him, unless it appears that some other person has an hereditary claim better founded than his[a].

§ 9. *Confut.* Admitting the credibility, and for argument's sake the inspiration of the *mosaic* history, the following objections seem abundantly sufficient to overthrow this hypothesis.

1. It can never be proved, that *Adam* had such an unlimited power over his whole race: it is certain, the relation of a *father* does by no means imply it, (*Lect.* 75. § 14.) and no text in the writings of *Moses* is alledged directly to prove it, unless *Gen.* i. 26—30. and iii. 16. the first of which, was a grant to the human race of the whole animal and vegetable creation for its use; and the second related only to *Eve*, and at most, amounts to no more, than that, as woman had abused her husband's tenderness, she should sometimes find herself galled by the yoke of his authority; but this does not imply an absolute power: at least there is not a shadow of argument for any thing more than *Adam's* dominion over his own wife, and by no means over their descendants[b].

§ 10. 2. Allowing *Adam* to have been possessed of such a power, it will by no means prove that it was to descend from

a HOADLY on Gov. p. 3, 4. FILMER's Patriarch. Scheme, c. i. § 4—9. p. 13—22.

b HOADLY of Gov. p. 5—35. præs. p. 5—13. LOCKE of Gov. part i. c. iv—vi. præs. p. 23—31.

him, and centre in one of his children. It is certain that the right of a *father* and of an *elder brother* are in this respect very different, (*Lect.* 75. § 3. *Lect.* 77. § 3.) and as for the argument of a supposed divine appointment, drawn from *Gen.* iv. 7. though it may prove some *pre-eminence* in an elder brother, especially during the time that his younger lived with him, it will never prove an *absolute power* during life, over him and all his remotest descendants [a].

§ 11. 3. The distribution of mankind into seventy nations, with an absolute sovereign to each, supposes a contradiction to the right of primogeniture, as before asserted by FILMER, without any apparent reason; and is itself a most chimerical and arbitrary assertion. *Gen.* x. 32. is a most feeble foundation for such a grand superstructure; and only signifies, that the chief nations among whom the earth was divided sprung from the persons there mentioned. The division, which FILMER supposes, would make the parents subject to their children; besides, that some of those there mentioned were not born when the distribution is supposed to be made [b].

§ 12. 4. Had God meant to establish the right of primogeniture in this manner, it is not probable he would so often have chosen *younger* sons to special favours, dignity and authority, as we are sure he did, if the truth of the old testament be granted [c].

§ 13. 5. The admission of such an hypothesis, grounded on so slender an evidence, would be attended with great damage to mankind; as it might destroy the settlement of many very considerable nations, as appears from the genealogy of their royal families. At best, this is an *useless* scheme; since no one person upon earth can be known to be the true heir: and since the number of sovereigns in the world is so vastly greater than *seventy*, it would, upon FILMER's hypothesis, be *cæt. par.* a great probability against any one, that he was not one of those seventy, in whom the right lay [d].

§ 14. 6. The scheme is plainly inconsistent with itself: for if fatherhood give an absolute power over the children, then it rests in all parents; and consequently, had *Seth* commanded his children to have resisted *Adam*, they would on this scheme have

a HOADLY ib. p. 35—38.
LOCKE ib. c. viii.
SIDNEY ib. c. ii. § 4.
b HOADLY ib. p. 49—54.
SIDNEY ib. c. i. § 7, 8.
c SIDNEY ib. c. i. § 13.
HOADLY ib. p. 55—59.
d LOCKE ib. c. xi.
SIDNEY ib. c. i. § 14, 17, 18.

been obliged to do it, though by another part of it they were obliged to an unlimited obedience to *Adam*[a].

§ 15. *Schol.* Some have argued for what they call *indefeasible hereditary right* in monarchs, from the right of elder children to succeed to the land of their parents. But it is certain that the elder son has not in equity a right to succeed to the whole paternal inheritance, so that the rest of the children should have no share of it; though it may generally be fit he should have a larger share than the rest; (*Lect.* 74. § 15.) yet he may be disinherited, whenever a regard for the common good requires it: besides, that a succession to places of trust, power and dignity, is a thing of a very different nature from a succession to an estate[b].

LECT. LXXIX.

Of a State of Freedom—of Resistance.

§ 1. *Prop.* EVERY man is born in a *state of freedom*, i. e. he is (so far as appears by the light of nature) no further obliged to support or submit to the form of government, in the country where he is born, than he shall judge, upon a view of present circumstances, that a subjection to such government will be for the good of the whole.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. If a person were, by any argument which the light of nature suggests, universally bound to be subject to and support any government, further than it appears to him for the public good in present circumstances, such obligation must be built, either on some natural right in the governors to unlimited obedience, or on such a power conferred upon them by some previous contract.

§ 3. 2. The natural right in favour of primogeniture has been considered and confuted above, *Lect.* 78. § 4, &c.

§ 4. 3. A previous contract of parents, binding themselves and their offspring to unlimited subjection, is a thing which can hardly be supposed: but if we were sure that such a contract had been ever so expressly made, as they had no right to dispose of the lives and properties of their children according to their

a LOCKE ib. § 68—72.
HOADLY ib. p. 13—15.
DE LOE's Jus Divin. l. ii. p. 2—6.
GROVE's Miscel. p. 42—62.
b RAMS. of Gov. c. ix.
HUTCHES. Syst. 3. viii. 3, 9—14.

own will, the children could not be bound by such a contract. *Valet propositio.*

§ 5. *Cor.* 1. Hence it will evidently appear, that virtue will allow to resist the supreme governor, if any circumstances shall arise, in which such resistance shall appear to be most for the public good [a]. *Vid. Lect.* 77. § 9. *Lect.* 70. § 16.

§ 6. 2. Much more may it be allowed in a *mixed* monarchy that the other branches of the legislative power should resist the monarch, when he goes about to subvert their constitution, in direct violation of that contract on which he is admitted to the crown [b] *.

§ 7. *Schol.* 1. Some, waving all pleas from a supposed donation of power from God to kings, assert resistance to be universally unlawful, because it can never promote the public good, but must on the whole be detrimental to mankind. But it may be answered,

§ 8. (1.) That cases may occur, in which the affections of the people may be so alienated from the government, that a revolution may be accomplished with very little blood-shed and confusion.

§ 9. (2.) That by this means, the civil and religious liberties of a mighty nation may be, and often have been secured, when even on the brink of ruin.

§ 10. (3.) That such an event may contain matter of very wholesome instruction to succeeding princes, in that country and elsewhere, and by preventing future oppressions, may greatly promote the good of mankind.

§ 11. And whereas it is urged, that the encouragement which the doctrine of resistance might give to insurrections and popular tumults would be an equivalent for all this, it is to be remembered,

a PUFF. de Jure, l. vii. c. 8. § 5.
LOCKE of Gov. part ii. § 202—222.
SIDNEY on Gov. c. iii. § 41.
b CARMICH. in Puff. de Off. l. ii. c. iv. § 4.

* The great question concerning the origin and design of Government, the rights of the people, and the power of resistance, have lately been amply considered, in consequence of the two grand political controversies of the age, occasioned, first, by Dr. PRICE's "Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty;" and, still more recently, by Mr. BURKE's "Reflections on the French Revolution." It would be endless specifically to refer to the variety of treatises and pamphlets which have appeared on both sides of the question in agitation. A list of those publications may be collected from the reviews of the time. K.

§ 12. (1.) That it may be concluded, a virtuous man will, as he certainly ought to do, attentively weigh the reasons and consequences of things, before he engages in so important an undertaking.

§ 13. (2.) That the apparent danger attending it will deter men of prudence from embarking themselves in it, till there be a great prospect of succeeding; which probably there cannot be, till the people have been alienated from their governors, by long, frequent, and notorious oppressions.

§ 14. (3.) That though it is true, this doctrine may be abused, and may in some cases be attended with ill consequences; yet, considering the temptations of royalty, the doctrine of *passive obedience* and *non-resistance* is likely to be much more abused, as it has certainly in fact been; so that upon the whole, the hazard seems to be abundantly balanced[a] *.

§ 15. *Schol.* 2. Considering the many difficulties to which princes are exposed, how liable they are often to be imposed upon, when they design best, and how impossible it is for the bulk of the people to enter into all the reasons of their councils and actions, we do most readily grant, that men ought to put the most candid interpretation upon the actions of their governors which they can in reason bear; and that they should never have recourse to violent methods, but in cases of very great extremity, and where the probability of promoting the public security and happiness by it is very apparent[b].

a RAMS. of Gov. c. x. p. 74—76, 84.
LOCKE on Gov. part ii. c. xix. § 223—230.
SACHEV. Trial, p. 88—114.
SIDN. on Gov. c. iii. § 40. p. 434—436.
HUTCHES. Syst. § vii. 3—7.
b RAMS. of Gov. c. x. p. 78—83.
EVANS's Christ. Temp. vol. ii. p. 308, 309.

* The doctrine of *passive obedience* and *non-resistance* is two-fold, according to the reasons on which it is founded. That which rests on the *divine right* of a supreme governor in a nation, and which claims universal sacredness for his person *jure divino*, however erroneous may be his conduct, has been long since exploded as neither scriptural nor supported by just reason. But there is another, and very different ground of the doctrine which may be expressed by these terms. In every martyr is exemplified passive obedience and non-resistance, he is a *sufferer* from obedience to God, nor does he *resist* men however unjust and cruel their conduct. And it is further exemplified in every person who acts upon the conviction that it is inconsistent with the spirit of the christian dispensation, or the refined benevolence of christianity, to bear arms in *any cause*. With persons who maintain this opinion, the question is not what we may claim or inflict, according to distributive or commutative *justice*, but what we should give up in *charity*; not what the laws of nations dictate, but what christian *benevolence*, conformable to a scale of more enlarged equity, demands. Thus, it is urged, were Christ, his apostles, and most of the primitive christians habitually and uniformly actuated; who "resisted not evil," but "overcame evil with good," even unto death. W.

LECT. LXXX.

Of the best Form of Government—A mixed Monarchy.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO enquire what form of government is to be preferred, as generally most subservient to the happiness of mankind.

§ 2. *Sol.* A *mixed monarchy, generally* to descend by *inheritance*, seems preferable to the rest.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. An *arbitrary monarchy* would undoubtedly be most desirable, if the monarch were perfectly wise and good; seeing he would then have much greater opportunities of doing good to his subjects, than under a limitation of power he could possibly have; and the unavoidable imperfection of general laws would be greatly remedied by his integrity and wisdom. But considering the degeneracy and imperfection of mankind, it seems unsafe to trust so much power in one man; and it is generally in fact seen, that where this kind of government is admitted, tyranny, cruelty and oppression prevail with it.

§ 4. 2. An *aristocracy*, and much more a *democracy*, leaves too much room for the cabals of statesmen, makes the dispatch of business slower, and there are secrets of state of which it is impossible that the people should be proper judges, and which it is by no means convenient to lay before them; and when discords arise between one part of the people and another, it is much more difficult to compose them, when there is no monarch.

§ 5. 3. The chief advantages of all these constitutions are secured, and the chief disadvantages are avoided, by a *mixed monarchy;* especially in one that consists, like ours, of three states, one of which is to be chosen by the people, and to have the power of granting revenues to be raised on the subjects, while the prince has the power of making peace and war: such a constitution is therefore to be preferred.

§ 6. 4. That a kingdom should be *elective*, has indeed many advantages; especially, as it prevents the succession of an improper person, and moderates the temptation which the sovereign is under to enhance the prerogative of the crown, as also that which the nobles are under to oppress the people, if the people have any share in the election.

§ 7. 5. Yet it proves the occasion of so many factions, and where the kingdom is considerable, of so many destructive civil

wars, that the danger seems to be more than equal to the advantage.

§ 8. 6. The proper balance between both seems to be, that the right of *succession* should *generally* prevail; but that in case of any evident incapacity or male-administration, the next heir should be set aside by the other branches of the legislature[a]. *Valet propositio.*

§ 9. *Schol.* 1. Notwithstanding these general reasons, so much regard is to be had to the temper and usages of particular nations, that it might often be attended with dangerous consequences, to attempt a change, from a less to a more perfect form of government[b].

§ 10. 2. Instances of the oppression and misery, which have attended arbitrary governments, are to be seen every where, especially in ADDISON's Freeholder, No. x. KROUSINSKI's Rev. of Pers. vol. i. pass. KNOX's Ceylon, l. iii. c. 3, 4. HANWAY's Travels, vol. ii. p. 339—441.

§ 11. 3. The *commons* of Great-Britain have grown up to their present share in the government, by gradual advances. In the earlier reigns, particularly that of EDWARD I. (A. D. 1280.) the laws were enacted by the king and lords, the commons being only mentioned as *suppliants*. But what laid the foundation of their growing so considerable, was the grant, which, according to RAMSAY, HENRY VII. but indeed STEPHEN, HENRY II. and JOHN had long before his time made, to empower the lords to alienate their lands, which thus passing into the hands of the commons, who before were only their tenants, they became more considerable than before, as the proprietors of land in a state will always be[c].

a RAMS. of Gov. c. xv, xvi.
PUFF. de Jure, l. vii. c. v. § 22.
MOYLE's Works, vol. i. p. 57—61.
PUFF. de Off. l. ii. c. viii. § 4—8.
Spect. vol. iv. No. 287.
HOBBES's Leviath. c. xix.
SIDNEY on Gov. c. ii. § 16, 24, 27, 30.
L'Esprit des Loix, l. xi. c. 6. l. xix. c. 27.
Preceptor, vol. ii. p. 474—486*.

b TEMPLE's Ess. vol. i. p. 16, 17.
——— Works, vol. i. p. 70.

c RAPIN's Hist. of Eng. p. 155. Note.
RAMS. of Gov. p. 138—140, 147—149.
BACON's Henry VII. p. 12.
LYTTLET. Pers. Lett. No. 59—69.
SIDNEY on Gov. c. iii. § 10. p. 297 & § 28.
Preceptor, vol. ii. On Gov.
HURD's Dial. No. 5, 6†.

* A most ample vindication of the mixed form of government, is given in Mr. ADAMS's "Defence of the Constitution of the United States of America," in three volumes, octavo. K.

† Much information on this head may be derived from the early volumes of the "Parliamentary History;" SULLIVAN's "Law Lectures;" BLACKSTONE's "Commentaries on the Laws of England," vol. i. KING "on the English Constitution;" MILLAR "on the English Government;" Bishop ELLYS's "Essays on temporal Liberty," Tract the fourth; and the several volumes of Dr. HENRY's "History of Great Britain." For a review of the British constitution as it now stands, see PALEY's "Principles of moral and political Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 190—234; and Dr. BEATTIE's "Elements of moral Science," vol. ii. p. 394—454. A still more copious discussion of the subject is presented in Mr. Le LOLME's "Treatise on the Constitution of England." K.

LECT. LXXXI.

Of Obedience to Civil Rulers—Duels.

§ 1. *Prop.* VIRTUE requires, that obedience should be paid to civil rulers, in those things in which the authority of God is not apprehended to contradict their commands.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. Virtue requires that there should be communities. *Lect.* 76. § 3.

§ 3. 2. Affairs cannot be administered in communities, unless some civil rulers are appointed to manage them.

§ 4. 3. This appointment would be vain, unless obedience were to be generally paid to them, as above.

§ 5. 4. The refusal of such obedience to civil power tends to the ruin of communities.

§ 6. 5. Virtue requires they should be generally obeyed as above[a]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 7. *Cor.* 1. Reverence is to be paid to rulers; and in dubious cases, virtue will require us to put the mildest construction upon their actions, which they will reasonably bear[b]. *Vid. Lect.* 79. § 15.

§ 8. 2. Virtue will require us rather to acquiesce in their determinations, even where we imagine ourselves injured, than to disturb the public by taking our revenge into our own hands; unless it may be the probable means of freeing a country from an intolerable tyranny[c].

§ 9. 3. To chuse to determine points by single combat, rather than to refer them to the judgment of the magistrate, is to be condemned: as being a derogation from his authority, or opposition to his determination, as well as a rash exposing our own lives or that of others; and a probable means of introducing a wrong sense of honour, which may be detrimental to the lives and souls of many, who might otherwise be useful to the common-wealth[d].

a PUFF. de Jure, l. vii. c. viii. § 1.
HUTCHES. Syst. § vii. 2. ix. 17, 18.
b PUFF. ib. § 2.
c Killing no Murder, pass. ap. Harleian Miscell. (now separately published.)
d HALE's Gold. Rem. p. 107—115. 8vo. p. 90—96. 4to.
Spect. vol. ii. No. 97.
MONTESQ. Spirit of Laws, vol. ii. l. xxviii. c. xvii, xx, xxiv, xxv.
Freethinker, vol. i. No. xv.
DELANY's Serm. on Duelling, vol. ii.
WATTS on Self-Murder, § 6*.

* Dr. HEY has written a distinct tract against the practice of duelling; and Mr. MORE has exposed it somewhat at large at the end of his work on Suicide. K.

§ 10. *Schol.* 1. Marriages are to be made only as the civil law of any country directs, supposing there is nothing in the ceremony so directed, which shall appear unlawful to the parties concerned: and though private contracts are undoubtedly binding in the sight of God, yet they ought to be discouraged, and the offspring of such unauthorised marriages may justly be laid under some incapacities, in order to prevent the prevalency of them, which would be much more to the damage of society. And the same kind of observations and reasons may be applied to *divorces* and to *wills* in some degree, where the civil law determines the circumstances with which they shall be attended[a].

§ 11. 2. Princes are undoubtedly bound by their covenant with their people; for the reasoning *Lect* 69. § 4, &c. has a peculiar weight when applied to them. Some have questioned, whether a succeeding prince be bound by any concessions made by his predecessors: but there can be no room for such a debate, when a prince swears or even promises to govern according to law, and the concessions made by preceding princes have been, as they generally are, passed into civil laws. To say, that such concessions were sometimes forcibly extorted, and therefore are not obligatory, would be to destroy all the faith of treaties, and is bringing the thing back to the exploded scheme of passive obedience[b].

§ 12. *Prop.* Briefly to enquire into the mutual duties of masters and servants.

§ 13. *Sol.* 1. Servants owe to their masters diligence in their business, fidelity in any other trusts reposed in them, and such a reverence in their behaviour, as may both promote and express their obedience.

§ 14. 2. Masters owe to their *hired* servants a regular payment of their wages; to *all*, a proper care of their support during the time of service, and a kind and affable treatment: they are to see it, that they be neither unemployed, nor overwhelmed with business, beyond what their strength and time will admit, and that their minds be duly cultivated, according to the circumstances of life in which they are placed[c].

§ 15. *Dem.* The obligation to these duties on both sides, is evident from the nature of the relation, and those mutual covenants which generally attend it, in which these things are either expressly or tacitly stipulated[d].

a PUFF. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 36, sub fin.
b GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. xiv. § 10, 11.
c SPECT. vol. v. No. 107, & 137.
PALEY's Philos. vol. i. p. 236—238.
DELANY on Rel. Dut. Serm. v, x.
BEATTIE's Elem. vol. i. p. 150—153.
d TILLOTS. of Rel. Dut. p. 279—281.
HUTCHES. Syst. § iii. 1.
PUFF. de Off. l. ii. c. iv. § 1, 2.
GROVE's Lib. vol. ii. p. 509—511.

§ 16. *Schol.* 1. It is disputed, whether it be unlawful to buy men as slaves, and forcibly compel them to do service for life or a term of years. Some have thought the strength of body, and stupidity of mind, to be found among some parts of the human species, especially the *negroes*, intimate, that they were designed to be the drudges of the rest. But to admit such an argument might be attended with dangerous usurpations and contentions; for who does not think he has genius enough to command others? Nevertheless, if any case occurs, in which a man be justly condemned to be a slave by the laws of his country, it seems very allowable to buy him and use him as such: and if purchasing men for slaves out of the hands of their enemies, by whom they are taken prisoners, may be a means of preserving their lives, which in *Guinea* is often the case, it seems very allowable to purchase them; unless it prove the means of encouraging unreasonable and destructive wars, and the mischief occasioned thereby be greater than the good arising from the preservation of the lives of those already taken, and the fruit of their labours: which may possibly make the matter a greater difficulty than some imagine. Yet virtue will require, even in this case, that the slaves be treated with as much humanity as may be consistent with the safety of their master, and with a prudent care of his affairs [a].

§ 17. 2. It is questioned, whether a father may ever sell his child. Some have argued, but without reason, that fatherhood gives a right universally. It seems he only has it, when the constitution of a country appoints him the civil judge of his children; or when his circumstances are such, that the sale of his child in his minority is absolutely necessary for the supporting the lives of either or both of them [b]. *Lect.* 65. § 11.

a SHELGRAVE's Guin. p. 160, 161.
PUFF. de Off. l. 2. c. 3. § 2. Carmich.
Abridg. l. xv. sect. xxiv. p. 169.
Spirit of Laws, l. xv. c. ii. vol. i. p. 336—357.
HUTCHES. Syst. § v. 3. xiv. 3. iii. 2—5
GROVE's Ethics, vol. ii. p. 5, 11—13.
Spirit of Laws, l. xv. c. ii*.
b GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 5.
HUTCHES. Syst. c. ii. 5.
PUFF. de Jure, l. vi. c. ii. § 9.

* The question concerning negro slavery has lately received the most ample discussion. It may suffice to refer to Mr. RAMSAY's treatise on the subject; to Mr. CLARKSON's two publications, first on the iniquity, and secondly on the impolicy of the slave trade; to Mr. DICKSON's letters on slavery; and to Dr. BEATTIE's "Elements of Moral Science," vol. ii. p. 153—225. The poets have not been deficient in appearing on the side of justice and humanity. This is evident from Mr. DAY's and Mr. BICKNELL's "Dying Negro;" Miss HELEN WILLIAMS's epistle to Mr. PITT; Mrs. BARBAULD's address to Mr. Wilberforce; and "Slavery" a poem, written, as is supposed, by Mr. ROSCOE, of Liverpool. K.

Our charming poet, Mr. W. COWPER, has produced some fine small poems on the subject of slavery, but one of them entitled "The Morning Dream," inserted in the last edition of his works, and in his life by HAYLEY, is inimitably beautiful. W.

LECT. LXXXII.

Of Punishments.

§ 1. *Lem.* AS the word *punishment* occurs in the proposition, and is not defined, it may be proper here to give a definition of it, as a *lemma*, not to alter the number of the succeeding definitions; and it may be taken thus—PUNISHMENT is an evil inflicted, in consequence of an offence committed against the person by whom it is inflicted or appointed, whether under a public or private character.

§ 2. *Prop.* Virtue may permit, or even require the civil magistrate, not only to execute other heavy punishments upon offenders, but in some cases to take away their lives.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. Virtue requires that the civil magistrate endeavour to preserve the public peace and tranquility, which is the design of his office.

§ 4. 2. In order to this, it is necessary that effectual methods be taken to deter men from such crimes, as are ruinous to society, v. g. murder, treason, theft, &c.

§ 5. 3. The corruption of men is so great, that it evidently appears in fact, that they rush on to the commission of those crimes, even though they are made capital by the laws of their country.

§ 6. 4. There is great reason to believe, that if such crimes were not severely punished, and even sometimes with death, they would be much more frequently committed, and the community in time destroyed by them[a]. *Valet propositio* *.

§ 7. *Cor.* A regard to the public good may in some cases require, that an innocent person should be given up to calamity and even to death: v. g. if a man infected with the plague,

a PUFF. de Jure, l. viii. c. iii. § 6,7.
BECCARIA on Crimes.
PALEY'S Philos. vol. ii. p. 268—302.
GODWIN'S Polit. Just. vol. ii. p. 687—759.
HUTCHES. Syst. c. ix.
Principles of Penal Laws, passim. (Understood to have been written by WILLIAM EDEN, Esq. since Lord AUCKLAND.

* To the force of this reasoning there are some weighty objections. It does not appear in fact that to multiply capital punishments lessens the number or enormity of crimes. Hard labour, solitary confinement, &c. have been, and probably may, with proper management, be universally applied with better effect than capital punishments. An institution of confinement and labour, formed on a proper gradation of strictness, in proportion to the civil crimes and subsequent behaviour of delinquents, and on a large national scale, has never been sufficiently tried to justify a *demonstrative* decision on the inefficacy of such a plan, or the *necessity* of capital punishments. W.

were, in a frenzy, to run up and down to the evident hazard of spreading the contagion; and many add, when an innocent person is demanded by an enemy, against whom the public cannot defend itself*: it seems more justifiable to confiscate the estates of traitors, though thereby innocent children are impoverished: both that a regard to their family may prevent their conspiring against the government, and that the children of noble families may be less able to revenge the death of a father[a].

§ 8. *Schol.* 1. Considering how precious life is, and how much the fear of violent death would embitter the enjoyment of it, virtue requires that capital punishments should be sparingly used. For murder, none can doubt the reasonableness of them, but perhaps some methods might be found out in case of theft, that would strike the offender with so much terror, as to render capital punishments but seldom necessary; and the severity of DRACO, in introducing them on the smallest occasions, was greatly to be condemned[b].

§ 9. 2. Public executions ought to be managed with very great solemnity; and it would be prudent to make a difference between the kinds of death inflicted for different crimes; since perhaps some may be found, who would dread the pain and shame of some executions, even more than death itself[c].

§ 10. 3. It is questioned, whether a community have a right over its *exiles:* but that must be determined by the degree of severity attending the sentence; for if the exile possesses the revenues of an estate in that country from whence he is driven, it is evident that community has a right and power over him, more than it would otherwise have had[d].

a PUFF. ib. § 33. c. ii. § 5.
Considerations on the Laws of Forfeiture passim.
GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. xxv. § 3.
b MORE'S Utopia, p. 145, 146.
Spirit of Laws, vol. i. l. vi.
WHISTON'S Life, vol. ii. p. 415—470.
STANYAN'S Gr. Hist. p. 145, 149.
MITFORD'S Hist. of Gr. vol. i. p. 261, 262.
GILLIES'S Hist. of Gr. vol. i. 455.
Thoughts on the Extension of Penal Laws, passim.
c MANDEVILLE on Exec. c. iv. l. v.
d GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 25.
WARB. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 16, 17. and Notes.
BOTT against Warb. p. 75—78.

* To the principle here maintained some would object, that no case can happen in civil society in which *another* mode of answering the same end may not be devised, without sacrificing human lives; and that, where no positive command from the God of justice continues in force, virtue requires that human blood should be spared. It is further urged, that a christian, acting consistently, should consider the state of one soul, at the moment of death, of more importance than the temporal welfare of the greatest nation on the globe; that christian benevolence would be at no loss to invent methods of avoiding such an evil as is here specified; and that the power of avoiding evils in society would be greatly augmented by public countenance from the highest executive authority, and suitable provision of pecuniary rewards. W.

§ 11. 4. It is questioned, whether private persons have a right of killing those who invade them by violence. CIVILIANS generally state it thus: where communities are formed, it is to be considered whether it be the intent of the law, barely to *permit*, or also to *require* such executions: in the former case, v. g. if a man find another in adultery with his wife, or if a rape be attempted, or an assault made by a robber, the law, though it permits to kill the aggressor, and thereby frees the slayer from punishment, yet cannot justify the action before God. Yet where the law *requires* such resistance, as in the case of soldiers invading a country, then it becomes the duty of the subject to endeavour the destruction of such invaders. But it seems, that in the former case it is a person's *duty* too, when upon the best views he can form of the consequences, it appears probable, that the immediate slaughter of the aggressor will turn to the public good *: otherwise, it is a vicious indulgence of the passion of revenge: and those who believe a future state ought to be peculiarly solicitous, that they do not plunge even an enemy into irrecoverable misery, by cutting him off unnecessarily in the act of his crime [a]. *Lect.* 65. § 10.

LECT. LXXXIII.

Laws of Nations—War.

§ 1. *Def.* THOSE rules, which by a tacit consent are agreed upon among all communities, at least among those who are reckoned the polite and humanized part of mankind, are called the LAWS OF NATIONS [b].

§ 2. *Prop.* The laws of nations are to be regarded.

a GROT. ibid. l. ii. c. xx. § 17.
PUFF. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 11, 14.
GROVE'S Mor. Philos. vol. ii. p. 353—364.

b GROT. ibid. Proleg. § 17.
GROVE'S Mor. Philos. vol. ii. p. 96.
Spirit of Laws, vol. i. p. 7, 8.

* To this representation it may be objected, that the *public good* is no proper standard of moral and christian obligation, and ought never to determine our actions in violation of a moral principle; that the consideration of *utility*, whether to ourselves or the public, should never bear sway but where the act itself is indifferent; that, consequently, "the best views a person can form of the consequences," especially the views of an affrighted person, can never sanctify a deed. His "best views," or what "appears probable," must serve him as a guide, but do not constitute any part of his path of duty. *Obligations*, and the *apprehensions* of the obliged, are widely different considerations; and, in the present imperfect state, oftener differ than coincide. W.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. Communities have certain affairs, which must of necessity be transacted between them.

§ 4. 2. Disputes may arise upon these, which cannot be determined by the peculiar civil laws of either of the contending parties.

§ 5. 3. Recourse must in that case be had to the laws of nations, to prevent disputes which might otherwise be very mischievous.

§ 6. 4. Mutual regard must be paid to these laws[a]. *2. E. D.*

§ 7. *Def.* WAR is a state, wherein men endeavour by open violence to hurt and destroy the persons or possessions of each other[b].

§ 8. *Cor.* War is a great evil, and virtue will require us to avoid engaging in it, unless circumstances should arise, in which it should appear necessary for the greater good of mankind. *Vid. Lect.* 65.

§ 9. *Prop.* Virtue may in some cases permit, and even require that men should engage in war.

§ 10. *Dem.* 1. The injustice of some is so great, that men will not be able to secure their possessions and their lives in many cases, unless they oppose force to force.

§ 11. 2. Persons violently opposing their inoffensive neighbours, without just cause, are so far from being valuable members, that they are the pests of society.

§ 12. 3. By attempting to destroy such invaders, we may not only secure ourselves, but also many others who might afterwards be swallowed up by them, especially if their power of hurting were strengthened by our submission or destruction.

§ 13. 4. Cases may occur, in which opposing force to force may tend to the public good, i. e. in which virtue may allow and require us to engage in war[c]*. § 7. *Lect.* 65. *2. E. D.*

a HUTCHES. Syst. vol. ii. p. 350, 351.
VATTEL's Le Droit de Gens, and Questions de Droit Naturel.
b GROT. de Jure, l. i. c. i. § 2.
PUFF. de Jure, l. i. c. i. § 8.
c GROT. ibid. l. i. c. ii. § 1—3.
PUFF. ibid. l. viii. c. vi. § 7.
[illegible] p. 423—426.
CARMICH. in Puff. de Off. l. i. c. v. § 13. p. 122, 123.
GODWIN's Polit. Just. vol. ii. p. 511—525.

* On the other side of this question it has been pleaded, that no benevolent person holds war to be desirable *for its own sake*, if the public welfare can be secured without it—that the public welfare *may* be secured, on pacific principles directed by wisdom, without war, to such a degree as is consistent with the real interest of christians, though probably not so far as to secure national aggrandizement, or any one uninterrupted form of government—that if in *any* case the distinguishing protection of a superintending providence may be expected, it must be while exercising the

§ 14. The argument urged in this demonstration only proves *defensive* war to be lawful: it is questioned whether it is ever lawful to engage in an *offensive* war.

§ 15. *Ans.* It is certainly inhuman, and therefore vicious, to begin to hurt unprovoked; and considering the many calamities brought on mankind by war, virtue will require us to abhor the thought of increasing our dominions and possessions by the ruin of innocent persons; nevertheless, self-defence will require us to take up arms, before we are actually invaded, as it may prevent the intended invasion, and the mutual slaughter which would be consequent upon it, and will indeed be necessary in order to sustain the first shock, which would otherwise be fatal to the party unprepared: nay, a regard to our own safety may require us to invade and subdue the country of the aggressor, and to push on our conquest, till he is disabled from doing us further mischief.

§ 16. As to the question, whether it is lawful to take up arms, in defence of the injured subjects of another state, to preserve their civil and religious liberties, it must be determined by the prospect of good arising from such a war: if there be an

most benevolent dispositions towards our enemies—that there is a manifest difference between the christian dispensation and all preceding ones, with respect to the exercise of justice and mercy; the prominent feature of each preceding dispensation was that of *justice* divinely executed, and often in the way of resistance, retaliation, and death; but that of the gospel is benevolence tempered with *mercy* towards all men, and most expressly to our enemies—that the language of *prophecy* concerning the design of the gospel, and the genuine effects of its prevalence, is highly pacific—with which accords the angelic anthem at the Saviour's birth—that the spirit and language manifested in our Lord's doctrine and discourses, and those of his inspired servants recorded in the New Testament, are full of those principles which are utterly *inconsistent* with fighting—that the manner in which they *exemplified* their principles clearly shew that they resisted not evil to the real injury of any—that, on the contrary principle, no one can be a *martyr* to doctrinal or moral truth; for, to fall in a contest because *weak*, or destitute of means to *crush* the adverse power, is not martyrdom—that it is unreasonable to expect the fulfilment of prophecies, in a state of universal peace, while the pacific system is rejected; for there will always remain, in the best of men, so much imperfection as will be construed by their neighbours, equally imperfect, *injustice*; and if injustice be a sufficient cause of fighting there never can be a prospect of continued peace in this world—that those who have adopted the pacific side, from conscience, have actually found the smiles of providence; and in case of suffering, an inward feast—that, moreover, those who hold the unlawfulness of fighting may consistently *defend* themselves, in the proper sense of the word; that is, so far as defence can be effected without offering *violence* or *irreparable injury* to another—that the pacific principle, which discards all threats and hostile menaces, is conciliating, by the exercise of benevolence, meekness, wisdom, reason; by negociations, concessions, and self-denial—that it does not prohibit a christian from holding the reins of civil government, as long as they can be held without bloodshed—that it does not forbid *coercion*, while the life is preserved and the lasting welfare of the individual is consulted. W.

apparent probability, that tyrannical power may be reduced, and the happiness of other states as well as that invaded may thereby be promoted, it seems lawful on the common principles of humanity [a].

§ 17. *Def.* PUBLIC WAR is that which is undertaken and managed by the authority of the community; PRIVATE is that which is undertaken and managed without it [b].

§ 18. *Cor.* Private war may sometimes be necessary, where the assault is too sudden to allow an act of the community to authorise resistance. (*Vid. Lect.* 82. § 11. But generally where the prospect of danger is more remote, it is very unwarrantable for persons to form themselves into military bodies, without commission from the civil magistrate; even though it be on pretence of warding off the enemy. Yet it must be acknowledged, there may be cases of public danger so extreme, that the force of the civil law may seem for that time to be suspended; and it is the business of every good man, conscientiously to judge for himself, when these cases occur; and the business of every wise and good state, to indemnify by a law such acts as shall appear to have been so necessitated, though not being foreseen they could not have been provided for by laws *a priori* [c].

§ 19. *Schol.* 1. Subjects may not, even when commanded by their prince, engage in any war which they are *fully persuaded* is unjust, but if it appears a *dubious* point to them, the same obligation does not hold; for otherwise, common soldiers could hardly ever engage at all, since they seldom have or can have a full view of all the circumstances of the affair. Nevertheless officers in the higher ranks are under greater obligations to enquire critically into it, both as they have much better opportunity of information than their soldiers, and as the part they are to act in carrying on the war is of much greater importance [d].

§ 20. 2. He who offered the injury may defend himself, when the party injured has refused an equitable satisfaction proposed; in that case, the party injured becomes the aggressor: much more may subjects defend themselves, even when their prince has been to blame, if the enemy endeavour to avenge the quarrel, not on the person of the prince, but on his innocent subjects [e].

a PUFF. ibid. § 3.
BURN. on Art. p. 261.
GROT. ibid. l. ii. c. xx. § 41—43.
b GROT. ibid. l. i. c. iii. § 1.
c GROT. ibid. § 2.
d GROT. ibid. l. ii. c. xxvi. § 3—5.
PUFF. ibid. § 4.
BURN. Art. p. 262.
e GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. i. § 18; c. xxvi. § 6.
PUFF. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 19.
Telemaque, l. xxi. p. 451—453.

LECT. LXXXIV.

Of War—Stratagems—Assassinations—Conquest.

§ 1. *Schol.* 3. THE violence of war is to be attempered, as much as may be consistent with securing the good ends proposed by it. An unnecessary waste of the enemies goods, (*Vid. Deut.* xx. 19, 20.) and much more of their blood, is to be avoided, and especially rapes, which injure the person by, as well as those upon whom they are committed; nor are women and children to be slaughtered, unless women be found active in war, and then they are to be treated as other soldiers. But it is to be observed, that we here, and in all this part of the work, speak only of war as undertaken on the principles of the common rights of mankind, not pretending to dispute the right which God has to doom any of his creatures to death, in such circumstances as he shall see fit, and to make some of them executioners on others [a].

§ 2. 4. It is questioned how far *stratagems* in war are lawful.

Ans. It may be lawful to deceive the enemy by dubious actions, which may probably be interpreted wrong; and the rather, as there is a kind of universal agreement to suspect each other, where no treaties are commenced, so that faith among men is not so much injured by these as by other deceits. Yet there is a degree of honour to be observed even towards an enemy, and a direct lie, especially a false oath, should by no means be allowed [b].

§ 3. 5. The laws of nations are to be observed in war; and these forbid violating the persons of *embassadors*, (seeing this would make wars perpetual, as none would venture to mediate a peace) hiring soldiers to assassinate their general, or subjects their prince, and poisoning the enemy by weapons, water, or any other method [c].

§ 4. 6. It is much queried, whether temples dedicated to God may be spoiled of their treasures by the conqueror.

Ans. Those treasures being in some degree still the property of the state, and therefore used in times of great extremity for its defence, the conqueror may justly seize them; yet care

a GROT. de Jure, l. iii. c. iv. § 19. c. xiii. § 4.
HUTCHES. Syst. 3. x. 6.

b GROT. de Jure, l. iii. c. i. § 17, 20. c. xix. § 1.
PUFF. de Jure, l. viii. c. vi. § 6.
Telemaque, l. xx. p. 426—432.
HUTCHES. ibid. § 5.

c GROT. ibid. l. iii. c. iv. § 15—18. l. ii. c. xviii. § 2, 3, 7.
PUFF. ibid. § 18.
MORE'S Utopia, p. 158—164.
HUTCHES. ibid. § 12—14.

should be taken to avoid any circumstances of rudeness and irreverence, lest by that means religion should be brought into contempt [a].

§ 5. *Prop.* To enquire how far government may justly be founded in conquest.

§ 6. *Sol. and Dem.* 1. The victor in a just war may see it necessary (in order to repair the expences and losses sustained, in order to punish those who have been injurious to the public peace, and that he may prevent future assaults from the vanquished) to make himself king of a conquered country, and to model the laws of it in such a manner as he shall on the whole judge fit, and he may be justified in doing it. Nevertheless, if the persons so conquered enter themselves into no engagements to him, it may reasonably be expected that they should take the first opportunity to throw off his yoke, and they are not obliged to submit to it so much as that of their natural sovereign: yet virtue will require them to be cautious, that they do not make their own condition and that of the public worse, by a precipitate resistance.

§ 7. 2. If a prince, by an unjust war, or any other unrighteous method, have possessed himself of the government, and uses it well, though he gained it ill, virtue will require, that he be obeyed; at least till the person to whom it belongs be able and willing to assert his right, with some probable prospect of success: for it is certainly better, that an usurper should govern, than that there should be no government at all.

§ 8. 3. It seems reasonable, that if the rightful prince, or at least his immediate successor be not able to assert his claim, but the government continue for a considerable time in the hands or family of an usurper, long possession should make up the defect of an original title; lest the encouragement of antiquated claims should throw nations into confusion, and by a parity of reason, private families too [b].

§ 9. *Schol.* The rights of hostages and captives are to be settled by the law of nations: but it is plain, that neither hostages, when upon public faith, nor slaves, when they have by compact obliged themselves to their masters, may be allowed to desert, unless extreme injury be offered [c].

a GROT. de Jure, l. iii. c. xii. § 6.
PRIDEAUX's Connect. vol. ii. p. 25, 26.
An. ante C. 278. vol. iii. p. 35.
Works of the Learned, for March 1738. Art. 16.
b PUFF. de Jure, l. viii. c. vi. § 24. l. vii. c. vii. § 3, 4. c. viii. § 9, 10.
LOCKE of Gov. part ii. c. xvi, xvii.
RAMS. of Gov. c. viii.
L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. l. x. c. iii—ix.
HUTCHES. Syst. 3. viii. 4—8.
c GROT. de Jure, l. iii. c. xiv. § 7 l. iii. c. xix. § 5.

LECT. LXXXV.

Of Human or Personal Virtues.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO enquire into the principal branches of human or personal virtue.

§ 2. *Sol. and Dem.* 1. Since the happiness of a rational creature must chiefly depend upon the state of his own mind, virtue requires that great care be taken of it, particularly to furnish it with such knowledge as may be delightful and useful[a].

§ 3. 2. As we may by an heedless conduct be betrayed into numberless evils, virtue requires that we should attentively consider our circumstances in life, and often reflect on our conduct[b].

§ 4. 3. Since we are compounded of body as well as mind, virtue will require a proper care of the body, that on the one hand, it may not want any thing necessary for its subsistence, health and vigour; and on the other, that it may not be indulged in such excesses, as however pleasant at first, might at length enfeeble and destroy it[c].

§ 5. 4. As it is impossible to be happy, while our minds are the sport of irregular appetites and passions, virtue will require a due guard upon these; that the agreeable things of life may not be objects of excessive desire, hope, or joy; and that the evils of it may not overwhelm us with fear, with grief, or resentment, nor its uncertainty with excessive solicitude[d].

§ 6. 5. As many disorders of body and mind may take their rise from idleness, virtue will on the preceding principles require, that we keep ourselves in a series of useful employments, and labour to improve every portion of our time well, proper allowance being made for such recreation as animal nature requires[e].

§ 7. 6. That we may not be led into undertakings disproportioned to our strength, that we may not expect too high regard from others, nor be too keenly impressed with a sense of slights and injuries, as well as for many other important reasons, virtue will require us to moderate our opinion of ourselves, in

a FOSTER's Serm. vol. iv. 1.
GROVE's Posth. Works, vol. ii. No. 11—13.
ABERNETHY's Disc. vol. ii. No. 5.
b LARDNER's Counsels of Prudence.
GROVE's Eth. vol. ii. p. 221—242.
c COLLIER's Essays, part ii. No. 17.
STUBBE's Dial. on Pleas.
Protest. Syst. vol. ii. No. 12.
FORDYCE's Serm. on the Love of Pleasure.
ABERNETHY's Disc. vol. ii. No. 16.
d WATTS on the Passions, § 15—24.
GROVE's Posth. Works, vol. iv. No. 6.
——— Eth. p. 257—287.
e BALGUY's Serm. vol. ii. No. 8.
GROVE on Recreations; passim.

proportion to the degree and value of our real advantages, whether of mind, of body, or estate[a].

§ 8. 1. It may be observed, that the first and second of these steps comprehend *prudence* and *consideration*, the third *temperance*, *chastity* and *mortification*, the fourth *fortitude*, *contentment*, *meekness* and *moderation*, the fifth *diligence*, the last *humility*; and thus the distribution in effect coincides with those of SCOTT, WRIGHT, &c.

§ 9. 2. Thoughts tending to vice are no further criminal, than as they are approved and indulged by the will[b]. *Def.* 38.

§ 10. 3. Though a constant care should be taken (on the principles laid down § 4.) to maintain such moderation, in the articles of food, dress, sleep, &c. as may prevent the mind from being enslaved to the body; and though it be prudence in us to inure ourselves to such hardships, as may be expected in a worthy and honourable passage through life; it is by no means necessary to deny ourselves in every thing which gives pleasure to the senses: for God has placed us in such circumstances, that some pleasures are unavoidable, (the benevolence of his nature no doubt engaging him to delight in the happiness of his creatures;) it is therefore ingratitude to him, as well as injustice to ourselves, to throw back his gifts upon his hands, as if they were snares rather than favours. To which we may add, that in the circumstances in which mankind now is, were all the elegances and ornaments of life to be renounced, many families must be undone, who are now maintained by an honest labour in furnishing them out, and maintained more cheerfully, and indeed more safely, than they could merely by alms[c].

§ 11. *Prop.* To enquire into some of the principal means of promoting virtue in the soul.

§ 12. *Sol. and Dem.* 1. Virtue may be promoted by attentive hearing and reading discourses on divine subjects, and seriously meditating upon them; all which may serve to assist us in forming right notions of God, and in judging of our duty, and may awaken us to the practice of it.

§ 13. 2. External acts of adoration and praise may promote as well as express inward veneration[d].

a COLLIER's Ess. part i. No. 1.
WATTS on Humility.
SCOTT's Christian Life, vol. i. c. iii. § 1.
CARMICH. Suppl. to PUFF. de Off. l. i. c. v. § ii.
GROVE's Serm. vol. v. No. 10, 11.
PRICE on Morals, p. 205—293.
[illegible] Elem. vol. ii. p. 105—123.
WILKINS's Great Concern, p. 113—125.
FORDYCE's Mor. Phil. l. ii. § 2.
GROVE's Eth. vol. ii. part ii. c. ii—v.

b OSTERV. of Unclean. § 1. c. vii. p. 72—74.

c PHILEM. to HYDASPES, part ii. prop. p. 26—64, 91, ad fin.

d ATTERB. Posth. Serm. vol. ii. No. vii. p. 191—207.

§ 14. 3. Earnest and frequent prayers to God may greatly tend to promote virtue: for though they can neither inform nor move him, yet they may bring us to a proper temper for receiving his mercies. And if any object, that God has established such an order of things, as he will not alter in compliance with the intreaties of his creatures; it may be replied, that this order was no doubt established in connection with, and in correspondence to the view, which the divine being always had of the prayers and temper of his rational creatures: and husbandry, and all the most necessary labours of life, might as reasonably be argued against, as prayer, on the force of this objection[a].

§ 15. 4. It is proper that men should meet in religious assemblies, to join in divine worship; as thereby a public honour is done to God, and the hearts of men may be fixed and quickened by beholding the devotion of each other[b].

§ 16. 5. It is proper that some person should be appointed, whose chief business it should be to preside in these assemblies; since by this means, religious offices will be performed in a manner most tending to common edification.

§ 17. 6. Lest the civil business of some should interfere with the religious appointment of others, it is proper that some time should be set apart by common consent for religious purposes: besides, that the rest of beasts and servants may require

a BURN. Life of ROCH. p. 52, 53, 60—64.
STEBBING on Div. Rec. p. 36—42.
BENS. of Prayer, p. 13—21.
IBBOTT's Serm. vol. ii. 10—12.
Relig. of Nat. p. 103, 104.
LEECHMAN's Serm. on Prayer, præs. p. 14—25. Glasg. Ed.
SHERLOCK on Prov. p. 391—402.
PRICE's Dissert. ii.
OGDEN on Prayer.
KIPPIS's Serm. vii.
PALEY's Philos. vol. ii. p. 31—47.
GROVE on Secret Prayer, Ess. i.
KING's Orig. of Evil.
ADERS. on Attrib. vol. ii. p. 401—415.
Relig. of Nat. p. 103, 104
LEECHMAN's Serm. on Prayer; præs. p. 14, 24, 25.

b COLLIB. on Nat. and Rev. Rel. p. 25.
PRICE's Dissert. p. 257—267.
BEATTIE's Elem. vol. ii. p. 84—87.
Protest. Syst. vol. ii. Serm. 8.
BEATTIE's Elem. vol. ii. p. 84—87*.

* The authority, propriety, and utility of public worship have lately been called in question by the Rev. GILBERT WAKEFIELD, in an enquiry concerning that subject. To this publication answers were given by a lady, under the name of EUSEBIA; in "Cursory Remarks on an Enquiry, &c." by Mrs. BARBAULD; in "Remarks on Mr. WAKEFIELD's Enquiry," by JAMES WILSON, M. A. in "A Defence of Public or Social Worship," by Dr. PRIESTLEY; in "Letters to a young Man," by the Rev. J. BRUCKNER; in Thoughts on Public Worship," by Mr. BURGES; in "Remarks, &c." by Mr. PARRY; in "A Vindication of Public and Social Worship," by Mr. POPE, in his essay entitled "Divine Worship, founded in Nature, and supported by Scripture Authority;" and in "Remarks, &c." by a Layman. Two sermons were likewise preached and published upon the question; one by Dr. DISNEY, and the other by Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. WAKEFIELD, in his "General Reply to the Arguments against the Enquiry into Public Worship," has partly given up the point; and in the second edition of his "Enquiry," he has sketched a plan of public worship in which he could acquiesce. The controversy seems now to be for ever decided; and it has had the advantage of shewing that the practice of public and social worship stands supported upon the unquestionable foundation of reason and scripture. K.

some such appointments; which therefore have made a part of the religious constitution of almost all nations [a].

§ 18. 7. It may be proper that fasting should sometimes be joined with other acts of divine worship, to promote more intense devotion, to express our humiliation for sin, and to promote that command of the mind over the body, which is suited to the constitution of a rational being [b].

LECT. LXXXVI.

Of Prayer—Forms—Liturgies—Ceremonies, &c.

§ 1. *Schol.* 1. THOSE things are only to be asked of God in prayer, which are of some considerable importance, by which our truest happiness may probably be promoted, and which there appears some hope of obtaining: and where it is dubious, as with respect to many temporal enjoyments it is, whether obtaining our petitions will be on the whole for our advantage, we are to ask these things only conditionally, with a becoming submission to the superior wisdom of God [c].

§ 2. 2. It is questioned, whether we may pray for what we are sure God will give or do.

Ans. There can be no doubt of this, if our asking it be the *condition* of its being bestowed or done: nor can we, without a revelation be absolutely sure of any future event, how probable soever: and it seems, that if a promise were absolutely given, we might justly plead it with God in prayer, thereby to promote our conformity to the divine will, our expectation of the blessing, and fitness to receive it: but such prayers ought to be managed, so as not to intimate any doubt of the divine veracity, but on the contrary to express a firm and joyful reliance upon it.

§ 3. 3. It is allowed, that *forms* of prayer may help the ignorant and weak, and may prevent public devotion from falling into that contempt, of which there might otherwise be danger, when such persons are to officiate; as also from being made the vehicle of conveying the errors and irregular passions, which particular persons so officiating might otherwise mingle with them: they may also be useful in secret and family-wor-

a WATTS's Holin. of Times and Places, p. 3—5. FOST. Serm. on the Morality of the Sabbath.
b LIMB. Theol. l. v. c. lxxv. § 5, 6.
ANDREW's Dial. on Devot.
c JUVEN. Sat. x.
PLATO's Alcibiades. II.

ship; and even to persons of the best capacity, in seasons when they are out of frame for the duty. Yet it is very unreasonable, that persons in public or private should be confined to forms; since they cannot suit all circumstances, and a frequent repetition of the same words tends to deaden those affections, which ought to accompany prayer.

§ 4. The chief objections against *extemporary* or *free* prayer are,

1. That the mind cannot, without great disturbance and dissipation of thought, give that attention and examination to it, which is necessary to a rational assent and concurrence.

2. That the auditory may be disquieted with the fear, lest the person officiating should fall into some impropriety or absurdity of expression, inconsistent with the reverence due to the divine being, and the improvement of his fellow-worshippers.

§ 5. To the *former* we reply, by appealing to experience as an evidence of the quickness of the mind in its operations, to which the quickness of words bears but little proportion. A probable guess may be made at the tendency of a sentence from its beginning, especially when due care is taken that sentences be not drawn out to an immoderate length, and when any book supposed sacred, furnishes out much of the language.—As to the *latter*, experience also shews, that persons of no extraordinary genius are capable of praying without gross absurdity or impropriety of expression; so that where the abilities of the person are known, the probability of his running into them is so small, as not at all to affect the mind; and there is a possibility, that a *reader* may mistake[a].

§ 6. *Schol.* 4. Where liturgies are established by public authority, great care ought to be taken that there be no phrases in them likely to lead men into hurtful mistakes: seeing the veneration quickly contracted for such offices, would render it exceeding difficult to eradicate an error so imbibed.

§ 7. 5. It is our duty to pray for *others;* since hereby our benevolence for them is expressed and increased, and it is the only way by which we can express it to far the greatest part of our species[b].

§ 8. 6. It is the duty of the community to take care that

a BENNET's Abridg. of Lond. Cases, p. 72—78.
[illegible]
LEIBNITZ's Theod. of Chris. Relig. c. iv. p. 398, 399, [illegible].
TAYLOR's Script. Account of Prayer.
PALEY's Mor. Phil. Vol. ii. p. 93—97.
JACKS. on Lord's Prayer, pref. p. 7.
LIMB. Theol. l. v. c. xxv. § 28.
HALL. Char. of a Trimmer, p. 45, 46.
BANT. Works, vol. i. p. 671.
WESLEY's Misc. p. 202—213.
b PRICE's Dissert. No. 2.

there be able teachers, of a virtuous character, that so virtue may be promoted in it. Nothing therefore should be done to deter fit persons from undertaking the work, by subscriptions, oaths, &c. which would be most likely in some cases to exclude the most valuable men. It is also fit, that the community by whom they are employed should allow them such subsistence, that they may pursue their studies without avocation, and may be fitted for performing their office, in a manner most honourable to the divine being, and most edifying to those among whom they officiate[a].

§ 9. 7. Great care ought to be taken that religion be not over-burdened with ceremonies; for the mind of man is of so limited a nature, that by an over exact attendance to these, greater things will probably be neglected; and the diversity of tastes, education, &c. will probably lead men into differences with respect to them, which, if they be too much regarded, will be very detrimental to that benevolence which they ought to maintain for each other[b].

§ 10. 8. Though prayer and praise have been mentioned above, as the *means* of virtue, yet they are not *only* to be considered in that view; they are certainly a part of the duty we owe to God, as well as proper means of disposing us to the other branches of virtue: and it would appear unnatural, under a deep sense of our dependence upon, and our obligations to the divine being, never to express it in any kind of address to him, though we believe him continually present with us[c].

LECT. LXXXVII.

Of Persecution for Religion.

§ 1. *Prop.* VIRTUE requires, that the civil magistrate should not so interpose in matters of religion, or rites of worship, as to inflict any penalties on his subjects upon account of them, so long as nothing is done prejudicial to the peace of the community.

§ 2. *Dem.* I. 1. Virtue, and consequently religion, which is that branch of it that more immediately relates to God, consists not merely in the external performance of an action, but in

a PEES of Maintenance.
Ho[illegible] vol. ii. p. 310—312.
b TIND. Christianity as old, &c. p. 123. 124.
GERDIL'S Tract., vol. iv. p. 205—225.
c PRICE'S Dissert. No. 2.

a correspondent temper and disposition of soul. *Lect.* 62. § 3, 4.

§ 3. 2. Compulsion only influences the external actions, and can by no means convince the understanding.

§ 4. 3. Such severities cannot make men religious, but are rather likely to make them hypocrites.

§ 5. 4. Persecution for conscience-sake must be prejudicial to the public, by corrupting the characters of men.

§ 6. 5. The persons persecuted must probably be brought into a very unhappy condition by it: for if they renounce their profession, they subject themselves to great remorse, while they secretly believe it to be true; and if they maintain it, penalties are incurred, by which ruin may be brought on themselves and their families.

§ 7. 6. The minds of men are naturally prejudiced in favour of a religion, for which men suffer hardships, though they do nothing injurious to the public peace.

§ 8. 7. Persecutions may promote the cause they are intended to destroy, and by increasing the number of its votaries may occasion insurrections, which may be extremely detrimental to the public tranquillity [a].

§ 9. 8. The magistrate by interposing in these cases, would prejudice the public rather than serve it, and therefore virtue requires him to forbear such interpositions [b].

§ 10. *Schol.* The history of religion in most countries, and the many calamities which have arisen from persecution, greatly tend to illustrate and confirm the last steps of this demonstration; and perhaps there is no part of history more instructive, though none be more melancholy [c].

§ 11. *Dem.* II. 1. There are a variety of religions in the world, which are so inconsistent, that it is impossible they should all be true.

§ 12. 2. If it be the duty of the magistrate to establish and defend *any* religion by penalties, he must establish and defend that which he takes to be true.

a TERT. ad Scap. c. v. ad fin. Apol. c. i.
b MOYLE's Posth. Works, vol. i. p. 24—26.
WARBURT. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 304, 305.
OWEN's Syn. Pneum. p. 137—139.
TIND. Rights Christian Church, part i. c. i. § 20.
WATTS on Civ. Power in Things Sacr. § 3, 7, 10.
FOWNES on Toler.
FURNEAUX on Toler.
———'s Letters to BLACKSTONE.
MONTESQ. Spirit of Laws, l. xxv. c. xiii. vol. ii. p. 153—159.
DODDRIDGE's Serm. on Persec.
Old Whig, vol. i. No. v, vi, viii, ix, x.
FOST. Serm. vol. i. No. vi.
c Occas. Pap. vol. i. No. iv. p. 18—22.
TEMP. Netherl. p. 166—169, 175.
GLEDES's Account of the Inquisit. ap. Tracts, vol. i.
GEDDES's Hist. of the Expulsion of the Moriscoes, ibid. vol. i.
New Advent. of Telemachus.
CHANDLER's Hist. of Persecut. pass.

§ 13. 3. There is reason to believe that the generality of men take their own religion to be true.

§ 14. 4. Many magistrates in the world, and perhaps the greatest part of them would be obliged (if the contrary to the proposition were true) to persecute truth, and establish falshood[a]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 15. *Schol.* 1. To the whole reasoning in § 2—9. it is objected, that some errors in opinion and in worship are so displeasing to God, that the toleration of them would quickly bring down his vengeance upon the public, which it is the magistrates' business to endeavour to preserve.

Ans. It seems that opinions and practices so provoking to God must be highly contrary to reason, and therefore that the prevalency of them might be prevented by a rational debate, without having recourse to violence: and if in some few instances they should prevail, there may be danger, lest God should be more provoked by attempting to root them out, by methods so detrimental to human society, and to the cause of truth, § 11—14. which this objection itself supposes to be the cause of God. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged, that if God should give any nation convincing proofs, that he would visit it with some extraordinary calamity and judgment, if any particular religion were violated among them, this would indeed alter the case, and justify such a magistrate in fencing it with such penal laws, as in other cases would be unjustifiable: but if a magistrate rashly concludes this to be the case of the people under his government, he is answerable to God for all those injuries which he may do them and religion upon this false supposition: and as for *christianity*, it does not treat with *nations* as *such*; nor does the new testament contain declarations of vengeance against the nations rejecting it, however virtuous they may be, but only treats with *particular persons*, as those who shall be finally happy or miserable, as it is received or rejected.

§ 16. 2. To § 6. it is objected, that it may be kindness to the person suffering, to endeavour by such severity to reclaim him from such notions and practices, which (supposing what is generally granted in this debate, the immortality of the soul) may expose him to the danger of eternal ruin.

Ans. It appears by § 4. that persecution is not the way to prevent it, but rather to bring on further guilt, by adding hy-

[a] Old Whig, vol. i. No. xxxiii. | PRICE's Morals, p. 313, 314.

pocrisy to error: and if it be said, that by this means at least others are preserved; it is answered, that the evidence of truth itself may be sufficient, without violence, to preserve men from such gross and dangerous errors as the objection supposes. If it be further pleaded, that the corruption of their natures will lead them to error, if human terrors be not employed to restrain them from it; it may be answered, persecution tends to beget a suspicion in their minds of the cause to be supported by it: the magistrate cannot by any means prevent and cure all the secret abominations of the heart, but many of them must be referred to the judgment of God: and upon this principle, it might be allowable to persecute any notion whatsoever, which the fury and uncharitableness of the magistrate might call a damnable error.

§ 17. 3. To § 3. it is objected, that severity may bring men to examine, and examination may introduce a rational conviction.

Ans. Arguments so offered are not likely to work upon the mind, and the magistrate seems to have done his part, if he has taken care the argument should be fairly, clearly, and strongly proposed; nor is it worth while to risk so much evil, for the sake of people that will not be persuaded to enquire; especially since the generality of such people usually go into the prevailing religion, which is that of the magistrate, and rest there [a].

§ 18. 4. To the argument of § 11—14. it is generally replied, that none are obliged to use violence in defence of their religion, but those whose religion is true. But then the question returns, who is that person? Every man will say it is he; and the controversy will be eternal, and all the mischief arising from it perpetual, unless some one person or body of men can give the world convincing proof, that they are in the right; and then there will be no further room for persecution, even on the principles of our adversaries [b].

§ 19. 5. Many insist upon the right of punishing those who *teach* false religions; though they confess that men are not to be obliged to profess the true. But seeing a man may think himself obliged in conscience, to endeavour the propagation of religion, as well as himself to believe and practice it, most of the reasonings in both *demonstrations* will take place here. Nevertheless, we readily allow, that the magistrate, or any religious

a GROT. de Jure, 2, 20, 24. SHAFTS. Charact. vol. iii, p. 107. LOCKE's Ess. B. iv. c. xvi. § 4.

b BAYLE's Philos. Comment. on Luke xiv. 23. CONYB. Serm. on Exped. of Rev. p. 17—21.

community, may deprive a teacher of any salary or emolument, given him at first as a teacher of truth, if he appear in the judgment of that person or society to become a teacher of error: but this by no means comes within the case condemned in the proposition [a].

§ 20. 6. The doctrines of atheism, human sacrifices, and community of women or goods, are so evidently detrimental to society, that many who have in general condemned penal laws in religion, have allowed them with regard to these, as well as to those who deny the essential difference between virtue and vice.

We readily allow, that if by any *overt act* in consequence of these doctrines, any subjects of the society be injured, the aggressor ought to be severely punished, and his pretences to conscience to be admitted as no excuse in these cases or any others. But these notions are so notoriously absurd, that there is little danger, that upon a free examination they should prevail, especially in a civilized country; and the danger there would be of admitting persecution, on any pretence whatsoever, seems an equivalent for the damage the public would sustain, by permitting them to be publicly defended, while they reached no farther than speculation [b].

§ 21. 7. If a body of men, as the *papists* among us, hold principles, which will not allow them to give the government security for their peaceable behaviour, and yet bring them under strong suspicion of being engaged in designs subversive of it, the government may in that case weaken them by heavier taxations than are laid upon other subjects; especially if the probable suspicion of their disaffection puts the public to any additional charge: and it seems only so far as this principle will justify it, that our laws against the *papists* can be vindicated, on the foot of natural religion, not now to enquire into any supposed revelation [c].

§ 22. 8. Some have represented all encouragement given to one religious profession in preference to another, as a degree of persecution: but this seems to be carrying the matter into

a Scotch Confess. Pref. p. 52—58.
Old Whig, No. iv. p. 37, 38.
b WARBURTON'S Alliance between Church and State, p. 118—121.
Old Whig, vol. i. No. xiii, xiv, xvi, xviii, xxxvi.
c Serm. against Popery, at Salter's Hall, vol. i. No. iv. p. 36—38.
LOCKE on Tol. Let. I. pass.
DODD. Serm. on Pers. p. 6—19, 20—28.
Old Whig, vol. i. No. xi *.

* The severity of the laws against the Roman Catholics, has of late years been exposed in various publications, and a general conviction been produced of their impolicy and injustice. Accordingly, these laws have in part been repealed. K.

a contrary extreme. Both a regard to the honour of God and the good of society (which surely the magistrate is not the only person under no obligation to) must engage him to desire and labour that his people may be instructed in what he takes to be truth; for which purpose it will be necessary that some provision be made for those that so instruct them, preferable to other instructors: that he may maintain such out of his private purse, none can doubt; and if he have a discretionary power with respect to any branch of the public revenue, it seems he may apply it to this purpose, even though most of his people were of a different religious persuasion from himself: and for any, who teach different doctrines, or will not submit to the ritual he thinks fit to establish, to claim the same emoluments from him, seems an invasion of that right of private judgment, which the magistrate and others joined with him must be allowed to have, as to the manner in which either his revenue or theirs shall be disposed of. But then it must be allowed, that it will be matter of duty and prudence in the magistrate, and those that join with him, to make his establishment as large as he can; that no worthy and good men, who might as established teachers be useful to the public, may unnecessarily be hampered and excluded; and for this he will be answerable to God.—If the majority of the people by their representatives join with the magistrate in such establishments, it will be the duty of the minority, though they cannot in conscience conform themselves, yet to be thankful that they are left in the possession of their own liberty, as by the reasoning above they certainly ought to be. If it be asked, whether such dissenters may regularly be forced by the magistrate and majority, to assist in maintaining established teachers whom they do not approve; it is answered, that this will stand upon the same footing with their contributing towards the expence of a war, which they think not necessary or prudent. If no such coercive power were admitted, it is probable, that covetousness would drive many into dissenting parties, in order to save their tithes or other possessions. So that none can reasonably blame a government for requiring such general contributions: and in this case, it seems fit it should be yielded to, as the determination of those, to whose guardianship these dissenters have committed themselves and their possessions. But if the majority disapprove of the conduct of their governor in this respect, it must stand upon the same footing with the right of resistance in any other case, in which the people apprehend themselves to be betrayed by their governor[a].

[a] DUNLOP's Pref. to Scotch Confess. ABERN. Tracts, p. 170—176. | FURN. Let. to Blackst. No. 1.

LECT. LXXXVIII.

Of Suicide—Inoculation.

§ 1. *Prop.* VIRTUE prohibits any man to put a period to his own life.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. Self murder plainly implies a want of reverence for God, and resignation to his will, who is the Lord of life and death, and has assigned to every man his post in life to be maintained, till he shall dismiss him from it.

§ 3. 2. It is generally injurious to the public, in defrauding it of a member who might some way or other be useful to it, and introducing an example which might be very pernicious.

§ 4. 3. It brings great distress and often great infamy on surviving relatives and friends.

§ 5. 4. It argues a dishonourable weakness of mind, in not being able to endure the calamities of life, which many others, whose passions are well governed, support with serenity and cheerfulness.

§ 6. 5. If there be a future state (which we shall afterwards prove) it may, in consequence of the preceding arguments, bring irreparable damage on the person himself, who dies in an action highly displeasing to God, and cuts off the possibility of further preparation.

§ 7. 6. Self-murder is contrary to the duty we owe to God, to ourselves, and to our fellow-creatures, by the preceding propositions, and therefore contrary to virtue[a]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 8. *Cor.* 1. All lawful means are to be used to preserve our lives; for not to preserve is to destroy.

§ 9. 2. If bringing any temporary disorder upon ourselves may be the probable means of preserving life, virtue will not only permit but require us to do it, though it may be attended

a WATTS against Self-Murder, p. 4—8, 39—41 47—52.
CLARKE of Nat. and Rev. Rel. p. 207—211.
GROTIUS, p. 1150.
OLIVET. Tom. ii. p. 325—327. Genev. Ed.
PALEY's Philos. vol. ii. p. 17—28.
PUFF. de Jure, l. ii. c. iv. § 19.
CIC. Somn. Scip. ap. Off. p. 229. Grev. Ed.
ibid. Tusc. Disp. l. i. c. xxx.
Spirit of Laws, vol. i. 145. vol. ii. p. 29.
GROVE's Eth. vol. ii. p. 274—280*.

* A Treatise on Suicide, in two volumes, quarto, has lately been written by the Rev. Mr. MORE. In this Treatise the subject is considered in every possible variety of lights; and the arguments of the apologists or extenuators of self-murder, whether ancient or modern, are amply refuted and exposed. K.

with some hazard; provided that hazard be less than would arise from omitting it: and if *inoculation* for the small-pox be lawful, it is on these principles[a].

§ 10. *Schol.* 1. To § 2. it is objected, (1.) That life was given as a *benefit*; and therefore may be returned, when it ceases to be so.

Ans. It was not given as a benefit merely to the person that enjoys it, but as a *trust* to be improved for the good of others: God intending, in the creation of each creature, not merely the happiness of that individual himself, but of the whole system of which he makes a part: this plainly follows from *Lect.* 55. § 2, &c.

§ 11. (2.) That we are such inconsiderable creatures, that there is no reason to believe, that God will be displeased with what affects the order of nature so little as our death would do.—But this argument would conclude for killing ourselves or each other at pleasure, and indeed at once overthrow the basis of all morality and virtue.

§ 12. 3. That we may conclude God gives us leave to retire, when our continuance in life will answer no good purpose.—But to this it is answered, we can never say that this is the case; since we may be sometimes unexpectedly recovered from great calamities: or even when we lie under them, may be very serviceable to others, by affording them examples of patience and resignation. God alone is capable of judging certainly when our usefulness is quite over; and therefore his orders are to be waited.

§ 13. (4.) As for GILDON'S observation, that we do not come into life by our own consent, as a soldier does into an army; the answer is obvious, that God as our creator has a much greater right to our humble obedience, than a general can have to that of a soldier, how willingly soever he may have enlisted himself into his service[b].

§ 14. *Schol.* 2. To § 3. it is objected, that some people cannot in any respect be serviceable to the public, or that if they could, they have a right to retire from the community when they see fit.

Ans. This can only be allowed, when there may be a prospect of at least equal happiness to mankind by the remove;

a SOME of Inocul. pass.
SOWDEN on ditto.
b BROUNT'S Orac. of Reas. p. 7—13.
Lettres Persannes, vol. ii. No. 64, 67.
PASSERAN'S Phil. Enq. pass.
FITZOSB. Lett. No. xxii.
MONTAIGNE'S Ess. vol. ii. c. iii.

otherwise the general laws of benevolence oblige them to a continuance; and how this can be the case in self-murder, will be hard to shew [a].

§ 15. 3. To prevent a tormenting death, (whether natural or violent,) certainly approaching, or the violation of chastity, seems the most plausible excuse for suicide. Yet as to the first of these, it is to be considered, (besides what was hinted § 10, &c.) that to die in torment for the sake of truth, is a glorious example of virtue, which may be exceeding useful: and humbly to yield to a severe sentence of death for any crime committed, may deter others from it much more effectually than self-violence could do, and may be on the whole an action the most pious and the most beneficial a man can in these circumstances perform. As to the *latter*, such violence would not destroy the character and usefulness of the person suffering by it; or if it did, it were to be borne with submission, as a trial coming from the hands of providence [b].

§ 16. 4. Nevertheless it seems, that if the magistrate condemns a man to death, and gives him his choice, whether he will die by his own hand, or by a more severe execution from the hands of another, he may in that case execute himself [c].

LECT. LXXXIX.

Of the divine Veracity and Faithfulness—Of Justice.

§ 1. *Prop.* GOD is true in all his declarations, and faithful in all his engagements to his creatures, if he enters into any engagements with them.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. Virtue requires *us* to be true to our declarations, and faithful to our promises. *Lect.* 68. § 6. *Lect.* 69. § 4.

§ 3. 2. Our obligation to truth and fidelity in our converse with our fellow-creatures does not arise from our own weakness and dependence, but from the general laws of benevolence: and if a being, beyond all possibility of receiving any personal advantage from falshood and treachery, were to be guilty of it, he would be so much the more inexcusable, and therefore so much the more odious [d]. *Valet propositio.* *Lect.* 54. § 14.

a WATTS ibid. p. 12—14.
b WATTS ibid. p. 65—69.
c Amen. Oracle.
d ABERN. Serm. vol. ii. No. v. p. 229—231. TILLOTS. vol. ii. p. 654. WILK. Nat. Rel. p. 140—142.

§ 4. *Schol.* 1. If there be any force in what is said, *Lect.* 68. § 13. to prove that there is a kind of *instinct* in favour of truth rooted in our nature, that may afford some presumption, that God the author of our nature is a lover of truth, as the *benevolent* instinct implanted in our nature may be an argument of his benevolence.

§ 5. 2. Many have questioned, whether God, by the veracity and fidelity of his nature, be obliged to fulfil his *threatenings*. It is urged, that promises give another a right to a claim to what has been promised; but for a person not to accomplish his threatenings, is to be *better* than his word; and consequently it would be no reflection on the divine being to suppose it thus with regard to him.

But it seems, this question is to be determined by the manner, in which the threatening is delivered. If any action be forbidden by God on such a penalty, and no further declaration be added, he does not seem to be bound by it; but if he has in any case added a declaration, that he will in fact make his threatenings as well as his promises the rule of his final proceedings, it seems inconsistent with his *veracity*, though not his *fidelity*, to act contrary to them; especially if we consider, that as there is no change in the views and purposes of God, if he fail to act according to such minatory declarations, he must have intended to act contrary to them even at the time he made them; which seems a mean and dishonourable artifice, infinitely beneath the majesty of God [a].

§ 6. *Def.* That governor is said to administer his government with JUSTICE, who in proportion to his legal power distributes good to the virtuous and evil to the vicious, or in other words, treats his subjects on the whole according to their characters [b].

§ 7. *Schol.* 1. *Justice* sometimes signifies, "giving to every one that which is his own, or that which he has in reason a right to," i. e. which virtue requires he should have; or in other words, treating him as virtue requires he should be treated: now in this sense of it, it is *universal rectitude*. (*Lect.* 52. § 12.) Sometimes it stands distinguished from *charity*; and then he is said to be *a just* man, who gives to every one that to which he has by law a claim, and he is *good* or *charitable*, who abounds in good offices, to which human laws do not oblige him [c].

a TILLOTS. vol. i. Serm. xxxv. p. 353, 354. Ed. 1704. p. 413, 414.
WATTS's Serm. vol. ii. p. 146, 147.
——— Works, vol. i. p. 218. 4to.

FLEYN's Tracts, vol. i. p. 243—246.
b ABERN. vol. ii. No. v. p. 180—186.
c FOST. Serm. vol. i. No. ii. p. 27—35.

§ 8. 2. Justice as it respects *men*, is often divided into *commutative* and *distributative* justice: the former consists in an equal exchange of benefits, the latter in an equal distribution of rewards and punishments[a].

§ 9. 3. It will not follow from the definition given above, that every governor is unjust, who does not carry the execution of the law to its utmost rigour upon offenders; all governments allowing a power of pardoning, in cases in which the governor shall judge it most agreeable to the public good to do it; and as the public good is the supreme law, justice is no further a virtue than as it consists with it: but as injustice is always a term of reproach, it is not to be applied to those instances of favour, which, though contrary to the *letter* of the law, are consistent with and subservient to its general design.

§ 10. *Prop.* God is with respect to his dispensations, on the whole just to all his rational and free creatures.

§ 11. *Dem.* 1. All rational and free creatures are the proper subjects of moral government, i. e. are capable of being governed by a law, inforced by the sanction of rewards and punishments.

§ 12. 2. It is in itself highly congruous, that they should be treated with favour or severity, as virtue or vice do on the whole prevail in their tempers and conduct.

§ 13. 3. It would be justly accounted an infamous thing, for any created governor to act contrary to the rule of justice, in his treatment of any such creatures committed to his government.

§ 14. 4. The most excellent creatures might in some imaginable instances lie under some temptations of this kind, to which an omnipotent God cannot possibly be exposed.

§ 15. 5. It would be most dishonourable to conceive of the divine being, as acting contrary to those rules, and dispensing final good and evil without regard to the moral character of his creatures[b]. *Lect.* 54. § 14. *Valet propositio.*

§ 16. *Cor.* GOD is just in all his dispensations to mankind[c], *Prop.* 16.

§ 17. *Schol.* The only considerable objection against this,

a Berry-street Lect. vol. i. p. 82, 83.
b ABERN. Serm. vol. ii. No. v. præs. p. 186—208.
c TILLOTS. vol. ii. p. 647.
WILK. Nat. of Rel. p. 139, 140.
BUTLER's Anal. part i. c. iii, vii.
BOURN's Serm. vol. ii. No. 2.

arises from the unequal distribution of good and evil, observable in the present administration of providence: but it may be sufficiently answered by considering,

§ 18. 1. That we are often mistaken in the judgment we form concerning the characters and conditions of men.

§ 19. 2. That the interest of particular persons may sometimes clash with that of society, in such a manner as that public justice will require, that for the present the former be sacrificed to the latter.

§ 20. 3. That if a future state be admitted, it will solve those phænomena, which otherwise would appear the most unaccountable; and perhaps those inequalities may be permitted, to convince us of it: but of this more hereafter[a].

LECT. XC.

Of Repentance—The Law and Light of Nature.

§ 1. *Def.* HE is said to REPENT of a vicious action that he has committed, who is so convinced of the folly of it, as heartily to wish that he had not committed it, and stedfastly resolve that he will no more repeat it[b].

§ 2. *Cor.* Wherever there is true repentance for an injury offered to another person, the penitent will be ready to make restitution, so far as it is in his power to do it[c].

§ 3. *Schol.* If it be hereafter proved, that every man who has committed a vicious action is obliged to repent of it, then he who by an unjust war has deprived any of their rights is obliged to make restitution: and if any possessions came into the hands of a conqueror in a just war, which did not of right belong to the persons from whom he took them: such a conqueror seems obliged to restore them, when the claim of the former owner is made and proved; proper allowance being made for the trouble and expence of recovering them[d].

§ 4. *Def.* Those rules of action, which a man *may discover* by the use of his reason to be agreeable to the nature of things,

a SCOTT's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 248—265.
Relig. of Nat. p. 110—114.
ABERN. Serm. No. v. p. 209—216.
BOURN's Serm. vol. ii. No. iii.
b TILLOTS. Serm. vol. iii. p. 63—69. Serm. cxiii.
c TILLOTS. vol. iii. Serm. cxvi. p. 86—90.
PUFF. de Jure, l. iii. c. i. § 5—11.
GROT. de Jure, l. ii. c. xvii. § 13—17.
GRANADA's Mem. p. 119—121.
d GROT. de Jure, l. iii. c. x. § 4—6. c. xvi. § 1—3.
CONTI's Will, ap. Life, p. 7—14.

and on which his happiness will appear to him to depend, may be called THE LAW OF NATURE: and when these are considered as intimations of the divine will and purpose, they may be called the NATURAL LAWS OF GOD[a]. *Vid. Lect.* 76. § 11.

§ 5. *Def.* That part of the law of nature, which a man by the exercise of his reason *has actually discovered,* is to him at that time THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

§ 6. *Cor.* The light of nature and the law of nature may to the same, and yet more evidently to different persons, be different: yet they can in no instance be contradictory to each other.

§ 7. *Schol.* If by the *law of nature,* be meant in general the obligation arising from the nature of things, it can in all its extent be known only to him, to whom the nature of things is universally known, i. e. to God: and with respect to him, it can only improperly and figuratively be called a *law,* since there is no superior whose will is thereby signified to him[b]. *Vid. Lect.* 76. § 11.

§ 8. *Prop.* The natural law of God requires the practice of universal virtue.

§ 9. 1. Since God is a being of perfect rectitude, it must be his will, that creatures capable of virtue should practise it in all its branches. *Lect.* 54. § 12.

§ 10. 2. As he is the just governor of the world, he will on the whole dispense good or evil, as virtue has been cultivated, or as it has been violated[c]. *Valet propositio. Lect.* 89. § 10.

§ 11. *Cor.* 1. A due reverence to the divine being, as well as a regard to our own happiness, will require us attentively to study the law of nature; especially seeing there are so many cases, in which it is exceeding difficult to determine what it requires[d].

§ 12. 2. The natural law of God must require, that those who have been guilty of vice, should repent of it. *Vid.* § 1.

§ 13. 3. This natural and universal law of God, is of infinitely greater efficacy to restrain vice and promote virtue, than any human laws can be; since, whereas in human laws, *punishments* are generally the only sanctions, (the magistrate being neither capable of judging of the degree of virtue in any

a CARMICH. on Puff. Suppl. c. i. § 10, 19, 20.
b CONYB. against TIND. p. 11, 13—17. LELAND against TIND. vol. i. c. ii.
c CIC. de Rep. ap. Lactant. quod vide ap. MIDDLETON's Life of CIC. vol. ii. p. 556, 557. 4to Ed. vol. iii. p. 351, 352. 8vo Ed. BEATTIE's Elem. p. 8—77.
d SYKES's Connect. c. i, ii.

action, (*Comp. Lect.* 63. § 2.) nor having a fund out of which he can universally reward men in proportion to it) the divine law has the sanction of *rewards* likewise, and extends itself to, what the civilians call, *duties of imperfect obligation*, i. e. those which cannot fall under the cognizance of human governors[a].

§ 14. 4. It is highly for the interest of states, that the great principles of natural religion should be believed, viz. the being and providence of God, and the certainty of an exact retribution either here or hereafter; since it is on these principles alone, that the efficacy of such supposed laws must depend[b].

§ 15. 5. For any to pour contempt upon this natural law of God, under pretence of extolling any supposed divine revelation, or intimation of God's will in an extraordinary manner, will appear very absurd; since our obligation to receive any such supposed extraordinary discoveries made by God, must depend upon our knowledge of his moral perfections; and no discovery can be supposed so particular, as not to need the use of reasoning upon the principles of the law of nature, in explaining and applying it to particular cases[c].

§ 16. *Schol.* 1. That it will not at all follow from the usefulness of religion to communities, that therefore it is merely an engine of state-policy, is in a most sagacious and conclusive manner shewn in WARBURTON's Div. Leg. vol. i. l. iii. § 6. p. 443—471.

§ 17. 2. From the second *Corollary*, (§ 12.) arises a most difficult and important question, viz. whether the justice of God will permit him to forgive the penitent; at least, whether we can have such assurance of it, as cheerfully to depend upon pardon, how great soever our offences may have been. Some have asserted the contrary in the strongest terms; and urge, that there is an infinite degree of evil in sin, from which it is impossible that any creature should recover himself; and that the infinite goodness of God must make every the least violation of the laws of eternal order and rectitude an incurable evil. But others have universally asserted, that we may on the principles of the light of nature be certain, that God will and must upon repentance fully and freely pardon every sin. But on the whole, we must answer in a medium between those two opinions.

§ 18. (1.) There seems some probable reason to believe, that at least *some* sins may be forgiven by God; considering

a WARB. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 12—21. FITZOSB. Lett. No. xlvi.
b WARB. ibid. p. 21—24.
WATTS of Civil Power in Rel. p. 27—29.
c HODGES's Elihu, Pref. p. 23—25. DOVE's Creed, p. 9, 10, 13.

the known goodness of the divine being, and especially from observing the provision he has made in the world of nature for the necessities and calamities of mankind, even of many which are brought upon men by their own folly: and indeed had God determined to punish every sin without mercy, we can hardly believe that such a benevolent being would have placed mankind in circumstances of such strong temptation from within and without, that not a person on earth who is arrived at years of understanding should be free from it. Nevertheless,

§ 19. (2.) We cannot *certainly* and *universally* conclude, that sin shall be pardoned on repentance: for the end of punishment is not merely, as some have rashly asserted, the amendment of the offender, (though even then some punishment might be inflicted after repentance, to make him more cautious, and to preserve him from future guilt;) but principally the maintaining the honour of the divine government, and the admonition of others: now it is impossible for us certainly to say, how far the right of his government and the interest of the whole rational creation may require severity even against penitents themselves, especially in cases of notorious provocation. So that on the whole, it seems that unassisted reason could give us at best but a wavering and uncertain hope that *all* sin was pardonable, though it might shew it to be highly probable, that *some* sins were so, or that the penalty inflicted for them might not be the utter destruction of the penitent [a].

§ 20. *Schol.* 3. Nevertheless, though it remains dubious how far God will pardon sin upon our repentance, yet repentance will appear reasonable; since to be sure, if any pardon is to be expected, it must be received in that way: for it would be utterly unbecoming the dignity of the divine being, and his character as the universal judge, always to spare and always to bless an obstinate and incorrigible rebel: and if any punishment is after all to be expected, it must surely be much better to meet it in a posture of humble submission, than with a vain and obstinate resistance and opposition to a being infinitely superior to us, and who can continue us in a capacity of feeling punishment as long as he pleases; for some mitigation of which punishment we might at least hope, in consequence of such humble submission as is recommended above [b].

a TIND. Christianity as old, &c. c. iv.
CONYB. against TIND. p. 114—131. or
LELAND against Tind. vol. i. c. vi.
BALGUY on Redempt.
FOST. Disc. on Nat. Rel. vol. i. c. viii.
HOWE's Liv. Temp. part ii. c. vi. § 3. c. vi. § 5, 6, 10.
HALLET on Script. 326—333.
TAYLOR against Deism, c. i. p. 1, &c.
WATTS's Strength and Weakness, &c. p. 72—87.
BUTLER's Anal. part ii. c. v. § 2—4.
LEIBN. Theod. § 73, 74.
SYKES on Redemp. p. 5—9.

b COLLIB. of Nat. and Rev. Rel. part i. § 8. p. 27—35.

PART IV.

OF THE IMMORTALITY AND IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL: ITS ORIGINAL: THE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS TO VIRTUE, AND STATE OF IT IN THE WORLD.

LECT. XCI.

Of Death—A future State—Moral Government.

§ 1. *Def.* THE DEATH of the MAN is the universal cessation both of perception and of animal motion, and particularly respiration, and the circulation of the blood in the human body.

§ 2. *Schol.* Though perception and animal motion are not necessarily connected; yet, so far as our observation reaches, the latter being never found without the former, it seemed not improper to join them as we have done in the definition.

§ 3. *Def.* The DEATH of the MIND is the utter destruction of its thinking powers.

§ 4. *Prop.* The soul does not die with the body; but survives in a state of greater happiness or misery than before, as it has behaved in a virtuous or vicious manner.

§ 5. *Dem.* I. 1. As God is just, he will take care, that on the whole his creatures shall be more or less happy or miserable, according to the degree in which virtue or vice prevails in their characters. *Lect.* 89. § 10.

§ 6. 2. No such distinction is here made, correspondent to their characters; but virtuous men are often exposed to the greatest distress, whilst the worst of men live and die in a series of prosperity[a].

§ 7. 3. There must be a future state of retribution[b]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 8. *Schol.* 1. To this it is objected, that the secret pleasure

a CIC. de Nat. Deor. l. iii. § 32—35.
b CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 251—257. Rel. of Nat. p. 199—203.
BALG. Six Sermons p. 81—86.
BURLAMAQUI Elementa Juris Naturalis, par. ii. c. xii. § 1—14. c. xiii. § 1. and § 11—15.
PRICE on Mor. p. 449—466.

attending virtue is its own reward, and renders the good man happier in his most calamitous state, than the wicked man is in his greatest prosperity.

§ 9. *Ans.* (1.) That the support and comfort of a good man in his troubles, greatly depends on the expectation of a future state; and that this expectation being his greatest encouragement to persevere in virtue under its greatest disadvantages, we can hardly suppose that a wise, just, and good God would so order it, that the great foundation and support of virtue should be a false and vain expectation.

§ 10. (2.) There are some sufferings of flesh and blood, to which good men even for conscience-sake have often been brought, so extreme, that without some extraordinary support from God, it is morally impossible the pleasure of rational thought should be enjoyed under them: and this case would be a sufficient answer to the objection, unless such supports were granted; which if they were, as they arise from views of a future state, the faithfulness of God, as well as those attributes mentioned before, would seem to be injured, by supposing there were no such state.

§ 11. (3.) Good men, in calmer seasons of life, often find the inward satisfaction arising from the consciousness of their own virtue interrupted, whilst they labour under disquieting doubts and fears as to the state and prevalency of it; and it is unreasonable to suppose that God would leave their minds under such distresses, if the present pleasure of virtue were its only reward. On the other hand, bad men often outgrow the remorse of conscience; so that those who are the most experienced in wickedness, and so deserve the heaviest punishments, do so far as we can judge, suffer much less than others not equally criminal, and owe their tranquillity to their wickedness.

§ 12. (4.) That all this passes in private, and is little taken notice of; whereas one would naturally expect that the justice of God should have its public triumphs, especially over those who, being in exalted stations of life, and therefore under the greatest obligation to virtue, have acted a very guilty part, without appearing to be in any measure proportionably miserable; and in favour of those who have suffered very hard things for virtue, without any visible retribution, and have perhaps even died in its defence [a].

a Relig. of Nat. p. 203—205.
CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 257—261.
BALG. Six Serm. p. 88—91.
BAXT. Reas. of Christianity, part i. c. xiv. § 1. ap. Op. vol. ii. p. 46—48.
FOST. Disc. on Nat. Rel. vol. i. c. ix.
PARKER's Law of Nature, part i. § 31.

§ 13. 2. Others urge, that this goes on a false supposition, that there are some good men; whereas the best, being but imperfectly virtuous, can claim no future rewards.

§ 14. *Ans.* (1.) It must be acknowledged, that the best of men cannot in strict justice claim any reward from God as a debt, seeing they owe all to him; especially are they destitute of such a claim, when they have in any instance failed of the duty they owe him, as the best here do: nevertheless,

§ 15. (2.) The vast difference there is in the characters of men will require that there should be some greater difference in the manner of treating them, than there is in the present state, where there is no proportion between their suffering and present demerit.

§ 16. (3.) That considering the extraordinary progress some make in virtue, and consequently how fit they are for the most sublime and rational happiness, and how unavoidable some degree of imperfection is, considering the constitution of our nature and the temptations of life, there seems some probable though not certain reason to hope, that God will hereafter reward those who are in the main his faithful servants, with some greater degrees of felicity than they have here enjoyed [a].

§ 17. *Schol.* 3. Nevertheless it must be confessed, that reason does not certainly assure us, that all good men do *immediately* pass into a state of happiness: least of all could we conclude it in favour of those penitents, who have been reclaimed but a little before their death, after a long course of vice, for which they have met with no remarkable calamity. It might seem more probable with regard to such, that they should either suffer an utter extinction of being, or pass through some state of purgation, whereby at least some further honour might also be done to the divine violated law [b].

a HALLET on Script. vol. i. p. 226—229. & p. 246—250.
GROVE's Thoughts on a future State, c. vii. p. 340, &c.
KENRICK's Poems, p. 148—150.

b VIRG. Æn. l. vi. ver. 719—748.
PLATO's Phæd. § 44, 45.
JORTIN's Dissert. No. vi.
Cyrus Trav. vol. ii. p. 110, 8vo.
ÆSCHIN. Dial. iii. § 19—21.
PINDAR's Olymp. ii. by WEST.

LECT. XCII.

Of a future State—Capacities for Improvement—Friendship—Conscience—Funeral Rites.

§ 1. *Dem.* II. 1. THE human mind is framed with perpetual capacities for improvement; whereas brutes soon attain to the utmost perfection of which their natures are capable.

§ 2. 2. It seems not consistent with the divine *wisdom*, to form so excellent a being for so short a duration, and such low employments, as are to be found in this mortal life.

§ 3. 3. The human mind is formed with a capacity for far greater happiness, than it can enjoy in the present state.

§ 4. 4. Men are necessarily exposed to a great variety of evils, from which even innocent infants are not exempted: and perhaps it may be acknowledged, that were immortality to be absolutely despaired of, the state of brutes would appear less calamitous and pitiable than that of men; at least that it would be so, were the whole human species to disbelieve a future state.

§ 5. 5. There is a strong desire of immortality possessing our natures, and it is strongest in the most virtuous minds.

§ 6. 6. The circumstances of men in the present world are such, as we can hardly reconcile with the divine *goodness*, unless we suppose some other and better state of existence; especially considering, that in others and those much inferior things, there is a correspondence between natural desire and the possibility at least of enjoyment.

§ 7. 7. The wisdom and goodness of God join in requiring that there should be a future state, and therefore it is reasonable to expect it[a]. *2. E. D.* § 2, 6. *Lect.* 48. § 1. *Lect.* 55, § 2, &c.

§ 8. *Schol.* Near akin to this argument, is that which Mr. BALGUY draws from the sense of *friendship* rooted in the human heart, which engages virtuous friends to wish to continue for ever in the enjoyment of each other, and renders the thoughts of a final separation so shocking, that it is not to be imagined the great

a Spect. vol. ii. No. cxi.
Rel. of Nat. p. 208—211.
CLARKE at Boyle's Lect. p. 269.
HOWE's Vanity of Man, &c. pass. præs. ap. Op. vol. i. p. 640—650.
HALLET on Script. vol. i. p. 256—258, 272—289.
FOST. Serm. vol. I. No. xv. p. 406—408.
BALG. Six Serm. p. 66—69.
GROVE against Hallet, c. iv.
YOUNG's Night Thoughts, No. viii.
KENRICK's Poems, p. 191—196.

and benevolent author of nature should have implanted such a passion, had he not intended to leave room for the eternal gratification of it. And it may farther be observed, that whatever weight there is in this argument is increased by considering, that the notion of the mortality of the soul will be an additional grief to a virtuous mind, when he considers, that upon this supposition he must not only be deprived himself of the enjoyment of his friends, but they likewise must entirely perish, and lose all the delight which growing science and virtue have given, and which they seemed fitted for receiving, in yet farther and more exalted degrees. To which we may add, on like principles, that the love of God growing in the virtuous mind, will make the thought of the extinction of being more painful in proportion to that advance; as all enjoyment of God must of course cease. And the importance of this thought both illustrate's BALGUY's remark, and is strongly illustrated by it[a].

§ 9. *Dem.* III. 1. The lives of men, according to the ordinary course of nature, are continually in the power of themselves and others.

§ 10. 2. If the soul were mortal, a desperate villain might immediately deprive the most virtuous man of his being, and with it, of all further rewards which his virtue might have expected and received.

§ 11. 3. Such a person might also upon that supposition put a period to all further punishment intended for his crimes and due to them, by laying violent hands upon himself.

§ 12. 4. The justice of God might in a great measure be frustrated, if the soul were mortal.

§ 13. 5. Seeing God is an omnipotent and just being, we have reason to conclude that his justice cannot be frustrated. *Lect.* 34, § 5. *Lect.* 89. § 10. Therefore,

§ 14. 6. The soul is immortal[b]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 15. *Schol.* 1. To this it may be objected, that God will in an extraordinary manner interpose, to prevent such deaths as would interfere with the distribution of justice.

Ans. (1.) So far as we can judge, many such deaths do in fact happen.

(2.) It would be unreasonable to expect a course of things to be established, in which without perpetual extraordinary interpositions the greatest irregularities must happen: this would

a BALG. Ser. 5 fin. p. 71—75. b WATTS's Reliq. Juv. No. lxxv. p. 334—336.

reflect as much upon the wisdom, as the other on the justice of the divine being [a].

§ 16. 2. What is most solid and important in the argument for a future state, from the impossibility of governing the world without the belief of it, seems to coincide with this argument, or *demonstration* 1 [b]. *Lect.* 91. § 5—7.

§ 17 *Dem.* IV. 1. There is in man a certain affection of mind, or principle of action, which is commonly called *conscience*, whereby we are capable of considering ourselves as under a divine law, and accountable to God for our conduct.

§ 18. 2. From hence arises self-approbation, or self-condemnation in men, as they apprehend their actions have been agreeable or disagreeable to the divine law.

§ 19. 3. The force of this often appears so great, that the worst of men cannot, at least without great difficulty, divest themselves of it; and that even when they are in such circumstances, as to have least to fear from their fellow-creatures, and especially in their dying moments.

§ 20. 4. It is exceeding probable, that this principle is intended by God to intimate a future state of retribution, since it is chiefly to that it seems to refer.

§ 21. 5. Both the wisdom and truth of God seem to require, that there should be a future state in some respect answerable to this apprehension [c]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 22. *Dem.* V. 1. It appears that most nations, not excepting the most barbarous, have generally believed the doctrine in the proposition: and it is observable that most of their *funeral rites*, so far as we are informed concerning them, seem to imply some apprehension of it: as that very ancient kind of idolatry, the worship of the dead, (as well as all pretences to the art of *necromancy*, which were plainly founded on this persuasion,) contains a further and most evident proof of it. To which we may also add, that the *lesser initiation* of the ancients seems to have been a sort of machinery, in which, especially in the *Eleusinian mysteries*, the seats both of the blessed and damned were represented [d].

a WATTS ibid. p. 336, 337.
b BAXT. Reas. of Christ. part i. c. xiv. § 5, 6, ap. Op. vol. ii. p. 49—51.
BARROW's Works, vol. ii. p. 334—337.
HALLET's Notes on Scrip. vol. i. p. 288—297.
GROVE on Fut. State, c. v.
c TILLOTS. Serm. vol. iii. p. 124, 125.
BARROW, vol. ii. p. 334, 335.
HALLET on Scrip. p. 259—263.
FOST. Serm. vol. ii. No. iii. p. 55—68.
BAIG. Six Serm. p. 75—79.
JUVENAL, Sat. xiii. ver. 192, &c. Sat. i. ver. 196.
d WARB. Div. Leg. vol. i. l. ii. § 4.

§ 23. 2. The doctrine was probably inferred from some arguments level to every capacity, or it would not have been so universally believed. *Comp. Lect.* 29. § 12, &c.

3. It is reasonable to believe it [a]. *2. E. D.*

LECT. XCIII.

Of a future State—Opinions of Ancient Philosophers—Objections answered.

§ 1. *Schol.* 1. IT is objected, that a great many ancient philosophers disbelieved the immortality of the soul, and some of the ancients tell us, it was first taught by the *Egyptians.*

Ans. The common people seem to have had a firmer persuasion of it than the philosophers, many of whom do indeed speak dubiously about it; and as for others of them, the accounts they give of it are very low and absurd, and several of the arguments which they bring for the support of it are weak and inconclusive: and it may by the way be observed, that in PLATO's *Phædon*, the argument in the *first* demonstration, though so proper to the circumstances of SOCRATES at that time, is strangely omitted, nor do any that I remember mention it before SENECA.

§ 2. Dr. WARBURTON has lately stated this matter very particularly; and undertaken to prove, that though the philosophers did indeed believe the doctrine of the soul's *immortality*, they did not believe that of the future state of *rewards and punishments*; which he proves to be inconsistent with the essential principles, not only of the *Epicureans*, but also of the *Pythagoreans*, *Peripatetics*, *Platonists* and *Stoics*, particularly with the doctrine of the το εν, or the refusion of souls into their common eternal principle, and also with that doctrine, which taught the deity to be incapable of that resentment without which they supposed he could not punish. So that all those passages, in which these philosophers inculcate future retribution, are, according to this ingenious author, to be looked upon, merely as popular accommodations to doctrines commonly received; or at most, as what the philosophers thought fit to *teach*, though they did not themselves believe them, in a view to their being

a TILLOTS. vol. iii. p. 116—118.
SLEV. against Pop. Serm. vii. p. 192—194.
Sp. SHERLOCK's Disc. vol. i. No. vi.
Customs of Ind. and Jews comp. Art. vii. p. 39—42.
BALG. Six Serm. p. 70, 71.

useful to society: and he imagines that the distinction between the *exoteric* and *esoteric* doctrines is of great importance here.—On the contrary, Dr. SYKES and Mr. BOTT suppose these philosophers really to have believed a future retribution, and that the difference between the external and internal doctrine, was only in the manner of illustrating the kinds of those rewards and punishments which they asserted in both; and the doctrine of the τὸ ἐν is so explained by BOTT as to be consistent with that of retribution [a].

§ 3. 2. Others account for the phænomenon by saying, that men might *wish*, and therefore *think* themselves immortal.

Ans. Most who held and taught a future state of distinct, personal existence, seemed to think it a state of *retribution*, which it is to be feared it was not their interest to desire: and the fears of it are sometimes spoken of as a burden: and if notwithstanding these fears, they wished the soul immortal, it is so much the greater confirmation of *Lect.* 92. § 5.

§ 4. 3. The principal objections against this doctrine are reckoned up by LUCRETIUS: but most of them are so evidently weak as not to deserve a particular examination. The most plausible are those that arise from the sensible decay of the faculties of the mind with those of the body, and the supposed impossibility of action and perception without bodily organs: but to these it is replied,

§ 5. (1.) That the soul does sometimes continue in full vigour, even when the body is under the greatest disorder, and death immediately approaching.

§ 6. (2.) That it may be a law of nature, that while the spirit is united to the body, it should be so affected with the good or bad state of the bodily health as we often see it is, and that the memory should be impaired with age and sickness will not appear at all strange, considering how much it depends on the brain. *Vid. Lect.* 8. § 7, &c.

§ 7. (3.) That perhaps this may be a state of imprisonment to the soul, as many of the philosophers thought; and that when it is set at liberty from the body, it may obtain new and noble ways of perception and action, to us at present unknown.

a WARB. Div. Leg. vol. i. I. iii. § 1—4.
BOTT. against Warb. § 2.
SYKES against Warb.
Critical Enquiry, pass.
TILLOTS. vol. iii. p. 132—134.
PLATO's Phæd. pass.
N. TAYLOR of Deism, p. 80—110. and p. 119—144.
GROT. de Verit. c. i. § 22. c. ii. § 9.
WOLLEBY'S Certainty of Christian Faith, c. x. § 11. with Annot. p. 312—315.
CUDWORTH'S Intell. Syst. c. i. § 45.
LELAND on Revel. vol. ii. par. 3. præs. c. ii.

§ 8. (4) That if a body were necessary, we might more reasonably believe God would give it a new body in the state immediately succeeding this, than suffer its faculties to perish, for the reasons assigned above [a].

§ 9. *Schol.* 4. Others attempt to prove the immortality of the soul, from the impossibility of governing the world without such hopes and fears on the one hand, (*Vid. Lect.* 92. § 16.) or of God's governing it by a lie on the other, as they say it is plain he in fact does, if there be not a future state. They also argue from God's being the author of those hopes which arise in the mind of a good man; and from the probability there is, that there are other worlds inhabited by spiritual beings, to whom therefore the soul may go, and among whom it may dwell after the dissolution of the body. It is likewise said, that since we see other beings ripening gradually to perfection, and animal life improved from low beginnings to noble heights; it is on the principles of analogy probable, that the human soul shall pass by death into some more elevated state of being, or at least may be a candidate for it *.—But as, where these arguments are distinct from the former, the premises in some of them are liable to much dispute, and perhaps cannot be all sufficiently made out; and as in others, granting the premises, the conclusion may be disputed, we reckon it enough barely to have suggested these considerations, without entering into the more particular examination of them [b].

§ 10. 5. It may further be questioned, whether allowing a future state, it can be proved *eternal* and *immutable*.

Ans. The soul seems originally designed for an eternal duration on the principles urged *Lect.* 92. § 1, &c. but that the state on which it shall enter at death shall be eternal, the light of nature does not discover; there is no reason at all to expect eternal rewards for so short and imperfect a virtue as can here be attained, and as for eternal punishments, though some of the heathens did assert them, and many have undertaken to infer them from natural principles; (all moral evil being a breach of

a LUCRET. l. iii. ver. 418—740.
FONTENAC'S Anti-Lucretius.
Rel. of Nat. p. 194—199.
CICERO'S Tusc. Disp. l. i. § 20.
CLARKE at BOYLE'S Lect. p. 79—81.
PLAT. Phæd. 2:, 10.
ROCHEST. Life, p. 65—68. and p. 20, 21, 150.
BAXT. on the Soul, vol. i. § 5. præs. p. 395—400.
MORE'S Immort. l. iii. c. xiv, xv.
KENRICK'S Poems, p. 152—155.
b BAXT. Works, vol. ii. p. 55, 658.
BUTLER'S Anal. part i. c. i.
YOUNG'S Night Thoughts, No. vi. p. 158, 159. Ed. 12mo.

* The argument from the soul's employment in sleep, in favour of its capacity of perceiving and acting after death, may be seen in Spectator, vol. vii. No. 487.—BAXTER on the Soul, vol. i. p. 391—395.—YOUNG'S Night Thoughts, No. 6, p. 158. 12mo. Ed. p. 194—196. 8vo. Ed. M.

order, and every instance and act of it having a natural tendency to harden the soul, universal and perpetual misery must follow, unless God interpose in an extraordinary manner, either to restore the health of the soul, or to end its being,) yet it seems that our natural apprehensions of the divine goodness would rather encourage us to hope, that he would leave some room for amendment, and recovery of happiness in a future state, or by annihilation would put an end to mens' misery, when they appeared humbled by their punishment. But if it should prove that in a future state of chastisement, the sinner should harden himself against God, and go on still in his crimes, perpetual succeeding sins would justify perpetual succeeding punishments: for it is certain, every new crime committed after severe punishment is on that account so much the more aggravated. The same may be said concerning a series of eternal happiness, in case of continued virtue, and that very consistently with the preceding observation[a]. *Vid. Lect.* 90. § 17. *Lect.* 91. § 17.

§ 11. 6. It may be granted that the resurrection of the body, whatever change it may be supposed to undergo after death, may be possible to the divine power, and may be subservient both to render rewards and punishments the more complete, and the triumphs of divine justice more conspicuous, than they would otherwise be; but it by no means appears certain by the light of nature[b].

§ 12. 7. The atheist cannot be infallibly certain that there shall be no future state, even though he should believe the existence of the soul to depend on that of the body, or thought to be no more than a power resulting from matter so disposed; since that omnipotent chance, which according to his principles formed the whole world, may possibly throw together into one body the particles of which he now consists, with such alteration, as to make him capable even of eternal misery, from which no virtue can secure him[c].

a LUCRET. l. i. ver. 108—112.
[illegible]
J. SERG. Bell. Jud. L. iii. c. vii. 5.
BALG. Ser. vol. i. 409—413.
b [illegible]
GALE's Court of the Gent. part. i. l. iii. c. vii. p. 81, 82. part ii. l. ii. c. viii. p. 139.
PHOCYLIDES, ver. 98—101.
PEARSON on the Creed, p. 366—367.
BANT. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 378—396.
LELAND on Revel. vol. ii. p. 436—441.
[illegible]
c GUYON at Boyle's Lect. p. 151—165.
FIDDES of Mor. Pref. p. 12—16*.

* In EDWARDS'S (ABRAHAM TUCKER'S) "Light of Nature pursued;" is much curious matter relative to the proofs of a future existence, and the apprehended nature of that existence. See particularly the second and third volumes of the work. For a farther view of the natural arguments in support of a life to come,

LECT. XCIV.

Of the Immateriality of the Soul.

§ 1. *Def.* THE MIND may be said to be CORPOREAL, if thought arise from and be inseparably connected with a certain system of matter; so that if such system so arranged exist, thought must exist with it, though no distinct being should be produced; or if that system were to be dissolved, or the arrangement of its particles to be altered, thought must immediately and necessarily cease with it, unless God were instantaneously to produce some new being which did not before exist.

§ 2. *Prop.* To enquire into the most considerable arguments brought to prove the immateriality of the soul.

§ 3. *Dem.* I. 1. God is an immaterial and almighty spirit. *Lect.* 27. § 9. *Lect.* 28. § 22. *Lect.* 47. § 2.

§ 4. 2. There is no absurdity in supposing the existence of an immaterial spirit produced by him.

§ 5. 3. If the soul be material, its faculty of thinking must either necessarily arise from the nature and arrangement of its particles, or it must be superadded by God to a system of matter.

§ 6. 4. It is in the nature of things entirely inconceivable and incredible, that thought should necessarily arise from matter, however figured or moved. *Lect.* 28. § 3.

§ 7. 5. To say that a power of thinking is superadded by the divine will, is unintelligible, or in effect granting the proposition; for there cannot be a power of thinking where there is not a thinking being, and the superaddition of this to matter is nothing more than the union of an immaterial being to a body, which none who assert the immateriality of the soul, (granting what is here supposed, the real existence of matter) pretend to deny. *Lect.* 94. § 1.

§ 8. 6. There are insuperable difficulties attending the supposition that the soul is corporeal.

recourse may be had to ANDREW BAXTER on the Immortality of the Soul, Bishop PORTEUS's Sermons, No. v, vi, vii. Dr. STURGES's Discourses, No. iv. Dr. BEATTIE's "Elements of Moral Science," vol. ii. p. 414—438. and the Rev. T. WATSON's "Intimations and Evidences of a future State." K.

§ 9. 7. It is reasonable to believe it incorporeal[a]. *2. E. D.*

§ 10. *Schol.* To this it is objected, that it limits the divine omnipotence, to say that God cannot make matter think.—It is generally replied, that it is no more so than to say, that God cannot make a square circle. God may unite a soul to a system of matter; but then the matter to which it is united can only be said to think, as our body is said to feel; i. e. by the divine appointment, though without any necessary connection, it may become an organ of sensation and motion to that spirit: and it will be difficult to form any scheme, by which thought may be supposed to result from matter any how modified and agitated by an omnipotent being, on which it might not be asserted to arise from it without the action of such a being, and consequently by which all religion might not be overthrown[b].

§ 11. *Dem.* II. 1. Matter is divisible, and consists of parts actually distinct.

§ 12. 2. Whatever system of matter can be supposed to be conscious, it is capable of being divided into several lesser parts; and they will be as really distinct, when laid or cemented together, as when separate, and removed to a distance from each other.

§ 13. 3. If any system of matter be conscious, it must either have a distinct consciousness in each lesser particle, or one consciousness resulting from the union of its several parts.

§ 14. 4. There cannot be in each system a number of distinct consciousnesses; for that would suppose a vast and unknown multiplicity of souls in every soul. *2. E. A.*

§ 15. 5. An assemblage of various unthinking parts can never be supposed to make one thinking mass; so that thought should arise from the whole, and yet not exist in any given part.

§ 16. 6. The soul is not material[c]. *2. E. D.*

§ 17. *Schol.* To the fifth step it is objected, that one indivisible power may reside in a system consisting of divisible parts,

a DITTON on the Res. p. 430—460.
CHEYNE's Princ. of Nat. Rel. c. ii. § 13. p. 36—40.
TILLOTS. vol. iii. p. 127—129, 130.
Dr. PRICE's Serm. at St. Thomas's, January 1, 1766.
BURLAMAQUI Elementa Juris Naturalis, c. xiii. § 2—10.
COLLIB. on the Soul, Ess. i. § 3, 4.
RAMS. Princ. vol. i. p. 230—233.
Rel. of Nat. p. 186—189.
ABERNETHY, vol. i. Serm. iv.
BAXT. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 156—160, 186—192.

b LOCKE's Ess. l. iv. c. iii. § 6. with Not.
Rel. of Nat. p. 189—193.
JACKSON on Matter and Spirit, p. 1—3, 12, 16.
RAMS. Princ. vol. i. p. 235.
HOWE, vol. i. p. 52, 53.
BAXT. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 192—195.

c CLARKE against DODWELL, p. 1—3.
JACKSON, ibid. p. 4—11, 32—36.
BAXT. ibid. p. 227—239.
RAMS. Princ. Prop. 32.

as sweetness in a rose: but it is replied, that sweetness is only a *secondary* power, (*Lect.* 11. § 1.) and not properly speaking in the rose at all; and as for those *primary* powers or qualities, they do proportionably reside in every particle[a].

§ 18. *Dem.* III. 1. The soul is immortal. *Lect.* 91. § 4.

§ 19. 2. What is immaterial has no internal tendency to corruption and dissolution; and is incapable of being hurt by a variety of accidents, which may destroy any material system known to us.

§ 20. 3. It is unreasonable to believe that God would make a being, which he intended for an immortal duration, with a tendency to corruption, or obnoxious to dissolving accidents.

§ 21. 4. It is unreasonable to suppose that God has made the soul material; even supposing it possible that matter might think[b]. *Q. E. D.*

LECT. XCV.

Of the Immateriality of the Soul; continued.

§ 1. *Schol.* 1. TO this it may be replied, that neither is matter obnoxious to dissolution; nor does any immaterial substance tend to continue in existence, any otherwise than as God shall act in and upon it; (*Lect.* 36. § 1.) so that the whole demonstration is founded on a mistake: and it is said, that allowing the soul to be material does no more disprove its immortality, than owning the body shall be so, after that resurrection which christians expect, will be a sufficient objection against its perpetual duration[c].

§ 2. 2. Nevertheless we allow, that if the immateriality of the soul were proved, it would something strengthen our natural argument for its immortality; as it would certainly shew us, that the destruction of the body does not imply the extinction of the mind; and would be a probable intimation that God intended it for a longer duration; as we have reason to believe, that though marble and freestone be equally dependent upon

a CLARKE, ibid. p. 8—15.
Letters between CLARKE and COLLINS.
b BAX., ibid. p. 239—247.
LAW's Theory, Disc. on Death, and Append. against the Nat. Immort. of the Soul.
c LOCKE's Third Letter to STILL. p. 420—429.
BAXT. on the Soul, vol. i. Sect. ii. § 5.
JACKSON on Matter and Spirit, p. 11, 12.
RAMS. Princ. Prop. 18.
BAXT. Works, vol. ii. p. 176—179.
——— vol. i. p. 565—568.

him, he intended the former should continue in its form longer than the latter[a].

§ 3 3. Some have argued much to the purpose of *Dem.* 2. (*Lect.* 94. § 11, &c.) that an indivisible power cannot subsist in a divisible subject: but the power of thinking is an indivisible power; therefore the soul in which it exists is indivisible, and therefore immaterial.—But the foundation of this argument is liable to much dispute; and some attempt to retort it thus: "The idea of two feet is a divisible idea; but it exists in the mind; therefore the mind is divisible." But though we conceive of two feet as divisible, it is not proper to say, that the *idea* of two feet may be divided into two ideas, each of which shall be half the former, as the *archetype* of it may[b].

§ 4. 4. Much of the same kind is that argument taken from the limited nature of bodies, which are incapable of being extended beyond certain degrees, whereas the mind is continually opening itself to receive more and more knowledge, and never complains that an idea is too long, too broad, or too wide: but this goes on the supposition, that ideas are material things, otherwise they could not crowd or stretch a material mind[c].

§ 5. 5. Some plead that the spirits and particles of the brain are in a continued flux, and therefore cannot be the seat of consciousness which is a fixed thing.—It is answered, that consciousness may inhere in some stable, solid and unchanged piece of matter, such as the *stamina vitæ* are by many philosophers supposed to be[d].

§ 6. 6. Against the proposition it is objected, that if thought infer immateriality, and immateriality immortality, then, as brutes may reasonably be supposed to have perception, (*Lect.* 3. § 1.) which is a species of thought, they must be immortal.—It is answered, that we know not what may become of them. God can no doubt put a period to their existence at their death, since immateriality cannot necessarily infer immortality. *Vid.* § 1. As for RAMSAY'S notion, that brutes are degraded intelligences, which were once *Seraphim*, and are now doing penance in so base a state; it depends on so many uncertain principles, and is in itself at first appearance so improbable, that we shall not now stay to examine or confute it[e]*.

a GROVE against HALLET, c. iii.
BAXTER on the Soul, vol. i. Sect. iii. § 11.
b HALLET on Script. vol. i. p. 216—219.
c Serm. de SUPERVILLE, vol. iii. p. 10, 11.
d HALLET, 2d p. 215, 216.
e RAMSAY'S Princ. part i. vol. i. p. 374—387.
TILLOTS. vol. iii. p. 127—129.
CLARKE against DODWELL, p. 26—28.
BURNET on the Art. p. 54.
EDWARDS'S Exercitations, part i. p. 125—129.
BAXTER on the Soul, vol. i. Sect. ii. § 36—38.
REYNOLDS'S Lett. to a Deist, p. 61.

* Taking it for granted that the principle of life in brutes is an immaterial principle, a Dr. HILDROP wrote a treatise, in the earlier part of the present century,

§ 7. 7. That the faculties of the mind are sometimes impaired by the decay of the body, will no more prove the soul material than mortal[a]. *Lect.* 93. § 4.

§ 8. 8. From comparing the arguments on both sides it appears, that allowing it not to be *demonstrable* that the soul is immaterial, it is at least *possible* it may be so, and even highly *probable* that it is[b]. *Vid. Lect.* 94. § 4.

§ 9. 9. Should the soul be immaterial, it is nevertheless possible that it may be always united to some *vehicle:* our not seeing it go off at death can be no argument against it; since many things known to be corporeal are to us invisible, particularly the air, which is so extremely forcible, and the magnetic and electrical effluvia[c].

§ 10. 10. As to the opinion which the heathen philosophers entertained on this subject, there is room for debate; but it seems the greater part concluded, that the soul consisted of, or was inseparably united to some system of matter; excepting those who held it to be an ἀπόσπασμα from the divine substance, and held that substance to be incorporeal[d].

a BURN. on the Art. p. 35.
BAXTER on the Soul, vol. i. Sect. v. § 6—20.
RAMS. Princ. p. 233.
b BLOUNT's Orac. of Reas. p. 185.
LOCKE's Ess. l. iv. c. iii.
c MORE's Imm. of the Soul, l. iii. c. i. § 2, 3.
Rel. of Nat. p. 197. Not.
JACKSON on Mat. and Spir. p. 41—47, 51—56.
COLLIB. on Souls, l. 5. iv. 1, 2.
CHEYNE's Ess. on Regim. ad. fin.
WATTS's Ess. No. vii. p. 173, 174.
BAXTER on the Soul, vol. i. Sect. ii. § 31. Sect. iv. § 1—9, 17—21.
d LOCKE's Third Lett. to STILL. p. 431—441.
CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 203—207.
N. TAYLOR of Deism, p. 131, 132.
PLATO's Phæd. § 20.
WARB. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 403, 404.
CAMPBELL's Necess. of Rev. p. 132—143 *.

to prove the future existence and immortality of the animal creation. In doing this, he has employed all the arguments which are usually alleged in favour of the natural immortality of man; and he has urged them with great apparent zeal and earnestness. The performance exhibits a curious instance of what will be judged to be sophistical reasoning. K.

* To the authors which have formerly been referred to, as treating concerning the immateriality of the human soul, may be added TUCKER's "Light of Nature pursued," vol. ii. chap. v; Lord MONBODDO's "Ancient Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 176—180; ibid, vol. ii. p. 1—50; ROTHERHAM's "Essay on the distinction between the Soul and Body of Man;" BEATTIE's "Elements of Moral Science," vol. i. p. 404—414; and Dr. FERRIAR's Argument against the Doctrine of Materialism," published in the Memoirs of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Manchester, vol. iv. part the first, p. 20—44. K.

LECT. XCVI.

Whether the Soul be unextended.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO enquire whether, supposing the soul to be immaterial, there is reason to believe that it is extended, i. e. limited to some certain quantity of space, so that it may be said to fill it.

§ 2. *Sol.* There is no reason to believe, that if the soul be immaterial, it is extended.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. If the soul be extended, seeing all acknowledge that extension must be limited, it must be of some shape or figure.

§ 4. 2. If the soul be extended, we may conceive of it as losing a part of its shape; and if it be supposed commensurate either to the whole or to any part of the body, a bullet, sword, or any thing else, which rends or cuts off a part of the body with which the soul is co-extended, may, for ought appears, also carry off a part of the soul with it; unless we were to suppose it, when in such danger, to shrink up into smaller dimensions.

§ 5. 3. This discerption of the soul on the one hand, or condensation on the other, would imply some degree of solidity, i. e. corporeity, *Lect.* 1. § 9. contrary to the hypothesis.

§ 6. 4. If the soul be extended, it may touch the body, or be touched by it: but it is utterly inconceivable, that there should be any contact between an immaterial being and matter

§ 7. 5. Whatever absurdity could be supposed to follow from granting the *soul*, if immaterial, to be unextended, would follow from supposing *God* to be so: yet on the other hand, insuperable difficulties would arise from supposing *him* extended. *Lect.* 47. § 8.

§ 8. 6 There is no reason to believe, that if the soul be immaterial it is extended[a]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 9. *Schol.* 1. To this it is objected, that nothing acts but *where it is*: therefore if the soul were not extended, it could not act at all.

Ans. All matter acts upon other matter at a distance by gravitation: and it is inconceivable how the soul should move the nerves inserted in the brain, any better by being near, than

a WATTS's Ess. No. vi. § 2. p. 146—152. RAMS. Princ. vol. i. Prop. [illegible]. | KING's Orig. of Evil, p. 91—93.

by being further off, unless we suppose it material: and we before observed, that, in whatever sense it is supposed to be seated there, it is impossible to explain the manner of its perception and action. (*Lect.* 2. § 27. *Lect.* 9. § 8.) God could no doubt give a soul a power of moving a stone or even a mountain, at several yards distance from the body to which it is united, i. e. he might appoint, that ordinarily the motion of such a distant body should follow on the volition of that mind; (*Vid. Lect.* 36. § 1.) which he could not, if the hypothesis in the objection were just; seeing, if such a proximity were necessary, this could not possibly be effected, without such dilatation and contraction, as seems inconsistent with immateriality. It is moreover plain, that it is not this proximity, which gives the mind a consciousness of bodily motion; since the mind is least conscious of some things, which on that hypothesis must be nearest to it; being entirely unacquainted, otherwise than by foreign observation and analogy, with the structure of the brain, and the cause of its disorders, and not being able to determine by inspection or consciousness, where the common sensorium is[a]. *Vid. Lect.* 5. § 10.

§ 10. 2. It is further objected, that what is not extended is *no where*; and what is no where has no existence. But though this has been generally allowed as a maxim, it is not self-evident; and indeed is no other than taking the whole question for granted[b].

§ 11. 3. Nevertheless, when God has united a spirit to any body, so that it shall be to that spirit an organ of sensation and action; the soul may in a less proper sense be said to *be there*, where the body is; and spirits in general may be said to *be*, where bodies are, on which they are capable of acting[c]. *Vid. Lect.* 5. § 3.

§ 12. 4. The objection, that if the soul were not extended, it could have no idea of an extended substance, is taking the matter for granted, and has been considered in the only view in which it is worthy of consideration, i. e. as an objection against its immateriality[d]. *Lect.* 95. § 3, 4.

a HOWE's Works, vol. i. p. 45.
——— Liv. Temple, part i. c. iii.
WATTS ibid. p. 152—161. Ess. vi. § 3.
Sir ISAAC NEWTON's Third Letter to Dr. BENTLEY.

b WATTS ibid. p. 161—164.
JACKSON on Mat. and Spir. p. 3, 4.

c WATTS ibid. p. 165—167.

d CUDW. Int. Syst. p. 824—826.
RALPHI Epist. Miscel. 5.

LECT. XCVII.

Concerning the Original of the Soul—Pre-existence—Ex traduce—Immediate Creation.

§ 1. *Prop.* TO propose and examine the principal hypothesis, relating to the original of the human mind.

§ 2. *Sol.* The three chief hypotheses are those of *pre-existence*, of existence *ex traduce*, and of *immediate creation.*

§ 3. *Hypoth.* I. Some suppose the human mind existed at first, without this gross body in which it now dwells; but whether without any body at all, is not universally agreed. Some of the ancient philosophers, particularly PLATO, supposed it *eternal*, or as the Latins emphatically express it, *sempiternal*, as being a necessary emanation from the divine mind: but most of those who have embraced this doctrine of pre-existence, supposed it to have been created at some far distant period of time; and they all agreed, that in some unknown moment between generation and birth, perhaps say some the middle space, it was sent to inhabit this body.—The principal argument to support this hypothesis, is taken from the justice of God, with which it is supposed to be inconsistent, that a pure and innocent spirit should be so incommodiously lodged: they say that this embodied state seems to be an imprisonment, to which it is condemned for crimes committed in some better state of existence.

§ 4. To this it is answered,

(1.) That the divine justice may admit, that an innocent creature in the first stage of its existence should be exposed to some inconveniences, if they be counterbalanced by the advantages of its state, and especially by an opportunity of securing a more perfect happiness hereafter, which the patrons of this hypothesis allow to be our case.

§ 5. (2.) If, as the generality of christians believe, the first parents of our race were in a happier state of existence, and were also under such a constitution, as made them the representatives of their whole posterity; and they in that state offended their maker; it is possible that the whole family might fall under some marks of his displeasure, which they would not otherwise have been subjected to: and this may perhaps be the easiest way of accounting for those phænomena on which the hypothesis is built.

§ 6. (3.) That divine justice seems to require, that if a creature were punished for its own personal offence committed in a former state, it should have some consciousness of its guilt: our present calamities therefore, not being attended with such consciousness, cannot be a punishment for sins so committed.

§ 7. *Schol.* It is a great objection against this hypothesis, that it is merely *gratis dictum*; forasmuch as no man can remember any such pre-existent state as is pretended, or the adventures that befel him in it[a].

§ 8. PLATO answers, that we have not entirely forgot them, but that all our knowledge is entirely *remembrance*; and that without it no knowledge could be obtained. But that is evidently inconclusive, because at this rate the argument might be carried on *ad infinitum*, and an eternal, immutable, and self-existent being could know nothing.—It is much more reasonably replied, that it is the law of our present state of being, that we should remember only by the assistance of the brain, in which it is impossible that any traces of our former adventures should be drawn[b].

§ 9. *Hypoth.* II. The hypothesis of the soul's existence *ex traduce*, is this. From the observations made chiefly by LEUWENHOEK of the animalcula existing in *semine maris*, some have supposed, that the first elements of the soul as well as the body were contained there; which gradually grow up to sense with the ripening fœtus, and to reason in the advance of life. Of the patrons of this hypothesis, some suppose that these animalcula are produced from the food of the immediate parent, others, that the elements of them are to be found in the body of an infant, and that all those from which all mankind have arisen, besides an immensely greater multitude that have perished, were contained in the body of the first man, each generation being inclosed in the former, as the coats of an onion within each other, or, as perhaps it might be better illustrated, the kernel of a nut.

§ 10. The chief arguments to prove this, are,

(1.) The existence of these animalcula.

(2.) The absurdity of supposing a kind of *equivocal* generation in the body of the parent. *Lect.* 26. § 3.

a PRAINERD's Journal, p. 221—223.
b PLATO's Phæd. § 16—18.
BURN. Theory, vol. ii. l. iv. Pref. p. 3—5.
Phœnix, vol. i. No. i. p. 16—30.
RAMS. Princ. Prop. xlvii. vol. i. p. 147—156.
JENK. of Christian. vol. ii. p. 243—245.
Travels of Cyrus, vol. ii. p. 149—152. 8vo Ed. p. 248—252. 12mo.
MORE's Immort. of the Soul, l. ii. c. xii, xiii.
CUDW. Int. Syst. l. i. c. i. § 31, 32.
WATTS's Ruin and Recovery, quæst. ii. p. 94—105. Ed. 2.
BARROW's Pre-existent Lapse, &c. passim.
PRICE's Dissert. No. i.
Lux Orientalis, prop. c. 5, 6, 10. with Annot.
COLLIB. on Souls, Ess. 3d. passim.
STONEHOUSES's Universal Restit. Lett. x.
"No Pre-existence." by F. W. passim.

(3.) The resemblance between parents and children, which seems to imply such a derivation or traduction of the *body*, which on principles of analogy may prove that of the *soul*.

§ 11. *Schol.* To this it is replied,

(1.) That there is some reason to doubt whether there really be such animalcula as LEUWENHOEK talks of: few but himself have ever been able to discover them with his glasses, and it is very possible the motion might arise from some spirituous particles of the fluid, as it was only observed while the fluid was in a degree of gentle warmth, but soon ceased, i. e. as it seems, those particles evaporated in the heat.

§ 12. (2.) That if it be allowed that animalcula are really seen, it may be questioned whether they are originally in the seed, or in the water; since they must be diluted with water, before they can be discerned.

§ 13. (3.) That if they be in the seed, it may still be questioned whether they be the stamina of the human body; not only, as it is doubtful whether they can pass the two teguments of the *ova*, but also considering how unlike the animal growing in an impregnated egg, as observed and delineated by MALPHIGI, is to that observed in the seed of the cock.

§ 14. (4.) That allowing such animalcula in the seed of every adult male, and also allowing them to be the stamina from whence the next generation proceeds, it is groundless to assert that they contain the stamina of all future generations. It is allowed indeed, that the exquisite smallness of those removed at the greatest distance from the present is no objection against the possibility of their existence, since omnipotence could no doubt in the compass of a grain of sand make a system similar to our solar system: but there is no necessity of supposing this to be the fact here, since we are sure the same omnipotence can, and perhaps does, by some settled law of nature to us unknown, produce animal bodies from particles of matter before existing under another form. And it is the more probable, as it seems hardly consistent with our views of divine wisdom, to form such multitudes of animal bodies for certain destruction, and to answer no imaginable purpose; for it is evident, that not one of many millions of them is ever born into the world: and if it be true with regard to *men*, it is so likewise with respect to *fishes* and *insects*, where this objection is vastly greater.

§ 15. (5.) If such bodies were allowed, it would be unrea-

sonable to suppose them all endued with souls; such low degrees of life, as in proportion we must have had at the distance of many generations, being hardly conceivable: nor can we imagine, that God would, for so many thousand years, continue human minds in so mean and contemptible a state of existence.

§ 16. (6.) This hypothesis is most suitable to the *materiality* of the soul; the traduction of one *spirit* from another being inconceivable, and but poorly illustrated by the simile usually brought, of lighting one taper by another.

§ 17. (7.) The destruction of a multitude of souls to every one that grows up or has life, is a still stronger objection against this doctrine than the destruction of bodies, § 14. and that these subsist in a future state none maintain [a].

§ 18. *Hypoth.* III. The hypothesis of *immediate creation* is, that at a certain time, generally supposed between conception and the birth, perhaps 20 weeks after the former, but some say in the birth itself, the soul is created; and from the first moment of its existence united to the body.—The weakness of the former hypothesis, seems the principal strength of this. It is indeed objected, that this supposes God to be always creating new souls: but it is not easy to see the force of that objection. We are sure he always acts; (*Lect.* 36. § 1.) and acts with infinite ease; (*Lect.* 34. § 5.) nor is continual new creation any reflection upon him. What if we should acknowledge, that his works may be ever growing, both in number, extent, and perfection? It is difficult to see how it would blemish either his wisdom or power [b].

§ 19. *Schol.* On the whole, it seems that this last hypothesis is rather the most probable: but it does not become us to be confident in so dark and dubious a matter [c].

LECT. XCVIII.

Of superior created Spirits.

§ 1. *Prop.* IT is highly probable, that there are some created spirits, which were in the first constitution of their nature superior to human souls.

a BAKER of Microscopes, c. xvi. p. 152—167.
LEEUWENHOEK Epist. vol. i. p. 1—12, 149, &c.
NIEUWENT. Rel. Phil. vol. i. Contempt. xvi. § 9, 11. p. 241—244, 345—346.
Lux Orientalis, c. iii.
Rel. of Nat. p. 88—91.
WATTS's Phil. Ess. No. ix. § 2. with Append. p. 201—208, and p. 307—311.
DENNES's 2d Serm. of Veget. Pref.
BRAKE's Anat. vol. i. c. xxiv.
BAXT. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 198—20 .
CHAMB. Dict. on the Word Generation.

b GALE's Court of the Gent. part ii. p. 344—346.
Lux Orientalis, c. ii.

c Le CLERC's Pneum. part i. c. viii.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. When we consider the vast variety there is in the inanimate, the vegetable, and the animal creation, and how one class and order of beings rises above another, almost by imperceptible degrees, it seems highly probable, that we, who are in part allied to the beasts that perish, and who are placed in so imperfect a state of being, are not the highest order of spirits, and the most glorious creatures of our almighty creator; but rather, that the scale of created beings rises abundantly higher[a].

§ 3. 2. Astronomers generally grant, and strongly prove, that some of the planets are abundantly larger than the earth: we can hardly think they were made merely to afford us that little light and benefit we derive from them; it is much more probable they are habitable worlds; especially considering what discoveries have been made of the satellites of *Saturn* and *Jupiter*, and those varieties in the face of our moon, that seem like seas, land, and mountains. And it is highly probable, that some of these inhabitants may be spirits superior to us: not to mention the possibility there is, that the interstellar spaces may be inhabited: nor to insist on WELLS's conjecture, that there may be more planets than we commonly reckon revolving about our sun[b].

§ 4. 3. Most nations have believed the existence of *demons*, i. e. created spirits superior to human souls: and the accounts that have been given of their intercourse with men might probably have some foundation in fact; though no doubt the greater part of them are fabulous[c]. *Valet propositio.*

§ 5. *Schol.* 1. If it be objected, that perhaps those beings, now superior to us, were at first on a level with us, though perhaps something different; we answer, that the reasoning of the *first* step lies strongly against this. And as for what is objected against the *third* step, (though it must be acknowledged, according to Dr. SYKES's assertion, that many of those, whom the heathens called both good and bad *demons*, were supposed to be *human souls*,) yet it is very evident they had a notion of some *demons*, who were originally in a state superior to humanity,

a BAXT. Matho, vol. i. Conf. v. p. 248—257, 275—299.
b SWINDEN, of Hell, p. 287.
KING's Orig. of Evil, 4. i. 1, 2.
c Spect. vol. vii. No. 519.
LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 13. l. iv. c. iii. § 24, 26, l. iv. c. xvi. § 12.
WILKINS's World in the Moon, Prop. vii—ix, xiii.
Matho, vol. ii. p. 55.
BAXT. Works, vol. ii. p. 55, 56.
HIER. in Pyth. Carm. ver. 3, 4. Vid. Dacier's Not. ibid.
EUSEB. Prep. Evang. l. xv. c. 43.
VOLTAIRE's Misc.

and never had dwelt in human bodies: compare HIEROCLES and EUSEBIUS quoted above[a].

§ 6. 2. However it may be granted, that the perfection and happiness of those spirits is growing and increasing, as (if we suppose them not subject to forgetfulness, which the extraordinary memory of some men makes probable) it is certain their stock of knowledge must always be; with the increase of which much pleasure is connected[b].

§ 7. 3. Nevertheless it must be acknowledged, that whatever their perfection be, or can be at any imaginable most distant space of time, with any imaginable degree of continued improvement, they will still continue inferior to the divine being in knowledge and in power, and will still be equally dependent on him for their existence and every degree of their happiness; in which respect the noblest and meanest of his creatures are on a level, and so are to him as nothing. And this, by the way, is a strong argument for the infinity of the divine being.

§ 8. 4. Let it be observed, that the proposition is to be taken only in a general sense; for we have not any assurance by the light of nature, that no human soul shall ever arrive in its improvement to an equality with the most excellent of those superior spirits: on the other hand, that there are some spirits now superior to what those of men are in this embodied state, is in effect no other than a corollary from *Lect.* 91. § 4.

LECT. XCIX.

The Practice of Virtue beneficial to Individuals.

§ 1. *Prop.* MORE fully to prove that it is the interest of every man to cultivate virtue through the whole course of his life, and in every particular action. *Vid. Prop.* 44. *Cor.* 2.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. There is a secret and immediate pleasure attending virtuous actions, especially those of a benevolent kind, or those in which there is any remarkable degree of gratitude and piety towards God; which pleasure is of a very sublime

a Inq. into Demoniacs, p. 1—4.
TWELLS's Ans. p. 5, 6.
Farther Inq. p. 2—20.
Answer to it, p. 8—24.
PSEUDO-ot Daemon. p. 1—35.
JUST. MART. Opera, p. 28. Col. Ed.
POPE's Iliad, l. xix. ver. 93. Not.
STILL. Orig. Sac. l. iii. c. iii. § 15. p. 514—516.
EUSEB. Prep. l. viii. c. xiv. p. 387. l. xiii. c. xi. p. 663.
GALE's Court of the Gent. l. ii. c. viii. § 11, 12. p. 186—188, and 337.
b LOCKE's Ess. l. ii. c. x. § 9.

and delightful kind, vastly preferable to any sensual gratification; as those who have tried both experimentally know: and pious philosophers will acknowledge that the immediate pleasures of virtue are superior to those of science. *Lect.* 52. § 8.

§ 3. 2. In reflecting upon all virtuous actions, and particularly those which are attended with the greatest difficulty, there is a high satisfaction of mind.

§ 4. 3. Human nature and life is so constituted, that generally speaking, health, reputation, and interest in the world, and in a moderate degree, the possessions of it, may be most effectually secured by a virtuous course; at least it is seldom or never injurious to any of these.

§ 5. 4. A good man has or may have a source of happiness distinct from all these, in the present views of the favour of God, a confidence in his care, and the prospect of a future state of happiness after death, by which he may be delightfully supported under those calamities which are common to all; so that the painful sense of them may sometimes be swallowed up in vastly superior pleasure.

§ 6. 5. On the contrary to all this, a wicked man often finds a great deal of uneasiness in his vicious affections and actions, especially in his reflections upon them; he often brings upon himself diseases, infamy, poverty, and various kinds of distress in life, greatly aggravated by the apprehensions of the divine displeasure, and the fears of future evil to arise from it, in this life and in the next.

§ 7. 6. If we consider only the present life, it appears that virtue does ordinarily on the whole tend to promote its happiness.

§ 8. 7. Though it be granted that in some extraordinary cases, it may be otherwise than has been represented in the former steps, (*Vid. Lect.* 91. § 8, &c.) yet the future state will abundantly overbalance all the advantages, which there may in any imaginable circumstances be on the side of vice; even where the most gloomy fears have clouded the virtuous mind on the one hand, or on the other the vainest hopes have been entertained by the bad man, his conscience ever so much deadened and perverted, or where his course of prosperity in life has been ever so great. *Lect.* 91. § 4.

§ 9 8. It is on the whole the interest of every man to cultivate virtue in every action[a]. *2. E. D.*

§ 10. *Cor.* 1. It must be the interest of every one to prosecute and cultivate the proper means of virtue.

§ 11. 2. It must be the interest of every person heartily to repent of every instance in which he has acted contrary to virtue. *Vid. Lect.* 90. § 14.

§ 12. *Schol.* Some have argued the necessary connection between virtue and happiness from this consideration, that the divine being who is perfectly virtuous is perfectly happy; so that in proportion to the degree in which any inferior being resembles him in virtue, he must also resemble him in happiness. But so far as this argument is distinct from that stated in the preceding demonstration, it is inconclusive: for if it would prove any thing, it must be, that every virtuous man is in every moment of his existence happier than any vicious man is, or can be, which seems evidently contrary to fact[b].

LECT. C.

The Influence of Virtue on Societies.

§ 1. *Prop.* IT is on the whole for the benefit of societies to cultivate virtue.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. It tends to promote the happiness of every individual member, and therefore by consequence of the whole. *Lect.* 99. § 1.

§ 3. 2. Virtue teaches each to consult the good of all, and to be willing to resign any private interest of his own to the interest of the society, when it comes in competition with it; so constituting each man in his sphere the guardian of the public happiness. *Lect.* 65. § 13.

§ 4. 3. Virtue must ordinarily tend to bring down the favour and blessing of God upon societies, to which they must owe their surest foundation and best prosperity: and his interposition may the more reasonably be expected, since societies,

a Wollaston's Rel. Nat. Sect. 9. p. 215—229.
Price's Review of the Princ. Ques. in Morals, c. v.
Wollaston's Rel. Nat. Sect. 9. p. 229—231.
Grove's Nat. Rel. p. 129—136, vol. i. p. 178—111.
Puffendorf. de Jure, l. ii. c. iii. § 14. l. iv.
Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, book ii. pass.
Butler's Anal. of Virtue, second dissertation.

Pope's Ess. Ep. iv. prax. ver. 309—360.
Balg. Serm. vol. i. No. iii.
Sermons at Boyle's Lect. on the Certainty and Necessity of Religion.
Night Thoughts, No. viii.
Beattie's Elem. vol. ii. p. 8—41
L. C. Bergman's Let. to Dr. Clarke, pass.

as such, have no existence in a future state[a]. *Valet propositio. Lect.* 89. § 10. *Lect.* 90. § 8.

§ 5. *Schol.* To this MANDEVILLE has objected, that private vices are often public benefits; and that a universal reformation would necessarily produce the ruin of multitudes of persons and families, who subsist upon the public luxury and debauchery: but it may be replied,

§ 6. (1.) That though some good may arise to particular persons from the vices of others, it does not from thence follow, that greater might not arise to the whole from common virtues.

§ 7. (2.) That virtue would allow the free use of many things, not absolutely necessary to the support of life, yet tending to make it more agreeable, as wine, tea, &c.

§ 8. (3.) That public temperance and reformation would prevent the ruin of multitudes of persons and families, which is often aggravated by former splendor, and the consciousness of those extravagancies by which they have been reduced, as well as by the additional infamy attending poverty when occasioned by such means.

§ 9. (4.) That during the time that the prosperity of families continues, we shall judge very wrong, if we estimate their happiness by their external circumstances, without allowing for the inward temper of their minds, the happiness of which virtue would always promote, and thereby be a noble equivalent for rendering them something less opulent and magnificent.

§ 10. (5.) That the community would be better defended from foreign and domestic enemies by poorer citizens, that were temperate, generous and courageous, than by the effeminate, debauched and mercenary; besides all that extraordinary protection, which an universally virtuous people might justly promise itself from divine providence.

§ 11. (6.) If the history of the most celebrated ancient or modern states and kingdoms be examined, it will be found they have risen by virtue, and fallen by vice, agreeable to our argument in the proposition above, and contrary to those principles which we here oppose[b]. See besides, (*Persian letters* referred to) *Lect.* 65. § 6.

a CLARKE'S Serm. vol. vi. No. xiv. p. 207—210. 12mo Ed.
BUTLER'S Anal. part i. c. iii. p. 85—96. Ed. 2. 8vo.

b Fables of the Bees, pass.
WARB. Div. Leg. l. i. § 6. vol. i. p. 76—84.
INNES of Virtue, p. 99, &c.
BROWNE'S Ess. on the Charact. No. ii. § 5. p. 140—158.
LAW'S Theory, p. 235—239.
PINTO'S Ess. on Luxury; passim

§ 12. *Prop.* To take a survey of the state of virtue in the world.

§ 13. *Sol.* 1. A great part of the world is over-run with pagan idolatry and superstition; many of their rites are impious, obscene or cruel; and as new countries are discovered, new scenes of wickedness are discovered with them: and it is by the way observable, that several of those writers which speak most favourably of the morals of new discovered countries, have in other respects most of the air of a romance.

§ 14. 2. Though it is to be acknowledged, that the religious institutions of *Christians*, *Mahometans*, and *Jews* contain many excellent lessons of morality in all its branches; yet it evidently appears, that under all these professions, the greatest part of mankind are strangers to real virtue.

§ 15. 3. Those who cultivate it with the greatest care are in many respects defective, and far from that perfection which they themselves desire.

§ 16. *Dem.* The proof of all this is too evident from all the opportunities we have of knowing the moral characters of our fellow-creatures, by reading, travelling, or observation at home[a].

§ 17. *Schol.* That the state of things in former ages, even amongst the most polite, learned, and celebrated nations of antiquity, was generally much the same, appears from all the strain of ancient authors; and further from the known lewdness and cruelty of many of their religious rites, the custom of exposing children, and the public spectacles, besides many other things illustrated in JENK. of Christ. vol. i. p. 353—364. St. REAL, vol. i. ENGLAND's Morals of the Ancients, c. ult. LELAND on Revel. vol. i. c. i. 18—20. vol. ii. c. iii. &c. LAW on the Theory of Rel. Part ii. p. 116—124.

§ 18. *Cor.* 1. There is great reason for adoring the divine patience, that the earth is still preserved, and made the seat of so much pleasure, considering the exact and circumstantial manner in which God knows all crimes, and the almighty power with which he is always armed to punish them.

§ 19. 2. Those who are themselves truly virtuous have great

a WATTS's Ruin and Recov. quæst. i. § 5. p. 32—41. | BARROW of Pre-existence, c. vi*.

* Great additional light has been thrown upon the history of the state of knowledge and virtue amongst mankind, in consequence of the vast number of voyages and travels, to and through every part of the world, which have been made and published within the course of the last thirty years. K

reason to exert themselves to the utmost, to stem the torrent of vice, and to support the interests of virtue, which humanly speaking are so weak.

§ 20. 3. There seems a great deal of reason to suspect, that mankind is degenerated from some better state, in which it may be supposed the race first came out of the hands of so holy and good a being as the blessed God is: and accordingly, we may observe among some ancient as well as modern nations remarkable traditions on that head, which will be more fully considered hereafter [a].

§ 21. 4. Some further discoveries from the divine being seem very desirable, to lead us into the paths of more perfect virtue and happiness: but the fuller discussion of this will be the business of the next part of this work *.

a HOWE, vol. i. p. 150, 151. | Cyrus's Trav. part ii. Ap. p. 93—99.

* It is not of small importance to be master of what the ancients have written on ethical subjects; in which view ARISTOTLE, PLATO, XENOPHON, CEBES, CICERO, SENECA, EPICTETUS, MARCUS ANTONINUS, and PLUTARCH well deserve to be closely studied. K.

PART V.

ON DIVINITY.

PART V.

OF THE REASON TO EXPECT AND DESIRE A REVELATION: AND THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVIDENCE WITH WHICH WE MAY SUPPOSE IT SHOULD BE ATTENDED.

LECT CI.

Theology—Miracles.

§ 1. *Def.* THEOLOGY or DIVINITY is that branch of *Pneumatology*, which relates in general to the *knowledge* of *God*, but especially to those *extraordinary discoveries* which he is supposed to have made of himself to mankind; and considers the probability, the certainty, and the contents of them.

§ 2. *Schol.* Forasmuch as *miracles* are generally urged in proof of such extraordinary discoveries, it seems proper here to enquire into the nature, use and importance of them.

§ 3. *Def.* When such effects are produced, as *(cæteris paribus)* are usually produced, God is said to operate *according to the common course of nature:* but when such effects are produced, as are *(cæt. par.) contrary to*, or *different from* that common course, they are said to be MIRACULOUS[a].

§ 4. *Cor.* 1. Nothing can be known to be miraculous, till the course of nature has been observed.

§ 5. 2. If two opposite effects *(cæt. par.)* were to be alternately produced, neither of them would be properly miraculous; but the alternate succession of both would make up the course of nature: v. g. if the sun were to arise one morning in the east, and the next in the west.

§ 6. 3. When the course of nature can be but imperfectly known, in particular instances we may be incapable of pro-

a CONYB. on Mir. p. 9—12.
FLEETW. on Mir. p. 2—5.
CLARKE, at BOYLE's Lect. p. 374—376.
CLARKE and LEIBNITZ, p. 89. § 17. p. 113. § 43—46. p. 149. § 43—46.

nouncing in many respects concerning certain remarkable events, whether they be or be not miraculous.

§ 7. 4. A miracle contains no greater exercise of divine power, than an operation according to the course of nature[a].

§ 8. 5. Miracles are possible in general, (§ 7.) and possible in any given instance, when the wisdom of God does not require that the course of nature should be preserved; which it is impossible for us to know that it always does.

It has indeed been asserted, that it is most honourable to God to suppose that he at first lays down the best possible laws, from which therefore it would be a defect of wisdom to deviate. But it may be answered, that at least for any thing we know, the best possible scheme may be that, in which there shall be some deviation from the stated rules, provided always that those stated laws be generally so far observed, as that men may know what it is their duty to do, and what consequences are generally to be expected from their actions, which is apparently the case[b].

§ 9. *Prop.* To consider some other definitions which celebrated writers have given of miracles.

§ 10. *Sol.* 1. Mr. LOCKE defines a miracle to be "a sensible operation, which being above the comprehension of the spectator, is *in his opinion* contrary to the course of nature, and taken by him to be divine."

But on this account of the matter, every juggling trick, which I cannot understand, will, while my ignorance continues, be a miracle to me. In answer to this, LOCKE urges, that if this definition be not taken, we can never know what a miracle is; because no man is acquainted with the whole course of nature. But though we acknowledge that great part of it is unknown, yet so much may be known, as that some instances may plainly appear to be above it: v. g. recovering the sight of the blind, or the life of the dead by a word speaking, or multiplying bread, so that one loaf should serve a thousand men, and more be left at last than there was at first.—Besides this, the extraordinary works apprehended to be done by evil agents, would not be miracles on this definition[c].

§ 11. 2. Many others define a miracle to be "an extraor-

a CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 371.
b —— —— —— Lect. p. 376, 377.
CONYB. Serm. on Mir. p. 12—17.
BUTLER's Anal. part ii. c. ii.
MACKNIGHT's Truth of the Gospel History, c. iv. § 2.
CASTBELL on Miracles, part i.
PRICE's Dissert. No. iv.
HARTLEY on Man, vol. ii. Prop. 28.
ADAMS on Miracles, part i.
HUME's Ess. No. x.
DOUGLAS's Criterion.
c LOCKE's Posth. Pieces, p. 217—220.
CHANDLER of Mir. p. 9—11.

dinary operation, above the power of all created beings, and performable by God alone.

But this definition either goes on the false supposition of such a proper agency in the creature, as is inconsistent with *Lect.* 35. § 5. or else supposes, contrary to fact, that we know the utmost limits of the power of created agents, allowing that to be called *their power*, which is usually communicated to them [a].

§ 12. 3. Dr. CHANDLER says, "a miracle is an action done, or an operation visibly performed by any being, which is really and truly above the reach, natural power and capacity of that being who does it of himself, and without the assistance of some superior agent to perform."

§ 13. This definition seems liable to the following objections.

(1.) It supposes created beings capable of doing something of themselves, and without the assistance of any superior agent, contrary to *Lect.* 35. § 5.

(2.) It makes it impossible for God to perform a miracle, without the interposition of some creature.

(3.) It supposes it would be no miracle for God to send an angel to relieve a starving man, to open the prison-doors, or even to roll back the sun in his course, supposing I know the angel so employed to be ordinarily capable of producing such an effect; whereas in truth here would be a miracle, in suffering an angel in such a manner to act out of his usual sphere, though not beyond his common strength [b].

§ 14. Dr. HUTCHESON's definition, "that it is a work far exceeding human power, yet performed by the command or upon the volition of a man," nearly coincides with this of Dr. CHANDLER's, and is equally liable to the second and third objection [c]. § 13.

§ 15. 4. Dr. CLARKE's definition of what he calls a *theological* miracle, includes several particulars in it, which may more properly be examined hereafter [d].

§ 16. According to Dr. SYKES, "a miracle is a designed effect, sensible, unusual in itself, beyond the art and power of man to do;" and he expressly declares against defining it, an event contrary to the course of nature.

a LIMB. Theol. l. ii. c. iii. § 17.
CHANDLER of Mir. p. 11—13.
CLARKE at BOYLE'S Lect. p. 372—374.

b CHANDLER of Mir. p. 13—19.
c HUTCHES. Metaph. Synops. p. 89.
d CLARKE at BOYLE'S Lect. p. 382, 383.

§ 17. But to this it may be objected,

(1.) That if he does not by the word *unusual*, mean as much as *beyond the course of nature*, its being unusual is of no importance at all to prove any thing miraculous, as in the instance of the first *parhelion*.

(2.) If by *sensible* be meant something made known in consequence of a sensation excited by external objects, distinguished from the inward perception of impressions upon our minds, it is no way essential to constituting a miracle.

(3.) That the expression of *designed* is either superfluous or improper; since considering it as the work of God, every thing is designed; and if it might happen without *human* design, it might still be miraculous; as if health should unexpectedly be restored, while another person was praying for it[a].

§ 18. 6. Dr. CHAPMAN defines it, "an unusual and sensible event, most evidently either in the nature or manner of it, above the power of all natural material causes, and the art of man to produce."

§ 19. To this it may be objected,

(1.) Against the words *sensible* and *unusual*, as in the last step, § 17.

(2.) That an event may really be a true miracle, though it is not *most evidently so*.

(3.) That is seems to intimate a distinction between *natural* and *supernatural* material causes; not to urge that a *material cause* can only be a passive power, nor to insist upon it, that it may be questioned, whether *dreams* be not miracles upon this supposition: so that here as well as in other instances, what is superadded to our definition appears to be an incumbrance rather than an advantage[b].

a SYKES of Mirac. p. 16—28. | b CHAPMAN's Fus. vol. i. p. 72—76*.

* The question concerning the nature of miracles is treated of with great ability in Mr. FARMER's Preliminary Considerations, in his Dissertation on Miracles, p. 1—51. The design of the whole work is to prove that miracles are never effected without a divine interposition. K.

LECT. CII.

A Divine Revelation—Possible.

§ 1. *Def.* A DIVINE REVELATION is a discovery of some proposition to the mind, which came in not by the usual exercise of its faculties, but by some miraculous divine interposition and attestation, either mediate or immediate.

§ 2. *Schol.* We shall endeavour in the following propositions to prove, that a revelation is possible, (§ 3.) that it is desirable, *(Lect.* 103. § 1.*)* and that there is some reason to hope that God will grant it, *(Lect* 105. § 1.*)* and then shall more particularly examine with what kind of internal and external evidence, we may reasonably suppose that it should be attended.

§ 3. *Prop.* A divine revelation is a possible thing.

§ 4. *Dem.* 1. God may, for any thing we can certainly tell, think proper to make some discovery to his creatures of what they did not before know, or what by the use of their faculties they could not find out.

§ 5. 2. Since God is almighty, we may assure ourselves, that he who has given us a power of communicating our ideas to each other, cannot be at a loss for some proper method to make it apparent to his creatures, that it is he who speaks to them.

§ 6. 3. The pretences that have from time to time been made to divine revelation, and the ready reception they have many of them met with, plainly shew, that the greater part of mankind have thought it not impossible.

§ 7. 4. A divine revelation is at least a possible thing[a]. *Q. E. D.*

§ 8. *Schol.* It would be most absurd to object, that God's goodness will oblige him to give his creatures by their natural faculties the knowledge of all that it is *necessary* for them to know, and that his wisdom will prevent his miraculous interposition to discover *unnecessary* things; for both these propositions universally taken are false. For since it is as easy for God to communicate knowledge to us by revelation, as by the use of our natural faculties, we cannot say universally, that he must

a TILLOTS. vol. iii. p. 441, 442.
CONYBEARE on the Credib. of Rev. p. 17.
JELAND's Advant. of Rev. vol. i. p. 17—27.
FARMER on Miracles, c. i. § 2.

make man in such circumstances as that no revelation should be necessary; much less, that he can never suffer him to fall into such circumstances. On the contrary, on the first formation of mankind, (when that experience, which now instructs us in so many things of the greatest importance, could not possibly be our guide) it seems that some revelation was necessary with relation to his food; for surely, unless human nature were then vastly different from what it is now, appetite would have been but a very uncertain and dangerous rule: and it is certain, that the giving necessary intimations by revelation rather than by reason, would in some views be an additional favour; as it would so much the more sensibly illustrate God's care of his creatures and inspection over them: which, though it might be solidly reasoned out on principles laid down above, might become more obvious in this case, at least to weaker minds. Nor is it on the other hand true, that God bestows on his creatures nothing that is unnecessary; if by *unnecessary* be meant, what in the present connection it must mean, only something without which they might have enjoyed some considerable degree of happiness, sufficient to overbalance the evils to which they are exposed: nothing is more evident than the contrary, i. e. that God has consulted our convenience and delight in numberless instances[a].

LECT. CIII.

A Divine Revelation—Desirable.

§ 1. *Prop.* THE circumstances of mankind are such, as to render a divine revelation highly expedient and desirable.

§ 2. *Dem.* 1. In the generality of mankind, we too plainly see such indolence with regard to the things of religion, such strong passions, such early prejudices, and inveterate habits of vice, as render them very unfit for an impartial inquiry after divine truth.

§ 3. 2. The greater part of mankind, even those whose morals are least vitiated, are so entangled in secular cares, that they have little leisure for long and laborious inquiry.

§ 4. 3. It appears by the preceding parts of this work, that it is a very laborious and difficult task, to trace out the

a DELANY's Rev. examined, vol. i. p. 2, 3. LESLIE against TINDAL, c. i, ii, iii. | ——— Advant. of Rev. vol. i. p. 48—51. 4to ed. HARTLEY on Man, vol. ii. Prop. 27.

great principles of natural religion in their due connection and evidence.

§ 5. 4. It is not to be expected that many will undertake it for themselves, or that if they do, they will succeed in it[a].

§ 6. 5. There are some points, which the most diligent and impartial inquirer will find it hardly possible to clear up to himself, especially those relating to the pardon of sin, and the complete happiness of a future state. *Lect.* 91. § 17. *Lect.* 95. § 5.

§ 7. 6. Of those things which such an inquirer may be able to clear up to *himself*, there will be many, which it will be difficult to communicate to *others;* considering how abstruse many of his arguments will be on the one hand, and on the other, that indolence, prejudice, and secular cares, will in their degree hinder the generality from inquiring into truth proposed by others, as well as from discovering it for themselves. *Vid.* § 2, 3.

§ 8. 7. Could the great doctrines of religion and rules of morality be settled, and proposed, and taught ever so plainly, and inculcated ever so frequently, it would nevertheless be exceeding difficult to *enforce* the *practice* of them. The credit of the person proposing them would do little, considering the pride of the generality of mankind, and the difference which might probably happen among those who should undertake to instruct others: and we have before *(Lect.* 87. § 1.*)* proved it not to be the business of the civil magistrate to establish religion by force; and it is certain, if he should attempt it, he could not by his secular power produce any single action truly virtuous, considering how much depends upon the temper and intention, with which an action is performed. *Lect.* 62. § 1.

§ 9. 8. A revelation seems in *theory* highly expedient, and in a manner necessary to bring men to the knowledge of natural religion, and the practice of virtue[b].

§ 10. 9. If we consult *fact*, we shall find the ancient and the modern world over-run with error, superstition and vice.

§ 11. 10. Though there have been in the heathen world some excellent teachers of morality, yet the number of those who have in good earnest set themselves about it has been but small; and some of those few have been entirely ignorant of some things necessary to be known, and very dubious about others, concerning which they had some glimmering of knowledge: where they appear to have been certain themselves, they have often been unable to advance a clear and distinct

a CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 472—475. | b CONYB. Serm. on Rev. p. 4—28.

proof; and even where proofs have been most clear and distinct, they have wanted authority to enforce their instructions and precepts; so that they have availed but little to reform those parts of the world where they dwelt; of which the remarkable wickedness of *Greece*, in the age of SOCRATES and PLATO, is a very melancholy instance, as that of *Rome*, in the days of their best moral philosophers, also was[a].

§ 12. 11. Experience joins with theory, to prove a revelation so necessary to bring mankind to the knowledge and practice of virtue, that little is to be expected without it.

§ 13. 12. A revelation may make the knowledge of what the light of nature might discover to every man, more plain, easy, certain, and affecting; not to say, that there may possibly be some things beyond the discovery of our unassisted reason, which might prove cogent motives to virtue.

§ 14. 13. The knowledge and practice of virtue is necessary to the happiness of private persons and societies. *Lect.* 99. § 1. *Lect.* 100. § 1.

§ 15. 14. A divine revelation is in the present circumstances of mankind, highly expedient, and therefore greatly desirable[b]. *2. E. D.*

§ 16. *Schol.* 1. The proposition may be illustrated (and especially gr. 10.) by observing, that the most celebrated *lawgivers* of antiquity have thought it necessary to profess some intercourse with heaven, in order to enforce their laws, though many of them were armed with secular power; as appears, not only in the instance of MOSES, but also of ZOROASTER, PYTHAGORAS, SOLON, LYCURGUS, SELEUCUS, NUMA, HERMES TRISMEGISTUS, ORPHEUS, SUPHIS the *Egyptian*, MINOS, ZAMOLXIS the *Getan*, WODEN the *Saxon*, MELESAGORAS the *Eleusinian*, ZATHRAUSTES the *Arismaspian*, MANGO-COPAL the *Peruvian*, and PHOE the *Indian:* to which we may also add AMASIS, MNEVIS, RADAMANTHUS, TRIPTOLEMUS, ZALEUCHUS, LYCAON, and ROMULUS[c].

a CLARKE at Boyle's Lect. p. 281—302.
JENK. of Christ. vol. i. p. 365—376, 384—389.
DAC. PLATO. vol. i. Introd. p. 7—9.
FIDDES of Mor. Virt. c. xix.
CHANDLER of Mir. p. 65—77.
Prot. Syst. vol. i. No. 20.
LELAND on Advant. of Revel. vi. 10, 12, 21.
——— View. vol. ii. p. 192.
Monthly Review, vol. xi. p. 99—105.
b TOST. against Tind. p. 12—24.
CAMBR. Necess. of Revel. pass. præs. c. v, vi.
WATTS's Strength and Weakness of Human Reason.
HODGE's Serm. No. 14.
LELAND's Advant. of Revel. vol. ii. p. 27—39.
c SHUCKF. vol. i. p. 319—323.
TEMPLE's Miscel. vol. ii. Ess. iii. p. 87—89, ibid. p. 58—74.
LUCAS's Enq. vol. i. p. 108, 109.
Customs of Ind. and Jews compared, p. 56, 57.
COLLIER and Bayle in Num.
WARB. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 101—109.

§ 17. It may not be improper to observe by the way, that whereas the rise of superstition is generally ascribed to the *priests*, it appears in fact, that *princes* and *legislators*, under pretence of inspiration, as well as by other methods, were the chief agents in introducing it into the world; as is with great accuracy and learning shewn at large by CHAND. against Morg. part ii. § 15. vol. i. p. 556—585. PHILEMON to HYDASPES, part iii. p. 53.

LECT. CIV.

Objections Answered—the Plainness, Perfection, and Universality of Natural Religion.

§ 1. *Schol.* 2. TO the reasoning in the demonstration above, it is objected, by the author of *Christianity as old as the creation*, that natural religion is so *plain*, as to need no explication, and so *perfect*, as to admit of no addition[a].

§ 2. 3. To the *first* of these assertions it is answered, that the differences there have been between many learned philosophers, about many branches of natural religion, do evidently prove it not to be so *plain* as is here supposed: and indeed this hypothesis would entirely supersede all *human* as well as divine teachings. And as to what is said of the *perfection* of it, we reply, that if *natural religion* only mean that which in the most extensive sense may be called the *law of nature*, i. e. the obligation on a rational agent arising from the whole nature of things, (*Lect.* 90. § 7.) though the assertion be true, it is nothing to the present purpose; but if we mean by it merely the *light of nature*, (*Lect.* 90. § 5.) then the assertion is evidently false, being contrary to fact: but if it be a sort of medium between both these, i. e. that rule of life, to the knowledge of which men might attain, if they would in general use their faculties well, then it seems, that it is neither so perfect nor so plain, as to supersede the usefulness of a revelation, though it should on the other hand be granted not so imperfect and obscure, as to render it universally of absolute *necessity*.—On the whole, TINDAL is very little consistent with himself, when, shifting between these different ideas, he sometimes insists on such a *perfection* of it, as is inconsistent with any tolerable degree of *plainness*; and

a TIND. of Christianity, c. ii. and vi.

sometimes on such a *plainness*, as must suppose it very *imperfect*[a].

§ 3. 4. It is objected further, that it seems injurious to the divine goodness, to suppose that God has suffered mankind to fall into such deplorable circumstances as the proposition represents. We answer,

(1.) That the proposition does not assert mankind to be left under an absolute *impossibility* of obtaining virtue and happiness.

§ 4. (2.) That to leave men in great danger of error and vice, and that in such a degree, as will in *fact*, though *not necessarily* prove fatal to many, is certainly consistent with the divine perfections, because we plainly see it to be done; and is a difficulty by no means peculiar to those that believe revelation, but common to all that believe the goodness of the deity. And what TINDAL says of the great evil of *superstition*, which he supposes worse than atheism, joined to the charge of superstition which he brings against the whole *christian* world, serves yet more to illustrate and confirm this reply.

§ 5. (3.) To suppose the light of nature ever so perfect, will not infer the circumstances of mankind less deplorable: for the degree of wickedness, and consequently, misery prevailing in the world, being in other respects the same, will be aggravated in proportion to the degree in which their light and advantage are supposed perfect[b].

§ 6. *Schol.* 5. It is objected nearly to the same purpose as before, that if a revelation were thus expedient, it must have been *universal*; there being no imaginable reason, why God should give it to some rather than others.

§ 7. Reserving this to be more fully considered elsewhere, we here answer,

(1.) Since, on our principles, God was not obliged in strict justice to give it to *any*, he could not be obliged to give it to *all*.

§ 8. (2.) That though we cannot tell why one nation should have it rather than another, there is no reason to be surprised at such a distinction, considering in how different, and to us unaccountable a manner, all must acknowledge the means of virtue and happiness to be dispensed among the children of men.

a CONYB. against Tind. p. 134—138. or LELAND against Tind. p. 4—10. vol. i.

b TIND. Christian. as old, &c. p. 173, 174. FOST. against Tind. p. 64—70, 73—77.

§ 9. (3.) That it is a very supposable case, that if ever God gave a revelation at all, suited to the general use of mankind, it was with such circumstances, that its not having an universal spread was owing to the folly and wickedness of men: nay it is a very possible case, that God may already have given an universal revelation; i. e. a revelation made to the human family when very small, the tradition of which has been lost through their own folly, though their happiness might have been greatly promoted by keeping up the memory of it [a].

§ 10. 6. Those who assert a revelation to be absolutely necessary, that every man, how well soever he uses his reason, must inevitably perish without it, generally ground that assertion, not on principles of natural religion, but on those passages of *scripture*, which relate to the necessity of *faith in Christ*, which cannot here be properly examined [b].

LECT. CV.

Of Room to hope for a divine Revelation—uncontrouled Miracles.

§ 1. *Prop.* THERE is some reason to hope that God will grant a revelation.

§ 2. *Lem.* It is to be observed, that we are far from saying, that a man could have any *certainty* in this point; but a *probable hope* might be produced by the following considerations.

§ 3. *Dem.* 1. The circumstances of mankind greatly need it. *Lect.* 103. § 1.

§ 4. 2. The general goodness of the divine being may lead us to expect it: and it seems probable, that God would not have suffered mankind to have fallen into so great apostacy, unless he had intended them such an assistance.

§ 5. 3. The provision which God has made in the natural world for removing *bodily disorders*, gives us some additional reason to hope, that he will not be altogether regardless of the much more dangerous diseases of the *mind*.

§ 6. 4. The pretences to a divine revelation, which have been often made, and one and another of them so readily received, even sometimes upon very slender evidence, plainly

a BLOUNT's Orac. of Reas. p. 210, 211, 196, 197.
CLARKE at Boyle's Lect. p. 315—318.
POST. against Tind. c. ii. p. 78—86.
BUTLER's Anal. part ii. c. vi.
SYKES on Mir. p. 217—229.
LAW's Theory of Rel. part i.
BALGUY's Tracts, p. 324—334.

b JENK. Reas. of Christianity, vol. i. p. 2—14.

shew that men have thought a revelation probable: and perhaps we may add, there would not have been so many counterfeits, if there had been no true coin. *Lect.* 103. § 16.

§ 7. 5. Some of the ancient philosophers, and especially SOCRATES and PLATO, though they did not believe the pretences to revelation made by their *priests*, yet hoped that such a favour would be given to mankind, and express their comfortable expectation of it[a]. *Valet propositio.*

§ 8. It may perhaps be objected, that since mankind brought themselves into these deplorable circumstances by their own fault, there is the less reason to expect any extraordinary assistance.

Ans. We allow no particular person can have any assurance that God will favour him in this manner; but since it is certain that God confers many unmerited favours upon his creatures, and that in the natural world many remedies are provided for evils, which men bring upon themselves by their own folly, this objection will not overthrow the preceding argument.

§ 9. *Def.* That MIRACLE is said to be UNCONTROLED, the apparent design of which is not evidently *contradicted*, either by the *absurdity* of the thing it is intended to prove, or by some at least *equal miracle* opposed to it[b].

§ 10. *Schol.* A man may be said to perform miracles *in proof of a doctrine*, when he asserts the doctrine, and then works the miracle as an immediate confirmation of it; or when he does publicly and frequently assert himself to be a teacher sent from God, and appeals to a train of miracles to shew that he is so: for in that case such miracles, (if they be allowed any proof at all) do prove particular facts or doctrines asserted by him, even though no miracle be distinctly applied to such particulars[c].

§ 11. *Prop.* When a man performs evident and uncontrouled miracles as a proof of any doctrine, virtue requires those who have sufficient evidence of the reality of such miracles, to admit of the doctrine as true.

§ 12. *Dem.* 1. God may see fit to reveal some things to his creatures, not discoverable by their natural light. *Lect.* 92. § 3.

§ 13. 2. God's wisdom will require him to reserve to him-

a CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 304—310. JACKSON's Chronol. vol. ii. sub finem Month. Rev. vol. vii. p. 47.

b CHANDLER on Mir. c. iii. SYKES, ibid. p. 130—134.

c FLEETWOOD of Mir. p. 120, 121, 220—228. FARMER on Mir. p. 515—521.

self some certain *criteria*, by which his own testimony may be known and distinguished by us.

§ 14. 3. A miracle cannot be performed without an extraordinary divine interposition, either mediate or immediate. *Lect.* 36. § 1. *Lect.* 101. § 3.

§ 15. 4. If God would confirm the truth of a proposition to one man, by the testimony of another to whom it was immediately revealed, we can think of no method, by which he could do it in so effectual a manner, as by giving him a power to work a *miracle* in confirmation of it.

§ 16. 5. When a miracle is *uncontroled*, we can imagine no circumstance by which it can be distinguished from a miracle wrought to confirm a truth. § 9.

§ 17. 6. If God were to suffer an uncontroled miracle to be wrought in confirmation of a falsehood, it seems he could have no criterion by which his testimony could be distinguished.

§ 18. 7. It is inconsistent with the *wisdom* of God, to suffer an uncontroled miracle to be wrought in confirmation of a falsehood.

§ 19. 8. It would also be inconsistent with his *goodness*; seeing it would leave his creatures in a perpetual and melancholy uncertainty, as to the truth of any pretended revelation from him; an uncertainty that would be most painful to the most virtuous and religious part of mankind.

§ 20. 9. Seeing God is both wise and good, we may depend upon it, that a proposition attested by uncontroled miracles is attested by him.

§ 21. 10. Seeing God is true, virtue will require us to admit of a proposition so confirmed[a]. *2. E. D. Lect.* 89. § 1.

§ 22. *Schol.* 1. We have not mentioned that additional confirmation, which may arise to the proposition, from the regard which men in all ages and nations seem to have paid to miracles, as the surest proof of a divine revelation; that fact having been disputed, especially of late by the learned and ingenious Mr. WESTON, though some considerable stress is laid upon it by Bishop ATTERBURY, in the place quoted below; and Mr. COMBER has laboured to shew that miracles were greatly regarded by the Gentiles. It is observable, that few of the *legislators* mentioned above, (*Lect.* 103. § 16.) though they pretended to revelations, (which by them must have been supposed miracles,

a BARROW's Works, vol. ii. p. 214—216. LOCKE's Posth. Works, p. 219—222. | CHAND. on Mir. c. ii.

see Lect. 102. § 1.) ventured to prove the truth of them by professing a power to work miracles. Nevertheless, though the pretended miracles of the heathens were seldom proposed as in proof of any doctrine, (as will be further noted) yet there was a sort of accidental credit derived to heathen establishments by such pretensions to them, which occasioned the multiplication of those pretences in opposition to christianity; and is a proof after all, that miracles were not disregarded by the pagans in general; as, considering the constitution of human nature, it would be strange if they were, at least by those who were themselves eye-witnesses of them, and that in instances where the facts could not be disputed [a].

LECT. CVI.

Objections to the Proof from Miracles—Answered.

§ 1. *Schol.* 2. TO this it is objected, that if we believe the *bible*, we shall find that it is not only supposed there, that miracles *may be* wrought in proof of a falsehood, but it is expressly asserted to *have been fact* in one case, and foretold as what *shall certainly be* in others. *Deut.* xiii. 1—5. *Matt.* xxiv. 24. 2 *Thess.* ii. 9, 10. *Exod.* vii and viii. To these texts it has been answered by some, that they, especially the *first*, may be only *hypothetic:* by others, that all the wonders here spoken of are *tricks*, and not real miracles; which may be true of 2 *Thess.* ii. 9. But the justest answer seems to be, that none of these are supposed to be *uncontroled* miracles, but to be sufficiently confuted, either by the apparent absurdity of the thing they attempted to prove, or by other more and greater miracles wrought on the contrary side: and it is to be remembered in this view, that *Matt.* xxiv. 24. refers to the *apostolic* age; so that all the miracles of those false Christs were directly opposed, by the sum of all those wrought in the very same time in proof of christianity [b].

§ 2. 3. Bishop FLEETWOOD's singular solution of the miracles of the *Egyptian Magi*, may be seen at large in FLEETWOOD on Mir. p. 52—61. SHUCKFORD's Connect. vol. ii. p. 412—433.

§ 3. 4. Others assert, that by stating the case as in the proposition above, we fall into a round of proving the doctrine

a ATTERB. Posth. Serm. vol. i. p. 207—210.
b PILLOTS. Serm. vol. iii. p. 499, 500.
LIMB. Theol. l. iii. c. xvii. § 2.
FLEETW. on Mir. p. 178—209.
CHAPMAN's Eusseb. vol. i. p. 119—127.
SYKES on Mir. p. 175—179.
JORTIN's Remarks on Eccl. Hist. vol. ii. p. 93—96.

by the miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine. But the contrary is plain; for though we readily allow, that nothing apparently contrary to the light of nature can be proved by a miracle, yet we maintain, that many doctrines, of which the light of nature could give us no information at all, and in which even when proposed we can see no innate mark of truth, may be proved by miracles; it being sufficient in this case to render the proof valid, that no apparent absurdity attend the doctrine to be established by them, where there are no contrary miracles to be compared with them: nor could miracles according to us in any imaginable case be proved by the doctrine, be it ever so apparently true [a].

§ 4. 5. It is further pleaded, that any *one* miracle is as good a proof of divine interposition as *a thousand;* and that *all* miracles are as to their evidence *equal*, since no work can to the divine power be greater or less than another.—We answer, though all things be equally easy to God, yet there are some of his works, which appear to us more grand and magnificent than others, and more indubitably miraculous: and the story of the *Egyptian Magi* before referred to plainly shews there may be circumstances, by which one miracle may appear evidently to triumph over another; in which case, it seems that all the evidence arising from the opposite miracle is in a manner even transferred to the victorious side [b].

§ 5. 6. It must be granted, that the evidence of miracles seems so strong, as to render it highly probable, that God will not suffer it to be applied in proof of a falsehood, without appearing by miracle to turn the balance on the side of truth: for should he suffer them often to be profaned, to confirm what is evidently contrary to the principles of natural religion or common sense, they would gradually grow into such suspicion and contempt, as we can hardly suppose his wisdom would permit; and the more illustrious any miraculous fact in question appears, the stronger will this argument be [c].

§ 6. 7. It is further objected, that this method of stating the doctrine of miracles renders them of no use. But not to repeat what was said in answer to the objection in the 4th *Schol.*

a FLEETW. on Mir. p. 169—175.
HOADLY's Tracts, p. 25—28.
CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 382—385.
Bp. SHERLOCK's Disc. vol. i. p. 303*.

b FLEETW. ibid. p. 30—37, 81—83, 211—213.
HOADLY's Tracts, p. 5—10.
LOCKE on Mir. p. 229—231.

c CHAPM. Euseb. vol. i. p. 89—93, 96—116.

* We should here distinguish between the doctrines we *prove* by miracles (viz. those of revelation), and the doctrines by which we *try* miracles, viz. those of natural religion. M.

which is nearly equivalent to this; it is most evident they may, on this hypothesis, serve to awaken attention: to illustrate the goodness of the deity, when they are of a benevolent kind, and in all instances, his power, and thereby impress the consciences of men with sentiments of religious reverence and awe: to command respect to the person speaking; who might otherwise, especially if in circumstances of external meanness, appear pragmatical and usurping: to increase the evidence of some things which may be less certainly known by natural light; and to discover many others, which though not contrary to reason, are not discoverable by it, nor capable of receiving immediate evidence from it[a].

§ 7. 8. It appears from the survey we have now been taking, that the question, whether evil spirits, if such there be, may work miracles, is not of so great importance as some have represented: since it is certain that on the principles of the proposition, God will not suffer them to work uncontroled miracles; and if any such should be wrought in proof of a falsehood, charging it upon an evil spirit would by no means remove the difficulty, since such a spirit could act no otherwise than by a divine energy communicated to him, *Lect.* 36. § 1. Nevertheless, if a miracle were ever wrought, which was controled by the absurdity and wickedness of the doctrine to be proved by it, or by a series of opposite and greater miracles; in that case, it seems more congruous to the christian scheme, (if there appear to be reason for admitting it) to ascribe such miracles to the power of evil spirits, than to speak of them as the work of God. *Vid.* 2 *Thess.* ii. 9. *Acts* xiii. 10. *Job* ii. 7. compare *Rev.* xiii. 2, 14[b]. *Vid. Lect.* 38. § 7.

LECT. CVII.

Of Internal and External Evidence—Of the Internal Evidence to attend a Revelation.

§ 1. *Def.* THAT is called the INTERNAL EVIDENCE of any revelation, which is drawn from the consideration of those declarations and doctrines which are contained in it: and that is called its EXTERNAL EVIDENCE, which arises from some other

a FOSTER against TIND. p. 50—63. ATTERB. Posth. Serm. vol. i. p. 210—216. JORTIN's Remarks, vol. ii. p. 3.

b CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 318—322. JORTIN's Remarks, vol. ii. p. 3. FARMER on Christ's Tempt. p. 25—27.

circumstances referring to it, v. g. predictions concerning it, miracles wrought by those who teach it, its success in the world, &c.

§ 2. *Prop**. To enquire what kind of internal evidence we may probably expect to find in a divine revelation †.

§ 3. *Lem.* Let it be observed, that the divine revelation of which we here speak, is supposed to be one intended for the benefit of mankind *in general*, and introduced as that in which the whole scheme of revelation *terminates:* for otherwise it must be acknowledged, that there may be particular revelations on different occasions, which may be very credible, though not attended with all those internal evidences; nor could it be expected, that every discovery which God makes of himself to any particular person, or nation, should answer all these characters.

§ 4. *Sol.* 1. We may be sure it can contain nothing apparently contrary to the light of nature, because that is the law of God, *Lect.* 90. § 4. and he is too wise and too faithful to contradict himself.

§ 5. 2. It may be expected, that it should further confirm some important truths known by the light of nature, and clear up the difficulties which hang on some articles in which our happiness is much concerned: particularly, that it should give us

* This and the ninety-seventh proposition (*Lect.* 109. § 1.) seem liable to some objection. It must be owned that we are very little qualified to judge *à priori* what kind of evidence, and especially what *external* evidence should attend a divine revelation: and to select all the particulars of that evidence with which the *christian* religion was attended, and to propose this as the *standard*, by which revelation in *general* is to be tried, looks too much like an attempt to prepossess the mind in favour of christianity, before it is fairly examined. The author seems to have been aware of this objection himself; and has accordingly in the *Lemma* to the 97th proposition endeavoured to soften the manner of expression; as if the intention of the proposition was only to shew the *reasonableness* of such kind of evidence, if it should hereafter appear to have in fact attended any supposed revelation, without asserting that all the particulars of this evidence would have occurred to us as probable, when only reasoning upon it in theory: for it is evident that to see the reasonableness of any scheme when it is proposed to us, is a very different thing from making the discovery ourselves.—But though this way of stating the question must be allowed less exceptionable than the other, yet it seems on the whole, that this inquiry would be made with much greater advantage, if it were reserved till the evidence which has in fact attended christianity were fully stated. We should then be better able to judge of any objections that are made to particular parts of the evidence, and should be prepared to make a more precise and determinate answer: whereas when the subject is only treated *in theory*, our reasoning upon it will of necessity be more indeterminate, and therefore less satisfactory; an instance of which we have in the objections that are urged in some of the following pages, against *positive institutions* and a *traditional* revelation. C.

† See both the internal and external evidences to be required in a divine revelation, well laid down in BAILEY's Essay on divine Inspiration, part the second. S.

firmer assurance of the pardon of sin in a way consistent with the divine justice, and that it should discover more of a future state of happiness, perhaps also of the entrance of sin and calamity in the world.

§ 6. 3. It may very probably contain a discovery of some doctrines as well as facts, which though not inconsistent with our natural light, are not discoverable by it.

4. As it is very probable that much of it will relate to the divine being and his operations, it is to be expected, that though some additional light may be given us, as to many things concerning him, yet these discoveries may be connected with further hints relating to what is yet unknown; so that there may be many things in it beyond our adequate comprehension, or in other words, some things *mysterious*. Vid. *Lect.* 22. § 14.

§ 7. 5. Nevertheless, we may conclude the most important things will be plainly revealed, so that every honest enquirer may come to a full satisfaction about them.

§ 8. 6. The end of all must be to subserve virtue, and so to promote the happiness of mankind: and those additional discoveries beyond what the light of nature could have found out, supposed § 6. will no doubt centre in this, and not tend merely to amaze our minds and excite our curiosity.

§ 9. 7. Considering how greatly and how universally *pride* prevails in the minds of men, how detrimental it is to almost all the branches of virtue, and how much it taints and debases many actions which would otherwise be the most excellent, as likewise how ill it becomes any creature, and especially a mortal and a sinful creature; it is exceeding probable, that the whole series of a divine revelation will evidently tend to exalt God and to humble man[a].

§ 10. *Schol.* 1. It is objected, that on these principles a revelation must be needless; since a man must understand the principles of natural religion before he can judge of a revelation, and if he can judge of these he does not need a revelation.

§ 11. To what is said, *Lect.* 106. § 6. we may here add the following remarks,

(1). We allow that the being and truth of God must be known, before we can judge of the internal evidence of a revelation as above.

a TILLOTS. vol. iii. p. 442, 443. DOD. x. Serm. No. viii. p. 209—211. | DUCHAI'S Serm. p. 111—118. BUTLER'S Anal. part ii. c. iii.

§ 12. (2). That nevertheless a revelation may improve what is known, correct mistakes, and excite men by proper motives to the practice of virtue, which they generally need more than merely to be instructed in its nature.

§ 13. (3). That a revelation may be a means of leading a person into the knowledge and belief of those doctrines, which must be believed before that revelation can be admitted: v. g. miracles may convince an atheist of the being of a God.

§ 14. (4). That the report of a revelation, and some probable external evidence of its truth striking the mind, may lead into more attentive reflection on the principles of natural religion; and thereby further promote the knowledge of them, and make way for a rational admission of the revelation itself, with a regard to its internal evidence as now better understood.

§ 15. (5). That the evidence with which a revelation is attended may further convince even a wise and good man of those things which he before believed, and on the belief of which he admitted the revelation as probably true: v. g. remarkable appearances of God may further prove his particular providence, and the accomplishment of prophecies and threatnings may introduce a further and more lively conviction of his truth. To which we may add,

§ 16. (6). That the whole objection is founded upon an evident mistake; since it lies against all methods of instruction whatsoever, and might be applied even to mathematical treatises; as it might be said, they cannot improve reason, since we must by reason judge whether the arguments are conclusive[a].

§ 17. 2. It may be questioned whether a revelation is to be admitted, which commands an action forbidden by the general rules of morality, v. g. to kill an innocent child, or put a whole nation of men to the sword.

Ans. (1.) That cannot be a divine revelation, which requires any thing which all things considered is in present circumstances evil

§ 18. (2.) It is difficult for us to say, that such actions as those here mentioned are in all cases and circumstances unlawful, or even that human sacrifices are universally so; because it is possible they may be for the public good; and God, whose views are infinitely more extensive than ours, might see them to be so in circumstances when we could not possibly discern it.

a TIND. of Christianity, p. 369.
POST. against Tind. p. 41—58.
LELAND against Tind. vol. ii. p. 95—100.
BUTLER's Anal. part ii. c. i.

§ 19. (3.) Upon the whole therefore, we must judge by comparing the evidence on both sides: and if in any given instance, we have a stronger evidence that God requires a thing, than we have on the other hand that in present circumstances it is an evil, we are then to believe it good, and to obey the revelation requiring it; depending upon it that God will one way or another interpose, to prevent such an issue of the affair, as it would be contrary to his perfections to permit [a].

§ 20. 3. Considering how liable the human mind is to mistake, great care should be taken that we do not admit any principle as certain, which may really be doubtful, with respect to natural religion; lest, trying revelation by this complex notion as a standard, we should reject any thing that is really authentic, and sufficiently proved to be so by external evidence. This therefore is to be diligently attended to upon the principles laid down above, and one part of the internal evidence weighed against another; as well as the sum of both with the external, in order to form a right judgment.

LECT. CVIII.

Of Positive Institutions—their Reasonableness.

§ 1. *Def.* THOSE are called POSITIVE INSTITUTIONS or PRECEPTS, which are not founded upon any reasons known to those to whom they are given, or discoverable by them, but which are observed merely because some superior has commanded them.

§ 2. *Cor.* It is plain, that *positive* precepts may be distinguished from *arbitrary* precepts, i. e. those which are founded upon the mere will of the commander, and for which he himself can see no reason [b].

§ 3. *Prop.* There may be positive institutions in a religion of which God is the author.

§ 4. *Dem.* 1. There are various relations of things unknown to us, and beyond the discovery of our natural faculties.

§ 5. 2. It is possible those unknown relations may render some things fit to be done by us, which we cannot see ourselves under any obligation to.

a CHUBB's Prev. Quest. pass.
BUTLER's Anal. p. 207, 208. 8vo Ed.

b CONYB. against Tind. p. 155—157.
Main Arg. p. 45, 46.
HALLET on Script. vol. iii. p. 187—194.

§ 6. 3. These are most clearly known to the divine mind. *Lect.* 39. § 5.

§ 7. 4. God may have sufficient reasons to us unknown for appointing some particular actions, which we could not otherwise see ourselves obliged to.

§ 8. 5. There may be in other instances a general reason for appointing some test of our obedience, when there is no peculiar reason for preferring one to another.

§ 9. 6. Humility, and consequently virtue, may be in some circumstances more effectually promoted, when we are required to obey commands founded on reasons unknown to us, than if those commands carried their own apparent reason along with them; and it may be with this view that God sees fit to conceal from us the foundation of the commands in question.

§ 10. 7. Civil governors may make laws founded on reasons unknown to their subjects, and proper to be concealed from them.

§ 11. 8. God, as our creator and constant benefactor, has a right to command us incomparably superior to that of any civil governor.

§ 12. 9. Circumstances of worship will appear more solemn, when considered as matters of divine institution, than merely as matters of human invention; a greater solemnity may thereby be added to the worship itself: by which means they may have a remoter tendency greatly to promote those several virtues, which such acts of religious worship are intended to subserve.

§ 13. 10. There may be positive institutions in a religion of which God is the author [a]. *2. E. D.*

§ 14. *Schol.* 1. To this it is objected, that forasmuch as God is unchangeable, (*Lect.* 34. § 3.) his will and our duty to him must always be the same.

Ans. Our *general* duty will always be the same, but the *particular expressions* of it must vary as our circumstances vary; nor is there any change in the divine will implied in such a variety, or in his giving new commands to us, when those new circumstances arise, more than there is in his producing new creatures [b].

§ 15. 2. It is also objected, that it is inconsistent with the divine wisdom to command *indifferent* things as *necessary*.—It is answered, they are not commanded as necessary, i. e. as *mo-*

a CONYB. p. 158—170.
FOST. against Tind. p. 284—284.

b TIND. ibid. p. 20.
CONYB. ibid. p. 170—174.
FOST. ibid. p. 288, 289.

rally and *universally* so, though in the present circumstances they may be *expedient;* and if they could never in any instance be expedient, they would not be indifferent, but universally and morally evil, contrary to the hypothesis [a].

§ 16. 3. It is said to be inconsistent with the goodness of God to fetter our liberty, and thereby impair our happiness, by requiring things under certain penalties, which we might else have been excused from; and that this will turn a revelation into a curse instead of a blessing.

§ 17. To this it is replied,

(1.) It is not granted that every positive institution as such does necessarily impair our happiness, whether by restraining our liberty, or by multiplying our care in observing them; for the pleasure a pious mind will have in resigning to God's will some of its enjoyments, and in finding itself continually employed in his service, may upon the whole make the observance of such positive precepts more delightful than a freedom from them.

§ 18. (2.) The tendency these things may have in their consequences to promote virtue, may on the whole be vastly more than an equivalent for present pleasure forborne and labour and difficulty incurred.

§ 19. (3.) If on the whole these positive precepts did diminish our happiness, a revelation of which they are a part might contain such advantages of another kind, as on the whole to make it a great blessing: nor can it by any means be proved, that every thing which God *requires* of us must *immediately* promote our happiness, any more than that all he appoints in the course of his *providence* must have this effect [b].

§ 20. *Schol.* 4. It is objected, that it is self-contradictory to suppose God should *forbid* that by a revelation, which he has *allowed* by a natural law.

Ans. (1.) No natural law allows it in *such circumstances*, as those in which it is by a revealed law forbidden, i. e. when God has expressly determined a case in itself indifferent.

(2.) On the same principles, all those civil laws are to be condemned, by which things are forbidden, which are not directly contrary to the law of nature [c].

§ 21. 5. It is also objected, that positive precepts over-

a TIND. ibid. p. 131, 132.
CONYB. ibid. p. 174—177.
b TIND. ibid. p. 123, and 131.
CONYB. ibid. p. 177—182.
LIMB. Collat. ap. Spect. vol. iii. No. 213.
c Main Arg. p. 52.
Post. against Tind. p. 285—288.

charge the mind, and so lead to the neglect of moral virtue; and that if people come to believe these things good for any thing, they will soon suppose them good for every thing, i. e. place the whole of their religion in them, considering how prone men are to superstition. *Lect.* 86. § 9.

§ 22. *Ans.* (1.) There is no arguing against the use of a thing from the possibility of its being abused; for then all the entertainments and supports of human life must be condemned.

§ 23. (2.) It is reasonable to believe, that if God gives a revelation in which positive precepts are contained, he will take proper care to distinguish them from the great precepts of moral virtue.

§ 24. (3.) A few positive precepts, given in a revelation declaring the rule of faith and practice, may more effectually prevent the increasing and idolizing such observances, than if none at all had been appointed [a].

§ 25. *Cor.* It appears from this survey of the subject, that the insertion of some positive institutions, in a proper manner moderated, and declared subordinate to the precepts of moral virtue, is so far from being an objection against such a revelation, that it is rather to be considered as an additional part of its internal evidence: especially considering, that as a divinely instituted religion will probably require some association of its professors, there must in the nature of things be some form of entering into that association, and of maintaining a profession of continued adherence to it; which will have evident advantages, if supposed of divine appointment [b].

LECT. CIX.

Of External Evidence attending a Revelation.

§ 1. *Prop* †. TO enquire into the external evidence which may probably attend a revelation.

§ 2. *Lem.* It is to be observed, that we do by no means limit the divine being to all the circumstances here mentioned;

a TIND. of Christianity, p. 123, 124.
CONYB. against Tind. p. 182—193.
Main Arg. p. 18—51.
FOST. against Tind. p. 289—303.

b BUTLER's Anal. p. 215—217. Oct. Ed.
Lett. to Wallace, p. 8—11.
Answer, p. 27—33.
LELAND against Tind. vol. i. p. 51—92.
Lett. of Posit. Inst. prefixed to LELAND, vol. ii*.

* Rather affixed to volume the first; but it is not in the second edition. S.

† See the note on *Lect.* 107. § 2.

but only remark, that if a revelation offered should seem to be attended with such circumstances, in conjunction with the above mentioned internal evidences, each of these circumstances would concur to recommend it to our candid and diligent examination.

§ 3. *Sol. and Dem.* 1. We might reasonably suppose, that at least *most* of the persons chiefly employed in the first publishing the revelation would be persons of piety and virtue; otherwise, we could neither imagine that God would favour them with such extraordinary discoveries of himself, nor could we depend upon their veracity in reporting them to us: yet we cannot say, that it is necessary that *all* the persons so employed, if there be a considerable number of them, should be good men, and much less that every one of them should be freed from every degree of sin, though perhaps, if any one person is to bear a much greater part in the revelation than the rest, he may be so distinguished [a].

§ 4. 2. It is possible that some *superior spirit* (*Vid. Lect.* 98. § 1.) may be employed as a messenger from heaven to bring this revelation; and if he should not only make a transient appearance on earth, but take up his abode here for a considerable time in a human form, giving an example of the most perfect virtue, we must acknowledge the circumstance extremely well chosen and worthy the divine wisdom, though we cannot pretend it to be of absolute necessity.

§ 5. 3. We may reasonable depend upon it, that the *chief* messenger, if such there be, or others commissioned by him, will, at the first publishing of such a revelation, be endued with a power of working evident, uncontrouled, and probably most of them beneficial *miracles*; they being not only a very solid proof of a divine mission, (*Lect.* 105. § 11.) but upon many accounts the most plain, popular, and convincing, and best suited to the bulk of mankind, for whose benefit no doubt a revelation would be calculated [b].

§ 6. 4. It is probable that the chief persons employed in opening such a revelation may appear in plain and low circumstances of human life, rather than with princely grandeur; since in this view their testimony might be less suspected of being a political contrivance, and their example would be more instructive to the generality of mankind. Nor is it on the whole

a TIND. ibid. p. 8, and 243. POST. against Tind. p. 113, 114.

b LELAND ibid. vol. ii. part ii. c. ii. p. 36—38 44—53. ATTERB. Posth. Serm. vol. iii. p. 217—222.

incredible, that such persons, notwithstanding their own virtue, should be despised and persecuted, and perhaps put to death, for their attempts to reform the world: if this were the case, they would give a most edifying example of suffering virtue, and an evidence of the integrity of their character and testimony to all ages, beyond what we could conceive in other circumstances. And though for this reason God might probably leave some of them to die by their enemies' hands, yet it is not unlikely, but in some remarkable instances he might interpose for the delivery of his servants in their extremity, either rescuing some of them by miracle, in order to their further usefulness, or perhaps raising them from the dead [a].

§ 7. 5. It is not improbable, that a revelation should be *gradually* introduced, and the expectation of mankind awakened by *predictions* and previous miracles, before the greatest scene of all be disclosed: this is analogous to the usual method of divine operation in the works of nature; and would lay a foundation for a very convincing additional evidence of the truth of the revelation; if it should appear, that a variety of different persons, of different ages and perhaps different countries, had been led by the providence of God and his influence on their minds to carry on their proper distinct parts of one harmonious design, the connection of which was unknown to each of them [b].

§ 8. 6. It is probable God may bear further witness to such a revelation, by giving it at first remarkable success, notwithstanding strong opposition, and though it may be destitute of human support; and by making it visibly effectual for reforming the characters of its professors. Such facts might be capable of most convincing proof to future ages; on which account they seem peculiarly proper.

§ 9. 7. Forasmuch as miracles would lose much of their force, if they were frequently to be repeated for a long succession of ages, it is not reasonable to conclude, that such a revelation would always be attended with the same degree of sensible evidence, with which it was at first introduced into the world: it is more natural to imagine, that God would take care that the first publishers of it should deliver in *writing* the history, purposes, and contents of the revelation, and that their books should be transmitted to posterity with such kind of evidence as other ancient records have.

a PLATO de Rep. l. ii. ap. Dod. x. Serm. p. 206. Ed. 1.
TOST. against Tind. p. 317, 318.

FLEM. Christol. vol. ii. p. 51—53. 76—85.
b BARRINGT. Ess. on Div. Disp. Pref. p. 22—26.
BUTLER'S Anal. part ii. c. vii.

§ 10. 8. It is probable, that if this method of transmitting a revelation be taken, providence may so order it, that the evidence of the main facts on which it is built shall at least in part be drawn from the testimony and confession of those by whom it was opposed; at least we must confess that this would be a strong additional medium of proof[a].

LECT. CX.

Of Traditional Revelation.

§ 1. *Schol.* 1. THE principal objections against the preceding solution are those which affect the *seventh step* of it: we shall therefore, in the following *Scholia*, give a view of the chief arguments brought against the supposition of such a *traditional* revelation, (as TINDAL, though with some partial ambiguity, has affected to call it) and propose the most obvious answers to them.

§ 2. 2. It is objected, that forasmuch as the credibility of any testimony is impaired by passing through a number of hands, all the evidence which any traditional revelation can be supposed to have, must in time be utterly worn out.

§ 3. *Ans.* (1.) Where the testimony of any traditional witness gives *indubitable persuasion*, the credibility of the thing testified suffers *no diminution* by passing through his hands; and the credit universally given to many facts in ancient history, proves that the decrease is exceedingly small even in a long succession of ages, when the intermediate witnesses are faithful, careful and knowing.

§ 4. (2.) That a tradition preserved by *writing*, is evidently less liable to corruption than that which is merely *oral*; since when the facts are once recorded, there is no room left for a failure in memory, to which alone the mistakes of honest men will be owing in transmitting a testimony.

§ 5. (3.) That the agreement of various witnesses, and many of them in separate interests, concerning such a revelation, may be more than an equivalent for the little defects mentioned above.

[a] DODD. x. Serm. No. viii. p. 215—218. Ed.

§ 6. (4.) That the success of a revelation, or the accomplishment of some prophecies contained in it, and the illustration of many other branches of internal evidence, relating to the characters of historians, mutual connection, and correspondence of facts, &c. on the principles of the *fifth* step, may give it such an increase of evidence, as shall abundantly over-balance all that it can be supposed to lose, by being transmitted through many hundred years[a].

§ 7. *Schol.* 3. It is also objected, that there are so many forgeries of books pretended to be ancient, that it is a difficult matter to distinguish the genuine from the spurious; and that since the bulk of the common people have neither leisure or ability to manage an enquiry of this nature, if they receive a traditional revelation, it must be by an implicit faith in the testimony of those who are the teachers of that religion; so that in reality they believe not *God* but the *Priest*.

§ 8. *Ans.* (1.) It is universally allowed that learned men may have sufficient evidence as to the genuineness of ancient books, and therefore of those which contain the substance of a supposed revelation: and as it is highly probable in the nature of things, that books of this kind would early pass into many hands, and be examined with the utmost rigour, and preserved with the greatest care, the evidence of their being genuine might (*cæt. par.*) be much greater than could be obtained as to any other books of equal antiquity.

§ 9. (2.) Though the common people cannot of themselves enter minutely into the proofs, yet they may have some opportunity of gaining rational satisfaction, by consulting persons of learning and seeming integrity, not merely among the priests but the *laity*; and by reading books that give a view of the argument, in which they may reasonably take it for granted, that especially in a learned and inquisitive age, no man will cite vouchers notoriously false.

§ 10. (3.) They may compare writers on both sides, if the revelation be opposed; and perhaps may see, from the manner in which the opposition is made, what may greatly confirm them in the truth opposed.

§ 11. (4.) A person that cannot read himself may get some valuable treatises read over to him, perhaps again and

[a] TIND. Ibid. p. [illegible].
POST. against Tind. p. 93–96.
LELAND. Def. vol. II. p. 111–119.
Warb. Div. Leg. vol. I. p. 1–5.
COMBER against Weston, Append.
JENNINGS Obs. Prop. xvii, xviii.
LITTON on Resurr. part II. Prop. xv, xvi.
FLEMMING's three Monuments, passim.

again by different persons, whose partiality he has no reason to suspect, and concerning whom he might be confidently sure they read what was before them[a].

§ 12. *Schol.* 4. It is objected that the common people cannot be sufficient judges of the faithfulness of a *translation*, which yet is necessary in order to their understanding a traditional revelation, depending on books and designed for the use of various nations. We reply,

§ 13. (1.) That though we acknowledge they cannot be so entirely satisfied as those who understand the original language; (which should recommend the study of the original to those who can conveniently engage in it;) yet the unlearned may very cheerfully depend upon the testimony of persons of acknowledged ability and known integrity, who have diligently compared the version with the original, and declare it as a fact on their own knowledge, that it is in the main agreeable to it.

§ 14. (2.) Such a testimony acquires a very strong additional degree of evidence, when persons of different parties and sentiments in religion agree in allowing the same version; and when the originals are in the hands of those who are its greatest enemies[b].

§ 15. 5. It is further objected, that there will be difficulties in the most literal and faithful translation of any ancient book, and in the original itself, arising from the different genius of languages; and especially if it be an oriental book, from the strong figures with which it will abound.

§ 16. *Ans.* (1.) Figurative language is not alway obscure.

(2.) It is reasonable to suppose, that if God sees fit to communicate a revelation by books, he will take care that the most important things shall be expressed in such a manner, as to be very intelligible in a literal translation.

(3.) The objection here urged would equally affect all ancient books[c].

§ 17. 6. To get clear of all these objections against a traditional revelation, some have asserted, that we may reasonably suppose, that if God communicates a revelation from age to age, every particular person will have the truth of a revelation so proposed immediately discovered to him by some divine agency

a [illegible]
[illegible]
Mant. Ant. p. 97—72.
[illegible]
[illegible]

b Mant. Ant. p. 7.
[illegible]

c [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

on his mind; though perhaps this may be an argument only for his own use.

§ 18. It cannot be denied, that such an immediate impulse on the mind of each individual is possible to divine power: but this manner of stating the case supposes the revelation to be a *personal* thing; so that those who have never experienced any thing of this kind, would probably look upon it as an enthusiastical pretence. Yet we may perhaps reasonably admit, that where men lie under great disadvantages for receiving the ordinary proofs, God may by some secret influence so dispose their minds, as that the *internal* evidence of a revelation, and its visible effects, shall produce a very strong degree of assent, though they are forced to take up with very slender *external* proofs: to which we may add, that God can if he pleases order such a correspondence between certain events in his providence, and certain impressions on the mind made in consequence of the supposed truth of a revelation, as shall greatly confirm the faith of the enquirer, and be almost equivalent to miracles wrought for his conviction; though he may not be able to make these things out fully to another. And if on the whole the belief of any revelation produces a virtuous temper, the great end of it is answered; even though the person so influenced and reformed by it may not be able to give a rational account of the grounds of this assent, or may build it upon some weak arguments[a].

§ 19. 7. On a survey of the whole argument, we must confess that a traditional revelation will be attended with some difficulties and some defects; and that those who have it, will not enjoy altogether the same advantages with those to whom the revelation was originally given: nevertheless it seems reasonable to conclude,

§ 20. (1.) That strong degrees of internal evidence, and an experience of the reforming power of any religion upon the minds of its professors, and especially on our own, will make up the deficiency of some degree of external evidence, which might otherwise be very desirable: more especially, when on the one hand it concurs with some remarkable *personal experience*, (as above § 18.) and on the other, there are no strong circumstances of suspicion attending what external evidence there is, v. g. the vices of the author of that revelation, its being first introduced by sanguinary methods, its acknowledging the want of miracles, or pretending to such as are palpably ridiculous, &c.

a Lett. to Wallace, sub fin. Christianity not founded on Arg. pass.

Dodd. Ans. No. i. præs. p. 11—32. Law's Theory, p. 18—23.

§ 21. (2.) That if God gives a traditional revelation, he will give such evidence of one kind or another, as shall be sufficient to convince every honest and candid enquirer.

§ 22. (3.) That it by no means becomes us to prescribe to God, what further degrees of evidence, beyond what is barely sufficient for this purpose, shall be given to any revelation.

§ 23. (4.) That a mixture of obscurity either in the proof or contents of a revelation may perhaps have its use; particularly to humble men's minds, and to serve as a *touch-stone*, by which their true character may be distinguished [a].

§ 24. 8. In this argument, it may be very proper to review that excellent abstract of the controversy between TINDAL and his antagonists, which is given in Main Arg. p. 77—86.

a GROT. de Verit. l. ii. c. xix. DODD. Third Lett. ibid. p. 57—59. | BUTLER's Anal. part ii. c. vi. p. 226—235. 4to.—333—344. 8vo.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

Lect. 83. § 13. *the public good* *.

* It is of some importance to observe, that "the public good" is a phrase of very equivocal import. If by it we understand extensive territory, strict independence, stationary or growing wealth, a powerful navy, a war establishment, a flourishing commerce, valour, honour, patriotism, liberty, and life, SECURED AT ALL EVENTS, and the possession of these the NATIONAL *summum bonum*, it is plain that destructive violence, or *war* may be sometimes necessary. But if we place "the public good" in righteousness, peace, virtue, industry, frugality, benevolence, justice tempered with mercy, a humble dependence on almighty providence for protection from evil, and for all needful prosperity; if these be the NATIONAL *summum bonum*, while extensive territory, strict independence, wealth, trade, commerce, liberty, and life are only *subordinate* considerations, it is equally plain that destructive violence may in no case be necessary while the end may be fully attained:—And it may deserve consideration whether these heavenly mandates are binding on collective bodies of men, even the largest nations, as well as individuals: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness, and all these things (all subordinate comforts) shall be added unto you."- "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them who despitefully use you, and persecute you."

If every event in the course of divine providence, every transaction in society, and every temporal enjoyment, be considered as only *subordinate* to *real virtue*, which is here supposed to be the true NATIONAL *summum bonum*, the *degree* in which the subordinate or secondary objects are possessed or enjoyed is cheerfully referred to the over-ruling wisdom and distributive pleasure of God, to whom such a nation would commit itself in well doing. It is not improbable that a peculiar blessing would attend a nation acting on those principles; and that prophecies will be fulfilled, and the full blessings of the gospel introduced among all nations, in that way. "Righteousness exalteth a nation"—"Who is he that shall harm a people who are followers of that which is good?"—"If men's ways please the Lord, he maketh even their enemies to be at peace with them." But where the other objects have been made the *principal*, as in all the renowned warlike empires of antiquity, and others in modern times, the proposed end *has not* been attained. Who can ascertain what *real advantage* has accrued to the Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Grecian, and Roman empires, not to mention others of later date, from having proposed to themselves such a standard of "public good" as made it necessary to employ destructive force in its support? The *evils* are but too obvious and shocking. On the other plan, states might indeed be less powerful and formidable, wealthy and splendid; but it is morally certain they would be more virtuous, and more under the protection and approving smiles of Providence. W.

Lect. 83. § 14. *end—an offensive war* *.

* The term "defensive war," though commonly used, seems to border on solecism in language, if not contradiction in terms. War implies, an "endeavour, by open violence, to hurt and destroy;" and therefore the phrase in question denotes defensive violence, defensive hurting, defensive destruction, or *defensive offence*. War is violent, hurtful, destructive, and offensive; but defence is innocent, consulting only self-preservation; warding off injury, but not returning it. Christ and his first followers used self-defence, but never warred or fought. Substitute the word *arms* for *war*, and the proper import of the term "defensive" will appear. *Defensive arms*

are such as *preserve* the person from being injured, as helmets, breast-plates, and shields; but *offensive arms* are those which are used to *injure* others, as the sword, bayonet, musket, &c. Properly speaking, persons who are only on the *defensive*, cannot be said to be in a state of *war*. W.

Lect. 83. § 19. *beginning—fully persuaded is unjust*.*

* It will easily occur to the reader, that an "unjust *war*" and an unjust *cause* are very different considerations. A man may have *justice* on his side, if simply the point of right or wrong be considered, while his *fighting* for it may be a very *unjust* thing, even on supposition that he could have *no other* mode of redress from the civil power, or were *commanded* to adopt that mode. To be "fully persuaded," therefore, that an enemy is *unjust* in his demands or provocations, cannot be a sufficient reason why fighting with him is a just thing; except it could be shewn that it is proper to fight on *every* provocation, or that *every* act of injustice ought to be punished that way. For the question would still return, what *degree* of injustice can warrant such conduct, whether on a private or public scale? Whether any degree of injustice can be greater than what Christ and his disciples endured with patience, meekness, benevolence, a forgiving temper, and intercessions for the offenders? And whether their conduct ought not to be regarded as a proper example to be imitated by all christians? W.

Lect. 83. § 19. *much greater importance*.*

* The argument of this scholium has been thought to prove too much. For on this principle virtue may require that two or more armies, provided neither of them be "fully persuaded" that the war on their side is unjust, may face each other as enemies; and, as virtue requires that an army should obey the orders of the commanding officers, so it may require that two or more armies may design, at the command of their chiefs, the destruction of each other. On the supposition, *all* fight under the banner of virtue, and may be required to charge and kill each other; that is, virtue may oppose and crush itself, which is absurd. W.

Lect. 83. § 20. *innocent subjects*.*

* The argument of this scholium proceeds on the supposition, that the refusal of an "equitable satisfaction" is a just cause of war. The necessary distinction between a cause *just* in some degree, and a cause that *justifies war*, is overlooked. However, the question returns, What is equitable? The parties differ in their views of equitable satisfaction. One observes, "Let any man coolly and impartially examine the history of the past and the present times, and say, whether *every* dispute between nations might not have been settled by negotiation, *if the parties had been so disposed.*" But suppose *one party* be so disposed, and the other not; *how much* is to be given up to prevent violence? Suppose the equitable balance in the view of one party amount to a million of money, an island, or a province; the other views the affair in negotiation perfectly equitable exclusive of the claimed balance; now the true question is, not who has *equity* on his side, but whether a million of money, an island, a province, and thereby an accession of more wealth, influence, power, or liberty; nay, more properly, whether the *chance* of gaining this be *really worth* the certain expence of money, the probable sacrifice of innocent lives, family afflictions, the cessation of industrious labour, the agitation of the public mind, and, above all, the *moral evils* ever attendant on actual war?" W.

Lect. 87. § 14. *Persecution* *.

* Persecutions are of two kinds, private and public. *Private* persecutions are the scintillations of pride, envy, hatred, malice, and false zeal, without public authority. *Public* persecutions are a fire fed by the supreme power, maintained systematically and deliberately upon principle, or legal reasons of state. They bear a similar relation to each other as partial quarrels, affrays, or combats bear to national wars. Systematic persecution attacks persons, not by a transient passion but merely as transgressors against *established rules of public good.* When the unity, honour, or supposed purity of the church is in danger; when uniformity of professed doctrine, or mode of worship is violated, and this violation is supposed to have great influence on the public temper and habits, which constitute or affect a great part of the public good; and when every thing inconsistent with it must be crushed by violence; it is a plain case, that persecution is unjustifiable only in proportion as a wrong NATIONAL *summum bonum* is adopted, and this must be SECURED AT ALL EVENTS. Confessors and martyrs prosecute an *end* which is inconsistent with what the persecuting state has fixed. Each party attains its end, respectively; the one by violence, the other by patient suffering; one obeys the *national* will, the other the apprehended *divine* will. W.

END OF THE FOURTH VOLUME

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